Le mal en deux maux

Douleur et souffrance à partir de Ricœur

Authors

  • Élodie Boissard

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2024.671

Keywords:

Ricœur, pain, suffering, philosophy of mind, functions

Abstract

This article reformulates and deepens Ricoeur's distinction between pain and suffering in the terms of contemporary philosophy of mind, so that itthe distinction can subsequently be discussed there in the its existing debate on pain. Pain and suffering are distinguished in terms of their respective evaluative dimensions, i.e., in terms of intentionality, as well as in terms of their functions, based on Ricoeur's characterization of suffering's own effects on mental activity and conduct. Our reading suggests that pain evaluates the harmful character of a bodily state or situation, while suffering evaluates the prima facie unjustifiable character of the harm suffered. The former has a practical function: to motivate us to preserve ourselves from that which harms us. The second has an epistemic function: to motivate us to question the moral imputation of the harm suffered, and the reasons that might justify it.

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Published

2024-12-20

Issue

Vol. 15 No. 2 (2024)

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2024 Élodie Boissard

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