Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies

Introduction à « Discours, métaphysique, et herméneutique du soi » de Paul Ricœur

Samuel Lelièvre — 2024-12-20

When examining the relationship of Ricoeur’s philosophy to the field of ontology and metaphysics, a text entitled “Discourse, metaphysics and the hermeneutics of the self” may attract attention as it provides useful and meaningful insights. This text is a reworking of a better-known text, “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993), but remains different by focusing on analyses relating to an ontology and metaphysics of human action and agency, and considers the speculative structure of a hermeneutics of the self constituted since Oneself as Another (1990). Originating from a conference held at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain) in 1993 and 1995, this text was first published in 1998 in the proceedings of that conference; the present version aims at making it accessible again and improving its editorial form.

Introduction to “Discourse, Metaphysics, and Hermeneutics of the Self” by Paul Ricoeur

Samuel Lelièvre — 2024-12-20

« Discours, métaphysique, et herméneutique du soi » de Paul Ricœur

Samuel Lelièvre — 2024-12-20

“Discourse, Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954) – translated as Being, Essence and Substance in Plato and Aristotle (2013) –, up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale – translated into English as “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” (1996) –, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research.

"Discourse, Metaphysics, and Hermeneutics of the Self" by Paul Ricœur

Samuel Lelièvre — 2024-12-20

“Discourse, Metaphysics ,and Hermeneutics of the Self” deals with the connection between the hermeneutics of the self, as constituted in the ethical-anthropological framework of Oneself as Another (1990), and Ricoeur’s conception of a metaphysics of human agency as developed within this period of his work. It relates to his inquiries in the fields of ontology and metaphysics, from the lectures entitled Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (1953-1954) – translated as Being, Essence and Substance in Plato and Aristotle (2013)—, up to “De la métaphysique à la morale” (1993) published in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale – translated into English as “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” (1996)—, via the article “Ontologie” (1972) for Encyclopaedia Universalis, the last chapter of The Rule of Metaphor (1975), and the first section of the conclusions to the third volume of Time and Narrative (1985). Ricœur aims at determining a specific kind of philosophical discourse as a common ground for the perspectives stemming from a hermeneutic phenomenology and from a more speculative ontological-metaphysical research.

Paul Ricœur and Metaphysics

Barnabas Aspray — 2024-12-20

In twentieth-century France, the word “metaphysics” had connotations of closed systems which claimed certainty for themselves. As a result, few dared to engage in metaphysical speculation. Ricœur, however, rejected this prevalent definition because he believed it came from Heidegger’s procrustean reading of the history of philosophy. While agreeing that certainty and closure were neither desirable nor possible, Ricœur did make metaphysical claims. Following Jaspers’s revival of pre-modern apophatic metaphysics for which transcendence cannot be comprehended, Ricœur, in his early work, argued for “critical realism” against neo-Kantian idealism, “original affirmation” against Sartrean negativity, and the “metaphysical choice” of human freedom’s consent to the unchosen features of reality.

The Ontology of Actuality and Potentiality as a Way for a Speculative Approach to the Aporetics of Time

Esteban Lythgoe — 2024-12-20

In this article we will show the process that allowed Ricœur to apply the Aristotelian ontology of actuality and potentiality to his hermeneutics, and how this development ended up providing him with a speculative solution to the aporetics of time. We will distinguish two alternative solutions: the poetic solution, given in Time and Narrative and the speculative one, developed in Memory, History, Forgetting. Despite the importance of the existential analytic, we believe that the introduction of the Spinozian conatus was decisive for Ricoeur’s change of perspective.

The Excellence Award at the Fonds Ricœur’s Summer Workshop 2024

Sara Rocca — 2024-12-20

This paper assesses the possibility of interpreting Ricœur’s notion of representation as a form of Darstellung in the Kantian sense of exhibition (presentation). The aim is to emphasize the ontological significance of representation as Darstellung, through the consideration of the paradigmatic case of historical representations. Indeed, the necessity to adequately interpret the relationship between representation and the represented becomes more compelling when dealing with the representation of history. On the one hand, history becomes objective insofar as it is depicted in historical representations, but on the other, this depiction remains the presentation of an underlying reality that demands to be spoken of. The notion of Darstellung thus helps ensure the demand of historical representations to stand for past reality, without being reduced to mere copies of a supposedly pre-given original. This allows for a transition from the epistemological reflection upon historical representations to the ontological consideration of historicity as such.

Recension. Pierre-Olivier Monteil, Penser l’imagination avec Ricœur. Raviver la société pétrifiée (Paris : Hermann, coll. « Le Bel aujourd’hui », 2024), 184 p.

Jean-Philippe Pierron — 2024-12-20

Recension. Luz Ascarate, Imaginer selon Paul Ricœur. La phénoménologie à la rencontre de l’ontologie sociale (Paris : Hermann, 2022), 281 p.

Cristina Stoianovici — 2024-12-20

Recension. Francesca D’Alessandris, La persona e la traccia. Ipotesi sull’esistenza e il suo racconto a partire da Paul Ricœur (Pisa : Edizioni ETS, 2023), 208 p.

Monica Gorza — 2024-12-20

Introduction. La place de la souffrance dans la pensée de Ricœur

Astrid Chevance — 2024-12-20

In Paul Ricœur's thought, suffering is primarily addressed from an existential and phenomenological perspective, as illustrated in the text of the lecture "Suffering is not Pain," delivered to an audience of psychiatrists. In this thematic issue, we present the very first English translation of this text. The contributions of the various authors explore Ricœur's definition of suffering as well as the dialogue he establishes between the philosophical and clinical approaches. By tracing the genealogy of suffering in Ricœur's systematic work, this introduction highlights the conceptual shifts resulting from methodological changes, notably the transition from eidetic phenomenology to a hermeneutic phenomenology with ontological implications, along with the plurality of his motivations and interests (psychoanalytic, theological). Suffering, as the negativity of existence, while exposed to the risk of a solipsistic affect, nonetheless unfolds a unique semiology, in an openness to the other, which Ricœur inquires in "Suffering is not Pain."

Introduction. The Place of Suffering in Ricœur’s Thought

Astrid Chevance — 2024-12-20

"Suffering is Not Pain" by Paul Ricœur

Astrid Chevance — 2024-12-20

In 1992, Ricœur delivered his lecture, "Suffering is Not Pain," at a psychiatry colloquium, addressing clinicians eager to explore this profound human experience, which is notably absent from the traditional psychiatric corpus. Ricœur examined the semiology of suffering through three moments: the specific relationship between oneself and the other, the characterization of a diminution in the power to act, and, finally, a hermeneutic reflection on suffering as an enigma that has something to teach—both at the level of self-reflection on one’s own existence and in the context of relationships with others. It thus appears that suffering can open the way to a hermeneutic of the symbols of human existence, whose meaningful manifestations can also be clinical. However, this text does not belong to Ricœur’s systematic work. To understand its significance this annotated translation accompanied by its explanatory introduction, allows for a detailed reading that considers the intertextual references and the meanings implied by Ricœur’s expressions. By integrating clinical and philosophical language, this translation acknowledges the importance of multi- and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of suffering.

Ricœur’s Practical Philosophy of Suffering in Medicine: a Contextualization of “Suffering is Not Pain” with Other Peripheral Works

Astrid Chevance — 2024-12-20

Contextualizing Ricœur’s lecture “Suffering is Not Pain” alongside his other peripheral works on the matter uncovers a “practical philosophy,” that could provide new perspectives for clinicians faced with suffering. The analysis unfolds in four stages. First, it examines Ricœur’s interest in dialoguing with psychiatry to nourish his philosophical work. Second, it highlights Ricœur’s contributions as a third party to help psychiatrists overcome some major issues at that time. Third, it contextualizes the topic of suffering within the prevailing medical views at that time, and their corresponding issues in clinical practice. Finally, it delineates three principles for an applied ethics of suffering; namely, the need to dissociate suffering from any moral justification, approaching the therapeutic relationship as an alliance, and a minimal recognition that patients endure despite the damages suffering inflict on the self-other axis, to preserve their dignity.

La place de la clinique dans « La souffrance n’est pas la douleur » de Paul Ricœur

Martin Dumont — 2024-12-20

This essay tries to underline the original position, sometimes hidden, sometimes not recognized by the author himself, that Paul Ricoeur attributes to psychiatric clinical experience in his lecture “Suffering is not pain”. Ricoeur first seems to separate markedly medical and philosophical phenomenological discourses, each having to separate objects and methods. But in many instances, some quite decisive, Ricoeur is compelled to dive into clinical experience in order to inform his phenomenology of suffering. He then seems to point at the necessity of an authentic clinical philosophy, ultimately attentive to the paramount role of pain in any suffering.

Le mal en deux maux

Élodie Boissard — 2024-12-20

This article reformulates and deepens Ricoeur's distinction between pain and suffering in the terms of contemporary philosophy of mind, so that itthe distinction can subsequently be discussed there in the its existing debate on pain. Pain and suffering are distinguished in terms of their respective evaluative dimensions, i.e., in terms of intentionality, as well as in terms of their functions, based on Ricoeur's characterization of suffering's own effects on mental activity and conduct. Our reading suggests that pain evaluates the harmful character of a bodily state or situation, while suffering evaluates the prima facie unjustifiable character of the harm suffered. The former has a practical function: to motivate us to preserve ourselves from that which harms us. The second has an epistemic function: to motivate us to question the moral imputation of the harm suffered, and the reasons that might justify it.

Pain and Suffering: In Conversation with Paul Ricœur

Jennifer Corns — 2024-12-20

In this contribution, I focus on three key questions that arise when engaging with Ricœur’s lecture, “Suffering is Not Pain.” The first is the methodological issue concerning the philosopher’s role, particularly in taxonomizing. I will examine mental taxonomy, as well as taxonomy more broadly, before turning to pain and suffering more specifically. I then move to Ricœur’s characterization and contrast of suffering and pain throughout the lecture. Following this, I expand on Ricœur’s definition of suffering as a diminution of the power to act by incorporating my own account of suffering as a significant disruption to agency. I explore how this expanded view can contribute to a deeper investigation of Ricœur’s agentive hypothesis of suffering within each of his three identified “moments” of suffering, thus enhancing our understanding of the specific agentive challenge that suffering represents.

Applying Ricœur’s Model of Suffering to Negative Non-Primarily Physical Experiences Not Called “Suffering” in Everyday Language

Charlotte Geindre — 2024-12-20

This article explores the application of Paul Ricœur’s model of suffering to negative experiences (termed here “para-suffering”), such as a hint of disappointment or a slight envy, which are not named suffering in everyday language, since the term is reserved for worse experiences. The analysis of a para-suffering example shows that a para-suffering experience can unfold within several of Ricœur’s figures of suffering. The implications of what should be regarded, at the very least, as significant commonalities between para-suffering and suffering are then examined: caution is necessary in using Ricœur’s definition of suffering, suffering benefits from being analyzed in comparison with para-suffering, and para-suffering deserves greater philosophical attention. Although it is neither physical pain nor suffering, it remains a crucial part of human negative experiences.

The Flesh of Stories of Pain and Suffering

István Fazakas — 2024-12-20

The paper explores the difference between semiology and hermeneutics of pain and suffering by focusing on narrativity and the body. First, it recapitulates some historical distinctions between explaining and understanding in the context of psychopathology. It shows how the hermeneutic method culminates in the idea of the cohesion of life, constituted through biography and narrative. The second section deals with the relationship between narrativity and selfhood in stories of suffering. The third part addresses the problem of the lived body and the ante-predicative embodiment of suffering and pain, which fuse with the ambiance, coloring the lifeworld.

Intolérable tolérance

Serge Margel — 2024-12-20

After distinguishing between suffering, which is always subjective, reflexive and narrative, and pain, which is always localized in the body, Ricoeur approaches suffering from two angles: on the one hand, as an alteration in the relationship to oneself and to others, and on the other, as a reduction in the power to act. On this basis, this study will attempt to show that suffering is a question of power. A suffering being is a living being who can suffer. The subject is a being who can suffer its suffering, tolerate it, endure it. To suffer is to experience a reduction in one's power to act and think. It means losing one's power, until one can no longer suffer or tolerate one's suffering.