Applying Ricœur’s Model of Suffering to Negative Non-Primarily Physical Experiences Not Called “Suffering” in Everyday Language

Autores

  • Charlotte Geindre Sorbonne Université

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2024.673

Palavras-chave:

Ricœur, suffering, unpleasantness, distress, emotions

Resumo

This article explores the application of Paul Ricœur’s model of suffering to negative experiences (termed here “para-suffering”), such as a hint of disappointment or a slight envy, which are not named suffering in everyday language, since the term is reserved for worse experiences. The analysis of a para-suffering example shows that a para-suffering experience can unfold within several of Ricœur’s figures of suffering. The implications of what should be regarded, at the very least, as significant commonalities between para-suffering and suffering are then examined: caution is necessary in using Ricœur’s definition of suffering, suffering benefits from being analyzed in comparison with para-suffering, and para-suffering deserves greater philosophical attention. Although it is neither physical pain nor suffering, it remains a crucial part of human negative experiences.

Referências

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2024-12-20

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