# The Excellence Award at the 2023 edition of the Fonds Ricœur's Summer Workshop – "Another in Oneself: Hybridity of the narrative identity and followability as narrative hospitality for others"

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## Abstract

The following article investigates the hybridity of narrative identity. It explores how idem-identity and the ipse-identity interrelate through time and otherness and illustrates the process of self's reflexive re-cognition via others. It posits that narrative identity encompasses both private and public dimensions, requiring a co-authorship that integrates collective identities. This article argues for an ethical dimension to this identity, emphasizing the reciprocal movement between self and other. It introduces the concept of followability, which involves reconstructing narratives in a resonance relationship, fostering narrative hospitality and mutual transformation. The study concludes by proposing an eschatological perspective as a horizon for followability, enhancing narrative refiguration through future-oriented imagination.

Keywords : narrative identity; followability; resonance; co-authorship; narrative hospitality

## Résumé

Cet article examine l'hybridité de l'identité narrative. Il explore comment l'identité-idem et l'identité-ipse entrent en relation mutuelle à travers le temps et l'altérité et illustre le processus de reconnaissance réflexive de soi via les autres. Il postule que l'identité narrative englobe à la fois des dimensions privées et publiques, nécessitant une co-auteurisation qui intègre les identités collectives. Cet article plaide en faveur de la dimension éthique de cette identité, en mettant l'accent sur le mouvement réciproque entre soi et l'autre. Il fait appel au concept de « followability », qui implique la reconstruction des récits dans une relation de résonance et favorise l'hospitalité narrative ainsi que la transformation mutuelle. L'étude conclut en proposant une perspective eschatologique comme horizon de cette « followability », susceptible de renforcer la refiguration narrative par le biais d'une imagination tournée vers l'avenir.

Mots-clés : identité narrative ; « followability » ; résonance ; co-auteurisation ; hospitalité narrative

The paper that won the Excellence Award at the 2023 edition of the Fonds Ricœur's Summer Workshop is published below.

Since 2017, the Fonds Ricœur's Summer Workshops, which take place in Paris during the month of June, have been co-organized by the Fonds Ricœur and the Society for Ricœur Studies. Each year the workshop is dedicated to a specific work by Paul Ricœur on which the presentations and discussions are based.

In 2019, the Fondation Goélands[1] launched an Excellence Award which is given annually to the best paper presented at the Summer Workshop. The winner receives 1,000 euros and, within six months of the Summer Workshop, his or her paper is published in the "Varia" section of the journal *Études ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies*.

All *doctoral* or *post-doctoral* researchers selected to present a paper at a particular Summer Workshop and who wish to apply are eligible for this prize. The paper can be presented in either French or English and its length must correspond to the 20-25 minutes allowed for the oral presentation at the Summer Workshop.

The Jury's criteria of evaluation for the Summer Workshops' Excellence Award are as follows:

1. As the Fonds Ricœur's Summer Workshop focuses each year on a specific work by Paul Ricœur, the Jury favours contributions that place this work at the centre of their reflection;

2. The Jury then assesses the scientific quality of the papers in terms of their precision, their argumentative rigour, and their mastery of the secondary literature on the subject;

3. Lastly, the Jury particularly values the originality of the contributions, that is, their specific contribution to Ricœurian research and the novelty of the theses put forward.


In 2023, the 6th edition of the Fonds Ricœur's Summer Workshop was organized by Azadeh Thiriez Arjangi and Cristina Vendra, and was dedicated to *Oneself as Another*.

The Jury of the Excellence Award was comprised of Annemie Halsema, Feriel Kandil, Hsueh-I-Chen, Fernando Nascimento and was chaired by Jean-Luc Amalric.

The winner of the Excellence Award in 2023 is: Dr. Jonghyuk Chang – Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Theologische Fakultät**.**

The title of his paper was: "Another in Oneself: Hybridity of the narrative identity and followability as narrative hospitality for others".

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[1] Housed by the Fondation pour l'enfance, an officially recognized non-profit organization, the Fondation Goélands is dedicated to two causes: the fight against genetic diseases (funding studies and research projects) and support for young high school students and underprivileged students (awarding grants and financing equipment, etc.).

Nous publions ci-dessous le texte du lauréat du Prix d'excellence de l'édition 2023 des Ateliers d'été du Fonds Ricœur.

Depuis 2017, les Ateliers d'été du Fonds Ricœur sont co-organisés durant le mois de juin à Paris par le Fonds Ricœur et la *Society for Ricœur Studies*. Chaque année, l'atelier est consacré à une œuvre spécifique de Paul Ricœur sur laquelle portent les contributions et les discussions.

En 2019, la fondation Goélands[2] a lancé un prix d'excellence qui récompense chaque année la meilleure communication présentée lors de l'Atelier d'été. La lauréate ou le lauréat se voit remettre une somme de 1 000 euros et, dans les six mois qui suivent l'Atelier d'été, son texte est publié dans la rubrique « Varia » de la revue *Études ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies*.

Sont éligibles à ce prix toutes les chercheuses et tous les chercheurs en doctorat ou post-doctorat admis à présenter une communication à l'édition des Ateliers d'été, et qui souhaitent candidater. La communication peut se faire en français comme en anglais et sa longueur doit être conforme à la durée de 20-25 minutes accordée à la présentation orale lors de l'Atelier d'été.

Les critères d'évaluation du jury concernant le prix d'excellence des Ateliers d'été sont les suivants :

1. L'atelier d'été du Fonds Ricœur portant chaque année sur une œuvre spécifique de Paul Ricœur, le jury privilégie les contributions qui placent cette œuvre au centre de leur réflexion ;

2. Il apprécie ensuite la qualité scientifique des communications proposées : c'est-à-dire leur précision, leur rigueur argumentative et leur maîtrise éventuelle de la littérature secondaire concernant le sujet abordé ;

3. Il valorise enfin tout particulièrement l'originalité des contributions, c'est-à-dire leur apport spécifique à la recherche ricœurienne et la nouveauté des thèses avancées.


En 2023, la sixième édition des Ateliers d'été du Fonds Ricœur était organisée par Azadeh Thiriez Arjangi et Cristina Vendra et elle était consacrée à *Soi-même comme un autre*.

Le jury du prix d'excellence était composé de Annemie Halsema, Feriel Kandil, Hsueh-I-Chen, Fernando Nascimento et présidé par Jean-Luc Amalric.

Le lauréat 2023 est : Dr Jonghyuk Chang – Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Theologische Fakultät.

**Le titre de sa communication était le suivant** : « Another in Oneself: Hybridity of the narrative identity and followability as narrative hospitality for others ».

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[2] Abritée par la Fondation pour l'enfance, reconnue d'utilité publique, la fondation Goélands se dédie à deux causes : la lutte contre les maladies génétiques (financement d'études ou de projets de recherche) et l'accompagnement de jeunes lycéens et étudiants défavorisés (octroi de bourses, financement d'équipements, etc.).

# Another in Oneself: Hybridity of the narrative identity and followability as narrative hospitality for others

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## I.        Narrative identity as a mixture of idem and ipse

The ego is nobody when it has not the concrete content of lived time. The self-reflecting ego is an uprooted subject, facing all of its contents while being detached from all spatio-temporal points of reference associated with its own body. This punctiform and unhistorical subject is nothing but the reduced act of thought. This identity of sameness, which implies immutability over time, is an idem-identity that corresponds to the reidentification of the same in differences.[3]

As the opposite of idem-identity, Ricœur designates ipse-identity, which does not imply any determination related to permanence but refers to change in strangeness or otherness. Ipse-identity corresponds to a dynamic structure of narrativity based on temporal structure. Ricœur uses the example of Rembrandt's various self-portraits to show that it is not one's sameness that constitutes one's self, but one's belonging to someone who has the capacity to relate to oneself.[4]

While idem identity corresponds to a re-identification of the same, ipse identity corresponds to the identity of differences. According to Ricœur, these two identities are dialectically related. When we see three different self-portraits of Rembrandt, we don't say that there are three Rembrandts, we talk about one and the same Rembrandt. This one and only Rembrandt corresponds to identification understood as the reidentification of the same as numerical identity. Meanwhile, the young, adult, and old Rembrandt correspond to a sense of identity of differences as qualitative identity.[5] Ipse identity is neither a stable nor unbroken identity, but rather fragile and vulnerable one due to its openness to differences.[6]

For Ricœur, these two ideas are not external to each other. Ipse-identity serves as an indirect criterion for idem-identity when the reidentification of the same becomes doubtful. When a single explanation is insufficient to understand someone's entire life, more detailed reasoning processes are required.[7] Ricœur thus proposes a path that blends characteristics of permanence and change, constructing the context of identity through the mediation of narrative.[8] Narrative identity is the process of becoming a subject that makes sense of life.

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[3] Paul Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996), 16-7. Cf. Paul Ricœur, *Vom Text zur Person*, 219.

[4] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 159.

[5] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 144-5.

[6] Paul Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3 (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1991), 396-9.

[7] Paul Ricœur, *Narrative Identity*, 1991, 74.

[8] Ricœur, *Vom Text zur Person*, 219.

## II.     Narrativity of the self: telling oneself through others

The sequence of episodes that happen in our lives is "the story not yet told." These experiences remain as fragments that must be composed into a story. To be able to narrate, one must reflexively recognize oneself because telling a story is always re-telling, and this re-telling always involves re-cognition of the self. As Ricœur mentioned in *Time and Narrative*, taking over a subject means becoming responsible for oneself.[9]  But the narrative is not only about being responsible for oneself; it is also about being responsible for others due to the unique characteristic of the hybridity of the "self."

First, we can find the problem of recognizing the hybrid self in Augustine's *Confessions*. Ricoeur stresses the re-cognition of the self through the other, in that Augustine recognizes himself in his memory differently when the Word of God instructs him.[10] Augustine reinterprets himself by re-cognizing himself in memory. His self is recognized through the awakening Word of God, and his identity is re-figured by reinterpretation of the story. In this case, recognition of the Word of God leads to reinterpretation of his memory and refiguration of his self. Re-cognition of otherness results in re-cognition of oneself, in that the place of re-cognition of others is "in" oneself.

In Husserl's notion of remembering, we can also find the reflexive form of re-telling oneself.[11] In remembering, the present (presentation as sameness) and the remembered present (representation as otherness) intersect through the overlap of duplicated intentionality.[12] The present intentionality becomes "second" intentionality through the parallel flow of the "first" intentionality in the remembered stream of experience.[13]  It is an interesting point that the present intentionality of sameness takes a secondary position when the remembered present of otherness emerges "in" my present. Doesn't that imply a receptive hospitality of the ego to the other? That is, the ego takes the second place of presentation, and the representation as the other of the presentation takes the first place. The present intentionality of the ego should follow the flow of the re-presentation of otherness, which is located within me.

In this hybrid crossover of ego and other, the reflexive form of "telling oneself" highlights the narrativity of the self, which escapes the dilemma of the sameness of oneself and the otherness of another. The self recognizes itself indirectly through the mediation of otherness.[14] In this way, the sameness of oneself changes to self-same, and the otherness of another changes to self-other. The narrative identity emerges from the dialectic of identity (of idem and ipse) and alterity (of ipse and other).

## III.     Hybrid co-authorship of narrative identity

In that narrative identity is identity confronted with alterity, not only private identity but also public identity is in demand for narrative identity. Narrative identity asks the "who?" of the plot as the

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[9] Paul Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1 (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1988), 118.

[10] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1, 51.

[11] Paul Ricœur, *Wege der Anerkennung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 120-1, 125.

[12] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 46. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), Hua X* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 43.

[13] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 53-9.

[14] Ricœur, *Vom Text zur Person*, 222.

figure of the story. As Ricœur refers to in *Time and Narrative,* society can be considered a quasi-figure (subject) of history, while individuals are characters (figures) of the story. Societal entities are regarded as figures in history as a form of narrative, in that these entities exist as the first order of participation, where individuals belong.[15]  This means that narrative identity can be applied to both individuals and communities. In fact, individuals and communities constitute themselves in their identity by receiving certain narratives, which then become their actual history.[16]

While the narrative identity of an individual comes from the sphere of individual memory, the narrative identity of a community arises from the history of cultures and mentalities. Each life story intermingles with those of others, and this entanglement in stories can be observed at the collective level of identity. As Charles Taylor argues, this collective dimension of identity is oriented by a framework of "strong evaluation", which stands unquestioned and guides us in following the meaning of life. According to Taylor, not having a framework leads to a life that is "spiritually senseless" because a framework is what allows us to make spiritual sense of our lives.[17]  In this sense, we can consider collective memory as a collective narrative, a passive synthesis that precedes the active synthesis of individual narrative. Before we configure our narrative from memory, collective memory is already given as the horizon of our configuration. Symbolic embodiment plays an important role in the function of collective memory because of its spontaneity, which commands our ability to confer sense on experience even before we reflect on it.[18]

Alasdair McIntyre mentions that individuals in a historical community never start literally *ab initio*; they plunge *in medias res*, with the beginnings of their story already made for them by what and who has gone before. The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives.[19]  In *In Geschichten verstrickt*, Wilhelm Schapp argues that I am always entangled (*mitverstrickt*) in the other's story at the same time, and just as being-entangled (*Verstricktsein*) would be misinterpreted as knowledge of one's own history, being-entangled-in-others (*das Mitverstricktsein*) could again be misinterpreted as knowledge of someone else's history, in that everyone is deeply interconnected with each other as "we."[20]  This notion of "being-entangled-in-others" (*das Mitverstricktsein*) parallels the

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[15] In Husserl's genetic phenomenology, this societal constitution is on the higher level of the intermonadological community: "Rather in the sense of a human community and of the human being, who already as an individual carries with him the sense of a community member, there is a reciprocal-being-for-one-another, that entails an objectifying equality of my existence and that of everyone else: i.e. I and everyone as one human being among other human beings." E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Parisier Vorträge, Hua I* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 157-8.

[16] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 397.

[17] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 14-8.

[18] At the deepest level, memory is involved in identity formation through its narrative function. The ideologization of memory is made possible by the narrative monopolies of the powerful, as history becomes a practiced memory that is enforced. In this case, the imposed narrative serves as the collective identity for discourse of justification for power and domination. According to Ricœur, reflection must be more complex and located on a higher level through the collective identities than the identity as selfhood of the individual subjects of action. See Ricœur, *Wege der Anerkennung*, 138, 180. Cf. Paul Ricœur, *Gedächtnis, Geschichte, Vergessen* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004), 131-7.

[19] Alasdair McIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 215-8.

[20] Wilhelm Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), 85-7.

Husserlian notion of "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*), which is already given (*vorgegeben*) as a horizon of our sense where we all belong together as a "we-subject" and cannot go behind it.[21]

The individual constitutes their life story through a series of rectifications made on previous narratives of a collective.[22] In *Time and Narrative*, Ricœur provides the example of the history of the community of biblical Israel, which became a historical community only by telling itself stories as its own founding history. It is through the reception and telling of the story that the narrative identity of the Jewish people as a historical community emerges. The historical community that calls itself the Jewish people created its identity from the reception of the texts that it produced itself. The narrative identity of both individuals and communities exists within this chain of refiguration of the hermeneutic circle.[23]

Narrative identity exists in the middle place between two boundaries: At the lower boundary, permanence in time consists of the dialectic between idem-identity (identity of sameness) and ipse-identity (identity of differences). For Ricœur, idem-identity is the character of a person, determined as the uninterrupted continuity through re-identification over time. However, this idem-identity of character is also an "acquired identification" with values in others, which one re-cognizes and re-identifies in others (in person and in community). In that sense, the sameness of character is also connected with selfhood and is inseparable from the identity of a historical community. That is why Ricœur calls the character a "contraction" (in the double sense of reduction and affection), in which the story is contracted.[24]

At the upper boundary, ipse exists without the support of idem. Ricœur finds the permanence of selfhood without the support of sameness in the model of the word kept. Keeping a word is a negation of the change of time since I stay true to my spoken word despite my changeable inclinations. The constancy of the self in the word kept has an ethical aspect because this keeping of the word corresponds to the trust that the other places in my fidelity. Ricœur modifies the Heideggerian concept of the constancy of the self (*Selbst-Ständigkeit*) by arguing that the keeping of the given word does not need to be placed in the horizon of being-toward-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*) but should be situated on the dialogical and ethical level of living-together (*Miteinander-leben*).[25]

Narrative identity oscillates between the lower and upper boundaries. Here, the problem arises that selfhood at the upper boundary is supposed to confront its fragility. Unlike individual identity at the lower boundary (within the dialectic of selfhood and sameness), the hybrid and intersubjective identity at the upper boundary (within the dialectic of selfhood and otherness) should be constituted together due to the social characteristic of the "word kept." For the constitution of narrative identity, selfhood returns to its sameness (ego) to give meaning to alterity. The question arises at this point

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[21] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), 117. Cf. 119. "dass die Welt ist, immer im voraus ist, und dass jede Korrektur einer Meinung, einer erfahrenden oder sonstigen Meinung, schon seiende Welt voraussetzt, nämlich als einen Horizont von jeweils unzweifelhaft Seiend-Geltendem, und darin irgendeinen Bestand von Bekannten und zweifellos Gewissem, mit dem das ev. Als nichtig Entwertete in Widerspruch trat."

[22] Ricœur, *Wege der Anerkennung*, 137.

[23] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 398.

[24] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 144-152.

[25] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 153-4.

whether narrative identity itself is fundamentally egocentric in the process of configuring episodes.[26] Even the collective version of narrative identity can be egocentric if a certain group, as the quasi-author of the story, excludes the story of another group.

The constancy of self (*Selbst-Ständigkeit*) is not about keeping one's authenticity or originality but about keeping one's word to the other, whose "self" is posited co-authentically and co-originally as my "self." In this sense, the notion of the constancy of self should be considered at the level of communicative intersubjectivity. In this respect, narrative identity not only oscillates "in" the boundary between self-same and self-other, but also between self-as-other and other-as-self, because narrative identity is a hybrid identity that exists "on" the boundary. Narrative identity is more about the process of refiguration of the self, which finds its constancy in relation to "living together."

As Ricœur states, we are the narrator and character of the story, not the author. We are authors only in the sense that we are co-authors of the story.[27] Although my life can be conceived as a singular entity of mine, it does not have the value of a narrative beginning. The memory (and its narrative) of early childhood and my birth belong to the story of my parents and others. After my death, the story of my life belongs to the narrative of my children and others. The criterion of the end as a "sense of an ending" is absent for my life.[28] My narrative identity regarding memory is a retrospective teleology, moving from the past to the present, but my life in the present is still narratively unfinished in relation to the future. I don't own the final version of my story. In that sense, narrative unfinishedness should be oriented by communicative intersubjectivity, which presupposes the mutual relation of the self-as-other and other-as-self in the common dimension of history as a collective singular.

For the mutual relation between oneself and another, Ricœur crosses the Husserlian movement of ego on alter ego with the Levinasian movement of another on oneself. The Husserlian ego (sameness) initiates the capacity for receptivity of alterity, which constitutes the movement of the ego on the other. As Husserl mentioned, the passive synthesis of perception is not in contradictory opposition to activity but is the synthesizing act of the subject. Husserl notes that the subject's apprehension is an act of receptivity, an intentionality directed towards the self-givenness of an object. In this sense, intentionality is being directed toward intentional experiences. What precedes the subject's receptive action is an affection that constitutes the "awakening" of the ego.[29]

In this framework, Levinas emphasizes the initiative of the other's request, which constitutes the movement of the other onto the self. Through this reciprocal movement of ego and other, the crossing point of self-same and self-other emerges, forming the basis of the exchange of giving and receiving in a friendly relationship.[30] The other "awakens" my ego, fostering a mutual relationship grounded in communicative intersubjectivity.[31]

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[26] François Dosse, *Paul Ricœur, les sens d'une vie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), 545.

[27] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 196.

[28] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 197.

[29] Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, Hua XI* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 75-6.

[30] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 229.

[31] "… aber Weckung besagt eben zugleich das Entspringen einer Richtungssynthese, in der die eine Vorstellung 'hinrichtend' ist und die Gegenvorstellung demgemäß in sich gerichtet ist, oder in der das eine Vorgestellte

The selfhood takes place at the point of mediation where Husserlian intentionality of the normative ("Here I stand") and Levinasian reversed intentionality of the accusative ("Here, see me") intersect, creating a communicative exchange of intentionality. In this communicative relation, the "awakened" ego transforms into self-same, and the "requesting" other transforms into self-other. The "self" encompasses all persons in this communicative relationship, circulating between all pronouns.[32] It can be attributed to my-self and to your-self as well, as conversation is an interplay of attribution between the first person and the second person, sharing the "self" as a crossing point between the two. The recognition of the self and the recognition of the other are equally original, and the being-recognized of the self and of the other are also equally original. Ricœur discusses that the Husserlian concept of "corrective appresentation" combines the similarity and asymmetry of the other. The other is not a stranger in this appresentation but a fellow human being like me.[33]

Due to its open structure, a subject exists in hybridity, insofar as the subject proves to be a place of impure intersections, combinations, interrelated differences, and referrals.[34] As Husserl's analysis of passive synthesis shows, one's self-identification does not succeed through the negation of the other but is only possible through the other. This problematic of the hybridity of the subject thrusts us toward an ethical dimension of the 'self'. Burkhard Liebsch rightly notes that the question of the self in Ricœur implies an ethical topography. According to Liebsch, the constitution of the meaning of the self is to be understood entirely in terms of the other, by whom it experiences itself as infiltrated and haunted, but also inspired and enriched, in ambiguous, disparate, and by no means uniformly denominable experiences.[35] At this point, Ricœur argues that Heideggerian "Je-meinigkeit" is in a way implied in selfhood, in that the transition from selfhood to Je-meinigkeit is marked by the formula "je" (every time). Ricœur raises the problem that this "je" is based on the unspoken reference to the other, since self does not mean I, but points out the subject on the way of constitution through the I-and-Thou relationship.[36]

## IV.    Followability as narrative hospitality for others: Another *in* oneself

The problem of narrative identity lies in the fact that the hostile other exists at most as an adversarial figure in my story, but not as a co-author. Then my selfhood must be deactivated to the extent that the narrative of the other is silenced, and the co-positing of the *alter ego* is thus excluded. Without recognition of the other, recognition of the self is not attainable. The exclusion of the *alter ego* results in the deposition (*Absetzung*) of my ego. Hegel's idea of being-recognized (*Anerkanntsein*) implies the fulfillment of the work of recognition, where the outcome of recognition is accomplished in being recognized. For Hegel, to be recognized means to exclude the exclusion itself and to reach reconciliation.

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charakterisiert ist als *terminus a quo*, das andere als *terminus a quem* ... Es sind Synthesen, die nicht das Ich aktiv gestiftet hat, sondern die in reiner Passivität sich herstellen und sich selbst dann herstellen können, wenn die in Verbindung tretenden einzelnen Erlebnisse in der Aktivität des Ich entsprungen sind." (Cf. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, Hua XI*, 75-6.)

[32] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 408-9.

[33] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 400-2.

[34] Andreas Reckwitz, *Das hybride Subjekt* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2020), 33.

[35] Bukhard Liebsch, *Hermeneutik des Selbst – Im Zeichen des Anderen, Zur Philosophie Paul Ricœurs* (München: Fink, 1999), 15-22.

[36] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 220.

In this respect, being-recognized is, for Hegel, the spiritual element that teleologically points to the whole of humanity.[37]

If history is a collective singular, as Ricœur argues, the oscillation of narrative identity between the lower boundary of the dialectic of sameness and selfhood and the upper boundary of the dialectic of self and other is not to be closed by my self-same, but to be kept open by the dialogical dimension of self and others. This openness allows for the transformation of this oscillation into a spiral forward movement toward the reconciliation of self and other in equal co-position (*Mitsetzung*) of living together.

In *Du texte à l'action*, Ricœur draws the dialectic of identity and alterity, which in Husserl enables the analogical interpretation of the combination of *ego* and *alter ego*. According to Husserl, the *alter ego* does not appear in the continuity of the appearance of the *ego,* but is presented as a second pure subject to which a soul (*Seelisches*) belongs. His soul as *for-itself* (*Für-sich-Sein*) cannot be perceived by me, since the *alter ego*, like my *ego*, is also posited in its own zero point. His soul does not belong to my field of experience. Therefore, the experience of the other should be interpreted analogically.[38] That is why Ricœur emphasizes the imagination, which conveys the transference of the *ego* to *the alter ego* through expression (or fiction, culture etc.) of the other. In this analogic transference we can find the metaphorical transition that the other is *like me*. The other is like me, even if he is not my neighbor, especially if he is my distant one.[39] Nevertheless, the analogic transference of *ego* to *alter ego* can remain egocentric when we stick with the Husserlian direction from *ego* to *alter ego*. As mentioned above, the dialogue of oneself and another is rather about a Levinasian direction from which the self is called into life as responding to the other.

This receptive action of 'being drawn to responsibility' in *Oneself as Another* parallels the receptive action of 'being affected by the past' in *Time and Narrative*.[40] In *Time and Narrative*, Ricœur suggests that the capacity of 'followability' is key to the refiguration of the story. By following the story, the reader advances amidst contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation and finds its fulfillment at the end. Even though the story is unpredictable due to the contingency of the outcome, the followability of the reader develops the story as a whole and maintains logical continuity through a poetic solution.[41]

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[37] Hegel's idea of being-recognized (Anerkanntsein) implies the eschatological fulfillment of the work of recognition, that the result of recognition is accomplished in being recognized. To be recognized means to exclude the exclusion and to reach for reconciliation. In this respect, recognition is the spiritual element that teleologically refers to a whole of the world and humanity. Cf. Ricœur, *Wege der Anerkennung*, 230-5.

[38] Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I 1905-1920, Hua XIII* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 338-41.

[39] Paul Ricœur, *Du texte à l'action* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986), 324-6. Cf. 324. "C'est ce 'comment' qui porte l'analogie que nous cherchons. Toute solution purement perceptive du problème, loin d'éliminer l'analogie, la présuppose, la met en jeu tacitement. L'important est que l'autre est compris comme étant sujet pour lui-même et que cette position de l'autre n'est pas en continuité avec mon propre vécu."

[40] Ricœur, *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, 232, 345. Cf. Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 334, 369. Ricœur mentions that "being-affected" (Affiziertwerden) also belongs to category of action, in that being-affected is also receptive action which means responding to past and history. *Ibid.*, 359.

[41] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.3, 108. Cf. Paul Ricœur, *From Text to Action* (London: Continuum, 1991), 137. "This is why we have to follow its development. but neither should be the story be disconnected:

In German, followability is translated as *Nachvollziehbarkeit*. *Nach-vollziehen* does not mean passively following the story; instead, it involves retracing the story. It entails reconstructing the thought or action to follow the logic that lies beyond one's own understanding. When a course of action in the historical narrative seems unclear, we retrace the history by reconstructing the actor's calculus and situation to understand it better. [42] By developing an explanation, we extend our own understanding. To understand better, we need more explanation. In this context, followability represents a combined ability encompassing explanation and understanding. It is mixed understandability, which is to be both suspended and extended by further explanations.

## V.     Re-telling the story in resonance relationship

The act of following a story involves the re-telling of that narrative within a 'resonance' relationship, presupposing a process of being affected by the other. According to German sociologist Hartmut Rosa, the resonance relationship constitutes a free oscillation of intersubjectivity wherein individuals mutually touch and transform each other. Rosa emphasizes that mutual accessibility in the resonance relationship extends beyond transforming the other; it encompasses a 'mutual transformation' of both self and others.[43] This responsive connection between diverse entities does not suppress heteronomy; rather, resonance is characterized as a reverberation of difference, distinct from a mere echo. Consequently, dissonance should not be construed as the opposite of resonance but as a constitutive element of unavailability and contradiction.[44]

In the context of the resonance relationship, I have no control over the process or outcome, but I can make myself reachable to others with an open outcome. In this sense, the resonance relationship requires the renunciation of manipulation or control of the other and the process of encounter by constitutively acknowledging the unavailability of the other's own voice. [45] Resonance, therefore, demands both a relationship with difference and hospitality. The process of listening to the other means participating in the horizon of meaning of the other and understanding how the other sees the matter: Listening is not a passive state, but an active activity insofar as it inspires the other person to narrate and opens a 'resonance space'.[46] Opening resonance space, in essence, means being affected by the voices of others. The core of resonance lies in the receptive understandability of a listening heart.[47] The

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although not deductible, its outcome still has to be acceptable. in every story told, there is thus a tie of logical continuity that is wholly specific, since the outcome must be at the same time contingent and acceptable."

[42] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1, 223-5.

[43] Hartmut Rosa, *Resonanz* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 313.

[44] Rosa, *Resonanz*, 313-22.

[45] Hartmut Rosa, *Unverfügbarkeit* (Wien-Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 2018), 62-6. Cf. Rosa, *Resonanz*, 326.

[46] Byung-Chul Han, *Krise der Narration* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2023), 84.

[47] Hartmut Rosa. *Demokratie braucht Religion* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2009), 53-5. Cf. Hartmut Rosa, *Accélérons la résonance !* (Paris: Le Pommier, 2022), 53. "Une transition devrait avoir lieu entre cette relation au monde qui vise le pouvoir de disposer des choses et de les mettre sous contrôle et une attitude au monde dont la caractéristique principale est l'écoute. Les dernières pages de Résonance s'achevant là-dessous."

natality of meaning emerges as a 'nevertheless' from the receptive understandability inherent in narrative hospitality.[48]

The act of following a story within a resonance relationship aligns with the Husserlian concept of second intentionality of the present. The second intentionality constitutes the present stream by following the first intentionality of representation as the otherness of the present. The duplication of self-presence in intentional consciousness is also found in Husserl's concept of recollection, which enables the reflexive form of self-narration. According to Ricoeur, the reflexive form of 'self-narration' points to the narrativity of the self, which recognizes itself indirectly through the mediation of the other. [49] Much like present intentionality is reconstructed through the interplay with the past intentionality as the 'other' of the present one, narrative identity undergoes a reconstruction process through interaction not only with one's own past but also with the past of others, which transforms into narration. In this regard, it is possible to reconsider the Husserlian notion of the 'appresentation of alter ego' within the realm of sociological phenomenology as the communalization of experience.

This concept suggests that the other, as the not-me, is being constituted 'in me,' marking the commencement of the constitution of collective entities as the 'we.'[50] In that sense, following the story of 'not-me' creates the resonance space of re-presentation where differences of 'not-me' constantly constitute my presentation and enable the re-telling of the story of 'us.'

## VI.    Conclusion: Eschatology as a new horizon of followability

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricœur proposes history as a space for critical pluralism, where different facts of two rival interpretations can exist by putting the same events in the perspective of different end-consequences. Both can be objective and true to the causal sequences on which they are based. We don't write the same story again, but a different story because of the characteristic of ipseity. However, this does not mean that historical science remains a battleground of irreconcilable viewpoints. Rather, the reception of the opposing point of view is a defense against skepticism and a justification of the struggle for objectivity, insofar as historical science functions as a space for a critical pluralism, which does not see all as equally legitimate. As Ricœur states, historical time is a collective singular in which every other time is contained.[51]

The Ricœurian notion of history as collective singular implies eschatological perspective of reconciled humanity. Ricœur emphasizes the significance of the utopian element being a component of our identity, what we expect and yet we are not. In *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* Ricœur mentions that

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[48] Cf. Rosa, *Resonanz*, 322. "An der Wurzel der Resonanzerfahrung liegt der Schrei des Nichtvesöhnten und der Schmerz des Entfremdeten. Sie hat ihre Mitte nicht im Leugnen oder Verdrängten des Widerstehenden, sondern in der momenthaften, nur erahnten Gewissheit eines aufhebenden >Dennoch<".

[49] Ricœur, *Wege der Anerkennung*, 120-5.

[50] Cf. Ricœur, *Gedächtnis, Geschichte, Vergessen*, 183-4.

[51] Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1, 179-80. Reinhart Koselleck shows the conceptual history of 'Geschichte' that the plural form of 'Geschichte' as the sum of all individual histories was bundled together into a collective singular through the epic unity of the historical narrative. See Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 51-3. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 173.

our identity comes not only from the past and present, but also from expectations of the future. In this respect, Ricœur states our identity is a prospective identity that is still suspended and to be hoped for.[52]

The followability, which constitutes logical continuity through the poetic solution of imagination, can be intensified by an eschatological perspective. The imagination is able to release the past and to release the future, to give time which is not subject to the rule of 'old' sequence. In this regard, eschatology serves as a horizon for creative representation and refiguration of memory and expectation, where the creative re-cognition of 'seeing-as' can emerge.[53] The German theologian, Phillip Stoellger, presents eschatology as a horizon for representation, in that it opens new horizon of memory of 'seeing differently' on the one hand and new horizon of expectation of 'seeing more' on the other hand.[54] Through this eschatological re-cognition of 'seeing as' the natality of refiguration can emerge by following a story of others.[55]

Narrative identity should include the voice of other as co-author of story. Including the perspective of others is narrative hospitality which means constitution of another 'in me'. As Ricœur argues, the experience of others merely 'develops' my own identical being, but what it develops was already more than myself, since it is a potentiality of meaning that exceeds the gaze of my reflection.[56] The other and oneself are included by an 'open and infinite horizon of explication' when oneself follows the narrative of another and another becomes as oneself.

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[52] Paul Ricœur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 311.

[53] Cf. Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1, 126. Paul Ricœur, *Die lebendige Metapher* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1986), 285-94.

[54] Cf. Phillip Stoellger, *Bild, Pathos und Vergebung*, 204-7, in B. Liebsch (hg.) *Bezeugte Vergangenheit oder Versöhnendes Vergessen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010).

[55] Cf. Ricœur, *Zeit und Erzählung*, Bd.1, 126. Ricœur, *Die lebendige Metapher*, 285-94.

[56] Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, 49. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Parisier Vorträge, Hua I* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 101-2.

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