Non-Europeans and their Presence to History
Universality, Modernity and Decolonization in Ricœur’s Political Philosophy

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Abstract
This article reconsiders Paul Ricœur’s political philosophical writings on the task of decolonization and European responsibility in light of a horizon of intercultural dialogue. Departing from the exchange between Ricœur and his former student Enrique Dussel, it discusses the Ricœurian critique of modernity. After giving some background on Ricœur’s reflections on decolonization, it will clarify what Ricœur calls the “crisis of the concrete universal in the thinking and in the historical experience of Western Europe,” and what role cultural difference has in this crisis. Considering Ricœur’s explicitly European perspective, this will lead us to a critical discussion on the envisioned possibility of a world-historical subject. Finally, I will discuss the role of European self-reflection in relation to a horizon of intercultural dialogue and narration from a post-decolonial perspective.

Keywords: Ricœur; Dussel; Interculturality; Coloniality; Modernity.

Résumé
Cet article se focalise sur les écrits de philosophie politique de Paul Ricœur abordant la décolonisation et la responsabilité européenne dans une perspective de dialogue interculturel. Partant de l’échange entre Paul Ricœur et son ancien étudiant Enrique Dussel, il examine la critique ricœurienne de la modernité. Après avoir donné un aperçu des réflexions de Ricœur sur la décolonisation, il précise ce que le philosophe appelle la “crise de l’universel concret dans la pensée et dans l’expérience historique de l’Europe occidentale,” et le rôle de la différence culturelle dans cette crise. Compte tenu de la perspective explicitement européenne de Ricœur, cela nous permettra de mener une discussion critique sur la possibilité envisagée d’un sujet historique mondial. Enfin, je traiterai le rôle de l’autoréflexion européenne par rapport à un horizon de dialogue et de narration interculturels dans une perspective post/décoloniale.

Mots-clés: Ricœur; Dussel; interculturalité; colonialisme; modernité.
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This paper takes its cue from a dialogue between Paul Ricœur and his former student, the Argentinian philosopher Enrique Dussel. Dussel, in his *The Underside of Modernity* (1996), retracts the influence of Ricœur on his own thought, up until he diagnoses “a crisis in the Ricœurian world”: his wager is that Ricœur’s hermeneutics does not withstand the asymmetries of domination between cultures, claiming that what is “appropriate for the hermeneutics of a culture, [is] not enough for the asymmetrical confrontation between several cultures (one dominating, the others dominated).” Beyond his accusation of Eurocentrism, which Ricœur actually accepts to a degree, Dussel’s crucial contention in the text is Ricœur’s purported inability to listen to the differential – non-Western or non-European – set of historical experiences, traditions, and other/ed conceptualizations of subjectivity. This disconnect, which Ricœur conceives of as a certain “incommunicability,” needs to be reconsidered in the light of Ricœur’s hermeneutical commitments to listen to history but also of his politico-philosophical imaginary of a possible “world-historical subject” in the age of modernity. What Sebastian Purcell has called an essentially “missed encounter” between Ricœur and Dussel can offer a fruitful opening to re-evaluate Ricœur’s notions of modernity, historical subjectivity and domination through the prism of coloniality. This is especially relevant with regards to Ricœur’s own, much earlier writings on decolonization: Ricœur is abundantly aware of the foundational violence and the racism underlying European colonialism. In the era of decolonization, Ricœur writes: “[...] no one can say what will happen to our civilization when it has truly encountered other civilizations other than through the shock of conquest and domination.” World history is at a point where a veritable intercultural encounter has only very recently gleened on the horizon for the first time. This dawning “true dialogue,” then, necessitates epistemological equity not simply for the sake of fairness, but truly as premise for the encounter with the self and the other – one where listening, or to put it in a more Ricœurian vein, receptiveness, is indeed central:

Receptiveness to other cultures is today the precondition of our allegiance to any viewpoint; the tension between what is “our own” and what is “alien” is all part of the interpretation by which we endeavour to apply to ourselves the distinctive significance of a particular tradition. This tension between “own” and “alien” implies no over-view, no all-embracing vision.

We see adumbrated in this quotation the deep commitment to *interculturality* – indeed it stems from a Unesco-publication that Ricœur contributed to called *Cultures and Time*, which constitutes an attempt at intercultural scholarship.

This paper, then, is not intended to simply leverage the reproach of Eurocentrism against Ricœur, but rather to arrive at a richer account of his proposition of critique and explicitly...
European self-reflection. Are Ricœur’s positions on decolonization, modernity, and cultural difference ready to enter into a veritable – intercultural – dialogue with post- and/or decolonial thought? Is the world-historical subject, whose formation Ricœur claims to witness in the masses of people worldwide who were “heretofore silent and downtrodden” and now increasingly “have the awareness of making their history, of making history,” reconcilable with the non-European/non-Western subject?

First, I will briefly contextualize the exchange between Dussel and Ricœur in order to critically discuss the latter’s notion of modernity vis-à-vis decolonization. Specifically, I will discuss his notions of authority and domination, as it is here that Ricœur locates a “modern crisis.” After giving some background on Ricœur’s reflections on decolonization, I will proceed by clarifying what Ricœur calls the “crisis of the concrete universal in the thinking and in the historical experience of Western Europe,” and what role cultural difference has in this crisis. Ricœur’s explicitly European perspective necessitates a critical discussion of the envisioned world-historical subject as a regulative idea for a single humanity based on a planetary historical consciousness. I will conclude by discussing the role of European self-reflection in relation to a horizon of intercultural dialogue and narration from a post-/decolonial perspective.

I. Contextualizing the Dussel-Ricœur Exchange: Decolonization & Coloniality

From the outset, the encounter between Dussel and Ricœur is marked by a certain disconnect. To be sure, their thoughts are rooted in the same philosophical heritage – Dussel received a classical European academic training in philosophy, in Argentina as well as Spain, Germany, and France (where he attended Ricœur’s classes at the Sorbonne), sharing the latter’s emphasis on a hermeneutical approach to difference. Yet for Dussel, it is precisely the nature of his training in philosophy that triggered this disconnect:

The Amerindian World had no presence in our studies, and none of our professors would have been able to articulate the origin of philosophy with reference to indigenous peoples. [...] [T]he ideal philosopher was one who was familiar with the precise details of classical Western philosophers and their contemporary developments. There existed no possibility whatsoever for a specifically Latin American philosophy. It is difficult to evoke in the present the firm hold that the European model of philosophy had on us…

Dussel’s inquiry into the limits of Western – and with that, Ricœur’s – philosophy therefore starts with “the massive ‘fact’ of domination, of the constitution of a subjectivity as ‘lord’ of another subjectivity at the world level” – it is the dialectical co-existence of master and slave, established between peoples, which according to Dussel incepts the modern era: modernity begins in 1492. Building upon the observation that “Ricœur takes the hermeneutics of language as the hermeneutics of history,” Dussel develops a critique of Ricœur’s dictum from text to action, asking “Can the dominated ‘interpret’ the ‘text’ produced and interpreted ‘in-the-world’ of the dominator? Under what subjective, objective, hermeneutic, textual circumstances can such interpretation be ‘adequately’ undertaken?” Whether the dominated “can” do that (and let alone whether they should) is precisely premised upon the “disconnect,” their exteriority to modernity: in what way does the dominated get access, and what is the price of the ticket? The
invitation of inclusion can at the same time be a threat of subsumption. To Dussel, this subsumption already takes place at the very level of language:

The European alienated the word of the Amerindian by the conquest of the sixteenth century and the word of African and Asian cultures by the colonization of the nineteenth century. English, French, and Spanish semiotics destroyed the word of the Aztec and Inca, of Ghana, India, China, and Middle East caliphates.19

The encounter with modernity – which from a Latin American (or Non-European) perspective is always already an encounter with coloniality – thus does not take place on a symmetrical plane but is radically hierarchical. This structurally violent and oppressive relation is, in the words of de Sousa Santos, always potentially “epistemicidal” – coloniality as dominant knowledge is simultaneously “murdering other knowledge(s).”20

Ricœur, again, is aware of this order: “[…] the discovery of the plurality of cultures is never a harmless [inoffensif] experience” he writes in “Universal Civilization, National Cultures.”21 Yet, as we can read in “Vraie et fausse paix” (1955), he holds that “colonialism contented itself with perverting [the ‘old cultures’] from the outside”22 – interestingly, here, too, a certain distance between colonizer and colonized is evoked (in contrast to the destructive potential of Marxism from within mentioned in the same passage). To be sure, I do not mean to inflate this sidenote for a Ricœurian theory of coloniality. Yet, the remark is instructive for understanding the fundamental paradox of decolonization that Ricœur articulates in several texts during the same period, starting from the key text “La question coloniale” from 1947, till 1965, where he writes: “All the struggles of decolonization and liberation are marked by the double necessity of entering into the global technical society and being rooted in the cultural past.”23 Here, it is not coloniality, but modernity that challenges the cultural other: more specifically, it is one aspect of modernity, namely the planetary order of technoscientific progress paired with a peculiar disposition of time as future-oriented linearity, which calls for adaptation, that is, cultural adaptation, as it is here where different temporalities are felt and experienced. Again, the non-European/non-Western cultural other’s vantage point lies in an assumed outside.

This necessary cultural adaptation to modernity is certainly problematic to Ricœur. While he emphasizes the “absolutely positive benefit of the freedom [libération] and of the massive access to comfort”24 as the undoubtable achievement of modern civilization, Ricœur simultaneously warns of the “subtle destruction, not only of traditional cultures, which might not be an irreparable wrong, but also of what I shall call […] the creative nucleus [noyau créateur] of great civilizations”25 – a destruction, which furthers and feeds an increasingly homogenizing, “ridiculous” [dérisoire] global consumer culture. It is because of this totalizing power that culture needs to persist and be defended. For culture “express[es] man’s muffled resistance to adapt himself to the modern world”26 – in its diametrical opposition to the storm we call progress, “[c]ulture is also that which unadapts man, keeps him ready for the open, for the remote, for the other, for the all.”27 Thus, Dussel’s question of whether the dominated “can” read the dominator, without being resolved, must at least be responded to with the observation that it is very difficult not to read, indeed to insist upon exteriority as part of having to negotiate their culture vis-à-vis modernity-as-progress. To Ricœur, importantly, this is decisively true across all cultures, including European/Western cultures.
Returning to Ricœur’s response to Dussel, we can say that his concern – his motivation to caution and instruct Dussel and his readership – stems precisely from these difficult negotiations. In a discourse-ethical fashion, he offers “three components of […] [the European] ethico-political conception of freedom”28 – the critique of sovereignty, “the search for and crisis of the concrete universal,”29 and the question of rights and responsibility. To Ricœur, it is these three aspects from which his interlocutor “ought to extract all the lessons.”30 To Dussel, to “learn from” Europe by not “repeat[ing] the political-economic errors already superseded by European history”31 reads like paternalism. The problem here is certainly not a dialogical incentive to learn from the other – to Dussel, Europe definitely has lessons to share, which is perfectly exemplified by his continuous engagement with European thinkers throughout his oeuvre. Rather, it is the temporal register of Europe having “already lived through” a certain history that Latin America has not, which implies a position of perpetual delay for the non-European: polemically speaking, she is not only late to Europe’s advancements and innovations, but even its grave errors.

I want to consider the problematic of a temporal disparity as exteriority here not to simply recast the accusation of paternalism, but to scrutinize its implications for the notion of history: such a temporal disparity could only come about in a non-world-historical setting of multiplicate histories that exist outside from each other. In such a setting of separate/separable histories, which is also the premise for Ricœur’s paradox of decolonization, there necessarily must be outsiders to these histories. This aligns with Ricœur’s aforementioned impression of a certain “incommunicability” of diverse experiences of liberation, which to be sure does not imply a denial of dialogue, but rather its premise.32 In acknowledging the fundamental difference in socio-historical experience, however, the problem of entering/exiting histories emerges, which Ricœur captures in another formulation of the paradox of decolonization: “Every culture cannot sustain and absorb the shock of modern civilization. There is the paradox: how to revive [réveiller] an old, dormant civilization [vieille culture endormie] and take part [entrer] in universal civilization.” Further, this entrance into “scientific, technical, and political rationality […] very often requires the pure and simple abandon of a whole cultural past.”33 Ricœur’s language here abundantly depicts a temporal mismatch between universal civilization and what he calls national cultures34; decolonizing peoples need to harmonize a cultural past – put to sleep by the fact of colonization and domination – with the modern, “shocking” presence of an unprecedented global civilization, which up to now they supposedly have been “external” to. By exiting colonial rule, having to enter this civilization becomes the new challenge toward cultures. To be sure, this civilization is based upon a “purely abstract and rational unity of mankind [sèic]”35 – primarily based upon scientific reason – thus precisely not a cultural hegemony dominating others and in itself actually timeless. Nevertheless, it is clear to Ricœur that the task of decolonization does raise the question of cultural survival: “Only a culture capable of assimilating scientific rationality will be able to survive and revive [renaître]; only a faith which calls upon the understanding of intelligence can ‘espouse’ its time.”36

Thus, whether it is fair or not to identify a certain paternalism in Ricœur’s remarks here (a problem that will reappear in Section III), what certainly appears is what Fabian calls the “denial of coevalness”37 between European/Western and other cultures, because only the appeal to presence and survival of the latter is conditioned upon a solely imminent entrance into modernity. As a sidenote, what remains undiscussed here is of course that recreation and survival is also about “how” culture survives and is recreated. Its reproduction, too, functions
through hierarchies, according to which a culture might be narrated as inferior, menacing, etc. Recalling Dussel’s experience with the representation of Amerindian culture(s), this is one of the points showcasing *coloniality beyond colonialism*.

Membership in the universal civilization is thus the socio-historical condition for the intercultural and pluralist task of planetary consciousness, embodied by a world-historical subject, to which we will now turn. While in brief, one might say the incipient suggestion of a disconnect between Ricœur and Dussel simply lies in a divergent date stamping of the phenomenon of modernity and world history, I want to reiterate Ricœur’s stance in terms of a *paradox of exteriority*: interiority to modernity is the condition for cultures to interact and communicate, which is necessary because of their exteriority to each other. At the same time, the cultural status of modernity as Euromodernity itself remains in question. In the next section, we will therefore explore this exteriority from within, setting out from Ricœur’s explicitly European self-location and its tasks.

II. Modernity in Crisis and the “Crisis of the Concrete Universal” – Who is Ricœur’s World-historical Subject?

In order to approach the specifically European task within a planetary order of decolonized peoples in dialogue, let us turn to Ricœur’s notion of *modernity* and its crisis – for it is the crisis which shall serve as the lesson for the non-European other, which explicitly contains the recommendation to “unadapt” already noted above. Ricœur puts forward three key “topoi” of modernity – “new times, the acceleration of history, and the mastery of history.” The crisis of modernity pertains to these three theses – so foundational to Enlightenment thought – which upon scrutiny cannot be upheld due to very similar reasons: according to Ricœur, the pitfall of Enlightenment thinking lies in (i) its obstinate renouncing of anything reeking of tradition; (ii) the proverbial attempt at a year zero (a reset of historical and calendrical time); and (iii) authority as power of the people. The assumptions of modern times (*Neuzeit*), different in kind from what came before, as ever improving, progressive tale of humanity’s dominance over nature, cannot be upheld vis-a-vis the tragic culmination of modernity in total war and genocide. The crisis, then, is not just that Enlightenment temporality is inadequate, but that the erosion of the relation to tradition as authority/authority as tradition precipitates a crisis of legitimacy, as he elaborates at length in “The Paradox of Authority.” Authority, briefly, is grounded in a “fiduciary relation between creditability and credence,” in which neither the authorized nor the authorizing party *really* knows “what authorizes this authority.” This holds true for any authority but becomes more pronounced once the recognition of authority has been called into question by Enlightenment thought, which instead calls for a self-authorization, a “self-grounding” of “free people” (thus also free from a history). Without recourse to tradition, what is at the heart of this paradox of self-authorization is thus the aporia of a foundation or origin. While certainly affirming the need for rational legitimacy, Ricœur cautions against a purely rational foundation of authority: without the historical footing, it is built on thin ice. That is the European lesson Ricœur puts forward in his exchange with Dussel.

What is in crisis here, then, is not so much modernity itself, but the multiplicity of European *cultures*: they, too, are subject to the empty universal of a deracinated, timeless non-
culture mentioned above. This absence of an origin constitutes a denial of what Ricœur
recurringly calls the “creative nucleus” of the “great” or “ancient” civilizations – or sometimes
“ethical-mythical nucleus.”43 This nucleus is “both moral and imaginative […] [it] embodies the
ultimate creaturely power of a group – it is at this level of profundity that the diversity of
civilization is most profound.”44 This notion also informs his introduction to the text Cultures and
Time, which forms part of a Unesco publication series entitled “At the Crossroads of Cultures.”
Confirming Ricœur’s commitment to interculturality, this text particularly speaks to the
problematic of the borders of a culture or cultural knowledge, what lies inside and outside of it.
To Ricœur, philosophy forms part of a distinct and explicitly European/“Western” history of ideas:
“There is in the Western context […] philosophical discussion, which does not derive from the
reading and interpretation of the writings of Greek philosophers,”45 which “reveal[s]
philosophical inquiry to be itself a distinctively Western feature.”46 To be sure, whether this
“Western feature” here is envisioned as primarily cultural is not clear. Much more importantly
however, this conundrum asks for an inquiry into what is exterior or interior to philosophy:
while Ricœur is speaking in this text of the favorable “distancing effect” that a comparative
approach toward philosophy has, he also draws lines of exterior absolute distance: “[…] however
complex it may be, being a totality [Greek thought] constitutes a finite configuration, a limited
space of variations which distinguishes Greek thought from that of India […]”47 However, the
inner kinship of Greek thought is also marked by an absolute distinction: discussing the pre-
Socratic/Socratic divide marking Greek thought as it is understood today, Ricœur emphasizes the
“obliteration of the former by the latter,”48 which marks the fundamental otherness of the two
ways of thinking. The point here is not just to diversify what is in the name “Greek thought,” but
rather to show how Socratic philosophy cannot be understood without the backdrop of its
predecessors – which themselves however cannot simply be understood anymore. Here, Ricœur
demarcates distinct “stage[s] of thought,”49 whose distinctiveness is, too, marked by a certain
incommunicability or unintelligibility from “our” modern point of view:

It is the development of the modern science of motion which distances us in every respect
from the Greek ontology of time. A number of consequences follow, chief among them
being that all other relationships between man and nature are, in the modern age,
subordinate to that relationship in which technology is the intermediary.50

Thus, when Ricœur turns to the key message in this text – how to form a new
relationship with past cultures – his point of departure is the “outside view” from all the
discussed ontologies in the issue: modern science, that “abstract unity” lying at heart of the
modern, planetary condition. Crucially, it only becomes slightly more clear in this latter part of
the text that the different knowledges of temporality explored here are of “ancient civilizations” –
whereas mostly, their temporal/historical aspects reside between the lines: we are dealing with
cultural diversity (such as Chinese, Indian, Greek, Jewish, Bantu, etc.) but it remains implicit
whether the discussed conceptions and cosmologies are ancient, contemporary, or to some extent
transhistorical. Insinuations toward the latter, to be sure, are not set in reference to any potential
world-historical events that led to cultural encounters, assimilations and creolizations. We can
sense this ambiguity in the following passage, which rather than distance suggests ultimate
proximity:

Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies
How close, then, the Hebrews feel to us if it is true that “alone among the systems of thought of antiquity, Hebraic thought thoroughly dominated space, raising human time to the level of a history that was unique, fertile, bursting with meaning and a challenge to the very destiny of man” […] Nothing appears to remain of the gulf separating the West from the conceptions of Chinese and Indian cultures.  

This passage is interested in a reconfiguration of “our” (qua modern and/as Western) historical self-understanding, a kind of “rectification” of heritage. Modernity remains the pending issue: as “epoch,” as suspended time and space, it has a continuous referential recourse to the premodern, and to what possibly lies outside of it; distance and proximity are constantly re-negotiated. The problem here is the view of modernity as outside of the entirety of these particular and distinctive cultures. Thus, when Riceur states that “the average reader of this study of cultural typologies […] is, truth to tell, placed in an orbit quite outside this entire area by the fact of his involvement with the problems of physical time,” it is crucial to add that this viewpoint must not be posited outside of “cultural typology” itself.

Thus, there lies a cultural ambivalence at the heart of the European modern subject, as it encompasses a supposedly a-cultural techno-scientific modernity and a multiplicity of modern European/Western cultures simultaneously. With this in mind, let us turn to Riceur’s interest in the potential of a world-historical subject, both with regards to the failure of the Enlightenment project of universalization, and to the paradoxical role that the non-European other has been assigned in his conversation with Dussel. Witnessing the novel concreteness of decolonization and independence throughout the world, Riceur writes in 1965 that “[w]e are doubtless the first historical epoch to include as a dominant fact the consciousness of belonging to a single global civilization, to experience ourselves as a single humanity […] which experiences itself as a single historical subject.” Whilst Riceur sticks to the Hegelian vocabulary of “this strange quasi-subjectivity which has always been the crux of philosophers” he breaks with Hegel precisely because of the novel (largely) postcolonial reality, which decenters a Eurocentric notion of Spirit and challenges dialectics through difference: in this context, “world-historical subject” can only mean a historically contingent, regulatively created idea of humanity. Yet, Riceur also pairs this planetary consciousness with a narrative identity of our times as “temporal regime of continual growth,” which, to be sure, is deeply marked by the modern crisis. Nonetheless, the idea of a world-historical subject takes up a special place within that regime, carrying with it the universalist/cosmopolitan appeal of the Enlightenment project towards mutual understanding and perpetual peace:

Like Kant, I hold that every expectation must be a hope for humanity as a whole, that humanity is not one species except insofar as it has one history, and, reciprocally, that for there to be such a history, humanity as a whole must be its subject as a collective singular.

Ryan Coyne (who interprets this humanism as another Hegelianism) calls this “the ideal of total contemporaneity achieved through the overcoming of distance.” Recalling the dynamics of absolute (historical, temporal, cultural) distance permeating our discussion up until now, the crucial question then is how this Riceurian world-historical subject relates to the neglected subject that Dussel is invested in, the one “which appears to be always forgotten, that it
is the oppressed herself or himself—their (child, women, “pueblo”)—who are the historical subjects of their own liberation: a subject that philosophy cannot pretend to replace but instead, with clear conscience, in which philosophy plays a function of solidarity of “second act” — a reflection (the a posteriori) about praxis (the a priori). Can this world-historical subject stay clear of an Enlightenment-type civilizational impetus reinstating an order of denied coevalness?

Let us approach this question in light of Ricoeur’s formulation of the crisis of the concrete universal, to which the world-historical subject is a possible response. Marcelo defines the concrete universal as an “alleged universal, which needs the recognition of others in order to be approved, and this recognition is obviously contextual and historical.” Ricoeur further describes this process of historical consciousness formation as an exercise of power:

In reaching power, one group reaches the concrete universal and supersedes itself as a particular group, thus realizing the fragile coincidence between a universal function and a position of domination. This doubtless explains the fact that a latent violence continues to affect the relation of all individuals with power. Political life remains unavoidably marked by the struggle to conquer, keep, and retake power; it is a struggle for political domination.

Here, the concrete universal forms an integral part of the logic of domination, which points us to its modern crisis: “Today’s crisis is the pathology of the process of the temporalization of history,” because the legitimacy of the modern/colonial world order is eroding. But Ricoeur continues:

Is not the remedy, however, implicit in the ill? Was it not necessary that modernity would estrange us from our very roots in order that, transcending the rift created by critical scrutiny, we might once again draw near in a second, post-critical “innocence,” both to what was farthest from us and to what was nearest to us? Equally estranged from things near and far, can we not find our way back to both thanks to the fact that the scientific revolution has created this equal distance between us and all traditional cultures?

It must not be obscured that this “ill” Ricoeur is speaking of is much graver when “modern estrangement” means imperial/colonial/modern epistemicide—raising the obvious question whether the price for this “post-critical innocence” was not too high for (formerly) colonized peoples. But more crucially for Ricoeur’s intercultural, dialogical vision of the world-historical subject is the question whether the current crisis of the concrete universal is putting forth a possible remedy to imperial/colonial domination, too; a question which is aggravated by the opaque status of Euromodernity-qua-culture vis-à-vis a regulative idea of humanity Ricoeur envisions. In the final section, I want to explore this difficult question from a post/decolonial standpoint in line with Dussel’s account of intercultural thought.
III. European Self-reflection and Intercultural Dialogue

In Ricœur’s philosophy, it is through narrative identities that time becomes human time, grounded in a certain temporal experience and providing meaning for both individuals and collectives. The notion of narrative identity is based in the self-reflective question of the who (cf. the notion of personal identity), which functions as the temporal layering of the subject, an “acting and suffering individual” who perceives herself as the who that acts and suffers, who plays the main role in her own story and thereby reaches identity through distanciation, through a somewhat external narration of the self:

Self-sameness, “self-constancy,” can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. The self characterized by self-sameness may then be said to be refigured by the reflective application of such narrative configurations.

This equally applies to humanity as “world-historical subject”: Ricœur writes that “[h]umanity becomes its own subject in talking about itself. Narrative and what is narrated can again coincide, and the two expressions ‘making history’ and ‘doing history’ overlap.” For Ricœur, this reflection often carries an avant-gardist impetus, which he also sees and promotes in the anticolonial movements described in “La question coloniale.” Yet, Enrique Dussel’s question remains, asking who gets to make this narrative; and perhaps also whether everyone has an equal interest in proclaiming this narrative in the name of a world-historical subject. Again, the pitfall of these narrative identities is which one can attain the stability and legitimacy necessary to persist. But it is also crucial to note Ricœur’s appeal to “reflective application” here, which he mobilizes when discussing the hermeneutical value of traditions: the exegesis of tradition is the premise for liberation. But as he explores in “Ideology and Utopia,” this exegesis takes place in a manner of distanciation – beyond a Gadamerian idea of belonging: a liberatory social imaginary can emerge only if the past is “reopened” and “revivified” in such a way that it can serve as “domain of presumed truth,” having been legitimized through the process of “hermeneutical [...] criticism” – having been given “credit,” to recall the discussion of the emergence of authority touched upon above. On a socio-historical level, a possible limit of this self-reflection, which conceives of oneself as another – is a certain always already self-rectifying self-referentiality – expressed for example when Ricœur equates anticolonial liberation with the French context of antimonarchical/antifeudal liberation: “The crazed and often premature hunger for freedom that drives separatist movements is the same passion at the origin of our history of 1789 and of Valmy, of 1848 and of June 1940.” Thus, while we inherit from Ricœur an impressive repository of narrative tools to bypass the stifling binary of history as contingency/disruption or transhistorical continuity, it has to be stressed that self-reflectivity (even and especially of the “self as another”) always bears the risk of “missed encounters” in which the “other” experience cannot exist for the sake of itself but only in relation to the encounter.

This brings us back to the crux of paternalism insinuated in Section I – Ricœur’s stance in between incommunicability (because of the radical difference of respective sociopolitical
situations) and his “lesson” for the non-European other. How does this relate to a world-historical perspective on intercultural dialogue as a different way of remembering, of writing (world-)history? Ricœur’s response to Dussel – an offer of specific insights on modernity gathered by a European positionality – can be tied to his intercultural commitment qua “responsibility,” which he had formulated in “La question coloniale” and “Vraie et fausse paix.” To Ricœur, speaking these warnings amounts to “not abandoning” the non-European other so that the grave mistakes of European history are not repeated: “There must be room for a systematic transformation of our position as colonizers to that of technical and cultural consultants to independent peoples.” But in this role of responsible consultant again lies the risk of assuming a temporal disparity, when Ricœur writes of the European inclination towards foreign cultures as driven by, for example, the “nostalgia for an abolished past or even through a dream of innocence or youth.”

We in Europe have not been able to extricate ourselves from the absurdity of nationalism; we can say nothing to the Hindus and Muslims who are tearing each other apart and, tomorrow, to other Asians and Africans who will be stuck at the stage of cherishing freedom. They are right to do as we do [faire comme nous], to want to be free before their time; they are wrong, as we are, to want to take this useless detour of the nation-state.

_Faire comme nous_ – again, here, non-Western politics and history cannot really extend beyond a mimetic relationship to the West, which then necessitates the European parental crutch (in this text, too, Ricœur draws the parallel between decolonizing peoples and _youth_) as “technical” support. A regulative notion of the world-historical subject in Ricœur’s vein can however only be compatible with his appeal to an egalitarian intercultural encounter (which he thematized in his 1992 work _Oneself as Another_) if non-European sociopolitical processes are considered distinctive and not bound by an already trodden, Eurocentric path. Thus, while Dussel’s charge of paternalism is arguably overstated vis-à-vis Ricœur’s extensive engagement with intercultural dialogue, there is a paternalistic thread running through the notion of the responsible ex-colonizer.

In the era of decolonization, the planetary crisis, to Ricœur, is still to come, as it lies precisely in the “serious test [épreuve grave] […] [of the encounter with other traditional cultures, which is] in a way, totally novel for European culture.” Thirty years later, Dussel emphasizes the difficulty of this task from the “other,” non-European perspective. Here, the “serious test” has been ongoing, and captured by the following questions:

How is it possible to imagine a symmetrical dialogue given the near impossibility of seizing the technological instruments of a capitalism based in military expansion? _Will everything be lost_, and will the imposition of an Occidentalism (identified more and more by the day with the “Americanism” of the United States), erase from the face of the earth all of the universal cultures that have been developing over the last few millennia? _Will English be the only language_, imposed upon humanity that, under such a weight, will forget its own traditions?

This constant threat of loss – a more or less violently induced forgetting – is also thematized in Ricœur’s later work in _Memory, History, Forgetting_, as Mouzakitis notes: “As
Ricœur is ready to observe, forgetting might well signify the erasure of ‘mnestic traces,’ against the loss of which all known historical civilizations have devised mnemotic devices, the most effective of which in Ricœur’s view being the *archive,*” all the while being aware of the “hybris of total reflection,” which is why Ricœur suggests the term “receding horizons” (complementary to Gadamer) “in an attempt to counterbalance the imperialist claims of thought.”

If we reconsider the citation that closed Section II – in which Ricœur evokes modernity as necessary ill – through a decolonial lens by understanding modernity as inseparable from coloniality, illness and estrangement have to be looked at through the prism of epistemicide as fundamental to the rise of “modern” thought, but especially its canonization or how it is remembered. Dussel’s language of distance and proximity thereby also echoes the concern of exteriority/interiority that Ricœur evoked earlier in his discussion of what is called philosophy: Dussel makes a similar claim to *exteriority* as an important step for the epistemic decentering of Europe. He writes:

> Europe’s crucial and enlightened hegemony scarcely lasted two centuries (1789-1989).
> Only two centuries! Too short-term to profoundly transform the “ethico-mythical nucleus” (to use Ricœur’s expression) of ancient and great cultures […]. These cultures have been partly colonized, but most of the structure of their values has been excluded—*disdained, negated and ignored* – rather than annihilated.

Like Ricœur, Dussel identifies the danger of “empty universal cultural identity, an abstract universality.” Yet for Dussel, this “abstract universality” nevertheless has concrete roots, has a cultural mark – modern/colonial Europe: “Eurocentrism consists precisely in confusing or identifying aspects of human abstract universality (or even transcendental) in general with moments of European particularity, in fact, the first global particularity (that is, the first *concrete* human universality).” Akin to an “ontological turn,” Dussel insists on the distinction of non-European cultures from the modern order. This exteriority “designates the oppressed. The other, the one excluded from the totality that constitutes a moral order.” Dussel’s decolonial and liberatory task, then, is to take up the memory work of an epistemically undervalued but not of a “forgotten” or *dormant* [endormie] culture – and with that, he is not so far from Ricœur’s diagnosis of “our dawning realization that it is wrong to identify science and technology with the relationship of truth which we can have with all things” – but with the important addendum that this latter identification is culturally marked.

The utopian aspect of Ricœur’s thinking is echoed in Dussel’s *Philosophy of Liberation,* but it is a “*trans*-modern utopia,” more specifically a “renovated culture, which is not merely decolonized but is moreover entirely new.” As Grosfoguel elaborates, “this is a call for a universal that is a pluriversal, for a concrete universal that would include all the epistemic particularities towards a ‘transmodern decolonial socialization of power.’” As the Zapatistas say, ‘luchar por un mundo donde otros mundos sean posibles’ – *struggling for a world in which other worlds are possible.* In this decolonial light, Ricœur’s commitment to a planetary task of narration and remembrance as well as his intercultural hermeneutic can be crucial tools for dialogue. It is Ricœur’s understanding of European responsibility as a kind of pedagogical or supportive notion that is ultimately the limit for this endeavor from a decolonial standpoint. Intercultural communication, for Ricœur, is premised upon a humanist universalism – he writes that “the
belief that the translation is feasible [possible] up to a certain point is the affirmation that the foreigner is a man [sic], the belief, in short, that communication is possible.85 In a decolonial vein, however, communication is in a way more embodied and embedded by recognizing fundamental imbalances and hierarchies – here, the task of European responsibility would therefore rather be a task of “unlearning” – a more complete and complex form of listening.

IV. Conclusion

In this paper, I have sought to recontextualize Ricœur’s encounter with Enrique Dussel within his politico-philosophical writings on modernity and the task of decolonization. Departing from the purported “missed encounter” between the two thinkers, I have attempted to reconstruct the contact points between Ricœurian and decolonial thought, exploring especially what exactly makes the encounter a “missed” one. As I have shown in Section I, Ricœur is critical of colonialism, but his thinking resists the register of what Quijano calls coloniality. Coloniality calls into question the grammar of modernity, where “colonialism” cannot be deducted from a universal, modern, progress-oriented civilization based on scientific reason. Because Ricœur does not see this entanglement, there remain the paradoxes of modernity/coloniality dormant in his writing. Ricœur, while attuned to the multiplicity of narratives making up history as conscious and subjective repository, does not adequately situate the aspect of cultural or epistemological domination within this hermeneutics. Ricœur does acknowledge the difficult and dangerous task of cultural preservation vis-à-vis the civilizational project of modernity, which lives forth in a powerful momentum of technoscientific advancements but does differentiate between cultures in this fight for preservation. As we have seen in Section II, the notion of the world-historical subject epitomizes this disconnect, because it comprises the paradox of the West/Europe as (marked) particular culture/locality and simultaneously as motor of an (unmarked) universal modernity. This paradox lies at the heart of what Madina Tlostanova and Walter Mignolo call the conversion of “geography into chronology”86 – Europe is always already and continually reinscribed as “ahead” within a “linear timeline in which colonized peoples are relocated as perpetually past to European cultures that are seen as modern and futurally open.87 […] While Europe and its settler states are seen as the ‘mirror of the future’ of humanity and seat of modernity, colonized peoples are projected backward as past.”88 While Ricœur concurs with the rejection of this view when criticizing the totalizing force of modern science and technology, he is less clear about it when it comes to the modern but culturally ambiguous socio-historical experience of the West.

Within such a script, the intercultural dialogue has to take place within the inescapable colonial grammar of modernity, not allowing for precisely that distance Ricœur envisions at the heart of the intercultural encounter. This position is also echoed in Ricœur’s key stance on the North-South debate:

But the mediation of discourse, of debate and argumentation, remains as our only recourse. [...] [A]lthough the North-South debate derives from relations of domination of another order, that is to say, of an order that is not ethical-political, it would be, just the same, one day or another, a conflict that will need to be arbitrated and treated.89
Again, what Ricœur does not address sufficiently here, is on whose terms this arbitration and treatment can take place – can it really occur to the benefit of the oppressed, of the dominated, if it is formulated (to take up Ricœur’s focus on translatability here) from the point of view of the oppressor? Even when both interlocutors assume an egalitarian role vis-à-vis each other, doesn’t the supposedly neutral backdrop of a world-historical concrete universal effectively still obscure the cultural markedness of the West?

For Ricœur, decolonization did imply an important philosophical caesura, showcasing his commitment to a dialogical and procedural notion of rationality and meaning that is explicitly recognizant of cultural difference. As Henriques and Toldy put it, “in postulating that the hermeneutic field is constitutively fragmented, and, therefore, that only the confrontation of interpretations allows for progress toward a deeper understanding of reality, Ricœurian thought can provide an epistemological foundation for […] a postcolonial theology.”

While Henriques and Toldy’s point pertains to theology, what is relevant for us is that more broadly, Ricœur’s hermeneutics is attuned to a decolonial notion of coexistent knowledges. Further, “a common purpose can be recognized in […] [Dussel’s and Ricœur’s respective] philosophies, namely, the will to think ‘normative creativity’°°: such a creativity implies the continuous renegotiation of norms and values vis-à-vis inherited traditions, which naturally include traditions of thought, such as philosophy itself. This is the strength of Ricœur’s hermeneutical approach to interculturality and shows both the necessity and the proximity/possibility of a pluri-versal project. The “crisis as loss of equilibrium”°° can thus also mean the loss of an altogether pathological equilibrium (of master and slave). This is why the self-reflective hermeneutical method, in the moment of encountering the other, must do so without necessitating sameness qua equally free, equally privileged, equally “capable” subjects. It must be attuned to different capabilities, narratives, traditions, experiences – and relations of oppression. Finally, we can say with Ricœur that it is the grammar of the “concrete universal” that has to be broken – but this crisis is simply more far-reaching than Ricœur acknowledged in his own account.

2 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, 79.


4 I use Aníbal Quijano’s notion of coloniality: "Coloniality of power was conceived together with America and Western Europe, and with the social category of ‘race’ as the key element of the social classification of colonized and colonizers" (in “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21/2-3 (2007), 168-78, here 171, the emphasis is mine).


6 Ricœur, “Civilisation universelle et cultures nationales,” 453.


8 Indeed, Ricœur is aware of Eurocentrism, yet he reserves a specifically European heritage (in short, the experience of Auschwitz and the Gulag) for his hermeneutical philosophy.

9 I thank Ernst Wolff for the invaluable input in connecting Ricœur’s thought with postcolonial concerns, and especially for pointing me to Ricœur’s early and crucial text “La question coloniale” and his Unesco publications.

10 I am evoking both post- and decolonial perspectives, emphasizing the Latin-American movement of decolonial thought, which – in an important addition to postcolonial perspectives of new power relations after the era of decolonization – stresses the continuous need to decolonize the mind, culture, tradition, technology, and so forth.


13 I have linked different periods of Ricœur’s oeuvre in this paper; using his earlier writings during the era of decolonization (broadly late 1940s till early 1960s) to contextualize the encounter with Dussel in the 1990s, but also evoking recurring notions of his hermeneutical project, arriving thus at a panoramic view on how Ricœur’s politico-philosophical commentaries link to his notions of history, narration, culture, etc.

15 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, 80.


17 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, 75.

18 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, 86.

19 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), 123.


21 Ricœur, “Universal Civilization, National Cultures,” 278; Ricœur, “Civilisation universelle et cultures nationales,” 446.


31 Ricœur, “Response by Paul Ricœur: Philosophy and Liberation,” 213, the emphasis is mine.

32 Nonetheless, in this response, the Latin American “reader” can listen to, learn from Europe, whilst the opposite directionality is not considered by Ricœur. “Ricœur seems more concerned with what he can bring to the debate than with what he can learn from his colleague.” (Alain Loute, “Enrique Dussel y
Paul Ricœur: pensar la creatividad normativa,” *Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis*, vol. 33/2 (2012): 61-68, here 62, the translation is mine.)

33 Ricœur, “Universal Civilization, National Cultures,” 277; Ricœur, “Civilisation universelle et cultures nationales,” 445-46, the emphasis is mine.

34 While Ricœur’s political philosophy is critical toward the nation state (see for instance “Ethics and Politics”), Dussel criticizes Ricœur’s “culturalist” reading of the nation as main representative for an integral culture. See Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Liberation.”


41 Ricœur, “The Paradox of Authority,” 93.

42 Ricœur, “The Paradox of Authority,” 93.

43 Ricœur, “The Task of the Political Educator,” 146.

44 Ricœur, “The Task of the Political Educator,” 146.

45 Ricœur, “Introduction,” in *Cultures and Time*, 27.


52 Ricœur, “Introduction,” in Cultures and Time, 31, the emphasis is mine.

53 Ricœur, “The Task of the Political Educator,” 143, the emphasis is mine.


55 Ricœur, “The Task of the Political Educator,” 146.


58 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, x.


64 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 246, the emphasis is mine.

65 Ricœur, “Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness,” 212.

66 Ricœur, “Towards a Hermeneutics of Historical Consciousness,” 216.


68 Paul Ricœur, “La question coloniale,” Réforme, vol. 3/131 (1947), 2-5, here 3. See also the version of this essay reedited in this present dossier of the Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies. The translation is from the English edition of this dossier.

69 Ricœur, “Vraie et fausse paix,” 60, the translation is mine.

70 Ricœur, “Universal Civilization, National Cultures,” 277-78.

71 Paul Ricœur, “La question coloniale,” 4. The translation is from the English edition of this dossier.


73 Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality,” 41.

75 See also Grosfoguel, “Epistemic Racism/Sexism, westernized Universities and the four Genocides/Epistemicides of the long Sixteenth Century.”

76 Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality,” 42.

77 Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality,” 50.

78 Dussel and Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity, 132, the emphasis is mine.

79 Loute, “Enrique Dussel y Paul Ricœur: pensar la creatividad normativa,” 64, the translation is mine.

80 Ricœur, “Introduction,” in Cultures and Time, 32.

81 Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality,” 49.

82 Dussel, “Transmodernity and Interculturality,” 50.


91 Loute, “Enrique Dussel y Paul Ricœur: pensar la creatividad normativa,” 61, the translation is mine.

92 Ricœur, “Is the Present Crisis a Specifically Modern Phenomenon?,” 135.