The Later Wittgenstein and the Later Husserl on Language

Paul Ricœur

Abstract:
This article presents an edited version of lectures given by Paul Ricœur at Johns Hopkins University in April 1966. Ricœur offers a comparative analysis of Wittgenstein’s and Husserl’s late works, taking the problem of language as the common ground of investigation for these two central figures of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Ricœur develops his study in two parts. The first part considers Husserl’s approach to language after the *Logical Investigations* and concentrates on *Formal and Transcendental Logic*; leaving a transcendental reflection on language behind it re-examines a phenomenological conception, according to which the sphere of logic is not separable from that of experience. The main focus of the second part is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as it moved on from the conception of an isomorphic relation between language and the world, as set out in the picture theory in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, to the more pragmatic notion of a language-game in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In order to get beyond the irrevocable differences between the two philosophies and the unresolved theoretical issues on both sides, Ricœur suggests turning to a semiological paradigm based on the Saussurean distinction between “language” and “speaking.”

*Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Husserl, Phenomenology, Semiology, Wittgenstein.*

Résumé:
Cet article est une version éditée de conférences données par Paul Ricœur à la Johns Hopkins University en avril 1966. Ricœur propose une analyse comparée des dernières œuvres de Wittgenstein et Husserl, avec le problème du langage comme sol commun d’investigations pour ces deux figures centrales de la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique. Cette analyse de Ricœur se joue à travers deux parties. La première partie revient sur l’approche du langage chez Husserl depuis *Recherches logiques* avec une attention particulière aux développements de *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*; dans le cadre d’une réflexion transcendante sur le langage il revient sur une conception phénoménologique selon laquelle, le domaine du logique n’est pas séparable de celui de l’expérience. La deuxième partie se concentre principalement sur la dernière philosophie de Wittgenstein alors qu’il s’est déparé de l’idée d’une relation isomorphe entre le langage et le monde telle que posée par la théorie du tableau dans le *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, pour s’engager vers la notion plus pragmatique de jeu de langage dans les *Investigations philosophiques*. Afin de surmonter les différences irrémediables entre les deux philosophies et, dans une certaine mesure, certains des problèmes théoriques non résolus depuis les deux bords, Ricœur fait finalement référence à un paradigme sémiologique et à la distinction saussurienne entre “langue” et “parole.”

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Paul Ricœur

[15847] Allow me to say something about the aim of this paper. It forms part of a wider undertaking of comparative studies aimed at mutual understanding between Anglo-American and European philosophy, at least as regard the line of thought that, to a greater or lesser extent, lies within the tradition of Husserl’s phenomenology. We have undoubtedly reached the moment when this inexcusable mutual ignorance should be overcome.

We do however share a common interest: language. The problem of language today provides a point of encounter and confrontation for both philosophies. We might even find a common goal to them. We are all looking for a great philosophy of language, which is also called for by disciplines as diverse as psychoanalysis and exegesis.

This confrontation between linguistic philosophy and phenomenology on the question of language is made possible by a particular characteristic of these two movements of thought. One can in fact make out some similarity in their development: with regard to language, both began, as regards language, with a theory in which the use of ordinary language had to be measured by an ideal language, which meant, on the one side, a language founded upon intellectual intuition, and, on the other, a language constructed in accordance with the requirements of a logical syntax and semantics. Further developments on both sides were made regarding a description of language as it works, of language in everyday use, and attention was directed to the diversity of these uses and functions, without reference to or dependence upon the constructed languages of mathematicians or logicians.

One finds, moreover, that Wittgenstein’s writings have successively borne witness to both approaches, first in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and then in the Philosophical Investigations. He therefore is open to a comparison with Husserl at two moments of his development: the Husserl of the Logical Investigations takes the measure of language using a clearly defined logical ideal and the later Husserl of Formal and Transcendental Logic, Experience and Judgment, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy provides an approach to language from the point of view of a meaningful potential implied by the lived world or the lifeworld (Lebenswelt).

I have already attempted, in another lecture I gave in this country—in Washington—a preliminary comparative study with regard to the Logical Investigations and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Today, I would like to try a second confrontation at the level of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Husserl’s last writings. In order to make the comparison even more significant, I propose to tie it to one specific topic, deliberately chosen as typical of each author and as representative of their work as a whole. In my first comparative study, I focused upon the notion of the picture, which I contrasted with that of an intentional signification. Today, with regard to Wittgenstein, I will focus my analysis on the conception of signification as use, and I will be considering the development of this notion of use through that of a language-game; with regard to Husserl, I will essentially be looking at his texts about the foundation (Fundierung) of logical signification through a reference back to the lifeworld. These notions of foundation and reference back are certainly very different from those of use and a language-game. Nevertheless, they are located within a same phase of a development that I will call the grasp of
language on experience—whether one understands the term experience in the narrow sense of experience governed by logico-mathematical or experimental procedures or in the wider sense of everyday experience related to common objects, other people, and to a cultural world.

It seems to me that one can consider any aggregate of signs from two different points of view. On the one hand, it can be regarded as a system governed by internal relations, that is, merely by relations from sign to sign, semantic relations within a lexicon, morphological relations within a syntax. From this first point of view, one does not have to consider the relation of signs to things but only the relation between signs in a delimited “corpus”—this might be a lexicon, a grammar, the literature of a given period, a collection of myths; in each case, one operates according to the principle of a closure of the universe of meanings. But, on the other hand, one can ask how this system of signs works, what use people make of them, how they apply them to situations. It seems to me that every system of signs has to fit a dual requirement: on the one hand, it has to establish itself as a system through interrelations of meanings thereby establishing the disconnection between the sign and the thing; on the other hand, it has to get hold of the totality of what can be thought and said about experience and, by speaking of such experience, establish a relation between speaking subjects. If the first phase represents the disconnection between the sign and the thing, the second moment is that in which the sign, by applying to something, by grasping the sayable or thinkable experience, returns to the world. This is the moment when language is, so to speak, re-orientated toward the universe. The problem of meaning deals with these two movements and not just with the first or the second one. Frege saw this in his well-known article of 1892 on Sense and Reference. There is the problem of sense, which concerns the constitution of non-real and ideal [15849] objects, and there is the problem of reference, which is the power of our sentences to reach and designate reality. The notions we are going to examine with regard to Wittgenstein and Husserl are related to this second approach to language, that of the functioning of language, but only with one aspect of it. Other aspects, such as the notion of thought, communication, etc., could also be discussed; there would especially be a lot to say about the critique of the “mental” and, in general, about the case against “psychologism” in the writings of both Wittgenstein and Husserl. I thought I could make a tighter comparison by considering just use as the application to experience, to reality, whatever that may mean. This is what guided me in my choice of the terms use and reference back to the lifeworld in the later Wittgenstein and in the later Husserl. In both cases, language is considered in its actual functioning as a power of reaching out to..., of grasping, in short of speaking about the experience.

This way of posing the problem already provides us with an indication about what can be expected from such a comparative study. I want right away to dismiss the extravagant and naive idea of reaching a compromise between Husserl and Wittgenstein. In doing the history of philosophy, one has to be content with improving our understanding of a philosopher through comparison with another. Here then, things have to be left as they are: Husserl will remain Husserl and Wittgenstein will remain Wittgenstein. There probably is no single theory that would embrace both their solutions. I would just like to make use of their difference to highlight the relationship between two ways of approaching language, through its ideal meaning and through its reference to reality.

For this reason, I will propose, at the end of this historical survey, to explain the difference between Wittgenstein and Husserl through reference to a third term, which will have to do with something like a semiology, that is, an investigation of the internal relations of sign systems. Perhaps Wittgenstein and Husserl will be better understood if we consider them as
providing two different ways to overcome the disconnection between the sign and the thing, of breaching the closure of the universe of signs, and of redirecting them toward the universe.

I.

[15850] The origins of the problem we are going to address in Husserl’s later writings are to be found in the Logical Investigations. There one can see that the theory of meaning remains incomplete as long as only the ideal units of meaning (or valid identities), which constitute the logical tenor of our language, are considered. These ideal units are independent of the different acts constitutive of a multiplicity of psychological experiences in which they are represented. Regarded for their logical tenor, these ideal units are subject to formalization and axiomatization, and they depend on the constitution of a theory of theories, the ultimate task of logic. But in showing how these significations enable reality to be expressed, everything still remains to be done. In terms of a return to the world of things, Husserl distinguished a threefold hierarchy for logic: a logic of signification or of pure grammar, which eliminates malformed meanings and grammatical nonsense; a logic of coherence or logic of inference, which eliminates formal contradiction; and finally a logic of truth, which eliminates the material contradiction or discordance between language and experience. It is in this third form of logic that our enquiry takes place. What is it that marks the presence of a logic of truth within the constitution of signification? What is it that assimilates signification to this third form of logic? It is Frege’s problem of Bedeutung—very appropriately translated by “reference” in English—and which he distinguished from Sinn (sense). The Logical Investigations made several suggestions toward an answer: first of all, the meanings of ordinary language, like Russell’s “egocentric particulars,” carry a much reduced logical tenor—if one takes into consideration what is independent of circumstances. They precisely constitute “circumstantial significations,” that is, meanings understood only through reference to an environment [15851] supposedly known by a particular audience, and in relation to objects that one could point to in this environment: for example, “here,” “I,” proper names, and all the typical aspects of a world perceived by a particular community. To be sure, the early Husserl was convinced that circumstantial meanings could be reduced to ideal meanings, independent of any audience and environment. However, this represented a first breach in the ideality of logic.

Next, the Logical Investigations noted that saying something differs from talking about something. Saying something intends an ideality, talking about something refers to an object. Husserl called “Nennung” this function of nomination and distinguished it from that of signification per se—a dangerous way of expressing things, which seems to link Nennung to the distinction between names and sentences, and more precisely to the function of the proper name as designating a peculiar thing. For Husserl, nomination (Nennung) is wider than denomination (Benennung) and designates the reference to an object: for example, the conqueror of Jena and the man defeated at Waterloo signify different things but name one particular individual; universal names (Universellen Namen) have an identical meaning as predicates but are distributively applied to numerous objects. So nomination has a wider function than that of the name as such: it indicates the movement by which the designation can reach the reality of the object through the ideality of the sense. Thus two contrary movements inhabit a meaning: one that stops at the sense, the other that continues on to the object; the first separates the sense from the thing; the second refers the sense to the thing.
It is in the function of fulfillment (Erfüllung), however, that the signification is really completed. In the first philosophy of Husserl, this third logic was linked to this concept of fulfillment. Denomination still remains an aspect of signification that is retained even if the validity of this meaning is not guaranteed by its object. (Wittgenstein said [15852] similar things about the proper name in the absence of the thing to which it refers, in connection with the sword Excalibur when it is broken.) Fulfillment means the coincidence between the emptiness of the intended signification and the fullness of the thing as present. If nomination is still an aspect of signification as intentional, it is quite different from fulfillment, which responds to the empty “signifying intention” by presenting the thing. We are here at the origins of Husserl’s later philosophy as a whole. For the notion of “fulfillment” is a problem more than a solution. The difficulty relates both to a matter of fact and one of principle. A matter of fact: the fulfillment presents itself as a telos, the telos of a complete identification between meaning and intention; but this is a limit-idea, the ideal of an ultimate fulfillment, what classical philosophy called “adequation” or “being as truth.” In this ultimate fulfillment, the act that confers sense and the act that fulfills this sense—a the intended object and the seen object—are the same; in the act of “fulfilling” the sense, we are somehow experiencing a “that’s exactly it.”

However, the development of knowledge, as verified by us, always remains a fulfillment in progress, a conflict between saying and seeing. The “absolute it” (das absolute Selbst) is never attained; the full coincidence of what is intended with what is given is only a limit case. Two considerations elaborated at length by Husserl reveal clearly the inaccessible nature of this total fulfillment.

First of all, there is the universal role of syntax: what we believe to be a simple perception is not one impression or a complex of impressions but an experience overlaid by language. We no longer know what a dumb perception would be; we reflect upon judgments of perception, upon statements about perception, which contain a “this,” “that,” “here,” or “there,” proper names, classes of universals, classes of qualities, classes of relations. The result is that, in order to fulfill the sense of the simplest statement about perception, one would have to [15853] fulfill not only the signification of each proper name, with the presence of a particular thing, but all the other kinds of meanings too—demonstratives, universals, classes of qualities, classes of relations. In short, something like a categorial intuition would be required, which would stand in the same relation to these complexes as does the intuition of an individual to the proper name. In other words, one would have to take up all our expressions like proper names.

But a second difficulty would follow from the first one: assuming that one could eliminate what is syntactic from our statements of perception, this allegedly purified perception remains complex from another point of view. The whole phenomenology of perception, from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, has developed the theme that the perception of an object as a whole makes no sense: I perceive a thing from one side and then from another, under one aspect and then under another; what I call perception is the presupposed synthesis of a converging sequence of perceptions, a flow of outlines or profiles. I presuppose this convergence in a synthesis of identification—already described by Kant in the first edition of the Critique: “run through” (durchlaufen), “retain,” “identify.” What then becomes of the thing in itself? Is its presence reduced to the present outline, to the present profile? What I call a thing, isn’t it more an expectation or a memory than an actual presence, a retained past and an anticipated future? Doesn’t the phenomenology of perception bring us back to Hume’s belief? In any case, the perceptual synthesis makes perception an inadequate intuition not by accident but by its very
nature. But these two considerations—the first on the mediation of categorial intuition toward sensible intuition, the second on the inadequate character of sensible intuition—confirm the purely ideal character of the notion of complete “fulfillment” or of perfect adequation. All “fulfillment” is a “fulfillment” in progress [15854] presenting different levels of completion, indefinitely distinct from perfect adequation.

Beyond this factual difficulty, there is also a difficulty of principle: the “fulfillment” is stated using the metaphorical term of seeing; intueri in Latin means “to see.” But vision is heterogeneous with speech, which in the first place is heard; a heterogeneity that underlines an always possible interpretation—albeit one alien to Husserl—of evidence as a gross opaque feeling, extraneous to the articulation introduced into meaning by language. Doesn’t intuition have to be not just meaning but an articulated meaning? How can an intended meaning and a seen presence be adjusted to one another, coincide, be the same? In terms of a philosophy of language, how can speech, which is invisible, and vision, which is dumb, coincide? Doesn’t vision have to be meaning itself in order to “overlap” the meaning of speech?

Husserl was thus led to pose in less and less naive terms the question of “fulfillment.” It was this research that led him, in the second section of Formal and Transcendental Logic and in Experience and Judgment, to the idea of a pre-linguistic or pre-predicative meaning, which would constitute the origin, the pre-established foundation of logic. But one would not understand what all this is about if the method that Husserl calls “questioning back” (Rückfrage) was not introduced at the same time.

In fact, the danger of any resort to the idea of a sensible intuition of the “lifeworld” (the world of experience) is that of postulating a non-linguistic given, an impression in Hume’s sense, which would be completely foreign to the linguistic order and ultimately undiscoverable for human beings involved in a system of culture and language, such as we are. The method of the “questioning back” expressly excludes this resort to a brute given, heterogeneous to the semiotic order.

“Questioning back” means, first of all, that we are questioning [15855] from within the world of signs and on the basis of statements and sentences. In Husserl’s language, it is from the heart of a doxa that an enquiry is conducted. The term “doxa” is not meant to oppose opinion to truth; doxa is taken in the positive sense of the Theaetetus where opinion is the judgment that occurs at the last stage of a dianoia, of dialogue of the soul with itself. Doxa is holding something to be true, it involves taking up a position in which one reaches a judgment about a state of affairs. It is therefore not a question of starting from anything other than an already structured and meaningful order, ordered syntactically. On this basis, it is possible to develop a “questioning back” toward primordial lived experience that will never be directly confronted but will always be designated by a movement of “referring back.”

What then is this “referring back” and what does it “refer back” to? This “referring back” is a genesis—provided one properly understands the term “genesis.” It is not a chronological genesis, which would bring us back to a history of all of our acquisitions since childhood or even from the origins of humanity, neither is it a genetic epistemology in Piaget’s sense. It is a “genesis of meaning,” that is, a search for what legitimizes, for what founds the meaning, and not for what precedes it in history. It has to do with the presupposition involved in the current use of language. It is noteworthy that, in order to be better understood, Husserl took up again the problem of “occasional significations,” set aside since the Logical Investigations, that is, of
judgments comprising terms such as “this,” “here,” “I,” “you,” demonstratives, proper names, everyday names common to those talking to one another. Husserl admitted that the Logical Investigations did not get to the bottom of the question they were aimed at: for “occasional significations” are only understood given the presupposition of a common public and environment, what Husserl now calls “situational horizons.” This presupposition is a concealed one; disclosing it reveals an implicit intentionality, the “horizon-intentionality.”

This example shows quite clearly why this critique of evidence should be called an “intentional critique” by Husserl, that is, an uncovering of hidden intentions anterior to the constitution of a logical formalism. Widening the scope of the discussion on occasional judgments to an intentional theory of judgment, we shall say that every predicative truth “refers back” to ultimate objects about which we pass judgment, to judgment-substrates. In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl indicates that “we must start by going back from the judgment to the judgment-substrates, from truths to their object-about-which.” But with these substrates appear “elementary cores which no longer contain any syntax,” in short, individuals. So it is the logic of truth that refers us to these “ultimate cores” which one has to render intuitive.

Here one can see what “referring back” means: it is not about an implication that would still belong to the domain of logic. For formal logic ignores the individual; it only recognizes something in general—a point established in the first part of Formal and Transcendental Logic. It is not a question of an implication from a homogeneous principle at the level of formal logic, but of an intentional “referring back” from the domain of the logical to that of the pre-logical. In order to relate to something in general, the judgment has to relate to individuals. This constitutes the requirement for a regressive move that Husserl names reduction of judgments to ultimate judgments: “l'examen réducteur.”

Have we reintroduced an opaque element, radically heterogeneous to discourse, as we did at the beginning, in a static analysis of evidence? We suggest two replies to this question: first of all, it is from within the domain of logic that this intentional referring back is carried out. It is noticeable that Husserl no longer speaks of “fulfillment,” of fullness (Fülle), which still retains something of a heterogeneous relation between an emptiness and a fullness (a container and a content), a saying and a seeing, but instead of foundation and horizon. A horizon of the world, a horizon of individuals, these are not the immediate experiences that we can set ourselves apart from or from which we could start out. We are still concerned with a genesis of meaning, with a reduction of the logical to the primordial. Which is why Husserl talks about “hidden intentional implications” or again of a “phenomenological pointing back”—for example, from the nominalized predicate “red,” through the activity of nominalization, toward the original predicate “red.” In general terms, we can say that “it is the place systematically, starting from the judgment, to discover that… trueness of being (being “actual”) and truth as correctness of sense… belong already to the intentionality of experience.”

The very movement of “questioning back” prevents us from transforming the pre-predicative into a point of departure. To the question: haven’t we reintroduced a vision alien to the logos? Our first answer would be that it is the doxa itself that “refers back” endlessly to the originary primordial. And we would also reply that this “referring back” from one syntactic structure to another syntactic structure never presents us with an unarticulated absolute but with an experience that lends itself to formulation in language, an essentially sayable experience. This second point is as important as the first one: the recourse to the individual allows us to believe
that this “referring back” to the simple is the last step in the reduction to the primordial. Pre-predicative syntaxes are to be found in perception as well as in affectivity.¹⁶

What does all that mean? Mainly that syntax and logic require a motivation in experience in order to be founded in that experience. We have one example in the synthesis [15858] of identification of perception insofar as it represents a process of convergence among profiles enabling us to presuppose one and the same thing. This process takes the temporal form of retention and projection (protention). This temporal structure is an example of pre-predicative syntax. It attests that all the “this” into which the reference to the individual seems to dissolve, does not constitute an absolute diversity but have an affinity among themselves and allows one to assume experience to be a related sequence, a harmonious development, a unity. Such are the “essential foundations of motivation”¹⁷—we cannot insist too strongly upon this “without which” that characterizes Husserl’s regressive analysis. Husserl continues¹⁸ “Has to do with,” a neutral expression that encompasses cases of discordance and concordance as a prescription of experience.¹⁹ It is this coherence of things that results in our language being tied down; even though the conventions of symbolic logic are free, the logic of truth is tied down by the “coherence of things” (Zusammenhang). The form of predication, with its S and p, would not exist without this “material congruity of the stuffs of possible judgments.”²⁰ Formal logic itself implies, in a hidden way, that through this connection the S’s, p’s, etc. “have something to do with each other’ materially.”²¹ To say the same thing even more strongly: “Traditional logic is formal apophantic logic and a formal ontology for a real world supposed to be already constituted from the beginning… It is to this world that all judgments, all truths, all the sciences with which logic has to do, are related.”²²

At the conclusion of this analysis it appears that the exercise of language requires two poles: a telos and an origin. Every philosophy of language arises from such consideration. On the one hand, discourse calls for formalization by elimination [15859] of the specific, and the possibility of such formalization is not eliminated by the reference back to the originary: it is rather revealed as something astonishing. But what follows is even more surprising: this world exists with its prescriptions of meaning. It is through the “questioning back” that I understand at the same time the telos and the origin.

Therefore it would be completely misleading to represent Husserl as the philosopher who starts with the logical in order to return to the world. We are always located within language, culture, in the movement toward formalization and the construction of theories, along with the originary remains what our signs refer to. We are meaningful through and through and reality is what is aimed by the totality of our signs. We shall never get back to the peaceful point of view of the immediate, for we are referred back to the point of origin (the originary) from the very heart of the logical domain. It is from the domain of discourse that we incline towards the silent presence, always criss-crossed by our signs. Even though signs, culture, and science draw us away from the primordial and even separate us from it, our signs only remain signs because they continue to relate to individuals within the horizon of a world. The logic of the truth is what brings us back endlessly from the logical domain toward the world.

II.

[15860] When one reads Wittgenstein after Husserl, it really seems difficult to find a point of contact between these two philosophies of language. In Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein makes no attempt to move from a logical language to ordinary language by means of “transcendental reflection,” from language to the world by means of a “questioning back” into the conditions of language. On the contrary, the philosopher directly confronts language and looks at how it works in everyday situations. We are told not to think but to look. Language is shifted from the field of philosophical worries to that of its successful functioning. It is the field of use, where language produces certain effects, that is, adapted responses in the realm of human and social action. One might argue that Wittgenstein stands in the place that Husserl laboriously struggles to reach: Husserl asks how formalism “refers back,” through a theory of truth, to a pre-existing world of individuals, whereas Wittgenstein examines the functioning of a language that cannot be separated from the non-linguistic context of needs and practical intentions. This is why the one carries out an enquiry and thus a “questioning back,” while the other describes what human beings do when they successfully say something.

Does this mean that because of such an initial divergence, no further point of contact would exist? I would like to show that one can at least find Husserl’s problem, if not his answer to it, within the unresolved difficulties of Wittgenstein’s theories.

The first consequence—and we could really say the first advantage of Wittgenstein’s approach—is to relax the hold of a unitary theory of language functioning. As long as one refers to an ideal model—which for Wittgenstein can only be a constructed model—the various uses of language derive their unity from this reference to a model. When one starts off without [15861] a model, what can be found? Innumerable uses, a few of which are supplied by Wittgenstein in paragraph 23 of his *Philosophical Investigations*.23

In order to do justice to this uncountable multiplicity, Wittgenstein introduces a comparison of these uses with games. One should not lose sight that it is an analogy and that only certain things are carried over from the notion of game to that of language. For example, it seems to me that the opposition between what is serious as opposed to what is just a game—an opposition that can be found in Plato—plays no part here. The point of comparison lies in the fact that the diversity of games is not subsumed by some essence of language and that each game is appropriate to a specific situation. Each game delimits a field wherein certain procedures are valid as long as one plays this game and not another; it works like a condensed model of behavioral patterns wherein different players play different roles. The most important consequence for this reduction of each language-game to a specific and limited use is quite well known; it concerns the issue of denomination (naming) that we have already looked at in Husserl’s writings, through the “referring back” of logic to reality.

The critique of denomination should be extricated beforehand from what makes it complicated and from what specifically belongs to English-language philosophy, starting with the critique of the atomistic theory of language, according to which it is possible to analyze names into irreducible meaningful constituents that would represent simple constituents of reality. This critique of “simples”24 is wrapped up in that of denomination: in effect, true proper names, logically simple names, would be the goal of the theory of denomination in a completely analyzed language. We will not ask here whether the language is wholly analyzable, but we are concerned with [15862] the question whether “simples” are names. The same thing should be said about the critique of the “picture theory” which was Wittgenstein’s theory in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It is also implied in the critique of denomination: the structural parallelism at stake in the “picture theory” is regarded here as a privileged form of the name/thing relation. Saying that there is a homological structure in reality corresponding to every signification is still
to “sublimate” the alleged relation between the name and the named thing. Therefore, the problem of analysis into “simples” (according to the logical atomism) and that of structural parallelism (within the picture theory) are closely intermingled in the discussion of denomination. Here we have to ignore this twofold polemic which does not directly concern the comparison with Husserl, since phenomenology is in question neither in the analysis into simple constituents nor even in the picture theory for which it has an alternative solution. On the other hand, phenomenology is in question in the general critique of denomination, in that phenomenology considers that talking about something is not one game among others but a function of all signification. That is why we have to pay close attention to this argument. According to Wittgenstein, a good part of our philosophy of meaning proceeds from an overestimation of the role of denomination, which has been regarded since Saint Augustine as the paradigm of the speech act. For Wittgenstein, naming is a special game, played under certain circumstances. For example, when I am asked: “what is that called?” I reply: “that is called N,” most frequently, I am showed the object, and I link the name pronounced to me and the thing I am showed. So it is relative to a certain need and thanks to a certain practice that we resort to what Wittgenstein calls “ostensive definitions,” which remain dependent upon the game of learning and assigning names. What is more, these “ostensive definitions” are themselves very diverse. [15863] Can someone be doing the same thing when defining a color and a form? Can someone be talking about colors in the same way when using them to identify an object or to compare nuances, or to obtain a new color by mixing? The limited character of this game appears even more clearly when we include, in the list of things named, the names of numbers, of demonstratives (this, that, here, there), which do not appear at all in the class of names. Nobody ever says, “that is called ‘this’.” It is therefore necessary to ask how one uses these words in order to know what they mean. At another point, Wittgenstein notes that denomination often is not a game at all, nor even a move in a game, but the preparation for the use of a word within an actual interchange. For example, naming the pieces in a game of chess is not yet playing, and one has to know something about the game to name the pieces. Wittgenstein also says, in order to mark the limits of the game of denomination, that the ascription of colors is a game in which it is not something that is represented but a means of representing something that is at play.25

The critique of denomination thus opens the horizon to a resolutely pluralist and, so to speak, “multiplist” conception of the use of language.26 As for the games themselves—the analogy would be the most striking at this point—these uses form families, whose members are more or less related, without there being a fixed essence to the language-game and therefore to language27 nor even a complete enumeration of the different kinds of games. If one “looks” instead of “thinking,” one can see the shift from one game to another through a series of similarities and differences that overlap and intersect. There is not even a border, an inclusive perimeter that would allow saying: “the games end here.” The most that can be said is: “this and those similar things are called games.”28 So one has to settle for a [15864] non-delimited concept of game, for which there are only examples and families of examples, allowing in turn similar constructions. No totalization of these varied types is possible; therefore, one cannot argue for a general form of propositions or of language.29 Words only appear alike; the diversity of their uses is concealed.

Has Wittgenstein succeeded, however, in not elaborating a general theory of language? This is open to dispute. As soon as one asserts that there are various languages, that these languages resemble games, that these games are innumerable, one says something general about...
language. Indeed there is at least one idea that looks like a general idea in the Philosophical Investigations, that of use. In spite of his precautions, Wittgenstein has enunciated a general proposition. It is worth dwelling on this notion of use, as it can allow initiating the discussion with Husserl. Two issues are involved: a polemical one and an affirmative one. The notion of use was originally intended by English-language philosophy as a way of taking up again the old battle against “entities.” This critique is what is at stake in the discussion on denomination: entities are sublimated names. For Locke, words are names for ideas. Taking advantage of this sublimation, language becomes a contemplative theoretical activity, a vision of the meaning of words. The notion of use is thus directed against any theory that would make meaning something occult, either in the sense of something indestructible or in the sense of a mental entity. Because of its objective and, so to speak, public nature, the notion of use conceals no mystery; it avoids examining what people think, feel, or experience. All that matters is what one does with a game. In the practice of language, everything is exposed; if meaning is use, it is a matter of indifference whether this use is or is not accompanied by a mental process, by images, or by feelings. In this way, all mystery is dismissed from language; everything is revealed to us. Language becomes a function in which nothing is occult: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”

In more positive terms, the notion of use implies that language-games are incorporated into human activity that works: they represent forms of life: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.” Interpreted this way, the notion of use lends itself directly to a confrontation with Husserl. Do they both not speak of a lifeworld? On what points do they agree or disagree, however? And why?

It seems to me that the discussion can be carried out on two levels: on the level of the language that one is talking about and on the level of the language that one talks in—that is, the philosophical language employed by Husserl and Wittgenstein in their respective philosophical enquiries.

Let us first remain on the level of the language both of them talk about. Husserl and Wittgenstein talk about language in relation to life, but they seem to say things that are incompatible and that hardly admit comparison. For Husserl, the lifeworld is not directly viewed but indirectly intended as what the logic of truth refers back to; the lifeworld is intentionally aimed by way of a “questioning back” from logical propositions. Wittgenstein, on the contrary, would immediately locate himself in this lifeworld, where language is a form of activity, like eating, drinking, and sleeping. Nevertheless, I wonder if it would not possible to improve our understanding of these two undertakings by providing them with a common norm of comparison borrowed from linguistics, to which neither Husserl nor Wittgenstein make reference. In particular, they do not seem to be aware of the distinction, introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Course in General Linguistics, between “language” and “speaking.” We will see if this distinction might clarify the debate. I will start from Wittgenstein’s last proposition: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.” This text might prove that Wittgenstein was not after a theory of “language” but of “speaking,” It is the “speaking” that is “part of an activity or a form of life,” not the “language.” But “speaking” presupposes “language,” first, as a social phenomenon—that is, as an institution that belongs to everyday life, which is even a form of life—then (and more especially) as a system of signs. Now, if “speaking” is a form of activity, that
is not true of “language” understood as a closed system in which one sign is opposed to another and in which signs considered individually presuppose the totality of the system. The system becomes detached from life in that it tends to close in on itself. Therefore, a theory of language would presuppose two definitions of meaning and not just one: a definition that reflects the belonging to a system of signs and a definition that reflects the application to reality, its use. The second definition could be Wittgenstein’s: the meaning of a word is its use in a language, providing one understands by “language” the combination of signs in sentences in a given situation. But this definition presupposes the preceding one, which concerns the constitution of the sign as a sign, prior to its use. In this sense, one should say that any pragmatic definition of language presupposes a semiological definition. In this semiological definition, we must consider “language” as a system and not “speaking” as a use; each sign has to be defined [15867] as the internal relation between a signifier and a signified, and all the signs have to be interrelated by way of their differentiation within the system.

At this price, it is possible to retain Wittgenstein’s notion of “use” and even to draw from it all the advantages of its application to life in an indefinite variety of uses, exceeding its logical function in every direction. But use does presuppose the constitution of the symbolic function.

This distinction between “language” and “speaking” allows us to ground the diversity of language-games upon a unitary function of language, without the latter implying an essence common to the multiplicity of uses. This unitary function is the unity of language as a system, what is found in phonology, in morphology, and even in lexicology, since the “corpus” of a language at any given moment is always a finite and delimited corpus. So we can retain not only the notion of use but also that of multiplicity of language-games, providing that these languages are referred back to the language, as “speaking” is referred back to “language.” We can even give free reign more easily to the diversity of uses in that we have strongly emphasized the systematic nature of language. With this systematic unity of language as opposed to the innumerable diversity of the uses of speaking, we are brought back to Husserl’s problem of language as “referring back” to the lifeworld. In effect, “language,” as opposed to “speaking” is not one part of an activity or a form of life, like eating, drinking, sleeping; it refers to a form of life. It is not because the sign as such is not present to reality and institutes a distance from life that language is not a part of an activity or a form of life; it is precisely because it does not belong to life, because it is an incorporeal entity or a “lecton”—according to the Stoics’ analysis—that it can transform all our human activities and all our forms of life into meaningful activities.

[15868] Thus, there is a primary operation before any use, a primary institution, that of the sign, which confers meaning upon sensible elements. It is this constitution of meaning that primarily deserves the name of signification or, to talk in Frege’s language, of “sense” (Sinn). All the various logical activities are grafted onto this constitution of sense—since this meaning contains, at least potentially, a logical tenor likely to be included in the activities of formalization that give signs a second degree, a third degree, etc., absence compared to reality and life. It is because the first movement is a centrifugal movement, with respect to life and the activities of life, that the use of language, that is to say, its application to reality and life, becomes problematic. It is no longer enough to look, one has to think. One has to think what the use means when the connection between language as a system of signs and as sense has been re-connected. One has to think in order to relate language as a speech-act to language as a system of signs. In short, one has to think about the relation of the event to the institution. Consequently, the application of language to reality cannot be taken for granted; it even becomes bewildering: if language is other
than reality, how can the sign express the thing? The problem of the meaning is thus posed a second time: it is no longer a matter of one term opposed to another within a system, but of a reference to an object, of a grasp upon reality.

We thus return to Husserl’s notion of “reference back,” after having set out from Wittgenstein’s notion of use. It is necessary to get back from the domain of logic to life by way of a “questioning back,” for we are forever separated from life by the very function of the sign: we no longer live life, we only designate it, we signify it, and we therefore are indefinitely referred back to it, by interpreting it in many different ways. Furthermore, in addition to [15869] the notion of “reference back” from the logical domain to life, we rediscover a form of denomination that cannot be reduced to language-games. Maybe one should say that there are two senses of denomination, a narrow sense and a broad sense. The narrow sense is related to “speaking;” it represents one game among other games (“How is this called? It is called N”). The broad sense of the denomination has to do with “language” (as a system); it represents a general characteristic of semiology, namely, the counterpart, within any sign, of its incorporation as a differential element in a system. This counterpart consists in the reference to something: when I speak, I say something about something; to “speak about” is to denominate in the broad sense. Frege made a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung this way, and Husserl—who rejected Frege’s terminology but did take up his method of analysis—distinguished, on the one hand, Sinn (or Bedeutung) and Benennung, on the other.

Does this amount to saying that one falls back into the sublimation of names and reconstitutes a world of hidden entities? I do not think so. The dichotomy that Wittgenstein wants to impose upon us is misleading: what, in a meaning, is not a use, is not necessarily a transcendent or mental entity. Since the Middle Ages, the theory of concept and the theory of universals has been a struggle to found the use of words upon significations without the latter being realized in a higher or an interior world; these significations represent the systematic conditions according to which a determinate use of the forms of language is possible; in short, it comes down to an attempt to avoid the dichotomy between Platonic realism and empiricism. Linguistics and phenomenology today allow taking up this struggle again. Linguistics does this by relating language to the semantic potentialities from which a multitude of uses is possible. It is certainly true that, in comparison to actual use, a signification [15870] is “indestructible;” it represents a paradigm case of use. But their place in the system constitutes the whole reality of these indestructible names; this simply means that use of the same word in different contexts does not alter the place of the word in the linguistic system. Phenomenology extends this semantics of the linguist by describing the act of signifying as an intentional act that cannot be reduced to a contemplation of essences or an introspection directed toward mental entities. This intentional act aims at the unity of a meaning, as a unity of validity; and this meaning is an ideality, unreal in comparison with the whole of nature. It is therefore from the perspective of language (as a system) that a signification can be held to be a unity of meaning. This treatment of the signification, at the level of language, does not exclude but rather requires another definition of meaning, which would pertain to the word as it operates in a sentence. Then all of Wittgenstein’s considerations on the multiple uses of language become relevant: indeed, it is only in a sentence considered as a unit of speech that the word has a meaning; and this meaning is its use.
In this way, we have not reconciled Husserl and Wittgenstein. We have just placed them, not by giving them not a common denominator but a common reference, alien to both of them: the relation between “language” (as a system) and “speaking” in Saussure’s linguistics.

The different meaning that they give to philosophical activity is what prevents us from combining them inside a convenient eclectic system. We will take up this question only in terms of a second question with respect to which we would like to confront the two philosophers, namely, how they both develop a reflection on language. One can in fact ask to what kind of language, to what language-game, the Philosophical Investigations belongs. By asking this question, we rejoin, but this time at a second-degree level, the distance from language to life, and so the possibility of questioning the “reference back” of this second-degree language to the primordial reality of a world.

At first sight, Wittgenstein’s undertaking seems very modest: it amounts to a description of language-games which does not seem to set at a distance the things described. Husserl, on the contrary, appears to set out from further off or from higher up, from a super-language established as a judicial authority; that is why he is able to pose the problem of a return to the lifeworld. Wittgenstein seems never to have left it. But we have our suspicions: is this description as down-to-earth as it appears? Does it not proceed from an evaluation of the destination of language, and therefore from a point of view that has already taken its distance in relation to every game and which considers itself authorized to confirm some and exclude others? All of the languages that govern practical activities are accepted, such as those dealing with bricks, apples, tables, colors, etc.; each of these activities is a little world wherein a number of players and quite flexible rules are involved. These games are diverse and discontinuous, as ordinary concerns of life are. It is understood, on the other hand, that to talk about the world, about human beings in the world, or situations and projects would be to formulate typically philosophical propositions in which language would spin its wheels in a vacuum, would “go on vacation.” A therapeutic program, that of curing human beings of metaphysical questions, is thus implied in what makes itself out to be a mere description. For this reason, Wittgenstein can say at the same time that philosophy leaves things as they are, that it does not pretend to be able “to repair spider’s webs with its fingers,” and that it has to cure itself of its own enquiries. Everyday life, and not simply everyday language, is what is actually “left as it is;” the rules that games propose are those of an accepted practice. Capitulation to everyday life, with its concerns and scattered games, disguises itself beneath the apparent modesty of the work of description. Indeed, every language game has to be respected, except those proceeding from astonishment and perplexity about everyday life itself. Such is the normative or evaluative assertion underlying the only positive thesis of the book: the aim of description is to bring language back from its metaphysical use to its use in everyday life. But bringing language back to everyday life also means to oblige it to end its career in the same pragmatic sphere to which it had been confined in the first place.

This appraisal and this normative activity, underlying the description, attest that the latter does not belong to the same circle of activities as do the language-games thus described. Philosophy is not itself a language-game or rather its language-game is not a form of life. Philosophy withdraws ordinary language from life by revealing it to be a game; it gives language the appearance of a game. There is an expression of Wittgenstein’s that we have ignored so far and which enunciates that distance: the notion of grammar. Wittgenstein uses it in a sense that is not rigorously a linguistic one, with regards to the rules of a particular game. The man in the street does not know that it is “grammar” that decides what kind of game is being played; only...
the philosopher knows that the game is ruled by a grammar. The man in the street moves from one game to another and is always in this or that game; only the philosopher can say that he complies with the grammar of a game. However, new kinds of questions are raised with this notion of grammar; they may be called transcendental questions in the sense that they are no longer inside a language-game but are about language-games compared one with another. So there is a linguistic activity— that of Wittgenstein, precisely—that consists in talking about language-games and their grammar. It is for such activity that the question of the relation between these grammars and reality ineluctably arises. It can be seen in the discussion about sensations and material things: in fact, language about sensations is quite distinct from language about objects. Should one say that the existential assertion according to which there are things such as sensations and things such as material objects is only a grammatical statement? But to say that a language-game of a certain kind is being played actually amounts to uttering a discourse about the conditions of the possibility for one kind of object in one kind of language. And all the problems about the relation to the object, from Kant to Husserl and Strawson, arise again. It is even a typically Kantian statement to say that it is the functioning of words in language that confers meaning on assertions about sensations and material objects. Certainly, this problem can be solved in a different way. Husserl, for example, refuses to admit that the notion of material object might be defined by the grammar of a game, nor by any particular kind of linguistic practice. Grammar cannot say what kind of object something is; the possibility of a given linguistic practice is founded by the different kinds of objects in referring back intentionally to this or that kind of object.

Whatever the manner chosen to resolve it, the problem of the relation of grammar to the world is posed as a transcendental problem: one no longer stands within a game but rather thinks about games. This reflexive activity too has its language, which certainly has its roots in ordinary language—when one speaks of “bodies,” “mind,” “sensation,” “object,” “thought,” “existence,” and “language.” We can neither accept this language as it is, nor reject it, but rather have to correct and criticize it. And this critique is no longer an activity of life, nor one game among others. We are not engaged in a practical activity anymore, but in a theoretical enquiry. So Wittgenstein would be right in thinking that the “speaking” of language is part of an activity or a form of life. The language in which this is said, however, is no longer a form of life but of reflection. And it is for this attitude of reflection that the lifeworld figures as a foundation of meaning, to which “questioning back” endlessly refers.
“The Later Wittgenstein and the Later Husserl on Language” from the Paul Ricœur Archive

Samuel Lelièvre and Catherine Goldenstein

This text comes from a section of the folders labeled Inventory I (lectures, seminars, conferences) in the Paul Ricœur Archives (Fonds Ricœur, IPT, Paris). This collection includes material that runs from lectures titled “La phénoménologie de Husserl: langage et phénoménologie” given at the Faculté de Nanterre in 1964 (dossier 139, Inventory I) to the those delivered at the University of Toronto (Canada) and the University of Texas at Austin (USA) in November 1968 (dossier 103), along with lectures given at Nanterre in 1965 on “analytic philosophy” (dossier 100) and lectures on language, given in 1965, 1966, and 1967 (dossier 109, 116), again at Nanterre, along with important handwritten notes for his lectures on language, prepared in French, for Nanterre, and in English, for North America (dossier 120). A mimeographed document titled “Phenomenology and Language” (dossier 102), related to three lectures given at Wheaton College, Illinois (USA) in October 1967, should also be mentioned.

In at least two of the folders, in which lectures from Nanterre were kept (dossiers 109, 116, and 120), it is noted, at the point where Ricœur planned to talk about Wittgenstein, that the passages about this philosopher are missing. Yet, according to notes taken by some students at the time, those lectures on Wittgenstein were in fact delivered. Ricœur probably meant to indicate to the students preparing summaries for the class from their notes that he was not content with these lectures as presented. As can be seen in other places in his papers, he would sometimes remove a section in order to expand it, like rolling a snowball. So where something is noted as “missing” one can sometimes find indications added later by Ricœur to his lecture manuscripts such as “here lect. about Wittgenstein II and Husserl II” or “Wittg. I and Husserl I.”

The lectures and conferences on Husserl and Wittgenstein were brought together in a separate folder (dossier 134) by Ricœur. This folder has the following material:


5 - Husserl and Wittgenstein: II. The later Husserl and the Philosophical Investigations [15750-15888]. Lectures given at Johns Hopkins University in April 1966. This is where the pages of the text “The later Wittgenstein and the later Husserl on language” [15847-15873] and its French version “Le dernier Wittgenstein et le dernier Husserl sur le langage” [15799-15822] are located. They have never been published before.

7 - The Tractatus of Wittgenstein and the question of the subject. [15913-15925]

Clearly, the French archival document that we publish today had received a lot of attention from Ricœur. We find all the preparatory steps: from draft manuscripts to the final typed text, carefully proofread and corrected by his hand. He included references to the passages cited from the books in his working library, which are accessible today at the Fonds Ricœur; the relevant passages can be found underlined or framed in these books.

The text was probably written first in French, then delivered in English by Ricœur, who managed to have it translated. This English version we offer today is a document based on material prepared by Ricœur but edited in order to prepare a clearer English text, albeit one still representative of what is in the archive. Given its relevance for this issue of Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies, the Editorial Committee of the Fonds Ricœur has authorized the publication of this text, quite representative of the way Paul Ricœur was working at the time in question. A first French version was prepared and edited by Marc-Antoine Vallée in 2009. This version has been completely revised and re-edited by Samuel Lelièvre, who has also prepared and edited the English version. Assistance in accessing the archival materials and in the editing process was provided by Catherine Goldenstein.

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We must thank the editors of this issue of Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies for their suggestions regarding the preparation of a scholarly version of Ricœur’s text and Prof. David W. Pellauer for his proofreading of the English version.

S L. & C. G.
Editor’s note: the numbers in brackets indicate the sheet numbers of the original document in the Ricœur Archives. The edition of this text, prepared by Paul Ricœur for teaching purposes, is ruled by the three following principles: 1) to leave the features of a verbal presentation as they are; 2) to be the closest to the original document in English—corrections have been made, however, regarding the punctuation, mistakes (missing words, typographical errors, or regarding the English language etc.), and regarding the academic presentation; 3) to include bibliographical references and quotations Ricœur is relying on for his analysis. Therefore, this English version is left with some imperfections and is not completely similar to the French version. For more details on these issues relating to the origin of this text, we refer to the note entitled “The later Wittgenstein and the later Husserl on language’ in Paul Ricœur Archives,” which is included at the end of this article.


Editor’s note: the original document includes the following indication at this point: "(note sur Guillaume)." This may refer to the dossier n°104 in the Ricœur Archives. This dossier deals with linguist Gustave Guillaume and contains around twenty handwritten pages prepared for a course.


Editor’s note: Ricœur refers here to Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), §39: “But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is not a name?—That is just the reason. For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: a name ought really to signify a simple. And for this one might perhaps give the following reasons: The word ‘Excalibur,’ say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if ‘Excalibur’ is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. So the word ‘Excalibur’ must disappear when the sense is analyzed and its place be taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call
these words the real names." When consulting Paul Ricœur’s personal library, it appears that the philosopher seemed to have a good knowledge of the English translation of Wittgenstein’s book, for he used to annotate terms in English to replace terms used in the French translation of 1961.

8 Edmund Husserl (1900–1901), *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 199. *Editor’s note*: from now on, the footnotes that do not start with "Editor’s note" refer to bibliographical references within the document; in the French manuscript, Ricœur indicated in parenthesis either a page number from the French translation of Husserl’s *Formal and Transcendental Logic* or a paragraph number or several paragraph numbers from the French translation of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*. (In a few rare cases of repetition of the same information, we have included only one note to this text.)


10 *Editor’s note*: Paul Ricœur notes in the margin of the French handwritten version: "Lire 270" ("Read 270"). He is referring to to page 270 of *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale* (French edition) and to page 200 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.


12 *Editor’s note*: Ricœur notes in the text of the English version of this document: "Read p. 276 end 282." The reference is to the French translation of *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*; pages 204-208 of the English translation of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

13 Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 204. *Editor’s note*: Ricœur quotes the beginning of a sentence from *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale*, 276. Here is the full passage from *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 204: "and reductive deliberation teaches, as an Apriori, that every conceivable judgment ultimately (and either definitely or indefinitely) has relation to individual objects (in an extremely broad sense, real objects), and therefore has relation to a real universe, a ‘world’ or a world-province, ‘for which it holds good’.”


16 *Editor’s note*: Ricœur notes in the text of the English version of this document: "286 and note b." The reference is to *Logique formelle et logique transcendantale* along with footnote b; page 212 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* along with footnote 2.


18 *Editor’s note*: a full quotation is missing here; Ricœur only notes “294” in different documents. He reference is again to page 286 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (French edition) and to page 218 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, especially the following passage: "Every judgment as such has its intentional genesis or, as we can also say, its essentially necessary motivational foundations, without which it could not at first exist in its primitive mode, certainty, nor be modelized thereafter.
These foundations include the necessity that the syntactical stuffs occurring in the unity of judgment have something to do with one another.”


21 Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, 219. *Editor’s note*: Here is the full passage from *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: “Formal-logical considerations and theory, with their focusing on what is Objective, have nothing to say about that; but every one of their logical forms, with their S’s and p’s, with all the literal symbols occurring in the unity of a formal nexus, tacitly presuppose that, in this nexus, S and p, and so forth, have ‘something to do with each other’ materially.”

22 Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §23. *Editor’s note*: Here is the passage form the *Philosophical Investigations*: “But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—there are countless kinds [...] Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: Giving orders and obeying them [...] Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)”

24 *Editor’s note*: This is the concept Wittgenstein used for “simple objects,” in making his distinction between “name,” “word,” and “object.” Wittgenstein notably used the example of the distinction between the “word ‘Excalibur’” and the “sword Excalibur”—playing on the phonetic proximity of these words in English. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §39. This passage is already quoted in note 7 (supra).

25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §50. *Editor’s note*: here is this passage from the *Philosophical Investigations*: “What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element’s being (non-being); just as when everything that we call ‘destruction’ lies in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the destruction of an element. One would, however, like to say: existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist, one could not even name it and so one could say nothing at all of it [...]—Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: ‘sepia’ means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not. We can put it like this: This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but is a means of representation.”

26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §18. *Editor’s note*: here is this passage from *Philosophical Investigations*: “Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets
and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”

27 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §65. *Editor’s note*: here is this passage of *Philosophical Investigations*: “Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena [i.e., the *general form of propositions and of language*] have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all ‘language’.”


30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §43. *Editor’s note*: here is this passage of *Philosophical Investigations*: “For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.”


32 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §116. *Editor’s note*: here is the full passage: “When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ ‘I,’ ‘proposition,’ ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their every-day use.”


34 *Editor’s note*: Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), notably 14–15 and 77–78. We have included Ferdinand de Saussure’s concepts, i.e., “langue” and “parole” translated as “language” and “speaking” in English. In his notes and corrections, Ricœur refers to the Saussurean distinction as an opposition between “language as a system” and “language as speech-act and discourse;” he in fact mainly uses the term “discourse” in his subsequent analysis instead of “language of speech-act and discourse.” The choice to replace it by “speaking” has been made because (1) this is the term used for “parole” in English translations of Saussure’s work, (2) it does not alter or change the sense of Ricœur’s developments, and (3) it actually fits in with his developments on Wittgenstein.


36 *Editor’s note*: Ricœur here refers to Wittgenstein’s formula in *Philosophical Investigations*, §106: “Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,—to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in
turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers.”