Translation, compromise, forgiveness
Exploring the role of original goodness in an ethics of capability

Amy Daughton
Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, UK

Abstract
While Ricoeur’s argumentation is philosophical, the symbols of religion nevertheless form an integral part of what his work investigated, and represent a meeting point between conviction and critique. Recent work has considered how the symbol of an originally good creation can shed light on Ricoeur’s philosophy. This paper builds from that proposal by considering the significance of the original goodness of creation for Ricoeur’s ethics of capability: in translation; through disagreements and compromise across economies of worth; and in the exchanges of memory transcended by forgiveness. These models operate within an ethics of recognition, where the original goodness of creation can be detected in human plurality in itself, as a presupposed horizon to enable constructive disagreement, and in an orientation to the good as a possibility of human freedom.

Keywords: Creation; Recognition; Moral Norm; Common Good.

Résumé
Si l’argumentation de Ricœur est philosophique, les symboles de la religion n’en font pas moins partie intégrante de ce que son œuvre explore, et représentent un point de rencontre entre conviction et critique. Des travaux récents ont examiné comment le symbole d’une création originellement bonne peut éclairer la philosophie de Ricœur. Cet article s’appuie sur cette proposition en examinant la signification de la bonté originelle de la création pour l’éthique des capacités de Ricœur : dans la traduction, à travers les désaccords et les compromis qui traversent les économies de la grandeur, et dans les échanges de mémoire transcendés par le pardon. Ces modèles opèrent au sein d’une éthique de la reconnaissance, où la bonté originelle de la création peut être détectée dans la pluralité humaine elle-même, comme un horizon présupposé censé permettre un désaccord constructif, et dans une orientation vers le bien en tant que possibilité de la liberté humaine.

Mots-clés : création ; reconnaissance ; norme morale ; bien commun.
Translation, compromise, forgiveness
Exploring the role of original goodness in an ethics of capability

Amy Daughton
Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham, UK

Introduction: the biblical symbol of an originally good creation

When treating Ricoeur and religion, there are some classic reference points in the literature: the accusation of “crypto-theology”\(^1\) that arose from other French philosophers, by Ricoeur’s own account and critique; his famous description that he “always walked upon two legs”\(^2\) of religious conviction and philosophical argument; the scholarly acknowledgement of both philosophical independence and rigour and the reality of Ricoeur’s sustained interest in “listening”\(^3\) to (his own) biblical Christian tradition and its symbolic heritage. Religion, in the form of a western Christianity, is both important to Ricoeur and distinguished – bracketed but an integral part of what his philosophy investigated.

Recognizing this distinction is a frequent methodological starting point of any theologian or scholar of religion when deploying Ricoeur’s work. It has itself been the subject of focused discussion and study in the work of Christof Mandry, Boyd Blundell, Brian Gregor, amongst others. Analyses by theologians highlight a further distinction for the status of theology as a systematic discipline versus the contribution of a scriptural text handled within a community of interpretation. Mandry has made this distinction sharply, suggesting that more speculative theology is “insensitive for the sense of the genuine biblical project,”\(^4\) resulting in Ricoeur developing a “rather negative view” of speculative theology,\(^5\) while for Gregor “Ricoeur prefers to focus on exegesis rather than the higher-level conceptual thinking of theology.”\(^6\) This analysis reflects Ricoeur’s own emphasis:

A hermeneutical philosophy, on the contrary, will try to get as close as possible to the most originary expressions of a community of faith, to those expressions through which the

---


\(^5\) Mandry, “The Relationship between Philosophy and Theology in the Recent Work of Paul Ricoeur,” 64.

members of this community have interpreted their experience for the sake of themselves or for others’ sake.\textsuperscript{7}

Such projects are set in contrast with theological work that reads scriptural narrative too swiftly as if already establishing philosophical conclusions, confusing symbol and argument in ways that could be “authoritarian and opaque.”\textsuperscript{8} Instead, Ricoeur’s detour is by way of symbols, which could be characterised as attending to a symbolic heritage that illustrates facets of a fundamentally philosophical problem of the human constitution with its complex relationship of freedom and nature.

The field of Ricoeur Studies then has this distinction on a reasonably solid basis. This allows us to move more swiftly to the questions that arise from such symbols, to follow the thought to which they “give rise.” In this case, to consider Ricoeur’s philosophical reflection on human agency, and the models of action that he proposed for European civil society: First, the paradigm of translation, as foundational for the “New Ethos for Europe.”\textsuperscript{9} Second, exploring a detour through “Cities” or “Economies of Worth” from sociologists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot which Ricoeur would use in his analysis of philosophies of recognition. Third, the exchange of memory as a further recognition of the other, leading to the singular case of forgiveness. My interest is in the opportunities presented in a plurality of social imaginaries and the challenges presented by moral disagreement, which have become all the sharper in Europe today from the mid-1990s when Ricoeur was writing on these models.\textsuperscript{10}

What I consider throughout is the possible role being played by the philosophical consideration of “originary goodness,” reflected in the religious symbol of creation. Such a possibility is introduced by Ricoeur’s own reflections on the significance of Immanuel Kant’s reasoning on religion and morality for his own work: “As radical as evil may be it will never be more originary than goodness, which is the \textit{Ursprung} in the field of ethics, the orientation to the good as being rooted in the ontological structure of the human being, or in biblical terms: creation.”\textsuperscript{11} In turn this plays a part in the open question of the ongoing role of religious and biblical references as part of plural imaginaries relevant for the self-understandings of different traditions in society.

In proposing this route, I am responding to the recent contribution from British theologian Barnabas Aspray who has focused on the role that the symbol of creation plays for Ricoeur in the earliest parts of his philosophy: the phenomenology of the will. In Aspray’s account of this method

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{7} Paul Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” \textit{The Journal of Religion}, 54 (1), (1974), 73.
  \item \textsuperscript{8} Paul Ricoeur, \textit{Essays on Biblical Interpretation}, ed. by Lewis S. Mudge (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1980), 74f.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Europe here appears both as the historical context that Ricoeur reconstructed, but also as an urgent practical context presenting social questions to which he could respond as a fellow citizen, rather than as a dominating intellectual model of Eurocentricity.
\end{itemize}
Christian symbols operate in a “heliotropic” way, presenting questions to which Ricoeur’s philosophical reasoning responds (and not replacing the work of argument). Aspray rightly rules out the idea of Ricoeur’s philosophy as theology; Ricoeur is not stealthily stepping his way to an idea of creation ex nihilo. Rather Aspray argues that in some of the earliest philosophical questions Ricoeur treated on evil, finitude and transcendence, his investigations included the idea of an originary goodness of existence. For Aspray, writing theologically, this philosophical premise is mirrored in the symbol of creation: of all that exists being created by God, declaring that “it was very good” (Gen. 1:31).

While acknowledging that Ricoeur repeatedly critiqued the confusion of biblical symbol and philosophical argument present in theological categories like creation ex nihilo, what Aspray is doing here, in his own words, is to “speculate and develop Ricoeur in a Ricoeurian vein.” He does this partly by relying on archived correspondence with Gabriel Marcel, and writings to specifically Christian audiences, where one such remark reads that if one were to seek to salvage philosophical romanticism then “reflection on creation must not be stifled by a reflection on fault.” Aspray points out that this suggestion would be later repeated as advice which the philosopher can contribute to the theologian: not to move too swiftly to discuss redemption as representative of sin as the sole definitive feature of human activity, obscuring the originary goodness of humanity as part of good created existence.

The interest of this article is in taking up Aspray’s thesis of the foundational importance of the originary goodness of existence for understanding Ricoeur’s philosophical approach, evoked in the symbol of creation. Specifically, to consider the ongoing significance of religious sources in Ricoeur’s later ethics of capability and in particular through the various models of dialogue in translation, economies of worth, memory exchange and forgiveness, as a horizon for action in the European political landscape.

The Ethos of Translation

It is in just a short article that Ricoeur sets out his suggestions for the reinvigoration of the European project through priorities that are strongly evocative of works that were to arrive over

---


13 Much of Aspray’s project concentrates on reconstructing the philosophical context for those questions, establishing the influences on Ricoeur’s early phenomenology (in particular Gabriel Marcel, Karl Jaspers, French reflexive philosophy, and a dialogue with existentialism, though notably not particularly Edmund Husserl), and distinguishing Ricoeur’s own approach.

14 Aspray, *Ricoeur at the Limits of Philosophy*, 202 (see 201-2 for a short review of where Ricoeur directly addresses Christian theology of creation, usually, though not always, with a critical eye on a confusion of disciplines).


the subsequent decade: *On Translation; Memory, History, Forgetting;* and *The Course of Recognition.* Ricoeur’s purpose is to consider the initiating spirit that is needed for the success of the European project, which he was then describing as “a political entity that is entirely unrealized.” Ricoeur proposes that the success of Europe as a political project depends on a spirit of intercultural understanding and of citizens’ active participation in translation, exchanging memories, and perhaps most surprisingly, of forgiveness.

The starting point is translation, a paradigm that Ricoeur would later use to make sense of all sorts of forms of both linguistic and cultural exchange. As a translator is caught between two ways of understanding, so too is someone seeking to make themselves understood in another culture whether that be in narratives, practices, or value systems. There is a loyalty owed to the “speaking” culture, and yet a responsibility to make oneself understood in relation to the “listening” culture. Translating, whether literally between languages, or “the interpretation of any meaningful whole within the same speech community” is hard work, and work that always loses something in the transfer. Yet to undertake such work, “the possibility of translating is postulated more fundamentally as an *a priori* of communication.” Consequently, on the practical plane it is also a task that is cast as an ethical responsibility – to do justice to the meaning of the translation (for both speaking and listening interlocutors and their languages) because we hope it is possible to do so.

The model that Ricoeur uses in *On Translation* is that of linguistic hospitality, which we see already present in this Europe article, and rooted in von Humboldt’s philosophy of language: “raising the distinctive spirit of his own language to the level of that of the foreign language… It is really a matter of living with the other in order to take that other to one’s home as a guest.” Various authors have used that model to think through cultural exchange more fully and already here for Ricoeur translation is first a way to manage concrete issues of power and accessibility in the European institutions by encouraging “the teaching of at least two living languages” as an entry point for those “languages that [are] not in a dominant position at the level of communication.” Second, as an attitudinal shift of seeking to understand across difference, and to recognise difference as our contingent reality – “where language (le langage) exists nowhere else than in languages (des langues).” Europe is lastingly plural, linguistically and culturally, and this is not a call to isolation, but a summons to inhabit “the mental universe of the other culture, having taken

---

20 The first two of the *On Translation* essays were originally delivered in 1997, and 1999 respectively, so are broadly contemporaneous with the "New Ethos for Europe" paper.
23 Ricoeur, "A New Ethos," 5.
account of its customs, fundamental beliefs and deepest convictions.” Such an account of hospitality goes well beyond recent political theological uses of the term because the transaltive paradigm keeps in view the necessity of an ongoing and mutual exchange.

It is by way of a religious narrative that Ricoeur invokes these features of linguistic relationship in the story of the Tower of Babel. Relying on André Nathan Chouraqui’s translation of the Hebrew bible, Ricoeur rejects the frequent interpretation of the story as a cautionary tale where the hubris of the tower-builders is punished. Instead he can point to the absence of moral evaluations of the tower: “there is no recrimination, no lamentation, no accusation… They left off building the city! That is a way of saying: this is the way things are.” Again, language can only be encountered in languages. It is striking that Ricoeur observes this particular narrative appearing as part of a progression from the early Genesis narratives of creation. The first eleven chapters map a society of increasingly complexity, accounting for various kinds of difference, culminating in chapter eleven’s narrative of Babel. Ricoeur reads these as the “non-judgmental acknowledgement of original separation,” and even though those chapters include violence and the fall, in the expulsion from Eden and the murder of Abel, he goes on to suggest that this inaugurates and summons the reader to ethical responsibility within plurality. To turn that back to translation, the introductory verses already note the plurality of languages as if with a “benevolent glance… Translation is definitely a task, then, not in the sense of a restricting obligation, but in the sense of the thing to be done so that human action can simply continue.”

To return finally to the theme of creation as originally good, the plurality that is the basis of translation is not punishment nor the consequence of behaviour treated by the narrative as immoral. This suggests that the religious symbol of the unfinished tower evokes an increasing complexity of human community as part of a good creation’s development.

Crucially then the navigation of translation as reconstructed by Ricoeur is not pure politics, but pre-political context. This is reflected in Ricoeur’s handling of such exchanges not as the domain of the formal instruments of the European Union, but the work of civil society and the public sphere: “the ethical and spiritual activities of individuals, intellectuals and cultivated persons, and also of intellectual communities, churches and other religious denominations.” These are the groups and institutions who are to take on the work of dialogue that is transaltive, exchanging. Such activity has the potential to furnish and nourish the “political imagination” from which new institutions may build that can navigate the character of a Europe that is still trying to make sense of a supranational political entity.

While this transaltive effort is oriented toward richer understanding between self and other, and amongst groups, that greater understanding does not erase the original, good difference.

---


---
More significantly for a project aimed at political renewal, this does not necessarily result in a new harmony on points of disagreement. Civil society is the site of fragility in this sense, as the arena of permanent conflict. In our current political landscape the question of how to disagree well is all the more urgent. This is in the context of rising populisms, which I have elsewhere discussed in Ricoeurian terms as political forms that are shaped by reductive narratives of national identity. On this plane of action and discourse Ricoeur has elsewhere introduced other models of exchange, which I want to discuss before turning to the other hermeneutical lenses, specifically “economies of worth” as a model for disagreement and compromise.

Economies of Worth as a model of exchange for disagreement and compromise

Where translation is the paradigm for exchange the question of loss is an inseparable part of the dialogue, but it is balanced by the possibility of new and richer understandings. However, a further challenge is introduced when one considers exchanges across differences in value systems in civil society. Ricoeur draws on the socio-philosophical work of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot who explored differing “economies of worth” or structures of valuing. They give these economies the image of the polity: cities or networks that operate on concepts of worth founded on differing principles. For example, commercial practice and discourse operate by different rules of recognition of excellence than do civic spaces; each have particular goods. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest six distinct cities: inspired, domestic, civic, industrial, commercial, and fame. Each polity is related to sociological engagement with empirical experience but are also already rendered philosophically in key representative texts – such as Augustine’s *City of God*, associated with the inspired city, or Hobbes’s *Leviathan* associated with fame. The whole project operates under the title of “justification” – the dispute that arises in encounters between these orders.

Ricoeur introduces this model as a way to understand disagreements as part of his ethics of recognition. Different forms of evaluating worth arise between and within communities – and even within individuals as people constantly operate with multiple types of valuing. The activity of articulating and resolving disagreements between different value systems can result in harmony, a collapse into violence, or the possibility of handling multiple cities simultaneously as a compromise. Such an approach of recognition is distinct from the naturalist schools of constructing the social world in terms of friend versus enemy. As Boltanski and Thévenot introduce their project: “When one is attentive to the unfolding of disputes, one sees that they are limited neither to a direct expression of interests nor to an anarchic and endless confrontation between heterogenous worldviews clashing in a dialogue of the deaf.” Indeed, it is precisely through dialogue that the assumption of violence is ever overcome; as Ricoeur asks “how can we take violence out of conflicts unless we have the hope that transferring them to the domain of the spoken

---


word will lead, if not to immediate consensus, at least to the recognition of reasonable disagreements”?  

Much of Ricoeur’s engagement with recognition considers the struggle for recognition as a socio-political reality, including the violence that arises in cycles of demand for recognition and its rejection. Earlier parts of his project address the juridical level of response to that struggle but it also stands as a background here when Ricoeur turns to the polities model, acknowledging that “compromises are fragile and ill-founded” as they suspend the full resolution of the principles that are the basis of the disagreement. Compromise is not consensus, and is consequently “precarious.” Ricoeur locates this consideration of compromise within his longer differentiated analysis of tenets and implications of philosophies of recognition, from Kant and Hegel to Honneth, in The Course of Recognition. There he describes compromise as part of the reality of struggle, where even the fragile compromise can be welcomed as the already constructive face of mutual recognition, making a distinction between compromis and compromission in the French: “We can take compromise, then, to be the form that clothes mutual recognition in situations of conflict and dispute resulting from the plurality of economies of standing.” Jean Greisch’s observation on this operation can be cast as an example of practical wisdom: “I can always criticize a city in the name of the values and criteria of justification of another; but perhaps it is more productive to negotiate an acceptable and livable compromise in a given situation.” This is not the suspension of moral judgment, but “one agrees in order to work things out – that is, in order to suspend the difference of opinion – without its being governed by recourse to a test in just one world.”

Finally, the model of compromise is not introduced as a concrete solution to the struggle for recognition. Rather it introduces the capacity for understanding another system of valuing as the condition of possibility for disagreement, and indeed the prospect of a harmonious consensus. Consequently Ricoeur pays particular attention to the encounter between people as the possible moment of recognising the other as another person; he is mapping the possibility of recognition as a horizon to reject the bad infinity of an always unsatisfied demand. Indeed, he introduces the models of the polities on the journey to the “clearing” that he envisages in his subsequent analysis – a moment of gift that goes beyond mere exchange. Thus as “experience of the gift, apart from its symbolic, indirect, rare, even exceptional character, is inseparable from its burden of potential conflicts”, gift and conflict are paired. Gift, which Ricoeur also names agape, appears as moments

---

36 Ricoeur, “Fragility and Responsibility,” 19
37 Boltanski & Thévenot, On Justification, 9.
40 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 209.
41 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 245.
42 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 245.
that can motivate the continued engagement rather than collapsing into violence. Thus even a precarious compromise is itself already a recognition of the other: making a compromise shows a willingness to recognise the other’s values, and moreover, her argumentation that justifies those values, even when it is wholly distinct from the self’s.

On one hand this approach insists on a reality of plurality that includes cultural and linguistic difference, and a plurality shaped by differing values. Such an emphasis can be seen in one of the earliest of Ricoeur’s essays, appearing specifically as a concern that global processes of marketisation, and cultural relativism might erode cultural difference: “a sort of attrition or wearing away at the expense of the cultural resources which have made the great civilizations of the past.” The question of the European project posed in the 1990s is aimed at a similar supranational tension, where Ricoeur is advocating for an approach that recognises and strengthens original difference, rather than subordinate it to the political entity. The dialectic here is between the ethics of how to argue well and the differing convictions.

Yet on the other hand, when one understands that plurality as a plurality of values, questions of compromise, consensus and the operation of power in the dialogue and the institutions that mediate dialogue become sharper. Ricoeur offers an example: “The major conflict arises, in my view, from the fact that everything currently belongs to the commercial order. Can everything be purchased? There are goods that are not commodities, such as health, education, citizenship…” In response one can return to Ricoeur’s dialectic approach to ethics and morality. Ricoeur does not oppose the categories of particularity in culture or conviction with the possibility of a universal moral norm, but instead understands the two to be in a mutually forming conversation. One’s reasons for critiquing an over-reaching of the commercial city might remain different from another’s, situated in social imaginaries of differing traditions, but able to agree on an underlying moral reference point. The negotiation of different polities continues to apply rather than suspend moral judgment; in some cases compromise is not possible because it would be morally unacceptable: here the struggle for recognition returns.

Recent theological discussion of a concrete example of differing systems of valuing may illustrate the tensions. In her work on migration, Anna Roper Rowlands discusses the normalisation of detention as a response to the arrival of refugees and migrants in the UK. Never absent, this system has become increasingly visible in national news recently once again, in the evidence of overcrowding and disease at a centre at Manston in Kent, and one recent incident of detainees abandoned at a central London railway station. Rowlands’s work amplifies the voices of the detained; in this work she also analyses the principle and operation of the detention system in terms of an Augustinian model of good and evil. In that model she characterises evil as “parasitic on what is and what is good.” Drawing on Rowan Williams’s reading of Augustine’s account of

---

44 Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Marie Muller & Francois Vaillant, “Pour une éthique du compromis: interview de Paul Ricoeur,” Alternatives non violentes, 80, October 1991, 2 (translation mine).
evil, Rowlands argues that “sin and evil gain their force not merely as a move from focusing on higher to lower goods, but through a continual process in which the good (and what is evil) is misrecognized, and embedded as a lack of the good through the force of habit.” The consequence is a “distorted visualization” of people, creation, God. Such a reading of good and evil invites “us to understand even the most twisted of state action as movements toward order—an order hideously misunderstood.” Rowlands is not solely drawing on Augustine’s “natural” reading of sin to the exclusion of the responsibility. She concludes instead with a challenge “to think about what we are doing: to think about the purposes of public practices and the processes they enact” as, invoking Arendt, the interpersonal exercise of power and its accountability.

There are two different issues here in Ricoeur and Rowlands respectively, which I suggest illuminate each other. One, in Ricoeur, is that the plurality of ethical visions will shape and colour the engagement between the Cities at the level of practical wisdom for decision-making. This is a philosophical question of reflective agency. The other, in Rowlands, is the theological position that, while finite human striving for the *summum bonum* of God cannot ever be fully achieved, humans may also actively choose evil, even in the name of a good. To use metaphorical spatial language, the former might be characterised as a horizontal problem of disagreement at the level of critical moral self-reflection and perhaps its unresolvability also on the plane of practice; the latter is a vertical problem of both the impossibility of fully grasping communion with God as the *summum bonum* in any one ethical vision, and in addition sin as an active deed of freedom.

Both problems have a shared influence in Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics*. Ricoeur’s position in *Oneself as Another* develops the idea of flourishing in an already moral direction, where the human person strives for the good life “with and for others.” Ricoeur is concerned there with establishing an ethics of reflective agency, where one is capable of imputing action to oneself and consequently critiquing it. Consequently, his proposal of the good life striven for is already inflected with the Kantian moral imperative, not the individual virtue: “to live well, with and for others, in just institutions.” Thus in practice differing traditions are recognised for their heuristic potential in identifying problems, as illustrated in his paradigm of translation for a renewal of citizens’ commitment to a shared political project, but always with the limit of a deontological “sieve of the universal and constraining norm.” At the level of practical wisdom, where the differing Cities arise as ways to organise thinking about disagreement around differing goals, the corrective of the norm remains in the light of a shared orientation toward the good, limiting what one can assent to as a compromise.

---

47 Rowlands, “Against the Manichees,” 179
48 Rowlands, “Against the Manichees,” 178.
49 Rowlands, “Against the Manichees,” 181.
50 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 172.
51 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 215.
By contrast, following the Aristotle-influenced thought of Aquinas (or more properly for Rowlands a “broadly civic virtue tradition of political theology”), what Rowlands discusses is the possibility that failures of moral self-reflection are situated in a double vertical problem of finitude and sin. Her purpose seems to be to acknowledge a shared desire for the good across even very urgent moral disagreement, to enable further dialogue and understanding. This is both a theological commitment and a political strategy. I suggest we can see this elsewhere in Rowlands’s analysis when she points to the responses to migration detention and its evils in the “wide (sometimes squabbling) coalitions of interests, who are nonetheless capable of fragile cooperation on the basis of shared goals and goods or at least a plurality of disruptions and enactments of alternative goods.” Her commitment is to the plurality of social imaginaries rather than setting up an unfruitful binary seen in other theopolitical projects. I suggest that the cooperation present in Rowlands’s account represents the negotiation and recognition that thinking about disagreement by way of economies of worth can engender when one navigates between them, rather than overreaching from a single world.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a common good is the named horizon that begins Boltanski and Thévenot’s project, where they suggest that “a compromise, in order to be acceptable, must be based on the quest for a common good of a higher order than the ones the compromise attempts to reconcile.” They invoke this horizon again as distinct from a system of relativization: “The presupposition of a common good is required in order to establish a compromise” (even though that common good is not in fact identified, still less agreed). Ricoeur’s critique of Boltanski and Thévenot’s project asks whether such a possibility in practice could only be “moved by the vision of a common good that is not just that of one city, of one world?” Rowlands’s theological framework is so moved even though the summum bonum itself cannot be fully reached. It is Ricoeur himself who gives that prospect a symbolic religious name, which would move the disagreement beyond the political: “Eden is not a political setting. The perpetual agreement of all with all proposes nothing other than a utopia, at the limit of any city... We are no longer in Eden.”

What this concluding symbol evokes is multifold. It recalls to the reader the original creation that was good, and humankind’s place within that creation in Eden. In another essay Ricoeur would comment directly on Genesis 1.31’s descriptor of creation as very good: “The hyperethical dimension of this predicate extended to all creatures is what we must emphasize, for the result is that it is as a creature that we find ourselves summoned.” That symbol also continues to link creation with the development of human community, albeit here in the utopian mode of “perpetual agreement” rather than a politics of negotiation. Moreover, Ricoeur returns the paired symbol of the Fall, the departure from Eden, that conditions human agency and the more fundamental orientation to the good. Together these shape Rowlands’s vertical reference point to

52 Rowlands, “Against the Manichees,” 181, n.41.
53 Rowlands, “Against the Manichees,” 177.
54 Boltanski & Thévenot, On Justification, 20 (emphasis mine).
55 Boltanski & Thévenot, On Justification, 336.
57 Ricoeur, The Just, 91.
an ultimate good that is bound up with humanity’s purpose, and the goods that humanity can still establish at the political level, albeit in partial and fragmented ways.

Finally, the creation symbol gives some indicator of a moral reference point, turning from the purely ethical – where “the hymn gets converted into an obligation”:\(^{59}\) the creation of human persons for each other introduces a mythic account of human singularity and value in the human made in the image of God. This suggests already Ricoeur’s own practical judgement in response to the over-reach of the commercial city: the non-commodification of the human person. When Ricoeur addresses those economies his focus remains on the reflexive agency of the judging self, navigating between Cities. Identifying the best possible compromise, at the level of judgement, is not compromising with evil, but more rigorously assessing plural visions in dialogue to make sense of what can be universalised as a moral expectation for each other. The philosopher Gaëlle Fiasse has characterised this by arguing that the ethic of solicitude is “not sufficient for Ricoeur. Ethics needs to turn into “morality.” In other words, because our hearts can be biased by wrong desires, imperatives are a necessary route on the way to countering violence and evil.”\(^{60}\) In fact, Ricoeur would insist on the dialectic relationship of the moral and the ethical, demanding a practical wisdom.

While Ricoeur would not, philosophically, accompany a Thomist trajectory to the universal destination of goods, what Rowlands’s and Ricoeur’s positions and differing purposes share is what Ricoeur would later call “the orientation to the good as being rooted in the ontological structure of the human being.”\(^{61}\) This Ricoeur finds in both the philosophy of Kant (to freely choose the good), and contingent religious expressions: “all religions are different attempts in different language games to recover the ground of goodness, to liberate, so to say, the enslaved freedom, the enslaved capability.”\(^{62}\)

What has this analysis achieved? The paradigm of translation indicates the richness of cultural difference, between linguistic cultures. While acknowledging that the full meaning of a previous era’s interpretation of the creative core of a culture may be lost en route, it celebrates the possibility of new understandings across the boundaries of each culture. It also offers a way to think about difference within such cultural formations, all within the interchange between traditions and individuals in civil society and integral to the ethical desire to “live well, with and for others.” At the same time, such exchanges will also articulate disagreement in terms of value systems. To this prospect, Ricoeur introduces the negotiations between economies of worth. Such negotiations can end in compromise. While on the practical level that can be a question of the limits of persuasion and of power, Ricoeur instead relates the model to his ethics of recognition where compromise demonstrates respect for the other’s way of valuing. An individual can even inhabit multiple such “economies” or “cities” and constantly negotiate between them. The risk that plurality collapses into relativism is a real one, addressed by Boltanski and Thévenot themselves

---

60 Gaëlle Fiasse, “The Golden Rule and Forgiveness,” in Brian Treanor & Henry Isaac Venema (eds), A Passion for the Possible (Fordham University Press, 2010), 78. Citing Oneself as Another, 170.
by evoking the horizon of a possible, if as-yet unidentified common vision of the good. In Ricoeur’s approach he turns to the test of the deontological “sieve of the universal and constraining norm,” in dialectic relationship with the horizon of the good to which human activity is oriented, expressed in plural forms. Rowlands’s theological reminder is that relativism is not the only risk here, but that there are accounts of the good that are mistaken and parasitic on the ultimate good that plural visions may be seeking to express. In his philosophical account, Ricoeur grounds this in a stark formula: “Because there is evil, the aim of the ‘good life’ has to be submitted to the test of moral obligation.” The creation symbol returns at each stage of this account, indicating the possibility of seeking the good despite the Fall and humanity summoned to that task; the way that evil remains always already present; and the singularity of the human person as the reference point for that moral test.

What this does not do is fully make the step to provide an analysis of power in concrete exchanges. That is not the level on which Ricoeur’s philosophy is operating. His interest here is in the conditions of possibility for practice, and the moral norm offers a crucial bulwark from which to make that assessment of power and its misuse. Indeed, we see in the remaining lenses an acknowledgement and a centering of the reality of violence, to which I now turn.

From the Imaginative Exchange of Memory to Forgiveness as Individual Initiative

The spirit of translation, and even the recognition of the other in provisional exchanges of the economies of worth, are a necessary foundation to the next stage. Memory exchange is a harder task, perhaps, even than translation. Memory is already entangled with the work of translation, as translation “loses” meaning and any fresh translation seeks to retrieve the full, remembered meaning in the face of mourning its loss. Ricoeur suggests that any meaningful exchange of who we are is done in time-bound ways that call forth narratives of memory of encounters of the past, to give them their full remembered meaning. Such a calling forth is an exchange of narratives in the context of Europe’s history of violence, and consequently competing narratives. This is not to introduce such narratives as fictive, but rooted in different readings of the past, reflecting remembered meaning.

Thus far the challenge in view for the public sphere is difficult yet fruitful, but if we look honestly at such a proposal for individuals and peoples of Europe, those narratives will be painful. As Ricoeur observes, “the history of Europe is cruel.” Indeed, Ricoeur consistently identifies a “fundamental relation of history to violence… there exists no historical community that has not been born out of a relation that can, without hesitation, best be likened to war.” In that later work Ricoeur’s concern is with the paradox of how to handle such histories in memory – too much

---

63 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 215.
64 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 218.
66 Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 79. This was also a significant theme in *Reflections on the Just*. 

Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies
memory where the wounds are kept without healing, or too little that erases the history. The consequence for all national and international histories is that “symbolic wounds calling for healing are stored in the archives of the collective memory.”

In Europe the problem is made manifest where there is an “extraordinary weight of suffering which the majority of states, great or small, taken in pairs or interposed alliances, have inflicted in the past.” Ricoeur is here reaffirming one of the original purposes behind the European project – to overcome concrete histories of enmity and violence. One could consider an analysis of Brexit as a kind of crisis of too little memory, which ignored or obscured the reality of entanglement and the consequent narrowed national identity of which Ricoeur directly warns. At the level of the peoples of Europe, the work is of an exchange of memories that is an exchange of experiences of violence and competing narratives. While in 1995 Ricoeur could publish the suggestion that “Europe is barely emerging from this nightmare” today Europe’s history of violence continues, still entangled with the histories to which Ricoeur referred and with global dynamics of power. The call to the exchange of narratives of memory is not one that would necessarily be resolved with respect to the past. Now one may go further to frame it as a summons to continuing attention to narratives developing today. One needs point only to limited examples: of open war in Ukraine, and other forms of violence in the stories of those seeking to cross European borders in the Mediterranean, in the Channel (La Manche), and on land, or the concerns being raised within the EU on challenges to the rule of law and public democratic discourse in member states.

It is valuable to note here Lucie Robathan’s caution regarding the expectant pressure when narratives are demanded, such as narratives in the context of asylum claiming, where narration is rendered unintelligible by the proximity to the traumatic “unspeakable” and through the “the temporalities of many refugee testimonies” which do not match the total coherence required in the context of a hostile or ignorant system of listening. They are not yet and may never be coherent memories. That difficulty with explaining experiences in time is evoked also in Anna Roper Rowlands’s work with asylum claimants, reading the biblical book of Jeremiah. This pair of analyses reminds one that what Ricoeur proposes is not an institutionalised exchange, in the sense of State apparatus. Instead the spirit of what Ricoeur proposes is both attention to the interdependent character of these narratives and prioritising attention to the suffering of others. As Hille Haker has observed, in a Ricoeurian vein, the migration crisis is specifically a question of responsibility, where

---

67 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 79.
70 Lucie Robathan, “At the Limits of the Narrative Unintelligibility and the (Im)possibilities of Self-Disclosure in the Asylum Claiming Process,” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, 13 (1), (2022), 124.
71 Robathan, “At the Limits of the Narrative Unintelligibility and the (Im)possibilities of Self-Disclosure in the Asylum Claiming Process,” 128.
responsibility towards the other is a necessary part of my own ethical self-understanding and hence connected to the sense of justice that motivates me to “aim at the good life with and for others.” The responsibility towards the other is, first and foremost, part of the ethics of the good life.73

The exchanges of narratives is both interdependent in a concrete sense of the entanglement of histories, but also at the moral level of interdependent responsibility. Thus, it is not a symmetrical exchange. Here instead is an insistence on the universal ethical summons to attend to the other. An important religious symbol in such an account might be the story of the Samaritan who acts because his life becomes entangled with the life of the victim of violence and theft through proximity, and in acting becomes that man’s neighbour. It is perhaps no surprise that an example of Ricoeur’s early work which considers the Samaritan as neighbour provides a reference point for very recent Catholic social teaching developments in the encyclical Fratelli Tutti, which cites one of Ricoeur’s essays from History and Truth in its consideration of social friendship and political bonds across disagreement.74

In fact, one should read the hermeneutical lenses for Europe in the context of the ethical framework Ricoeur had recently established in Oneself as Another, where the ethical relationship with the other is reciprocal. That reciprocity is not a do ut des arrangement where an exchange becomes getting something for something, or the action of purely self-interested parties. The name he gives instead is solicitude.75 As Gaëlle Fiasse has observed, the starting point of reciprocity is immediately unbalanced by action:

Asymmetry means the absence of symmetry. In the same vein, dissymmetry shows the two-sided relationship of such an asymmetry; each has the possibility to act on the other. By acknowledging the dissymmetry initiated by my behavior, and by imagining how I could myself be a victim, given the passive form of such an action, I am led to see the manifold possibilities of violence.76

Consequently Ricoeur argues that even as one offers an exchange of one’s own suffering the onus is on listening and imagining the suffering of the other as if it were one’s own. While the story of the Samaritan is not the creation symbol itself, it operates as a further reaffirming of the reciprocally interdependent character of human identity and action begun in the Genesis myths. This parable of love of neighbour Ricoeur himself links once more with the “hyperethical”77 dependence of creation, summoned to action. The parable recentres the need for attention to “that

75 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 180 – with the ethical aim discussed throughout the seventh study.
the peoples of Europe show compassion to each other”78 which goes beyond only “imagination and sympathy.”79

The dissymmetry present in that compassionate, imaginative attention prompts the introduction of the final lens of forgiveness. It is initially evoked by the exchange of memories, because the imaginative compassion of the exchange may arise “just as [participants] are about to call for vengeance for those injuries which have been inflicted upon them in the past. What is demanded here strongly resembles forgiveness.”80 It is unusual for forgiveness to appear as a task amongst other tasks. Ricoeur famously treated forgiveness not within a systematic treatment of Memory, History, Forgetting, but in its Epilogue and only further affirmed the distinction between the closed question of the book from the incompletion of the Epilogue in later discussions.81 Yet it appears here when discussing the citizens’ agency that is the basis for a new ethos for Europe, and this requires some consideration.

The two counterpoints for Ricoeur’s approach to forgiveness are Jacques Derrida and Hannah Arendt. Derrida leaves forgiveness as impossible, against the risk of it being normalised in any way. Arendt situates forgiveness with promising as a paired solution to paralysis in action arising from the temporal dimensions of past and future; for Arendt forgiveness is the human faculty to manage the irreversibility of action, thus encouraging overcoming the paralysis. In the Epilogue, Ricoeur’s analysis is situated between these two readings and corrects them. Forgiveness is not categorically impossible, but its “height” goes beyond a usual exchange, even an exchange bearing moral weight like promising. There is a “disproportion between the depth of the fault and the height of forgiveness,” which Ricoeur describes as a “torment.”82 To think about forgiveness otherwise runs the risk of erasing the wrong action and the suffering it caused – a crisis of too little memory again. In this, Ricoeur is closer though not identical with Derrida – Fiasse describes it as a “positive echo”83 – in arguing that forgiveness does not operate like a reciprocal exchange, but in the manner of the biblical call to love one’s enemy: “an (almost) impossible commandment.”84

How does this operate in terms of the activity of civil society with which Ricoeur is concerned for Europe? Here it might be seen to echo Arendt’s purpose at least: “lifting the burden of guilt which paralyses the relations between individuals who are acting out and suffering their own history,”85 not through erasing that history but by transforming its meaning. In Ricoeur’s briefer “Ethos” article, forgiveness appears to make possible the “moving on” from painful history. Still, it cannot become a purely horizontal exchange; here five years before Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur, “A New Ethos,” 11.

---

82 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 486.
84 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 482.
Forgetting was first published, Ricoeur would already say: “forgiveness falls within the scope of an economy of the gift whose logic of superabundance exceeds the logic of reciprocity.”

Indeed, in doing so, forgiveness follows a similar logic of recognition as translating and memory exchange:

First, we do not act in order to be given to, since our first intention is directed toward the other, and is not motivated by our selfish interests. Secondly, a hope remains, which itself belongs to the economy of the gift. This hope concerns the unknown possibilities of the agent – that is, his capabilities in spite of his fallibilities.

None of these practices – translating, exchanging memories, forgiving – can be institutionalised in the sense of the formal EU institutions. Instead, civic (and perhaps even political) institutions can mediate and support such practices to create the conditions for thinking in new way. Forgiveness though is singular in the extraordinary “height” and “depth” it has to cover, which cannot be tackled collectively. Instead Ricoeur advocates for their operation between persons, through other mediations of civil society as the conditions to enable institutional renewal. They are in that sense a “spiritual economy… the poetics of moral life” which establish an ethos.

Forgiveness consequently forms part of Ricoeur’s thinking about the economy of the gift. The “clearings” of mutual recognition noted above are also of the order of the gift. Forgiveness offers a particular kind of recognition, where “the guilty person can be understood as capable of something other than her offenses and faults.” Rather than allying forgiveness with models of Christology, Ricoeur links it with the ontology of an originally good existence. He situates the economy of gift once more in relation to the human dependence evoked in the symbol of the good creation, but forgiveness, in its difficulty and its unknown outcome, is in suspension between that symbol and that of the transformation of the eschaton: “In this way, the God of hope and the God of creation are one and the same God at both extremes of the economy of gift.” Indeed one commentator suggests that is the symbol of creation that makes Ricoeur’s concluding, incomplete treatment of forgiveness possible: “because it is on the basis of the gift of existence, which religiously interpreted is the gift of creation, that forgiveness becomes more than a paradoxical command.”

What enables the action of forgiveness despite the inability to change the past is the strand of thinking arising from religious symbols about the goodness of creation to which I have repeatedly turned in this paper. In a philosophical meeting point with this ground of possibility, Ricoeur has pointed to the translatability of philosophical and religious accounts on the possibility

of ontological goodness: “As radical as evil may be it will never be more originary than goodness, which is the Ursprung in the field of ethics, the orientation to the good as being rooted in the ontological structure of the human being, or in biblical terms: creation.”

Fiasse’s analysis above already evoked that connection, which becomes plainer when we draw on Ricoeur’s self-reflection on his own philosophical course: without some kind of ontological reference point “we lose, to my mind, the root in a philosophical anthropology, because we are not allowed to use the terms capability, imputability, and the whole set of ideas around the ‘I can.”

That ‘I can’ is in turn the horizon for action, including both capabilities mediated by and transforming of institutions and those seated in individual initiative: of translation that prompts understanding; of exchanges that prompt disagreement, compromise, and compassion; of the possibility of forgiveness.

Conclusion

This article began with a proposition in Aspray’s analysis of Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the will: that it established philosophically an originary goodness of existence, paralleled by the biblical symbol of creation, and that this was important for understanding Ricoeur’s philosophy. Taking up that claim as a way to consider the open question of religious symbols in nourishing the ongoing public life of Europe, the article considered various models for plural encounter: translation; disagreement across economies of worth; exchange of memories; forgiveness. What sustains each of these models is the richness of plurality, but also its demands: compromise, competition, and overcoming that with compassion, all which resolve to individual responsibility and initiative within the context of civil society. These models are made possible by Ricoeur’s ethics of capability, the self who speaks, narrates, acts, imputes action and recognises in the other, and all others, other such selves. The ontological foundation of that self is the originary goodness of existence, and an ethical orientation to that good, in dialectic with the moral reference point of human singularity and a public debate on the consequent norms. Here the symbol of creation repeatedly appears, giving rise to thought about how such models operate philosophically by evoking the original goodness of plural cultures, the orientation to the good in the possibilities of human nature, the ethical and moral limits of human action and the moral reference point of human singularity, and the unknown possibilities of the gift.

In turn this allows a re-addressing of the challenges of those models of action with ongoing tasks. First, for political ethics, to strengthen plurality in the “spirit” Ricoeur advocates, and not to assume consensus too early. Second, for theologians to attend to the dialectic of creation and fall as a summons to human agency: through engaging in encounters of ethical and political plurality, replenishing social imaginaries, and discussing moral norms and responsibilities as part of the plural public sphere.

Bibliography


ROBATHAN Lucie, “At the Limits of the Narrative Unintelligibility and the (Im)possibilities of Self-Disclosure in the Asylum Claiming Process,” Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies, 13 (1), (2022), 117-137.

