A Living Spatial Movement of Relation
Reconceptualising Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another and Heidegger’s Being and Time

Paul Downes
Dublin City University

Abstract

Beyond the disparate and mainly fleeting references to life in Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another, whether as life as power, living well and with others, or as Ricoeur’s attempt to develop a concept of embodied subjectivity as flesh, which is presumably living flesh, not dead flesh, a further and arguably primordial life principle needs emphasis, namely, living space. Ricoeur’s recognition of the vital significance of space primordiality, as a pivotal dimension that is even prior to language, offers a significant conceptual leap in Ricoeur’s later work, Oneself as Another. Ricoeur’s proposed ontology of the flesh is one dimension towards expression of an authentic phenomenology of spatiality, though not necessarily the only one. Building upon but going beyond Ricoeur, the article explores concentric and diametric spatial interplay in relation to the early Heidegger’s existential spatiality, Angst and care, as candidate living spatial movements. This proposed primordial spatial discourse re-examines Ricoeur’s conatus as power to act, and his quest for a structure of relation to the other that is not closure, separation, or diametric opposition.

Keywords: Diametric Space; Concentric Space; Ricoeur; Heidegger; Lévi-Strauss.

Résumé

Au-delà des références disparates et surtout fugaces à la vie dans Soi-même comme un autre de Ricoeur, celle-ci soit entendue comme pouvoir, comme vie bonne et avec les autres, ou envisagée à travers la tentative ricœurienne de développer un concept de subjectivité incarnée comme chair (chair vivante et non morte), on peut sans doute aller plus loin et soutenir qu’il existe un principe de vie primordial, à savoir l’espace de vie. La reconnaissance par Ricoeur de la signification vitale du caractère primordial de l’espace, comme dimension charnière antérieure au langage lui-même, représente un saut conceptuel significatif dans cette œuvre tardive qu’est Soi-même comme un autre. L’ontologie de la chair proposée par Ricoeur exprime l’une des dimensions d’une authentique phénoménologie de la spatialité, mais celle-ci n’est pas nécessairement la seule. En s’appuyant sur Ricoeur mais allant au-delà de sa pensée, l’article explore l’interaction spatiale concentrique et diamétrale en la mettant en relation avec la spatialité existentielle dans la philosophie du premier Heidegger - l’angoisse et le souci étant envisagés en tant que mouvements spatiaux vivants. Cette proposition d’un discours spatial primordial réexamine la conception ricœurienne du conatus comme pouvoir d’agir, et sa quête d’une structure de relation à l’autre qui ne soit pas une fermeture, une séparation ou une opposition diamétrale.

Mots-clés: Espace diamétral; espace concentrique; Ricoeur; Heidegger; Lévi-Strauss.
A Living Spatial Movement of Relation
Reconceptualising Ricœur’s *Oneself as Another* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time*

Paul Downes
Dublin City University

In *Oneself as Another*, Ricœur confronts the dismantling of a static and monolithic human subject, such as that of the Cartesian self-grounding cogito. Ricœur seeks a divided and dynamic subjectivity. This “dividing line” that he excavates runs across the crevice between self as sameness (*idem*) and self as oneself (*ipse*), which he views as two fundamental modes of being, in a dynamic dialectical tension that evades any simple appeal to foundations. This dividing line opens up a gateway beyond a univocal self to a wider questioning, with an array of intertwining strands of argument, in quest of these two purportedly fundamental modes of being, dynamically interacting.

Key strands of Ricœur’s argument involve a search for a constituting structure of the other in the self, not as external to self. Allied with this is a concern to bridge the cavern between Heidegger’s Dasein and an acting self as subjectivity. Both of these strands pertain to life principles either directly or indirectly apprehended by Ricœur. Search for a constituting structure of the other in the self is a question already raised in terms of a life principle by Dilthey, though as the early Heidegger observes, it remained unanswered by Dilthey. Ricœur’s engagement with a life dimension for this constituting structure of the other takes place more directly as part of a concern with “living well with and for others.” Ricœur’s bridging principle between Heidegger’s Dasein and the self as acting subject is derived from Spinoza’s *conatus* as power to act, and again expressly related by Ricœur to life, to life as power. His discussion of *conatus* and the power to act is oriented in terms of “the internal dynamism worthy of the name of life” linked with power, “it is in man that *conatus*, or the power of being of all things, is most clearly readable.” Ricœur sees power and life as interchangeable, “the power or life,” “this power of animation,” summarising Spinoza approvingly. When Ricœur seeks to associate if not equate *conatus* as power to act with Heidegger’s care – a core structure of Dasein – it is tempting to treat both as held together through the common connection of a life principle, given that the early Heidegger also expressly treated care as pivotal to life.

Beyond the disparate and mainly fleeting references to life in Ricœur’s *Oneself as Another*, whether as life as power, living well and with others, factical life, or as Ricœur’s attempt to develop a concept of embodied subjectivity as flesh which is presumably living flesh, not dead flesh, a further and arguably primordial life principle needs to be brought to the fore, namely, *living space*. How does this proposed living space appear as a dynamic phenomenon? Ricœur engages with this question though not directly in such words or terms. A significant conceptual leap takes place in *Oneself as Another*, a leap that is embedded in the seeds of *La métaphore vive* but ultimately rests simply as a promissory note in that earlier work. This leap forward is Ricœur’s recognition of the vital significance of space primordiality, as a pivotal dimension that is even *prior* to language. His search in his later work is for a prelinguistic, primordial, spatial structure to give expression to, or at least to lay bare, the relation between self and other. Ricœur recognises:
On the basis of the model of the problem of localizing the flesh, other problems relating to the primordial spatiality of the flesh could be posed [...] As Jean-Luc Petit has established [...] it is upon this prelinguistic relation between my flesh localized by the self and a world accessible or inaccessible to the “I can” that a semantics of action is finally to be constructed which will not lose its way in the endless exchange of language games.9

Continuing on this theme of spatialization, Ricœur asks, “[W]e may wonder if the phenomenology of spatiality, so propitiously begun in Husserl, receives the attention it deserves in Heidegger.”10 This acceleration of focus on space in later Ricœur contrasts somewhat with La métaphore vive, where spatial understandings also pervade much of Ricœur’s discussion of metaphor in terms of proximity and distance, tension, substitution, displacement, change of location, image, the “open” structure of words, closure, transparency and opaqueness. Yet this attention usually occurs where space is discussed within metaphor, and as a metaphor itself, rather than as a precondition or prior system of relations to language interacting with language.11

A living space as a dynamic interacting background stands in stark contrast with a Cartesian conception of space as “empty” and a “mere nonentity.”12 The nuanced position of Ricœur is not simply that he recognises that the Heidegger of Being and Time gives limited though notable attention to space; Ricœur quests for a space that avoids the Scylla of reduction to geometric or “objective” space and the Charybdis of collapsing the subtlety of space into mere place. A spatial turn is increasingly recognised across the social sciences,13 aided and abetted by commentators on Heidegger14 that aptly emphasise the central importance of space in Being and Time and elsewhere in Heidegger’s work. However, commentators on Heidegger’s spatial understanding, such as Stuart Elden and Jeff Malpas, then flatten the dimensionality that space offers conceptually into a scrutiny of space simply as location, as mere places, as part of a socio-historical critique of space. The significance of Ricœur’s exploration in Oneself as Another is that he amplifies space in search of an ontology of space and in doing so, he does not engage in an écrasement of space into place.

Whereas space moves forward in Ricœur’s Oneself as Another, to take centre stage as a foregrounded concept for interrogation, a life principle or movement nevertheless remains held together in the background fabric of the assumptions of his work on selfhood as a living power to act. The role of a life principle here is pervasive if not omnipresent as Ricœur is still rejecting, in a Heideggerian vein, a substance ontology of ousia as presence, and especially its Latin version as substantia. The pertinence of a life principle in Oneself as Another is further supported by it being an extension of concepts at work in La métaphore vive. At the core of Ricœur’s interrogation in La métaphore vive is a search for a living metaphor, a metaphor that lives, an animating principle underpinning and arguably prior to metaphor. It is a life principle in La métaphore vive that is in some ways so obvious and foregrounded, that it becomes too close to be fully seen, a life principle that is not aided for viewing by the distorting lens of translation of La métaphore vive from life, from metaphor as living, to the more inert terminology of rule, The Rule of Metaphor. This translational slippage from life to rule moves the angle of preoccupation with and interpretation of this work away from the primordial, and towards interrogation of speech-acts and rules in the analytic philosophy of Austin, Searle and colleagues. Thus, a life principle in Ricœur, becomes hidden in full view, so to speak.

The main argument of this article is that a spatial phenomenology and ontology is possible, and that Ricœur stepped towards this in Oneself as Another before diverting in that same volume.
into a Husserlian retreat, via an ontology of the flesh. The concern for current purposes is less to subdue the Husserlian emphasis of Ricœur than to highlight an alternative pathway by means of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* on which basis Ricœur could have more fully bridged a mode between Dasein and subjectivity as a primordial spatiality. This alternative pathway is developed both by drawing out elements already in Ricœur and by introducing external elements to extend a path that remains inchoate in Ricœur.

Implications for understanding the relation between *conatus* and care, as dimensions of a living space principle will be examined. The proposed primordial spatial discourse of concentric and diametric space will also be developed to elucidate Ricœur’s key concern with a structure, a mediating structure between self and other, what he terms the metacategory of otherness.

**Beyond Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism to the Interplay between Diametric and Concentric Spaces as Pure Spatial Movement in Heidegger’s *Being and Time***

Key concerns of Ricœur regarding subjectivity require understanding not simply in general spatial terms but through specific spatial dimensions, as concentric and diametric spaces, which emanate from Claude Lévi-Strauss’ initial structural anthropological accounts. Yet the proposed spatial-phenomenological analysis goes far beyond these structuralist commitments, to engage in a primordial ontological search, resonant with the early Heidegger.

Ricœur comments on Heidegger that “the spatial dimension of being-in-the-world appears to involve mainly the inauthentic forms of care […] We may then wonder if it is not the unfolding of the problematic of temporality, triumphant in the second section of *Being and Time*, that prevented an *authentic* phenomenology of spatiality.”15 Ricœur’s proposed ontology of the flesh is one dimension towards expression of an authentic phenomenology of spatiality, *but not necessarily the only one, if going beyond Ricœur, as well as if building on background assumptions in Ricœur and implications of his work*. There may be other pathways towards a fundamental ontology and phenomenology of space.

The thematic of separation and connection is not only central to Ricœur’s complex tapestry of a dynamic, divided selfhood, but it also pervades contrasts between the concrete spatial structures of diametric and concentric space, extending Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropological accounts. Moreover, dimensions of connection and separation are key features of the early Heidegger’s existential spatiality, his understanding of being-in and being-alongside, which overcome Cartesian conceptions of space and the subject-object dualism.

Ricœur seeks to carve out a conceptual domain with strong affinity with Heidegger – a domain of truth prior to the apophantic judgment of Aristotle – that is not committed to a substance ontology. Ricœur rejects Aristotle’s “presumed preeminence of assertive judgment, of apophansis,”16 of being-true and being-false as a basis for attestation as certainty (of continuity of self as *idem*). In doing so, Ricœur is firmly within Heidegger’s similar distancing from the apophantic truth of Aristotle in Heidegger’s search for a primordial truth domain. Ricœur’s recognition of the “difficulty” of Aristotle’s “primacy of actuality over potentiality in connection with the theory of substance”17 is again resolutely in Heidegger’s territory of *Being and Time*. Yet Ricœur goes even further and aspires to a structural affinity between the role key concepts of
Heidegger play in his architecture of being and Ricœur’s own architecture of selfhood. Thus, Ricœur’s concept of attestation is resonant with Heidegger’s conscience, self as sameness with Heidegger’s being present at hand (Vorhandenheit), and conatus as power to act with Heidegger’s concept of care.

There is a significant nuance in Ricœur’s accelerated preoccupation with space, and in his recognition of the need to counterbalance Heidegger’s prioritising of time, of temporality as the transcendental horizon for the question of being in Being and Time. The counterbalance proffered by Ricœur is that of primordial spatiality. Early Heidegger describes time as a pure movement. Heidegger’s early Aristotle lectures recognise: “The being of life is seen as the movement that has run its courses within itself, in this life [...] [T]he being of life itself has to be regarded solely in terms of such a movement of pure temporalization [...] in its genuine movement when it has given up every kind of concern for practical orientation and apprehends simply.”

This article’s argument is for a perspective on life as a movement of pure spatialization, a movement of concentric and diametric spaces which has given up every kind of concern for practical orientation and is a mode of self-propagation. The article’s argument seeks to develop space as pure movement, as a dimension of a primordial life principle. Space is examined as a pure living movement as a relation, not substance. This is not to pit space against time, to oppose the argument to Heidegger’s emphasis on temporality, but rather to accelerate emphasis on spatial movements that embrace temporality within its own dynamic spatial interactions.

As part of this understanding of space as pure movement, a pure movement of relative differences, a key starting point is offered by structural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss’s observations of contrasts between concentric and diametric dualism in physical structures and myths across various cultures. However, Lévi-Strauss tended to discuss concentric and diametric structures as structures and not so much as spaces. Building on an aspect of Lévi-Strauss’s understanding of structures of relation, space is to be examined as an interactive tension between diametric and concentric spaces of relation. A diametric spatial structure is one where a circle is dissected in half by a line which is its diameter, or where a square or rectangle is similarly divided into two equal halves (see Fig. 1). In a concentric spatial structure, one circle is inscribed in another larger circle (or square); in pure form, the circles share a common central point (see Fig. 2).

![Figure 1. Diametric Dualism](image-url)
A purportedly key distinguishing feature of concentric and diametric structures, highlighted by Lévi-Strauss, is that they tend to co-exist in “functional relation” with each other and not merely in isolation. Being mutually interactive, at least potentially, they are examined as structures of relation but also structures in relation. Lévi-Strauss recognizes that they are fundamentally interlinked, so that an increase in one is compensated for by decrease in the other.

Ricœur comments on French structuralism in general:

> The linguistic turn [...] has often signified a refusal to “go outside” of language and a mistrust equal to that of French structuralism with respect to any extralinguistic order [...] The implicit axiom that “everything is language” has often led to a closed semanticism, incapable of accounting for human action as actually happening in the world [...] A phenomenology like Husserl’s, according to which the stratum of language is “ineffectual” in relation to the life of intentional consciousness, has a corrective value, just because it proposes the opposite extreme.

Ricœur signals some distance from the linguistic turn. He displays an openness to a level prior to or, at least, beyond language, while situating French structuralism and hence Lévi-Strauss, as locked within linguistic assumptions, though overlooking that the latter’s concentric and diametric structural relations were in some way prior to language. The feature of concentric and diametric relations being prior to language was, however, not emphasised by Lévi-Strauss. It would seem that Lévi-Strauss overlooked concentric and diametric structures as a discourse fundamentally of space due to his own structuralist commitments to the primacy of language.

As a priori entailments, the relative differences between concentric and diametric spaces are to be firmly differentiated from Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology and its empirical objectivist paradigm, drawn from phonetics invoking structures as communication. This is not to deny some commonalities between Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism and Heidegger, such as the search for transsubjective background relations prior to causality and intentionality.
A key relative difference between diametric and concentric spaces, neglected by Lévi-Strauss’ empiricism, is ascertainable in principle. It is evident that the inner and outer poles of concentric space are fundamentally attached to each other, unlike in diametric space. Both concentric poles coexist in the same space, and thus, the outer circle overlaps the shared space of the inner one. The opposite that is within the outer circle or shape cannot detach itself from being embedded within this outer shape. Similarly, although the outer circle or shape can move in the direction of greater detachment from the inner circle, it cannot, in principle, fully detach itself from the inner circle in concentric relation even if the inner circle becomes an increasingly smaller proportion of the outer. Full detachment could potentially occur only through destroying the very concentric structure of the whole relation itself.

In contrast, in diametric space both oppositional realms are basically detached and can be further smoothly detached from the other. A concentric space assumes connection between its parts and any separation is on the basis of assumed connection, whereas diametric space assumes separation and any connection between the parts is on the basis of this assumed separation. A concentric spatial relation is a structure of inclusion to be distinguished from a diametric spatial structure of exclusion.

While Ricœur acutely perceived the importance of key issues regarding an ontology of space – a dialectical structure for two modes of being, a structure of self that includes otherness in its constitution – the way that he has addressed them needs to move along a somewhat different path than the one that he traversed in *Onself as Another*. In response to the fundamental question of a selfhood made flesh, an embodied dimension of self to provide the sustenance of continuity for the self as same, as *idem*, Ricœur turns away from Heidegger and towards Husserl, while still recognising that this quest must not fall into the cogito-related comforts of representation, of intentionality. Ricœur views Husserl rather than Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as closer to an ontology of the flesh. Yet Ricœur could have developed a different path, namely, of following through further on spatiality in Heidegger as a pathway to the self, through concentric and diametric primordial spaces of relation. This spatial-phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time* goes beyond engagement with Heidegger’s explicit spatial themes to unthought spatial structures, pervading a wider range of its key concepts.

For current purposes, the focus is on the relation of concentric and diametric spaces to existential spatiality, as well as aspects of *Angst* and care. Resonant with Ricœur’s concerns to interrogate the as-structure of being-as, and belonging-as with regard to the copula as a background dimension to understanding metaphor, for Heidegger, “‘Being alongside’ the world […] is an existentiale founded upon Being-in. In these analyses the issue is one of seeing a primordial structure of Dasein’s Being – a structure in accordance with whose phenomenal content the concepts of being must be Articulated.” This seeing is a phenomenological disclosure that includes sight but is not simply reducible to the visual. In the words of Dieter Henrich:

When abstracting from the richness of phenomenological analyses and focusing solely on the scaffolding of the progression of thought in *Being and Time*, one immediately recognizes that its driving force is the question concerning the unitary structure of the original totality of Dasein […] Yet how is this concept of the ontological structural unity of Dasein different from the speculative interpretations of subjectivity?
For Heidegger, there is a primordial structural totality of being-in-the-world, prior to predicative assertion, that encompasses Dasein’s spatial structures but somehow extends beyond them; it is less a process of abstracting structures than of uncovering them in their surreptitious immanence. Primordial structures of being-in-the-world are irreducible to derivative subjective unconscious structures. Heidegger’s purportedly primordial structures of relation include “being-alongside” and “being-in,” with both modes “equiprimordial” with “being-with.”

Much of Heidegger’s argument in Being and Time rests on the uncovering of a set of structures, where some aspects are treated as prior to others, through a series of relations in a structural whole – a structural whole that was itself never quite manifested as a concrete spatial projection. In the absence of a clearly visualized spatial structure or holistic set of structures, much of Heidegger’s account falls away into an argument merely by authority.

The Early Heidegger’s Existential Spatiality as an Interplay between Diametric and Concentric Spaces

It is clear that Heidegger sought in Being and Time to uncover specific, concrete, a priori spatial ontological structures and did not succeed in doing so. His project lies incomplete. Filling this vacuum for interpretation of Heidegger has resulted in importation of a Wittgensteinian schema of shared background practices onto background contexts of being in the work of Charles Guignon, Hubert Dreyfus, as well as Jeff Malpas. Malpas has also sought to interpret Heidegger through an Aristotelian schema of spatial containment as topos.

Spatiality of being-in-the-world is expressly linked in Division One, III, 21c of Being and Time with the earlier discussions of being-in and the two modes of “categories” and “existentialia.” Seeking to transcend the nature-culture binary opposition in his conceptualization of space, Heidegger develops these contrasting modes of spatial relation. Traditional Western conceptions of “world” oversimplify this existential conception of being-in. Being-in, as a category, is like water in a glass or a dress in a closet, whereas the existential mode of being-in-the-world is a different spatial mode of being-in, which overcomes a distance or remoteness within the categorial mode of being-in. Existential remoteness is not something measurable in terms of objective spatial distances of objectively present entities, as Heidegger explicates:

“The table stands ‘by [bei] the door’ or ‘the chair ‘touches’ [berührt] the wall.’ Taken strictly, “touching” is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate reexamination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the chair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is the sort of thing “for” which a chair would be encounterable.

Relations between solid objects in space are diametric, as there is a basic assumed separation between each object as an object. Both objects exclude each other from occupying the same space. This assumed separation means they are not “encounterable”; encountering overcomes the remoteness of assumed separation and is a concentric possibility which Dasein as being-in-the-world possesses. Heidegger explicitly equates the “touch” of encountering with the
mode of being-alongside. For Heidegger, entities such as a table or a chair cannot even potentially be encounterable. Against this backdrop, it is notable that Ricœur refers to “primordial features” such as touch.\textsuperscript{36}

Heidegger challenges the primacy of “side-by-side-ness” or the separation built into two entities in order for them to be “side-by-side.” He overcomes a diametric relation between Dasein and “world” in his description of “being-alongside” the world: “There is no such thing as the ‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ with another entity called ‘world’.”\textsuperscript{37} Diametric space is where both parts are side-by-side. Heidegger seeks to go beyond Cartesian separation between self and world – beyond a diametric split structure of relation between self and world, subject and object.

In contrast to diametric structured space as side-by-sideness, Heidegger interrogates a different spatial relation of dwelling “alongside.” For a mode of “being-alongside” the world, a different mode of assumed connection is needed, which is not a diametric “side-by-side” relation. Concentric space expresses a “being-alongside” model of relatedness, where one pole dwells within and alongside the other, surrounded and in assumed connection. Concentric spatialization offers an existential structural relation that overcomes the remoteness and non-involvement within diametric space. It offers a spatial relation, where one pole is “in” the other, and hence, is a being-in. Being-alongside is founded upon being-in for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{38} It is movement between contrasting directional spaces of diametric “side-by-side” and concentric “alongside” structures of relation that offers a framework for primordial spaces as an interactive dance.

De-severance is central to this being-alongside and “Dasein is essentially de-severance – that is, it is spatial.”\textsuperscript{39} A recurrent spatial theme within \textit{Being and Time} is the tension between loss of interactive relation and an overcoming of this loss. Some typical examples of this tension between two modes – an interactive, connective, involved mode and a detached, severed, non-relational mode, respectively – occur in the context of the purported spatiality of being-in-the-world. Heidegger refers to the relational state of de-severance: “‘De-severing’ amounts to making the farness vanish – that is, making the remoteness of something disappear.”\textsuperscript{40} This is thoroughly consistent with a movement from a mode of assumed separation or severance within diametric structures of relation to a spatial mode of assumed connection summoning concentric structures of relation: “The circumspective de-severing of Dasein’s everydayness reveals the being-in-itself of the ‘true world’ – of that entity which Dasein, as something existing, is already alongside.”\textsuperscript{41} Being-in gives expression to the “true” authentic world of its existential space through de-severance, which brings a return to an already being-alongside, to a concentric assumed connection.

As a feature together with the “directionality” of the spatiality of being-in-the-world,\textsuperscript{42} Heidegger treats de-severance as movement towards a more connective state: “Every bringing-close has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close.”\textsuperscript{43} This connective state of de-severing reveals a being already alongside.\textsuperscript{44} Loss of interactive relation is highlighted. “The spatiality of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world loses its involvement character […] the world loses its specific aroundness.”\textsuperscript{45} In concentric space, the outer pole surrounds or is “around” the inner pole, a feature lost to diametric space. A concentric structure is a mode of being-in. “Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have.”\textsuperscript{46} It is a fundamental feature of Dasein’s existence. The inner concentric circle is interpretable as being in a mode of “being-in” the outer. The “spatially
encountered” being-alongside is a concernful, connective (de-severant), concentric mode, which is subject to a displacement or falling, where Dasein can become “rid of its being-alongside.” In other words, the concentric being-alongside can be displaced into a diametric relation, where its relation to Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-being is an issue.”

De-severance is an active process of interaction. Dasein “cannot wander about with the current range of its de-severances; it can never do more than change them.” Dasein’s primordial connective space undoes the assumed separation through its engagement, what Heidegger calls encountering, “Dasein is spatial in that it discovers space circumspectively, so that indeed it constantly comports itself de-severantly towards the entities thus spatially encountered.” It is evident that for Heidegger an interaction takes place between this primordial spatial relation and that space of entities diametrically side-by-side each other which is, thereby, changed through this interaction, what Heidegger also terms directionality. They are not simply two spaces divided into existential and “objective” space, spliced from each other, as Dreyfus envisages. To do so, would be to reimport a subject-object dualism through a kind of subjective versus objective space, very much contrary to the project of Heidegger.

The very distinction of subject-object is challenged by Heidegger in his spatial conception of Dasein. In spatial terms, Heidegger is challenging the ineluctability of the potentially malleable diametric structural relation that frames the subject/object relation. Iain Thomson summarizes Heidegger’s insight into this assumed separation, with implications for a diametric spatial understanding: “As Heidegger frequently points out, in the modern, post-Cartesian world, an ‘object,’ Gegenstand, is something that ‘stands opposite’ a human subject, something external to subjectivity.” Diametric spatial relation is such a standing opposite, a counterstand; a spatial precondition for objectification is diametric space through its assumed separation and distanciation, where the diametric poles are opposite each other.

This characterization of existential space as a concentric structure and of extended space as a diametric structure offers a number of advantages over other interpretations (e.g., Dreyfus, Malpas). It provides domains of interaction between both spaces as envisaged by Heidegger. Treating both spaces as part of the ontological structure of being-in-the-world paves the way not only for their interaction but also for a view of them as key to Heidegger’s transcendental project, since the relational interaction between existentialia and categories is viewed by the early Heidegger as key to the transcendental horizon for the question of being, “The connection between these two modes of the characters of being [existentialia and categories] cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of being has been clarified.” While Malpas does centrally acknowledge the need for uncovering a primordial spatial structure, the specific concrete structures of concentric and diametric spaces go further than simply an assertion of the need for such primordial spatial structures. The interpretation of existential spatiality as a concentric mode of spatial relation and extended space as a diametric mode of spatial relation does not treat Heidegger’s spatiality of being-in-the-world as fundamentally confused, in the fashion of Dreyfus.

For Heidegger, “Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally.” The taking in of diametric space into Dasein’s existential spatiality is a more radical step than simply movement towards a concentric space. It is a restructuring, a modification of the diametric space, so that it is taken in by or dissolved into the concentric holistic space. Insofar as diametric space is engaged with “objective” extended space, its being-taken-in through interaction with concentric space
becomes a process of literal change to this relation in extended space. The interaction with concentric structured space brings literal effects in extended space, influences mediated through concentric spatial openings.

Existential spatiality of Dasein’s being-in is a concentric spatial structure of assumed connection. Dasein’s existential spatiality is a dynamic process of taking space in; it is a directional movement towards concentric structured space. This concentric directional movement belongs to being-in and its equiprimordial dimensions of being-alongside and being-with that involve directionality and de-severance. All are part of the same concentric spatial movement.

Building on this account of Heidegger’s existential spatiality in relation to Ricœur’s dynamic and divided subjectivity interpreted through the thematic of connection and separation in spatial terms of interacting concentric and diametric spaces, the next section will not only examine Ricœur’s interwoven concepts of Care and Conatus, Angst and Suffering in spatial terms of connection and separation, it will also do so through exploring another spatial feature, symmetry, specifically mirror image inverted symmetry, recognised by Lévi-Strauss for diametric space, while adverted to indirectly by Ricœur.

Care and Conatus, Angst and Suffering

In arguing here for a reading of early Heidegger’s care in concentric spatial terms and Ricœur’s conatus as a complementary structural dimension to care, though with conatus framed in diametric spatial terms, this will require a more divided, less unitary concept of reciprocity than that provided by Ricœur in Oneself as Another. Moreover, this proposed concretising in primordial spatial terms of Ricœur’s bridging project between Heidegger’s Dasein and a complex, multistranded subjectivity, highlights the need to retain Heidegger’s distinction between the primordial and the derivative, which must not be conflated with his conception of authenticity and inauthenticity in structural terms.

Dissociating the notion of existence from substance and instead relating it to the act, Ricœur regards the body as a “nonrepresentative certainty” involving resistance that gives way to effort. This assumed connection to the body is prior to the self and body apprehended as an object of self-consciousness. Ricœur echoes Maine de Biran explicitly, and more implicitly a Nietzschean concern with pre-representative experience of the Dionysian apprehension of music. A notable feature of Ricœur’s account is a bridging concept between Dasein and the self as idem, as continuity through a structure of conatus akin to Heideggerian care; this bridging concept requires an affective dimension, and Ricœur supplies this sentience for conatus as the power to act, namely, through the addendum to conatus of suffering.

Ricœur seeks to develop a bridge in spatial terms between Heidegger’s Dasein and subjectivity. While pursuing this task, he develops a parallel between Heidegger’s care and a conception of conatus as power to act, and within this emphasises a key dimension of suffering that offers at least indirect parallels with Heidegger’s Angst as a key structural element of care. Flesh for Ricœur is “this original correlation between acting and suffering”; Ricœur seeks a “a sharp-edged dialectic between praxis and pathos,” along an axis resonant with Heidegger’s care-Angst entwinement.
Ricœur treats *conatus* as a response to his concern with continuity of self, of self as *idem*: “the idea of *conatus* stands out, as the effort to persevere in being, which forms the unity of man as of every individual.” From this vantage point, Heideggerian care is being reinterpreted in Ricœurian terms as a key dimension to continuity of the self, to self as *idem*. Sameness of self is for Ricœur related to Heidegger’s *Vorhandenheit* – presence at hand. Flesh can be construed as a softening of a rigid diametric side by sideness between separate bodies. Yet a discourse of living spatial movements in terms of concentric and diametric spaces can be further developed with regard to Heidegger’s key concepts of *Angst* and care, as fundamental influences on Ricœur’s whole framework, to further concretise in spatial phenomenological and ontological terms Ricœur’s search for fundamental structures of subjectivity.

On this proposed reading of the early Heidegger’s conceptions of encountering and being-alongside, as projections of concentric existential structures in contrast with diametric structures, *Angst* can be examined as the process of openness to movement – of openness to change from and between concentric and diametric spatial modes of relation structuring experience. For Heidegger, “The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.” Diametric structures involve a turning away from concentric spatialization. Similarly, being-alongside undergoes a “falling” which again illustrates this directional movement, as the being-alongside of concentric spatialization turns away towards a diametric mode. *Angst*, as the dynamic component of change and movement between concentric and diametric spaces, brings a focus on change and transformation within experience. This structural interplay explains how inauthenticity can still be a *primordial* state of relation. Heidegger observes the possibility of Dasein “becoming […] rid of its Being alongside,” so that a radical shift from concentric to diametric structures would occur.

*Angst* invokes a futural direction of possible movement towards authentic concentric spatialization, through modifying diametric structures – through modifying a state of assumed separation into a state of separation on the basis of assumed connection. This sense of directional movement, towards the “aroundness” of concentric relation, gains indirect support from Carleton Christenson’s examination of the translation of Heidegger’s understanding of purpose, in his phrase “*etwas, um zu*.” While John MacQuarrie & Edward Robinson note the dual meaning of *um* as “around” and “in order to,” Christenson amplifies this point:

The German phrase *etwas, um zu* […], which MacQuarrie and Robinson translate as “something-in-order-to,” is, while not ungrammatical, certainly unusual; one would normally speak of *etwas zum*, as in *etwas zum schreiben*, i.e., something for writing. This indicates that Heidegger is placing weight on what the expressions in the phrase individually mean. In particular, he is placing weight on the meaning of the word *um*. In German this word doubles as a preposition meaning “around,” as in *um die Ecke* (“around the corner”) and as a prefix meaning “surrounding,” as in *Umwelt*.

As has been seen, a key feature distinguishing concentric from diametric space is that, in the former, the outer pole “surrounds” and is “around” the inner, in a relation of assumed connection – a dimension which is not obtainable in diametric relation. Purpose, envisaged as directional change towards concentric spatialization of surrounding and being around, is thus consistent with Christenson’s conclusion, regarding Heidegger’s emphasis on “*um*.” “It is thus
reasonable to conclude that Heidegger is using the unusual phrase *etwas, um zu* […] in order to exploit, on the one hand, the meaning of the whole phrase *um-zu* as expressing purpose, and, on the other, the meaning of the component word *um* as expressing roundness.”69 Concentric spatial projection is a directional movement towards roundness.

Interpreting care, Ricœur recognises that “Everything turns, as we know, on the sense of the preposition ‘in,’ which has no equivalent on the side of the relation among beings belonging to the metacategory of *Vorhandenheit.*”70 For early Heidegger, both care and primordial temporality must be interpreted in structural terms, “the care-structure does not speak against the possibility of being-a-whole but is the condition for the possibility” of this potentiality.71 For Heidegger, the care structure is not simple, though it is central to the question of the unity of the structural whole of Dasein, as “Dasein can be spatial only as care.”72 Care embraces the contours and structures of Dasein’s existential spatiality, but goes further.

While the interplay between care and primordial temporality in relation to a proposed primordial spatial discourse of concentric and diametric spaces is explored in more detail elsewhere,73 it suffices for current purposes to outline this argument in preliminary terms. A further dimension interrogated in this spatial-phenomenological reading of *Being and Time* focuses on the background relation *itself* between concentric and diametric spaces, to go beyond treating these spaces in diametric fashion as operating “side-by-side” to each other. Heidegger’s inquiry into “the meaning of care” asks “what makes possible the totality of the articulated structural whole of care.”74 Is there a background relation that engages with the structure of care? This focus on a more primordial dimension than concentric (authentic) and diametric (inauthentic) spaces invites a questioning of the background spatial relation *itself* between concentric and diametric spaces. Is this background spatial relation between concentric and diametric spaces itself a concentric one of assumed connection or a diametric one of assumed separation? A diametric spatial relation between concentric and diametric spaces would be a split between both spaces to minimize their interaction. The connective feature of care is a background spatial movement of concentric spatial direction towards unifying the foreground spatial structures of concentric and diametric spaces. However, this background is in an ongoing dynamic tension between a connective care as a concentric spatial direction, on the one hand, and an assumed separation, a diametric split in the background itself between concentric and diametric spaces, on the other hand. Care encompasses both the background connective relation between Dasein’s concentric and diametric structures and these structures of Dasein themselves. It becomes both connective background and the totality of the foreground spatial structures.

Although care expresses concentric structured authenticity, the contrary space of diametric inauthenticity is made visible as a potential structure. Like *Angst*, care includes an awareness of the potential for movement between authenticity and inauthenticity, between concentric and diametric spaces. However, care goes further than *Angst* to a prior connective directional level. For this possibility of movement between concentric and diametric spaces, a prior background temporal dimension is a necessary condition. “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care […] The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporalityi.”75

Yet the intrusion of *conatus* as a kind of Heideggerian care, to bridge an ontological chasm between Heidegger’s Dasein and Ricœur’s self as continuity of self, as idem, brings with it a
commitment to power. Ricœur quotes Spinoza, “‘the power or conatus by which it perseveres in its own being, is nothing but the given, or actual essence of the thing’.”

Power (to act) imports a diametric spatial relation. This is an implication of another feature of diametric space, this one expressly recognised by Lévi-Strauss, namely, that diametric structures are ones of mirror image inverted symmetry. Ricœur’s concerns touch briefly on issues of symmetry in metaphor, including symmetry by inversion, whereas Lévi-Strauss explicitly relates concrete spatial diametric structures to mirror image symmetrical inversions between both diametric poles, such as good-bad, above-below reversals. While Lévi-Strauss related diametric structured, mirror image symmetry to myths, concentric spatial structures of relation are not a symmetry as inversion. Rather they offer a different entailment of symmetry as unity, where the line or axis of symmetry brings the same pole rather than a mirror image pole in diametric structures.

Diametric mirror image symmetry is a spatial precondition for mirror image oppositions framing power relations, such as between upper/lower, superior/inferior, master/slave, powerful/powerless. The concentric assumed connection of care becomes twisted into a diametric power realm, that necessarily brings a power hierarchy. It is resonant with the twist within Nietzsche’s work where the will to life becomes inverted into a mirror image opposition as will to power. Regarding Nietzsche’s good and bad conscience in the *Genealogy of Morals*, Ricœur highlights “a problem in Nietzsche to determine whether the reference, assured by the genealogical method, to ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ Life, reaches the ultimate referent of a terminal deciphering.” What Ricœur hints at here is the displacement from the diametric mirror image symmetry of good/bad conscience to strong/weak life of a master/slave morality as remaining locked with a diametric spatial frame of reference that is far from being a fundamental resolution of this issue. Again Nietzsche’s creditor/debtor account of morals as an owing is a frame in terms of diametric mirror image symmetries. Ricœur observes the “authoritarian tone” of Nietzsche’s claim to have discovered the “origin” of the moral conceptual world. When Ricœur criticises the “new dogmatism” of Nietzsche, where “all the reversals made by the genealogical method [are…] intended to destroy teleology with the weapons of archaeology,” he could go further to realise that Nietzsche is projecting a distinctive space, a quasi-compulsive repetition of diametric space as mirror image inversions and that this is not the only possible experiential space for understanding conscience.

A further key diametric mirror image reversal relied upon by Ricœur in his account of suffering underlying *conatus* as the bridge between Dasein and subjectivity, is that of active/passive: “the basic dissymmetry, inherent in interaction, resulting from the fact that an agent, by exerting a power over another, treats the latter as the patient of his or her action.” Ricœur here engages in an explicit appeal to issues of symmetry. However, this active/passive inversion is not dissymmetry but mirror image inverted symmetry.

Ricœur’s *conatus* as power to act interrogates power as a reigning: “Starting from this otherness, I can reign over. Primordiality however, is not a reign. Ontologically, the flesh precedes the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary.” On a spatial-phenomenological reading in terms of concentric and diametric spaces, Ricœur is treating the diametric power dimension of a reign as not being primordial. However, this may be a conflation of the authentic and the primordial, at least in Heideggerian terms. On a reading of *Being and Time* in terms of
concentric and diametric spaces as care, the diametric space is primordial but inauthentic – and for Heidegger the inauthentic can still be primordial and requires a structural modification to be authentic. A further problem here with Ricœur’s position is the ascription of power dimensions solely to the subjective will as voluntary-involuntary. In contrast, diametric spatial systems of relation propagate themselves prior to simply the subjective will, and hence the power force in diametric space is more akin to Nietzsche’s impersonal will to power as a system of self-propagating diametric spaces. Ricœur’s quest for an “authentic phenomenology of spatiality” needs to disaggregate the primordial-derivative and authentic-inauthentic axes.

Ricœur seeks a power relation that is not one of sheer diametric space of master/slave: “And what are we to say of the Other when he is the executioner? And who will be able to distinguish the master from the executioner, the master who calls for a disciple from the master who requires a slave?” Ricœur interrogates “reciprocity […] in which the roles are continually reversed.” However, reciprocity as diametric mirror image reversal and inversion requires distinction from reciprocity as assumed connection, as an affective mutual attunement. The glue holding together words such as reciprocity must be stripped bare in spatial terms to reveal fundamental differences of relation.

In this article, care is interpreted as embracing a concentric spatial structure, in stark contrast to the diametric spatial hierarchy of power, whether the latter is the power to act of conatus as a living principle or the will to power as a turning within or of the will to life in Nietzsche. The conclusion is not that Heidegger’s care and Ricœur’s conatus are thus incommensurable discourses and that Ricœur’s attempt to connect them conceptually is flawed. Rather the opposite is the case. While concentric and diametric spaces are contrasting systems of relation, so that there is a turn in the shift from concentric spatial care to diametric spatial preconditions for power as conatus – nevertheless, both are primordial spaces. Both concentric and diametric spaces as structures of relation are themselves in mutual relation; they offer a common discourse of mutual interplay and tension. Hence, in the sense that both concentric care and diametric conatus share a primordial spatial discourse, Ricœur’s observation is justified that there is a conceptual transferability from Heidegger’s care as a fundamental structure of Dasein and conatus as a fundamental structure of selfhood in its continuity as a power to act. They play similar roles in a comparable overall architecture or network of mutual relations, even though care is a concentric spatial structure and conatus presupposes diametric spatial preconditions. Moreover, care’s extra role as background (as well as foreground) connection encompasses the diametric within which conatus lurks.

**Diametric Space as Assumed Separation and Closure**

This final section explores Ricœur’s challenge to a closed conception of interiority. In doing so, this ineluctably spatial questioning builds on a further entailment of a relative difference between concentric and diametric spaces, recognised explicitly by Lévi-Strauss, namely, concentric space as relative openness contrasted with diametric space as relative closure.

Selfhood with otherness is explicitly envisaged by Ricœur as existing in structural terms: “the specific dialectical structure of the relation between selfhood and otherness.” This dialectic with otherness is an internalisation of the other, which Ricœur treats as a “metacategory of otherness.”
The other is in some way a dimension of the primordial structures of self, of relations embedded in the self: “[O]therness is not added on to selfhood from outside, as though to prevent its solipsistic drift, but […] it belongs instead to the tenor of meaning and to the ontological constitution of selfhood.” Ricœur develops this in *Oneself as Another* in three ways, otherness as the body or flesh, otherness as the foreign, and the relation of self to itself as conscience.

Ricœur explores the crevices of the disjunction between Aristotle’s actual-potential dimensions of being and a conception of the being of the categories as *ousia*, in order to uncover a space to interrogate the question of the continuity of being in the self as *idem*. Paradoxically, he seeks continuity of self through a conceptual device of exploration of disjunction. For his exploration of self in relation to inclusion of the other, he operates a reverse conceptual trajectory, namely, his is a search for a continuity of relation rather than a rupture of an outside, in the relation of self to another.

Ricœur seeks to strip bare the layers of foreignness in the understanding of the other as a constituting relational structure of the self, a foreignness he construes in terms of passivity. A pivotal thread to this foreignness in the structure of the self is that of Heidegger’s ‘they’ self, as inauthenticity, a structure requiring modification to turn it towards authenticity. According to Ricœur, in *Being and Time* “Heidegger perfectly described this moment of otherness that distinguishes conscience. Far from being foreign to the constitution of selfhood, this otherness is closely related to its emergence, inasmuch as, under the impetus of conscience, the self is made capable of taking hold of itself in the anonymity of the ‘they.’ […] Now how does the self free itself from the ‘they’?”

The anxiety of authenticity reveals the possibility of moving from diametric structures (a category mode of experience) in a direction towards concentric space. From this perspective, authenticity occurs in the modification of diametric structures of experience towards concentric, existential “being-in” structures. In Heidegger’s words, “Authentic *Being-one’s-Self* does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the ‘they’; it is rather an existentiell modification of the ‘they’ – of the ‘they’ as an essential existentiale.” Heidegger’s authentic self, which is not detached or floating above the inauthentic self, can still retain a realm distinct from inauthenticity if the relation is viewed in terms of a concentric relation, where the authentic is the inner circle surrounded by and immersed in the outer inauthentic pole, yet still differentiated from it.

Another entailment of the relative differences between concentric and diametric spaces is the foreground-background interaction versus noninteraction. This entailment of diametricity, contrasted with concentric space, is highlighted by Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss rejects closure for concentric structures. As the concentric poles are in assumed connection to each other, they are also in assumed connection to the background; and this assumed connection to the background resists closure within the concentric structure. Diametric structures’ relation to their own poles is one of a mirror image division, which then maintains a cleavage from the background that becomes closed off.

Ricœur’s challenge to a view of interiority as being “determined solely by the desire for retreat and closure” is a quest for an interiority that goes beyond diametric spatial closing off of self from other and towards a more open concentric spatial relation. In Ricœur’s words, Husserl’s radical self-grounding “expresses a will to closure, more precisely a state of separation, that makes
otherness the equivalent of radical exteriority”; “separation has made interiority sterile.” Ricœur explicitly thematises in terms of both closure and separation key hallmarks of diametric spatial structures relative to concentric space; diametricity is a sterile, inauthentic space for interiority in split opposition to exteriority. Moreover, this thematization is also explicitly treated in diametric if not spatial terms, but Ricœur recognises that the work of Levinas is “directed against a conception of the identity of the Same, to which the otherness of the Other is diametrically opposed.” From these Ricœurian threads of a quest for an otherness that is not closure, separation, or diametric opposition, combined with his interrogation of a prelinguistic and primordial spatiality, it is evident that Ricœur has anticipated a diametric spatial discourse without naming it as such as a diametric spatial structure – and without engaging with its countermovement in explicit spatial terms or in explicit terms of a life principle as concentric spatial movements.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Ricœur’s Oneself as Another marks a significant and distinctive acceleration of interest in space in his work. It no longer subordinates space to language, as simply metaphor within language, in contrast to La métaphore vive. Moreover, unlike others advocating a spatial turn for the humanities and social sciences, Ricœur avoids reduction of space simply to place. Ricœur’s renewed spatial orientation paves the way for amplification of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in specific spatial structural terms with regard to dimensions of connection, separation, mirror image symmetry, and relative openness and closure. The proposed amplification in this article seeks to develop a specific spatial discourse in terms of concentric and diametric spaces, while building bridges between Ricœur’s Oneself as Another and the early Heidegger in terms of a spatial phenomenology.

In this article, a life principle is postulated as a dynamic constituting structure, as a spatial directional movement, a concentric spatial movement structuring experience and wider systems. A life principle in terms of a being-nonbeing relation is one lens of interrogation of concentric spatial movements. Other resonances include Schopenhauer’s will to life and Freud’s life drives. A life principle is related in Paul Downes, *The Primordial Dance*, to Freud’s life drives and Heidegger’s background temporal horizon of being. Paul Downes, *The Primordial Dance: Diametric and Concentric Spaces in the Unconscious World* (Oxford/Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). As W. J. Richardson highlights, Heidegger’s background temporal horizon of being is a question of being, inviting also a conception of non-being: “It is only when we comprehend the horizon of transcendence as both the unifying dynamism of sheer presence and as non-being that we understand it properly.” W. J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 3rd edition, 1974), 148.

Martin Heidegger, *Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Worldview*. In *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings 1910-1927* (Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, eds. Seattle, Noesis Press, 2009, 2nd revised, expanded edition). Ricœur’s questioning of a phenomenological and ontological structure of otherness offers strong resonance with a question of life in relation to the other, perhaps best expressed through Heidegger’s words on Dilthey: “Inasmuch as life is life with others, the structures of this life with one another still have to be produced. But how is this life of the other originally given?,” 254, a question Heidegger states that Dilthey never pursued further.

Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 330.

Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 316.

Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 316-7.


Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 325 (emphasis added).

Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 328.
11 Downes, *At the Threshold of Ricœur’s Concerns*.


15 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 328.

16 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 302.

17 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 306.


20 Downes, *At the Threshold of Ricœur’s Concerns*.


22 Downes, *At the Threshold of Ricœur’s Concerns*.

23 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 301.

24 In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly distinguished his ontological questioning from that of anthropology, due to the latter’s subjectivist and ontic, empirical commitments.

25 See also Downes, *The Primordial Dance*.

26 Downes, *At the Threshold of Ricœur’s Concerns*.

27 Downes, *At the Threshold of Ricœur’s Concerns*.

28 The interplay between diametric and concentric spaces is argued in Downes, *The Primordial Dance* to be a fundamental implicit feature of Heidegger’s *magnum opus, Being and Time*, especially, though not exclusively, with regard to the entailments of assumed separation and connection. Concentric and diametric spatial projections are argued to pervade the panorama of Heidegger’s basic concepts in *Being and Time* including: (i) Dasein’s existential spatiality as being-in, being alongside, directionality, deseverance and encountering, contrasting with the extended space of categories, (ii) *Angst of*
authenticity, (iii) phenomena and appearances, unconcealment (*alethia*), (iv) care as an *a priori* structure and primordial temporality as a transcendental horizon.

29 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 80-1; italics in original.


33 The poverty of Heidegger’s method has been perhaps most forcefully criticized by Ernst Tugendhat. He emphasizes the lack of criteria for privileging as primordial in any Heideggerian truth claims, whether for disclosure of being or for preference of a dimension of experience as being authentic. Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967).


35 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 81; italics in original.

36 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 324.

37 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 81.

38 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 81.

39 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143; italics in original.

40 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 139.

41 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 141; italics in original.


43 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143.

44 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 141.

45 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 147.

46 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 84.

47 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143.

50 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143.
51 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 143.
57 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 419.
58 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 321.
60 It is not being denied that there may be many connections between Heidegger’s Dasein and Ricœur’s self as *ipse*. The necessarily selective vantage point in the current argument focuses in on the *idem* aspect, on the continuity dimension for this particular analysis in spatial terms of commonalities between Heidegger’s Dasein and Ricœur’s self.
61 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 320.
62 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 320.
63 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 316.
64 Ricœur, recognises that the connection between selfhood and Dasein is through care for Heidegger, “the most fundamental existential capable of ensuring the thematic unity of the work, at least until temporality appears on the stage in the second section,” *Oneself as Another*, 309.
65 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 230; italics in original.
69 Christensen “What are the Categories in Sein und Zeit? Brandom on Heidegger on Zuhandenhheit,” 165.
70 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 310.
Power as a relative term of increase/decrease is a diametric structured mirror image space, while power to act presupposes the diametric space of assumed separation, what Ricœur elsewhere aptly describes as "distanciation" between subject and object, Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, trans. J. B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 110, 51. However, Ricœur’s power here is not to be equated with the Nietzschean will to power. The power of Ricœur’s *conatus* as framed through a diametric spatial supporting condition, of diametric space as position, is to be distinguished from the active diametric spatial directional movement of the Nietzschean will to power. This distinction also pertains to the background relation between concentric and diametric spaces. The Nietzschean will to power operates as a diametric active splitting background between concentric and diametric spaces. So the level of description and directional aspect of diametric space as a movement distinguishes the Nietzschean will to power from Ricœur’s *conatus*, though both are still imbued with diametric spatial assumptions.
short of murder. Thus master/slave represents a cultural development away from sheer savagery and violence. However, while master/slave may represent a restraint upon violence, it also institutionalizes violence. Violence is *aufgehoben*, preserved, in the fundamental inequality of recognition: the master is recognized by the slave but does not reciprocally recognize the slave.”

Robert R. Williams “The Concept of Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in A. Denker & M. Vater (eds.), *New Critical Essays: Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Humanity Books 2003), 71-2. The raw violence of monistic obliteration of the counterpole that is shifted from in the recognition of a diametric mirror image inverted symmetry of master/slave is nevertheless not the same as connection. Even if Ricœur is treating recognition as a connective improvement on obliteration, this is not to treat such recognition as connection. A much further leap beyond the master/slave recognition is required in relation to an assumed connection as affective mutual attunement in concentric space. Ricœur addresses the concept of recognition at greater length elsewhere. Paul Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). Diametric space is not non-recognition but a much more limited recognition on the basis of assumed separation. It is not a monistic obliteration of the counterpole. Diametric spaces allows for a mutual co-existence. However, it can scarcely be denied that a master-slave relation is still a very attenuated conception of mutual recognition, far from one of an assumed connection as affective mutual attunement.

89 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 298.
90 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 298.
91 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 317.
92 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 342.
93 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 168; italics in original.
95 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 339.
96 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 335-6.
97 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 337.
98 For an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s compassion as a concentric spatial internalisation of the other that the sterile interiority of Nietzsche’s diametric spatial projections could not accommodate, see Paul Downes, “Reconceptualising Schopenhauer’s Compassion through Diametric and Concentric Spatial Structures of Relation,” *Enrahonar: An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason*, 60 (2017), 81-98.
99 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 335.