Recognition and Exteriority
Towards a Recognition-Theoretic Account of Globalization

Sebastian Purcell
Sebastian Purcell is Assistant Professor of Social Philosophy at SUNY Cortland.

Abstract
This essay aims to extend Paul Ricœur’s account of recognition to address some of the concerns of globalization, especially those voiced by Enrique Dussel. The extension is accomplished in two parts. First, Dussel’s account of spatial existence as dwelling is reviewed as it is pertinent to the concerns of globalization. Next, it is demonstrated that each of the aspects of Ricœur’s account of recognition may be given a spatial re-articulation. The results thus establish an outline of how recognition theory might address some of the concerns of globalization. The essay concludes with several consequences for the modification of recognition politics as one finds it in the late work of Ricœur and in Axel Honneth’s ongoing inquiries.

Keywords: Dussel, Globalization, Privilege, Recognition, Space

Résumé
Cet article vise à donner une extension pratique à la théorie Ricœurienne de la reconnaissance. Il s’agit de répondre à certaines préoccupations liées à la mondialisation, en particulier celles exprimées par Enrique Dussel. Ce projet d’extension s’articule en deux temps. Tout d’abord, l’importance que Dussel accorde à l’existence de l’espace comme habitation est ré-examinée, pour autant qu’elle concerne directement des enjeux de la mondialisation. Ensuite, il est démontré que chacune des dimensions de la théorie Ricœurienne de la reconnaissance peut donner lieu à une nouvelle articulation de la question spatiale. Les résultats ainsi établis donnent un aperçu de la façon dont la théorie de la reconnaissance pourrait répondre à certains défis posés par la mondialisation. L’article s’achève sur une réflexion sur les conséquences à tirer de ce projet d’extension du point de vue d’une transformation de la politique de reconnaissance, comme on le retrouve dans l’œuvre tardive de Ricœur et dans les travaux en cours d’Axel Honneth.

Mots-clés: Dussel, Mondialisation, Privilège, Reconnaissance, Espace
Recognition and Exteriority
Towards a Recognition-Theoretic Account of Globalization

Sebastian Purcell
SUNY Cortland

The present essay concerns the recognition of those who inhabit the underside of modernity, who dwell in the shadow of globalization. A brief excerpt from a New York Times article might make clear what is intended.

Phnom Penh, Cambodia – Western men who visit red-light districts in poor countries often find themselves surrounded by coquettish teenage girls laughingly tugging them toward the brothels. The men assume that the girls are there voluntarily, and in some cases they are right. But anyone inclined to take the girl’s smiles at face value should talk to Sina Vann, who was once one of those smiling girls.

Sina is Vietnamese but was kidnapped at the age of 13 and taken to Cambodia, where she was drugged. She said she woke up naked and bloody on a bed with a white man – she doesn’t know his nationality – who had purchased her virginity. After that, she was locked on the upper floors of a nice hotel and offered to Western men and wealthy Cambodians. She said she was beaten ferociously to force her to smile and act seductively.

Eventually Sina was freed by a police raid and now has become a chief operative in fighting human trafficking in Cambodia, though it is somewhat difficult to say that this outcome constitutes any sort of happy ending to her drama.

What Sina’s case illustrates is the sinister side of globalization. The increasing connectivity, trade, cheap airfare and so on that are often thought to typify the process of globalization as progressive at the same time make human exploitation possible in ways that were before unfathomable. Those who are exploited and victimized by this process form the Exteriority to the privileged group who live in the wealthy nations of the world and who are among the wealthy and enfranchised in those nations.

Philosophers have been slow to address this other aspect of globalization. We have been slow to present an account that would make sense of how to ameliorate this situation. As the Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel has written, “there is little prestige to be gained by taking into account those at the bottom.” Nor is this matter merely an economic one, since what is primarily at issue here is the status of human dignity and the failure of institutions, political and otherwise, to sustain that dignity. One could even say that the problem only exists because the matter is inter-national, so that individual nation states may dodge responsibility for doing anything about it. The wager that sustains the present essay, then, is that it might be possible to use Ricœur’s account of recognition to sketch a framework for the amelioration of the condition of those who inhabit the underside of globalization.

Recently Bent Uggla has extended Paul Ricœur’s work to address the topic of globalization in her Ricœur, Hermeneutics, Globalization. Yet while her work was exceptional in its
scholarship, this other, sinister side of globalization was not addressed there in any sustained way. What I hope to accomplish here, then, is to extend and not merely apply Ricœur’s work, and my principle guide in this latter aim will be Dussel, who has produced perhaps the most historically and anthropologically accurate account of globalization in the course of developing his liberation philosophy. Because Dussel has provided compelling grounds to understand globalization in spatial terms rather than temporal ones, the limited aim of the present essay may be understood as a sketch of a spatial rearticulation of Ricœur’s recognition theory. I begin, then, by preparing the way for my extension of Ricœur’s work through a review of the exchange between Dussel and Ricœur in the middle 1990s, which establishes the possibility of extending the one thinker’s work (Ricœur) by drawing from the other (Dussel).

The Dussel-Ricœur Exchange

In The Underside of Modernity, Dussel challenges Ricœur’s account of hermeneutics, arguing that the history of domination in the world puts “in crisis the Ricœurian world, appropriate for the hermeneutics of a culture, but not enough for the asymmetrical confrontations between several cultures (one dominating, the others dominated).” Dussel’s initial criticism thus amounts to the point that Ricœurian hermeneutics is inapplicable to the problems of injustice at a global level. Ricœur responds with the following three points. First, he argues that “the philosophies and theologies of liberation that do not depend on this history can no more express themselves in the same terms before and after the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism and the failure of its supposedly socialist and revolutionary bureaucratic economy.” Here, Ricœur appears to be interpreting Dussel’s points as reducible to certain Marxist economic commitments. Second, he insists that there are a multiplicity of philosophies of liberation, such as one finds in Benedict Spinoza’s Ethics, so that the question of liberation in fact presupposes a larger backdrop than that to which Dussel is avertig. Finally, Ricœur adds the following argument:

the Latin American philosophies of liberation depart from a price situation of economic and political pressure which puts them in direct confrontation with the United States. However, in Europe our experience of totalitarianism, in its double aspects, Nazism and Stalinism—eight million Jews, thirty or fifty million Soviets sacrificed, Auschwitz and the Gulag—serves as a different point of departure.

Ricœur goes on to suggest that Europeans must come to terms with their own catastrophic legacy and that, in response to Dussel’s critique, his own textual hermeneutics is up to that task.

This exchange is unsatisfying for at least two reasons. The first matter that is unsatisfactory about Ricœur’s response is that it fails to meet the challenge Dussel proposes at both an intellectual and moral level. Though I have long been a student of Ricœur’s work, and though I have long admired his genuine hospitality towards others—indeed, in many ways I find him to be a kind of moral exemplar—here one finds an instance of a personal, moral failure. It is simply not enough to concern oneself with “Europe” and “European” atrocities such as the Shoah. Catastrophic though it was, and singular though it was, such an exclusive focus fails to recognize that the state of the globe, the unequaled disparity between the rich and the poor at a planetary scale, the continued occurrence of race-based genocide, and the continued global “tension” among the nations of the G7 and the so-called “underprivileged” nations such as those found in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, is the direct result of aggressive European
imperialism, colonialism, and institutionalized white supremacy. These are also European problems; these are also problems for those of us who are so fortunate to live in Canada and the United States of America. What the passive language of “underprivileged” betrays is that it was people of largely European ancestry who put those people there. What Ricœur’s response to Dussel betrays, then, is a profound denial of the direct role that Europe played in producing the misery of so many in the contemporary world. This denial of the basic facts of the globe and human history, I suggest, exhibits a clear case of ethnocentric privilege and prejudice on Ricœur’s behalf.

Because these matters are prone to misunderstanding, I pause to elaborate. None of what I have developed, of course, negates or denies the terrible life circumstances that Ricœur endured personally and the disadvantages he himself faced. Furthermore, Ricœur was certainly not responsible for the aggressive colonial expansion of his ancestors and their multiple successes in institutionalizing a system of global white supremacy. Yet privilege is precisely that kind of systemic ill from which one can benefit in some respects and not in others. In my own case, for example, I benefit from my privilege as a member of the male gender and yet at the same time I am a recipient of systemic injustice on account of my Latino ethnicity. Ricœur also led his life at the cross-section of privilege and systematic injustice, and perhaps this is why he was almost always attuned to the plight of those who suffered. Yet in this case, and in this matter, his denial with respect to the very character of the problem Dussel raises, a denial (and hence pre-judgment concerning its non-existence) that was sustained the kind of privilege he enjoyed, lead to a conclusion that is both morally problematic and factually inaccurate.

With this critique of Ricœur having been noted, it is a hope of the present piece to demonstrate that Ricœur’s thought, his philosophical work, is in no way bounded or limited by his own moral failings—even these uncharacteristic lapses. His philosophical thought is one that, in my own understanding, proves especially well suited to address just the problems Dussel raises. In fact, the only matter that needs to be developed concerns the tools for just this kind of concern from a recognition-theoretic point of view.

This last matter, however, brings me to my second point, the second reason I find the exchange between Ricœur and Dussel unsatisfying: it is clear from both Dussel’s challenge and Ricœur’s response that the central point at issue, namely the meaning of “space,” is never clarified. When Dussel speaks of the world-system as a kind of spatial reality, Ricœur takes him to be speaking of a kind of Marxist economic analysis, which is simply off the mark. Dussel writes quite clearly: “I thus reject conclusively the expression Marxist liberation philosophy.” What their exchange might have been like had they understood each other on this fundamental point is unclear, but in what follows I suggest what I take to be a fruitful approach to the matter.

With the actual disagreement between Ricœur and Dussel thus clarified, and the conceptual possibility of this project thus limned, I turn now to flesh out what Dussel intended by space and how this could be used to extend Ricœur’s understanding of recognition.

**Globalization Viewed from its Underside**

While Dussel’s account of globalization and the origin of modernity is quite complicated, for the present purposes I think that five points stand at its heart.
The first concerns the basic meaning of “space.” By “space” Dussel intends the lived space of dwelling that is the result of the coordination of recurrent schemes of goods, services and existential possibilities. Consider a rather mundane example: this morning, along with my breakfast I had a cup of coffee in a hotel restaurant. It came out of a machine, already mixed with milk, was poured into a ceramic cup (which I have no ability to make myself), and to which I added sugar (from a sugar packet provided at the table at which I was seated). If one reflects on the matter, the coordination of institutions, goods and services that have to be in place for this simple affair is astounding: from agriculture to delivery, from field work to hotel hospitality, literally dozens of institutions were required. Even more astounding, this coordination was expected, precisely because these schemes of goods and services are not one-time affairs but are recurrent. Dussel’s point is that our lived space, the one in which we dwell, is made up primarily of just this coordination, which, one should note is a global coordination. This is why, following Immanuel Wallerstein, he calls this space the world-system.

The next two points form a pair. As should be clear, the distribution of goods, services, and existential possibilities of the world-system is unequal. In fact, it is today more unequal than it has ever been. When I awoke this morning, for example, I did not need to worry about whether or not I would be able to eat, but for billions of people this basic struggle for subsistence is a capital concern. That I myself was able to make a career change from computer science to philosophy is an existential possibility that I would not have had, were I instead born in rural Uganda. The related third point is the following: among the goods that are distributed unequally in this world-system one finds what Axel Honneth and Ricoeur have called “social esteem.” Simply by inhabiting a certain part of the world, in a certain way, one can come to enjoy a matter of social esteem passively. As noted before, because I am male there is an unquestionable privilege that I enjoy in the symbolic schemes of recognition at work in our current, globalized world. At the same time, I am Latino, so that I dwell in a space that is systematically coordinated in a way that is not to my advantage. The distribution of recognition, then, is a complex matter and is what ensures that the lived space of dwelling is overdetermined.

Fourth, while Dussel has in mind a lived space of dwelling, it is at the same time an account of space provided from the third person. While phenomenologists have generally equated lived experience (Erlebnis) with the first-person perspective, Dussel separates the two. This space is still lived; it is the space that determines, for example, the narrow range of existential possibilities afforded a rural Ugandan farmer. Nevertheless, in order to understand this space one must grasp its systematicity, which is what forces the account to be a third-person account. In short, one might say that the grounds that attest to this space are hermeneutical rather than phenomenological.

Finally, because this is a concrete lived space, it has a datable point of historical origin, which is rather older than most would expect. Dussel’s argument is that on October 12, 1492 at 2 am, when Ridrigo de Triana first spotted the land of what came to be called, in an exclusively Eurocentric way, “the new world,” our contemporary world-system came into being. In making this argument, Dussel is following the standard practice of anthropologists and historians, who have long claimed that human civilization emerged through areas of contact. In the period just before the Encounter, humans lived in relatively isolated societies with inter-regional connection and trade. Portugal, for example, had just established the first major trade route to India by traveling south around the Cape of Good Hope. The world, at this point, could not be said to be
globalized, since two major habitable and civilized continents were still unconnected to this inter-regional system of trade.

Portugal’s new trade route left Spain in a disadvantaged position economically, since it was unable to partake in this new trade. So it was that Christopher Columbus hoped to find a path to India by traveling west. That he happened to “discover” the “new world,” then, was an accident, and he died believing that he had found a route to India. It was Amerigo Vespucci who first recognized the land navigated by Columbus as other than India, and it is for that reason that these lands bear his name as the Americas. With this newly established trade, all the major portions of the inter-regional systems of the world were finally connected. Despite his ignorance concerning the significance of his own actions, then, Columbus nevertheless managed to begin the process that is now recognized as globalization.

This monumental event set the conditions for a new kind of dwelling within the world. Now that all spatial regions of existence had been coordinated, the distinction between those at the privileged center and those on its periphery became magnified. The Amer-Indian became the source of cheap labor and the African was eventually imported to aid in this task. One may say that in general those who live in the G7 today enjoy the highest privilege, and those who are surviving in Europe’s post-colonial legacy, especially in Latin America, Africa, and portions of Asia, form the Exterior to this system of privilege, which is usually called “globalization.” To view the process of modernity and the coordination of lived spaces in the world-system in this way, to understand it from Sina Vann’s perspective, is to grasp what is intended by the underside of globalization and the form of spatial dwelling that makes it up.

**Reconstructing Recognition**

Because I would like to find a way to give voice to those who inhabit the underside of globalization, to find a way for their recognition, I am going to undertake a spatial rearticulation of Ricœur’s work. It is helpful to recall for this task that Ricœur’s work on recognition was itself a project of reconstruction. In his Preface he writes: “[t]his book was born of a wager, that it is possible to confer on the sequence of known philosophical occurrences of the word recognition the coherence of a rule-governed polysemy capable of serving as a rejoinder to that found on the lexical plane.” His hope, in short, is to find a philosophical unity in “recognition” (reconnaissance) such that it might parallel the more standard epistemological project concerning knowledge (connaissance). Because it was an act of reconstruction, then, Ricœur writes that the term “course” in the title of the work is intended “to acknowledge the persistence of the initial perplexity that motivated this inquiry, something that the conviction of having constructed a rule-governed polysemy halfway between homonymy and univocity does not fully remove.” The question that immediately concerns my project is thus: on what grounds is it possible to extend Ricœur’s account of recognition to include a form of recognition that addressing the relevant sense of spatial dwelling?

The way that Ricœur undertakes this reconstruction, or better: the place from which he undertakes this reconstruction, is that of a post-Kantian philosophy. A theory of recognition proper, for Ricœur, only begins in the modern period with René Descartes. In Descartes’ works one finds that recognition takes the epistemic role of identification and is opposed to epistemic distinction. Descartes locates this identification in judgment as a psychological capacity. The reason why a philosophy of recognition cannot unfold on Cartesian grounds, the reason why
Descartes’ account of connaissance is not really different from reconnaissance, is that Descartes provides no grounds by which to determine the character of recognition on the part of the object. While Descartes’ psychological approach may thus be considered an advance over Kant in some ways, recognition in any meaningful sense simply cannot be given its full sway until misrecognition is possible, which requires more than a merely subjective account. It is Kant who takes this decisive step to relocate recognition a parte objecti. While Kant retains the thesis that recognition is a matter of identification, “[f]or Kant, to identify is to join together.” This connection is made possible only under the condition of time, which is what makes sense of change for Kant, and hence the possibility of identifying the same thing over changes.

What marks Ricœur’s project as post-Kantian is what he calls, borrowing from Emmanuel Levinas, the ruin of representation (Vorstellung). Representation, as Ricœur insightfully notes, is the basic wager that Kant places in stating his hypothesis that has famously come to be called the Copernican revolution. In short, representation as a philosophical concept is made legitimate only by placing oneself within the circle of the Copernican revolution, by assuming not that our cognition conforms to objects but the reverse. Ricœur writes: “[t]o move beyond Kant, therefore, is by the same gesture to refuse the Copernican reversal and to move out of this magic circle of representation. Through this gesture the fundamental experience of being-in-the-world is posited as the ultimate reference of every particular experience capable of standing out against this background.”

Yet, a corollary point follows from this break. Since for Kant change was subordinated to time, and it was change that made recognition possible, Ricœur rightly argues that time is the central determinant of recognition for Kant. Now, however, change itself may be considered as the ultimate determinant of recognition. “Henceforth,” writes Ricœur, “varieties of temporalization will accompany varieties of change, and it is these varieties of change and temporalization that will constitute the occasions for identification and recognition. Recognition is thus, like Kant, a matter of concern a parte objecti with unrecognizability as the test or limit case for recognition. It is precisely this point that prepares the way for the three forms of recognition investigated in Ricœur’s work: recognition as identification, self-recognition (where the object and subject coincide), and mutual recognition (the final portion of which concerns the recognition of gifts). All the while Ricœur continues to understand change as the principle determinant for the process of identification at the heart of recognition. Still, and this is the corollary point, on this path it is entirely possible that change might be understood with respect to space as well. With time having been deposed from its central position, the path for the current project is thus opened.

Recognition as Identification

At the end of his first chapter, and after having provided the philosophical grounds for his project, Ricœur engages in a two stage hermeneutic inquiry into the character of recognition as identification. While it is true that all forms of recognition are forms of identification, the specific cases he examines are cases in which identification is exhausted in the act of distinguishing.

In his first stage of hermeneutical inquiry, Ricœur retrieves the work of Merleau-Ponty, especially in the Phenomenology of Perception, in order to address the character of recognition as identification in judgments of perception. At this level the identification of a single
object as it appears in my perceptual field through the manifold of its profiles rests on perceptual
constants: my sensorial registers, color and sound, even mass and movement.29 If I thus
recognize an item as the same one, this act integrates the temporal delay into my experience
seamlessly—as a kind of small miracle, as it were.30 In the second stage, Ricœur considers the
more complex case of alteration. Here Ricœur turns to the famous dinner scene in Marcel
Proust’s Time Regained to make his point. In this scene the narrator is confronted by an encounter
with guests who had earlier peopled his evening outings, and who now are struck by the
decrepitude of old age. Time has altered these people such that they border on the
unrecognizable. The role that recognition plays is thus to make sense of the contradiction
between the two states by resolving their identity—yes, this person is the same as the one I knew
before.31 Is there an analogous role for space to play, especially space as dwelling, in recognition
as distinction?

I think there is such a role, and like Ricœur, I make my point in two stages, beginning
with an insight from Edmund Husserl in the first stage. That recognition in the act of
distinguishing also concerns space, and not just time, is a tenet that Husserl seems to have held
rather consistently since at least his 1907 lectures on Thing and Space and through at least his
Cartesian Meditations. In his earlier work, space is placed on a par with time in the constitution of
my intentional perception. In the draft essay “Systematic Constitution of Space,” Husserl
reviews the way in which embodiment is itself a spatial matter that is constituted through the
synthesis of multiple kinaesthetic fields, each of which allows for its own spatial
differentiations.32 It is the coordination of these fields - for example, my eye movement with my
sense of balance - that allows one to perceive the same object and to distinguish it from others
through its profiles. There is, then, a spatial component to recognition as identification, much as
Merleau-Ponty suggests there is a temporal component to such perceptual recognition.

Moving to the second stage, I note that Husserl does not ever seem to have developed
a kind of intersubjective space in the way that he did with perceptual space. There is no essay, to
my knowledge, where Husserl moves from perceptual spatial existence to the kind of spaces that
make up public realms, such as town squares, the sacred spaces in churches, and above all the
globalized space that makes up contemporary existence.33 Thus, like Ricœur, I shall make use of
a moment of poetic attestation in order to show that one is able to perform acts of recognition that
concern spatial difference, though I leave off from providing a phenomenological account of just
in what this spatial recognition consists.

For this task, that is in order to establish the minimal claim that there is a spatial
dimension to intersubjective recognition, I draw from the bilingual work of the Latina feminist
and queer theorist Gloria Anzaldúa, especially her account of dwelling along the borderlands/la
frontera in southern Texas. Her family had lived in this space for some time before the land was
divided between that belonging to the United States and that belonging to Mexico, so that the
history of her family is literally split in two by this boundary. Meditating on this border she
writes: “[t]his is my home/ this thin edge of barbwire. ... The U.S.-Mexican border es una herida
abierta where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds.”34 For Anzaldúa her homeland
is literally a split existence, one in which the uncanny (Unheimlich) and the familiar (Heimlich)
coincide. Those who live there, she writes are “[l]os atravesados ... the squint-eyed, the perverse,
the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those
who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the ‘normal.’”35
What is it that these experiences, attested poetically here, demonstrate? What do they indicate in a broadly phenomenological way? My contention is that they show that there exists a spatial form of recognition which, just as in Ricœur’s analysis of Proust’s dinner scene, is exhausted in the act of distinguishing. For it is only by distinguishing the multiple kinds of space, those politically deemed to belong to the United States, and those who by custom, habit and practice belonged to her family, that Anzaldúa is able to live a split existence. The space of los atravesados thus only comes into existence through the collective recognition of public spaces and equally a collective recognition (shared only by some) that these spaces are distinctly partitioned. Certainly, more could and ought to be said here, but because my claim is minimal, this point is sufficient to make my present argument.

Self-Recognition

The case of recognizing oneself is only a special case of recognition as identification, yet in placing oneself in the role of the object recognized, a vast realm of new experiences for reflection opens, provided one is willing to make a certain number of presuppositions. Capital among the other points, self-recognition presupposes that it is possible that one’s actions may be meaningfully designated, such that one can become a responsible agent of those actions. Beyond this point, it must also be possible to produce a reflexive account of the self such that one’s own ipseity, one’s own selfhood and not merely one’s identity (idem) might be understood to have a complementary role. Ricœur’s answer to this problem is to undertake a kind of phenomenology of the capable human by thematizing the full amplitude of one’s own capacity, of one’s “I can.” For Ricœur this thematization has two major branches: the individual’s capabilities and the social ones. While both branches are in fact forms of self-recognition, the phenomenology of his second chapter focuses principally on the individual forms.

Ricœur’s phenomenology identifies six individual human capabilities: the capacity to say, the capacity to make happen, the capacity to narrate oneself, the capacity for imputability, the capacity to remember, and the capacity to make promises. It should be noted, however, that the last two capacities are critically different from the first four, since they both raise difficulties concerning the “now” of actualization, they do not relate to the dialectic of selfhood and sameness in the same way, and both are only defined in terms of their opposite, namely forgetting and betrayal. Since what matters for the present investigation is the way in which Ricœur finds time inscribed in these capacities, I shall focus on the capacities to narrate, to remember, and to promise.

The capacity to narrate oneself concerns one’s ability to recognize one’s own identity through the manifold of one’s actions, much the same way that a plot synthesizes the discordance of acts in a drama. This capacity thus concerns principally what Ricœur in Time and Narrative called the configurating aspect of narrative. One is able to recognize oneself by “reading” one’s own actions, as it were, as making up a narrative. Yet, this act of narration brings together the two poles of one’s identity as same (idem) and as self (ipse). Time is thus constitutive of one’s narrative identity at a semantic plane other than that of mere cosmology, which concerns only the sameness (idem) of one’s character, and other than that of one’s personal (ipseic) commitments, which are typified in promises. This intersecting sense of time is narrative time.

Turning to the capacities for memories and promises, one notes that they form a pair, and in a certain sense support the possibility of narrative identity. Memory is opposed to
forgetting, and thus concerns the relation of the past to the present—it inheres somehow in the present only by our capacity to recognize these events. Promises, in a symmetrical way, are opposed to betrayal, and thus concern the relation of the future to the present so that they inhere in it by our capacity to retain our own ipseic constancy, by our capacity for fidelity.

The extension that I propose concerns two spatial dimensions of self-recognition. The first of these concerns the spatial aspects of narrative. In my essay “Space and Narrative,” I have already detailed the ways in which the sense of space as dwelling is inherent in narrative. For the sake of completeness, however, I shall review what I there called the spatial-configural, which corresponds to Ricœur’s account of temporal configuration. In Time and Narrative Ricœur accounts for configuring aspects of narrative by demonstrating how plot synthesizes a narrative’s heterogeneous occurrences in three ways: (i) by mediating between the events and story, (ii) by uniting various heterogeneous factors such as goals, means, events and agents, and (iii) by synthesizing these events according to time. It is this temporal synthesis that constitutes the followability of a story, since it has both an episodic and configural aspect. In this latter dimension time provides meaning to a story by transforming “the succession of events into one meaningful whole,” providing an sense of an ending, and allowing for an alternative representation of the events in the story, since it allows one to understand the end’s relation to the beginning of the story.

Just as Ricœur’s account of the temporal-configural in Time and Narrative presents a dimension of time that makes sense of the episodic events of a drama, by the spatial-configural I intend a concept that makes sense of these events by linking them together. It does not do this, however, by providing a sense of an ending or allowing for an alternative representation of events as one finds with the temporal-configural. Instead, I argue that one can understand this linking operation through the metaphor of “housing” the occurrence of incidents.

As a simple example of what I have in mind, one could take a lecture hall, in which academic conferences are often given. The hall has a distinct number of exits or entrances, a space devoted to the speaker and chairs arranged for those who would be interested in listening. There is, if one will, an organizing sense to the room articulated by the function each part is supposed to facilitate. The room itself is connected to other rooms, other spaces, so that it provides a kind of continuity to one’s spatial understanding. It thus configures meaning by “housing” the events and acts of our narrative stories in three ways. First, it organizes them by allowing them to be thought together—as a meaningful whole in some cases, but sometimes only as an incomplete joining, as when one understands only the room in which one presently is speaking but not the precise way in which one arrived there. Second, it relates spaces functionally, regardless of whether these spaces so related are intentionally demarcated or tacitly given their function. Finally, in so organizing spaces together, the “housing” of occurred incidents provides a context of meaning that allows one to think of the spaces as related to publicly recognizable functions: lecture halls, campuses, city streets, and so on. While the foregoing is but a sketch, I think it serves to indicate that there is just as much a spatial dimension to emplotment as a temporal one.

The second extension I propose concerns the two modes of dwelling that Edward Casey has so brilliantly articulated in his work Getting Back into Place, namely dwelling-as-wandering and dwelling-as-residing. As memory and promising form a pair, one looking to the past the other to the future, so these two modes of dwelling are related as two ways to inhabit a space. Dwelling-as-residing is the more familiar of these modes. It is the way one dwells, for
example, in one’s work space, a familiar library or a machine shop. The items here have a certain sense of familiarity that enable one to reach out and pick up an item without looking. Above all, there is a sense of ease that characterizes this sense of dwelling. This is why Casey argues that the paradigm case of dwelling-as-residing is the home. “There is nothing like staying at home,” Casey writes “precisely because at home we do not usually have to confront such questions as ‘Where am I?’ ‘Where is my next meal coming from?’ or ‘Do I have any friends in the world?’”. Here, one might say, one comes to recognize oneself negatively—the space that makes up ones surroundings are lived-through, so that one only recognizes it when it breaks down (as Heidegger argued). Nevertheless one recognizes that in those cases one belongs somewhere, that one is from somewhere.

Dwelling-as-wandering may appear to be a kind of oxymoron, but Casey astutely points out that it is possible to dwell as someone not “settled in.” One can think in this case of Odysseus’ dwelling through his journeys, say in the land of the Phaecians, where he is brought to tears at the bard’s recounting of his own exploits in Troy. Or perhaps more pressingly, one could think of Anzaldúa’s own family, which inhabited land that was later divided between the United States and Mexico, so that her own home became a place riven from within. To dwell as a wanderer is to take one’s place through an orientation, through being directed toward somewhere else. It thus forms a pair with dwelling-as-residing, which is not directed anywhere else, and which is above all characterized by an easiness of knowing where one is.

In both cases one is able to recognize who one is in a spatial manner by coming to understand where one is, where one is going, and where one has come from. One might want to add to Ricœur’s six capacities two more for the capable human being: the capacity to dwell-as-residing, and the capacity to dwell-as-wandering.

**Mutual Recognition**

Turning finally to the matter of mutual recognition, it is possible to argue that what is at stake here is still a form of social self-recognition, but that now the accent shifts to the character of self recognition in relation to the Other. The “bridge” to this new dialectic of reflection is Amartya Sen’s economic and political account of one’s right to capabilities, a right to increasing one’s positive freedom. This goal sets the stage for one’s relation to the Other, which makes up the struggle for recognition at three distinct levels: that of love or the familial, the juridical, and that concerning social esteem. I shall focus on this last aspect, since it is here that one finds not only the most well-known concerns with recognition, but also the temporal dimension of mutual recognition.

Following Honneth’s retrieval of Hegel’s Jena-period account of recognition, Ricœur broaches the recognition of social esteem as a third model of recognition that in a certain way sums up the others. Yet he does not follow Honneth’s path, which he argues rather quickly concludes with solidarity. Instead, he undertakes a hermeneutic retrieval of three separate domains of social esteem, namely orders of recognition, economies of standing, and the politics of recognition. Finally, in order that this struggle for recognition not become a kind of “bad infinity” in which the struggle becomes interminable, he undertakes an investigation of gift giving as a symbolic solution to this struggle for recognition. Since it is with the politics of recognition that time is broached, I shall focus on that matter.
The demand for recognition is a demand to recognize a form of identity, but unlike the personal identity examined before, it now concerns a collective identity, which is usually that of politically marginalized groups. In order to make sense of this demand, Ricœur follows Charles Taylor’s account, which locates the tension of this demand in two opposed principles of universal equality. One stems from the claim for universal responsibility; the other from a Rousseauian discourse on identity and authenticity. The latter cuts against the former when institutionalized, as in the case of university admittance, for in this case strict adherence to universal responsibility would lead to the perpetuation of systematic differences. Time enters, then, as the history that makes up the various divisions of cultural identity and their position in the contemporary world. It is, in a certain sense, this time that must be ameliorated in the struggle to affirm our right to social esteem as a capability.

The spatial extension that I propose here concerns what I have elsewhere called the differential and integral of space. Here I think that Taylor’s analysis of the moment of disvalue, and by extension Ricœur’s appropriation of his argument, is in need of rectification. Following Taylor, Ricœur argues that a critical aspect of disrespect at this level is “the internalization of … [a] form of self-depreciation.” The basic problem with this analysis is that it fails to take into account the system of privilege that sustains the center, especially concerning the social esteem that one enjoys by virtue of having been born in a certain portion of the world-system. Though Dussel’s account of globalization makes clear that the primary form of victimization concerns the basic demand for sustenance, these victims at the same time endure a form of social dis-value through the discrediting of their basic human dignity. The differential of space, then, may be understood to distinguish the relative social esteem one enjoys, whether one is part of the center, periphery, or the spectrum of intermediate positions.

To rectify this differentiation demands a form of recognition that integrates the spaces of the world-system. Dussel describes the goal of liberation philosophy as an infinite analectical process that sequentially incorporates the Exterior into the center. As a spatial form of recognition, then, this would require not only the recognition of the basic dignity of those Exterior to the center, but a form of self-recognition on the part of those who inhabit the center, namely, that they enjoy a certain amount of social esteem that was unearned and unmerited. For example, feminists and race theorists have for some time argued that it is more important for a person to understand himself as anti-sexist and anti-racist rather than simply as non-sexist or non-racist. The latter points of view enable a person to avoid the obligation to rectify long standing social ills under the pretense of not having contributed to the problem personally. Thus it is only by taking an active anti-stance, only by a certain form of social humility, that the narratives sustaining the myth of modern progress, the myth that sustains inaction, can be overcome.

Concluding Thoughts

I take the foregoing to constitute the first steps required to provide an account of recognition that could make sense of globalization and especially its underside, the side that the majority of the world still inhabits, the side that Sina Vann had to endure. This was done by showing how Ricœur’s account of recognition could be extended to account for space, in the sense of dwelling, at each of its three levels: recognition as distinction between lived spaces, spatial self-recognition in narrative and through the two complementary forms of dwelling-as-
residing and dwelling-as-wandering, and finally the mutual recognition of spatial differentiation and integration. There are five capital consequences that follow, the first three of which express ways in which this present meeting of recognition theory and the philosophy of liberation are mutually beneficial, while the last two points suggest new avenues for research.

(1) To begin, then, I argue that the present spatial rearticulation of recognition theory enables my account to address a salient social ill to which both Honneth and Ricœur’s accounts remain blind, namely, privilege. This point touches on a matter that Nancy Fraser raises in response to Honneth. That is to say that an account of justice explicated solely in terms of recognition is insufficient, so that recourse to an account of distributive justice is still required.\(^{53}\) The present rearticulation demonstrates that this “distributive” matter may yet be understood in terms of recognition.

In both Honneth’s and Ricœur’s accounts of mutual recognition, each sphere is coupled with a form of disrespect appropriate to that sphere. Honneth summarizes these as follows: abuse and rape for the sphere of love, denial of rights and exclusion for the legal sphere, and denigration and insult at the level of social esteem.\(^{54}\) What is not included in this account, and equally not included in Ricœur’s own extension via Taylor, is a role for privilege as a kind of non-recognition that is not direct disrespect. This point is critical for contemporary race and feminist theorists who are generally more concerned with the ongoing systemic ills facing people of color and women than direct volitional racism or sexism in the form of racial and gender slurs, or overt discriminatory practices. While I take this point to be general, I shall make a specific case here with regard to the contemporary discussion of race in the United States of America, especially after the election of Barack Obama, as an elucidatory example.\(^{55}\)

The very day after Obama’s election to president of the United States, an editorialist for the Wall Street Journal wrote: “One promise of his victory is that perhaps we can put to rest the myth of racism as a barrier to achievement in this splendid country.”\(^{56}\) Somehow it was perceived that the election of one man managed to remedy the ongoing systemic ills affecting people of color in the United States. Indeed, on the eve of Obama’s election, even before he had enough votes to be proclaimed the winner, New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani couched the significance of Obama’s election in the following terms: “we’ve achieved history tonight and we’ve moved beyond … the whole idea of race and racial separation and unfairness.”\(^{57}\) Most white people seemed to agree. According to a summer 2008 Gallup/USA Today poll, more than three quarters of white folk said that blacks have “just as good a chance as whites to get any job for which they are qualified,” and that they have “just as good a chance as whites to get a good education” (less than one half of blacks agreed with either statement). According to the same poll, only about a third of whites accepted the proposition that discrimination played a significant role in producing the income disparities between whites and blacks.\(^{58}\) Indeed, only one in nine whites believed that racial discrimination against blacks was still a very serious problem, and nearly four times that number held that it was not a serious problem at all, according to a survey conducted for CNN and Essence magazine.\(^{59}\) During this same time, however, a New York Times/CBS poll revealed that seven in ten blacks had suffered from a specific discriminatory incident (up from 62 percent in 2000), thus utterly contradicting the perception widely held among whites.\(^{60}\)

I review these statistics because they suggest a basic point about liberation philosophy: that the epistemic conditions for recognizing lack of respect do not (as a rule) exist in the dominant group, but primarily among those who are oppressed. These statistics reveal an
unsurprising divide: whites in the United States tend to think that racism is not much of a problem, while people of color do. The data, of course, overwhelmingly support the position of the oppressed. To cite but a few studies, the socio-economic data demonstrate: that blacks who are high school graduates have higher unemployment rates than white dropouts, that blacks, Latinos, and Native North Americans are two and one-half to three times more likely than whites to be poor, that only seven percent of private sector management jobs are held by African Americans, that Latinos/as hold another seven percent, and that whites hold over eighty percent of all such positions. Furthermore, even if one controls for differential test scores, grades, family background and like factors, additional studies demonstrate that white males still receive 17 percent more income than their black male counterparts who are otherwise identical. To confirm matters even more thoroughly, a study conducted by economists at MIT and the University of Chicago found that job applicants with white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to receive a call back for a job interview than applicants with black-sounding names and who were otherwise identical with respect to qualifications. Truly, only privilege could sustain the illusion that whites are suffering from so-called “reverse discrimination.”

I review these racial ills because it appears that they are precisely the sort of matter that Fraser has in mind when she suggests that in addition to recognition, one must also retain a more traditional distributive account of justice. These injustices are systemic, not the result of a particular person’s ill will, and thus are not the kind of disrespect (Mißachtung) that either Honneth or Taylor describe. The present spatialization of recognition, however, can address this systemic matter by introducing a broader category than disrespect, namely non-recognition, which captures the differential epistemic access groups have to injustices on the basis of their concrete empirical existence (i.e., whether one is in the center and privileged, or not). Furthermore, I note that the ground for this difference in epistemic access is only empirical and not transcendental. The reason whites (generally), or men (generally), or straight people (generally), or able-bodied people (generally) do not know anything about the plight of those who are not so privileged is because they do not have to know it. Most of the time nothing untoward happens to them (to us) if they (we) do not know it. Furthermore, if we are in fact well intentioned people, if we do not commit overt acts of racism or discrimination, we simply will not register the ongoing suffering of the oppressed because we are not forced to confront it in our daily lives. It is privilege that allows such groups to ignore these matters. I thus take this spatial refiguring of recognition theory to constitute a significant advance over the account one finds in either Honneth or Ricœur’s work, since the spatialization of mutual recognition introduces the category of non-recognition to capture the position of the dominant group.

(2) The present spatial account of recognition theory also enables one to address a matter that is not well addressed (if it is addressed at all) in the work of either Honneth or Ricœur: globalization. While it is not true that the grammar of social conflict that Honneth outlines is constrained to a basic situation, a nation-state, as one finds in the work of a political philosopher such as John Rawls, what Honneth’s theory lacks, and Ricœur’s by extension, is a way to make sense of the differences that are present when that struggle is understood at the global scale and when all human history is considered. By introducing Dussel’s insights into recognition theory, it becomes possible to discern just how one might discuss, diagnose, and otherwise identify social ills at a global scale. One must, in brief, attend to the way in which the periphery is subordinated to the interests of the center, and one must seek ways to incorporate the cries of the Exteriorized into the presently existing political and legal institutions. A
particular point of concern here, and this follows from the last point, is that the center, the privileged nations of the world, are likely to have the wrong understanding of global states of affairs, and thus one must work to articulate, to give voice to those who are unheard.

(3) I think the present framework also solves a certain puzzle in Dussel’s own account of spatial differentiation. Karl-Otto Apel, for example, makes the following point: “[i]f one ought somewhat to transform and improve the world economy system, then one must be clear that the division of the planet, in terms of the North-South conflict, already presents an enormous simplification – although occasionally a useful one.” In short, Hispanics, Blacks, women, homosexuals, and many others still suffer from egregious disadvantages in northern “central” countries, even if these usually do not concern starvation. Yet, by rearticulating the space of the world-system through an account of recognition, one can nuance the account of spatial differences in a way that meets the particularities of the present world. While one may not be starving in the United States, one may nevertheless suffer from the ill effects of the systematic denial and privilege, examples of which include patriarchy, white supremacy, and homophobia. The spatial differentiation here is thus to be understood as a matter of lacking social esteem (at least) and its integration may be understood to be a recognition-theoretic extension of Dussel’s own account of liberation philosophy.

(4) The final consequences both concern new problems that are raised by the foregoing for further reflective thought. To begin, it appears to me that Dussel’s own description of an analectical integration of the Exterior into the center, what I have here described in terms of spatial integration, could turn out to be a kind of “bad infinity” just in the same way that Ricœur was concerned with Honneth’s description of the struggle for recognition. Ricœur’s suggestion that acts of gift giving might form a kind of symbolic resolution to this impasse is one that I find appealing, but it must be noted that Ricœur’s account neither addresses the role of time nor space. In order to take up Ricœur’s solution to this matter, then, it appears to me that a double rearticulation of the gift in temporally and spatially adequate terms is warranted by the foregoing, at least if a complete account of globalization in recognition-theoretic terms is to be achieved.

(5) This matter of space and time in gift giving, however, brings up the larger matter of the relation of spatial and temporal forms of recognition. While my account has worked to provide a spatial articulation of recognition, I have at the same time raised a new problem: just what is the relation between temporal and spatial recognition? This matter is made especially pressing since, as Dussel argues, space plays an integral role in making sense of the contemporary human historical condition. While I am disinclined to suggest that some third form of recognition is at work here that would sublate these two forms, the foregoing suggests that spelling out how exactly spatial and temporal recognition are related would constitute a paramount task, not only for the concerns of globalization but for inquiries concerning the character of recognition itself.

My hope in raising these new problems is to suggest some new avenues of research that might reveal the fruits of approaching globalization in terms of recognition-theory. At the very least, by integrating Ricœur and Dussel’s work on this topic, the foregoing may be taken to provide a sketch for a recognition-theoretic account of globalization and its underside. And while philosophers have traditionally been laggards in addressing this matter, perhaps this is one way that philosophical thought may be capable of addressing the systematic wrongs endured by the majority of the earth’s population.
1. I would like to thank the external reviewers who provided valuable criticisms of earlier drafts of the present essay as well as Gonçalo Marcelo, who took pains to urge on me the significance of working out several portions of the essay that were underdeveloped.


3. I take this point to be so commonplace as hardly needing support, but just to make the point in a philosophical context Jorge J. E. Gracia approaches globalization in exactly this way in chapter eight of Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).


10. The data on this score are so overwhelming as hardly to require citation. Yet, because these matters are so routinely overlooked, I recommend (almost choosing a global study at random) that one avert to the United Nations Development Program (2003), pp. 237-240. Here one will find the depressing statistics that document how poor and systematically disadvantaged nations, such as Sierra Leone, have an average life expectancy that is less than half of that of “developed” nations such as the United States, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

11. By the phrase “global white supremacy” I intend the term in the standard way that critical race theorists use the phrase, namely to indicate the systematic privileging of whites throughout the globe and equally the systematic injustices that persons of color must endure. I do not mean the parading of men in white hoods who burn crosses. The classic statement on this matter in English is undoubtedly Charles Mill’s The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). For a more popular account, and one more localized for the United States of America, one should see Tim Wise’s more recent White Like Me: Reflections on Race from a Privileged Son (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2008).

12. Dussel details this history in the tenth chapter of The Underside of Modernity.


I do not mean to suggest that the male privilege I enjoy is limited to forms of social esteem, which would be bad enough in itself. Certainly, male privilege extends far beyond these matters, but I raise the point here only for the purposes of illustration.

Dussel is clear that his own notion derives from Emanuel Levinas’ account of the face of the other, but his more recent work makes it explicitly clear that this phenomenological basis must be superseded in order to understand the character of contemporary global functioning and the ethics of liberation that is to follow. On these points, one should see his essay “The Architectonic of the Ethics of Liberation: On Material Ethics and Formal Moralities,” trans. Eduardo Mendieta, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 23 (3): 1-35.

This point seems only to be new to philosophers. Jared Diamond’s Pulitzer Prize winning *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1999) can be seen to set out an account of much of human history in just this way.

Whether one wants to call this new set of conditions “modernity” is a matter about which there has been much dispute. On this point one should see Dussel’s *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of ‘the Other’ and the Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michel D. Barber (New York: Continuum Press, 1995), Karl-Otto Apel’s response in “‘Discourse ethics’ before the challenge of ‘liberation philosophy,’” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 22 (2) (1996): 1-25; Dennis Beach’s “History and the Other: Dussel’s Challenge to Levinas,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 30 (3) (2004): 315-330. Whether or not it deserves the name modernity (I am partial to Dussel on this point), for my present argument, it is sufficient that the Encounter is a event significant enough to change the conditions for dwelling in our world.


Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, xi.


Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 35.


Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 58.

recognit

Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies

29 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 63.
30 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 65.
31 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 67.
33 Perhaps the closest one can find on this matter is Husserl’s account of the origin of geometry in the essay under that title, wherein he reviews an original earth-measurement. This matter, however, seems to be far from the present concern. For the English translation of this text, see “Appendix VI: The Origin of Geometry,” in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 353-78.
34 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999), 25.
35 Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 25.
36 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 151.
37 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 91.
38 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 110.
40 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 100.
41 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 101.
45 Edward Casey, Getting Back Into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 121.
46 Casey, Getting Back Into Place, 121.
47 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 202
48 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 213.
49 On this point again, see my essay “Space and Narrative,” to which the present essay may be considered a complement on this point especially, as the account provided here extends considerably the points made on the differential and integral of space that are to be found there.


53 For what is still the clearest introduction to this debate, see Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth’s exchange in *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (New York: Verso Press, 2003).

54 Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, 129.

55 For what follows, I have drawn from the work that Tim Wise has already undertaken in dismantling the preposterous notion that race is no longer an issue in the United States. In particular, I draw from the first chapter of his *Between Barack and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009).


