Testimony, Memory and Solidarity across National Borders:

Paul Ricœur and Transnational Feminism
Elizabeth Purcell

Abstract:
In many ways, globalization created the problem of representation for feminist solidarity across the borders of the nation state. This problem is one of presenting a cohesive identity for representation in the transnational public sphere. This paper proposes a solution to this problem of a cohesive identity for women’s representation by drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur. What these women seem to have in common are shared political aims, but they have no basis for those aims. This paper provides a basis for these aims by turning to Ricœur’s work on collective memory from Memory, History, Forgetting. The paper concludes that it is the shared testimony through narrative hospitality, which can provide a foundation for a social bond for those with common political aims. More specifically, this common knowledge provides a justification for the representation of women and their allies in the transnational public sphere.

Keywords: Feminism, Paul Ricœur, Hospitality, Social Justice, Memory, and Transnationalism

Résumé:
De différentes manières, la globalisation a créé un problème de représentation pour la solidarité féministe au-delà des frontières de l’Etat-nation. Ce problème consiste à présenter une identité cohérente en vue d’une représentation dans la sphère publique transnationale. Cet article propose une solution à ce problème de la constitution d’une identité cohérente pour la représentation des femmes en s’appuyant sur l’œuvre de Paul Ricœur. Ce que ces femmes semblent avoir en commun, ce sont des objectifs politiques partagés, mais elles ne disposent pas de bases pour ces objectifs. Cet article fournit une base à ces objectifs en faisant appel au travail de Ricœur sur la mémoire collective développé dans La Mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. L’article conclut que c’est le témoignage partagé à travers l’hospitalité narrative qui peut contribuer à fonder un lien social pour ceux qui ont des objectifs politiques communs. Plus spécifiquement, cette connaissance commune fournit une justification à la représentation des femmes et de leurs alliés dans la sphère publique transnationale.

Mots-clés: Féminisme, Paul Ricœur, Hospitalité, Justice sociale, Mémoire, Transnationalisme
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I. Introduction

The challenges facing Syrian women refugees are only a recent example of the challenges women face in the transnational public sphere. Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Syria in the spring of 2011, the displaced refugees have faced dire poverty, violence and poor health conditions. Many of these refugees are women between the ages of eighteen to fifty-nine.\(^1\) Amnesty International interviewed forty refugee women and girls in northern Europe who traveled from Turkey to Greece and then across the Balkans, and reported that these women were often subjected to violence, assault, exploitation and sexual harassment.\(^2\)

The case of the Syrian women refugees points to a larger problem within the transnational public sphere. This problem is one of presenting a cohesive identity for representation in the transnational public sphere for women. Should this lack of a represented identity be considered a problem for “women’s rights” or should it be considered a challenge a group of women with shared experiences faces in a specific region in the world? Both of these approaches face particular difficulties. On the one hand, if one considers the problem of cohesive identity to be a problem for “women’s rights,” this stance does not address intersectional concerns. On the other hand, if one seeks to ground this cohesive identity on a set of shared common experiences, then one excludes those who are allies in the fight for representation in the transnational public sphere.

This essay proposes a solution to this problem of a cohesive identity for women’s representation in the transnational public sphere by drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur. What these women seem to have in common are shared political aims, but they appear to have no basis for those aims. This paper will provide a basis for these aims by turning to Ricœur’s work on collective memory from Memory, History, Forgetting. A group of people has access to past events and deeds through a collective memory. This memory is strengthened by the testimony of its group members. Thus, this shared testimony through narrative hospitality can provide a foundation for a social bond for those with common political aims. Moreover, this common knowledge provides a justification or basis for the representation of women and their allies in the transnational public sphere.

II. Globalization and the Solidarity Problem

In many ways, globalization has created the problem of representation for feminist solidarity across the borders of the nation state. First, globalization has increased the kinds of
injustices to which women are subjected. From the perspective of capital, along the global assembly line, there are lesbian women in Uganda who are targeted and made to suffer particular injustices, women in Cambodia endure abusive sweatshop conditions, and something similar is happening across multiple geographical locations. Moreover, from the political perspective, women are mostly absent from formal decision-making bodies of institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, which are institutions dominated by the interests of wealthy nations and multinational corporations. These two perspectives are combined for women in poorer nations. Allison Jaggar argues that globalization has undermined national sovereignty, especially in poor nations. In “Globalization and Women,” she writes:

The present organization of the global economy undermines democracy by rendering the sovereignty of poor nations increasingly meaningless and further excluding the poorest and most vulnerable people across the world. Many women, who are disproportionately represented among the poorest and most vulnerable of all, are effectively disenfranchised. The virtual absence even of privileged women from the decision-making processes of such bodies as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization reflects the minimal influence exercised by women at the highest levels of global politics.3

Specifically, structural adjustment policies such as austerity measures and trade rules that can affect the health and safety standards for imported goods disproportionately harm women in these economically disadvantaged nations.4 To stop these injustices, there is a need for a basis for a cohesive identity to represent “women’s interests” in the global age.

In her article, “Feminist Paradigms of Solidarity and Justice,” Ann Ferguson argues that these particular challenges of globalization have created two central problems for feminists working through global gender justice: (i) the justice problem and (ii) the solidarity problem. Ferguson articulates the distinction between these two problems as follows:

The first is a normative question which asks what goals and principles of justice, that is, what paradigm of Justice, is viable cross-culturally to assess the situation of women? The second is a strategic political and theoretical question: if we reject essentialism and acknowledge that women have many power and privilege differences that enter into their political priorities and frame their interests, how can feminist women and men unite across these differences to challenge patriarchal social structures that promote gender injustice?5

Feminist thinkers such as Ferguson and Iris Marion Young have pioneered feminist responses to the Justice paradigms from the Western Liberal tradition.6 My focus in this paper, instead, will be to address the Solidarity problem. The Solidarity problem captures the particular challenge of forming a cohesive identity across national borders as exhibited in the case of the Syrian refugees. Numerous feminists have proposed solutions to the Solidarity problem, but I think that while their solutions are valuable, they do not fully address the aims of transnational feminism for various reasons.
The challenge of presenting a cohesive identity for the representation of “women’s rights” across borders has been emphasized, for example, by Nancy Fraser, who has argued that the Western Model of the transnational public sphere may be our most pragmatic choice. These public spheres, defined by Habermas, are areas of social life in which individuals come together to reach a common public opinion about social issues. It is considered the will of civil society and can be utilized to hold those in public offices democratically accountable. While the transnational public sphere is a Western political model, which can make some forms of transnational communication difficult, it still provides the most pragmatic model for an area in which co-citizens, with equal rights to participate, can create a public opinion addressed to their particular nation state. In Scales of Justice, she writes: “[i]n general, then, the task is clear: if public-sphere theory is to function today as a critical theory, it must revise its account of the normative legitimacy and political efficacy of public opinion.” Fraser argues that globalization has created new transnational public spheres for the representation of women. Fraser reframes the model of transnational public sphere to address the feminist issues of maldistribution, misrecognition and misframing and offers the model of representation as a solution to these issues. According to Fraser, representation is not only a matter of ensuring equal political communities; in addition, it requires reframing disputes about justice that cannot be properly contained within established polities. In contesting misframing, therefore, transnational feminism is reconfiguring gender justice as a three-dimensional problem, in which redistribution, recognition, and representation must be integrated in a balanced way.

While the model of representation is helpful for gender justice, it may not provide an adequate solution to the Solidarity problem for transnational feminism at hand. Specifically, I think Fraser’s proposal of the transnational public sphere more adequately addresses the Solidarity problem with regard to global feminism rather than transnational feminism.

To clarify, global feminism is a second-wave theory that fights the common experience of patriarchal oppression across borders. Whereas, transnational feminism, by contrast, requires that a model meet the following three conditions. First, transnational feminism acknowledges intersectional differences among women and advocates methodological commitments sensitive to specificity and self-reflexivity. As a result of differences in geographical and social locations, women may receive privileges or carry burdens in an unbalanced way. Second, according to Ann Ferguson and Sally Scholz, transnational feminist solidarity is grounded in the political commitments of individuals rather than a common identity or set of experiences. This enables allies and advantaged individuals who have benefited from the injustice to join in solidarity against oppression directly. Finally, Ferguson argues that transnational feminists focus on specific globalizing processes (for example, offshore manufacturing) and develop existing feminist collectives as models of solidarity. Examples of this resistance can be found in worker-owned cooperatives, labor unions, fair trade organizations, and land reform movements, which create conditions for North-South women’s coalition movements. A model that can meet these three conditions is necessary for transnational feminists working to solve the Solidarity problem. Such a model would provide the foundation for local feminist collectives of resistance. Moreover, through the use of technology, this model could engender the opportunities for new digital
political spaces to counter these injustices. Thus, a model which includes these three aims, could create the conditions for democratic global governance and democratic participation.

In response, I think Ricœur’s account of narrative hospitality provides an adequate solution to the Solidarity problem of representing a cohesive identity for transnational feminism. I believe Ricœur’s model of narrative hospitality could be extended to meet these three conditions and provide a foundation for transnational feminist solidarity. Before turning to his account of narrative hospitality, however, I begin by addressing his account of collective memory, which sets the stage for it.

III. Collective Memory and Wounded Communities

Ricœur provides a model of collective memory that I think will prove fruitful for articulating the injustices facing the victims of the Solidarity problem. As a term, collective memory is difficult to define. On the one hand, collective memory includes the individual act of remembering that can be practised by those who make up a community. On the other hand, it also includes the social contexts of memory, which honor the culture and tradition of a community. And many times, these opposing uses can be in conflict, especially when an individual finds her very identity and experiences at odds with her community.

Ricœur offers an account of collective memory that successfully navigates between these two opposing poles. For Ricœur, collective memory, when enacted, should be understood as a network of intersubjective relations among individuals and communities, which is specifically structured by narrative. According to David Leichter, narrative provides a useful “framework for understanding the continuities and discontinuities between time, action, and identity insofar as it is able to disclose how the temporality of an individual’s action occurs in community with others.”11 As such, it can help a community “identify both the sources of oppression and distortion of the past and the possible strategies for addressing and rectifying violence.”12

The psychic life of the community, however, can fall prey to ideology and oppressive institutions, which manipulate beliefs to ensure a certain system of power. This manipulation can take the forms of distorting memories of feuds between social groups and covering over past injustices. Moreover, certain social groups within a community can manipulate the identity of others by speaking for them and narrating for someone else. Thus, when considering the role of memory at the individual and communal levels from a historical perspective, it is necessary to be aware of the role trauma and a wounded memory can play in the community.

To underscore the importance of a wounded memory in a community, which has experienced past violence, Ricœur draws from two texts from Freud to examine the pathologies, which arise from repressed memories. In Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricœur recalls two of Freud’s essays: “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through” and “Mourning and Melancholia.” In “Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through,” Ricœur highlights the patience required by the analyst in the act of transference when helping the analysand “work through” a painful memory.13 It is the challenge for both the analyst and the analysand to “work”: the “work of interpretation (Deutungsarbeit) along the path of recalling traumatic memories.”14 According to Freud, the obstacle the analysand faces is to substitute memory for compulsion. In other words, the analysand does not work to remember the traumatic event, but
instead resists the memory by way of “repression” (Verdrängungswiderstände), and manifests this repression with a “compulsion to repeat” (Wiederholungswang) and a tendency to act out (Agieren). According to Ricœur, Freud thinks that “[t]he patient reproduces it not as a memory but as an action, he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.” The compulsion to repeat and resist forms the obstacle to memory. To overcome this compulsion, the patient must no longer hide her true state from herself.

Ricœur pauses here to emphasize the “working through” (Durcharbeiten) or “reworking” (remaniement) which must take place in this dynamic collaborative process between the analyst and the analysand. Thus, Ricœur’s first distinction is brought to the surface for overcoming trauma: rather than sustaining the compulsion to repeat, one instead must recognize one’s truthful relation to one’s past by working to remember what really took place.

In “Mourning and Melancholia” (“Trauer und Melancholie,”) Freud works through a second distinction important for trauma’s effect on memory: the distinction between mourning one’s lost love object and melancholia. According to Freud, mourning “is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on.” In the former essay, the juxtaposition is that of the compulsion to act with remembering. In this latter essay, the pairing is that of melancholia to mourning. In melancholia, according to Freud, “the disturbance of self-regard (Selbstgefühl) is absent in mourning.”

Unlike the work required in remembering, the work required in mourning is the “reality-testing” to show that the “loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachment to that object.” Hence, to give up this loved object is a painful but liberating process.

Melancholia, by contrast, parallels the position of the compulsion to repeat, and so it is necessary to return to the “recognition of oneself” (Ichgefühl). According to Freud:

Melancholia confronts us with yet other problems, the answer to which in part eludes us. The fact that it passes off after a certain time has elapsed without leaving traces of any gross changes is a feature it shares with mourning. We found by way of explanation that in mourning time is needed for the command of reality-testing to be carried out in detail, and that when this work has been accomplished the ego will have succeeded in freeing its libido from the lost object. We may imagine that the ego is occupied with analogous work during the course of melancholia; in neither case have we any insight into the economics of the course of events.

In melancholia, one’s complaints are accusations and reproach (Klage and Anklage), because one now feels ambivalent to the lost love, preferring to feel love and hate, rather than loss. Thus, to work through the trauma of one’s past, the analysand must do the work of mourning, which comes at a cost to the work of remembering, but the “work of remembering is the benefit of the work of mourning.”

Ricœur takes Freud’s account of the individual working through traumatic memories and extends it to the community. Speaking for others can also be an exercise in telling otherwise. However, allowing others to speak for themselves and recall their own history is the positive form of telling otherwise. Hospitality, however, is able to provide a way to heal a wounded
communal memory. When others are able to narrate their identity otherwise by discussing founding events as the ground for collective memory, this does justice to the individuals and the community to rectify past harms. Those who have been harmed by transnational injustices share a wounded memory. Narrative hospitality, as Ricœur develops it, may prove to be a common basis for the healing of the victims to begin. This exchange of narratives, as a result, would make possible the foundation for solidarity for transnational feminist aims. Thus, I now move from Ricœur’s account of wounded memory to a model of narrative hospitality, in order to counter the common failings of communities when they fall prey to ideology and oppression, which is at the heart of the Solidarity problem.

IV. Narrative Hospitality and the Solidarity Problem

Some recent work on Ricœur’s philosophy has extended many of his concepts to feminist problems of social justice. Gonçalo Marcelo, in “Reshaping Justice: Between Nancy Fraser’s Feminist Philosophy and Paul Ricœur’s Philosophical Anthropology” compares Nancy Fraser’s Critical Theory and Ricœur’s reflections on hermeneutics and justice. In his essay, Marcelo argues that Ricœur’s philosophy has many similarities with the aims of feminist philosophies:

Ricœur’s subject is embodied, vulnerable and prone to fragility and suffering; however, it aims for the good life “with and for others in just institutions” and thus, when the intersubjective experience turns up to be negative — of domination rather than cooperation — it is the denunciation, the cry against injustice that makes the transition to the normative standpoint of justice. Finally, by insisting on narrativity and on the possible continuity of identities through time as being conferred by both narratives and ethical traits (such as the capacity to hold promises) while also providing space for mutation in those identities, Ricœur’s model seems supple enough to grasp justice claims and social change.

Marcelo contends that Ricœur’s reflections on justice and his model of practical wisdom can prove fruitful in reshaping justice for feminist aims at the national and transnational levels.

Similarly to Marcelo’s work, Morny Joy’s essay “Ricœur, Women and the Journey of Recognition” situates the work of Ricœur in the problem of equal treatment and opportunity for women. Here, Joy extends what Ricœur called “a story-not-yet-told” to the predicament facing women in wounded communities. The narrative disclosure of a devastating experience makes way for a recuperative process. Through re-gaining their ability to tell their stories, women can begin to find justice and restitution for the wrongs they have experienced.

Finally, Damien Tissot has argued in “Transnational Feminist Solidarities and Cosmopolitanism: in Search of a New Concept of the Universal,” that the traditional feminist critique of the universal is problematic for transnational feminism. Following cues from Judith Butler, he considers Ricœur’s propositions of process in becoming, as a “pretention,” and translation to refigure the concept of universalism, which is guilty of essentializing and reifying feminist concerns, for transnational solidarities among feminists. Rather than emphasizing women’s narratives as Joy does, Tissot relies upon Ricœur’s model of translation to “build solidarities beyond the limits of our own language.” For Ricœur, the model of translation
provides a paradigm for the intersubjective experience feminist solidarities share and provides a foundation for the just societies in which we want to live.

My aim in this section is to continue in this pattern of thought by extending Ricœur’s account of narrative hospitality to the Solidarity problem for transnational feminism. To recall, transnational feminist solidarity requires that three conditions be met. First, transnational feminism acknowledges intersectional differences among women and advocates methodological commitments sensitive to specificity and self-reflexivity. Second, transnational feminist solidarity is grounded in the political commitments of individuals rather than a common identity or set of experiences. Third, transnational feminists focus on specific globalizing processes and develop existing feminist collectives as models of solidarity.

In his essay, “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe,” Ricœur provides the model of the exchange of memories called “narrative hospitality,” which I think may prove helpful as a basis for transnational feminist solidarity. Narrative hospitality takes into account the “difference of memory, precisely at the level of the customs, rules, norms, beliefs and convictions which constitute the identity of a culture.” The exchange of memories includes not only recollecting one’s past but also incorporating the narratives of the characters involved in the story.

For Ricœur, when a community experiences an event, it also interprets that event. Conversely, this interpretation comes from a shared horizon of experience. Drawing from Max Weber, Ricœur realizes how this shared horizon of experience constitutes the life of the community, but it also can be distorted by the reification of institutions. Leichter summarizes Ricœur’s view on the common life of the community as follows:

the identity of a community is not to be found in what the community recognizes about itself. It is instead the stories that individuals tell to each other about the origins of their common life. It is a story of who “we” are and, and when done justly, a story of who has been affected by “our” actions.

Ricœur’s account of narrative identity includes the persistence of the same thing over time as well as the ability to be self-constant. The former, he calls idem-identity and the latter he calls ipse-identity. Both forms of identity are realized at the individual and communal levels.

Idem-identity at a community level is a kind of national character, which includes the “values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes in which the person or community identifies itself.” Idem at the communal level thus characterizes the ethos that defines a group. This ethos animates a collective existence that operates dialectically between the individually existing selves and the shared identity they make up as a collective. On the one hand, communal idem-identity can be defined by geographical borders or specific governmental institutions. But, on the other hand, idem-identity at the communal level also includes the socio-cultural norms, habits, and traditions.

Ipse-identity at the communal level, by contrast, is characterized by the self-constancy and accountability of the community for its actions. It can be understood as a collective intention, in which individuals act together from a heritage with a vision of a shared life. In other words, the ipse-identity of collective existence involves a structure of living together that belongs to a historical community. Thus, ipse-identity at a collective level is supported by and endures through institutions.
Healing for wounded communities can begin through narrative plurality and narrative exchange. Part of this healing begins with telling otherwise, or transfiguring the past. By transfiguring the past, we give those who have suffered or who have died a political voice. For example, to revisit the case of the Syrian refugees, many of the women and girls were subjected to poor health conditions and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Some have even gone days without food. Amnesty International interviewed sixteen-year-old Maryam, who described her experiences in the following story:

(In Greece) People started screaming and shouting, so the police attacked us and was hitting everyone with sticks. They hit me on my arm with a stick. They even hit younger kids. They hit everyone even on the head. I got dizzy and I fell, people were stepping on me. I was crying and was separated from my mother. They called my name and I was with my mother. I showed them my arm and a police officer saw my arm and laughed, I asked for a doctor, they asked me and my mother to leave.37

This political voice founded on narrative exchange transfigures the representation of those who had been voiceless in the transnational public sphere by providing them with a cohesive identity. Not only do narrative hospitality and plurality transfigure the representation of those who have been politically silenced such as women in the global South, but narrative hospitality also maintains the intersectional differences among women.

Narrative hospitality transfigures the political sphere of representation through the exchange of memories from those who have suffered injustices across national borders. Specifically, the poor conditions of the Syrian refugees lead to many women reporting health problems related to nerve issues, depression, unusual pain and fatigue, repeated vomiting and migraines.38 Most did not seek gynecological care, unless they were pregnant, due to shame and fear of stigmatization. Ricœur’s narrative hospitality is both sensitive to the specificity of the conditions these women and girls have experienced and can provide a method for working through the resulting stress and trauma of these conditions.

Furthermore, the model of narrative hospitality not only acknowledges the intersection of disability and gender but it also can meet point two: it can provide a platform for these Syrian women to tell their stories while also receiving the support from allies who may not have had the same experience but are animated by the political commitment to justice. The narrative constitution of each personal identity and the entanglement of personal incidents in stories told by some and heard by others open the door for hospitality at the individual and communal levels through narrative plurality.39 Ricœur writes:

If each of us receives a certain narrative identity from the stories, which are told to him or her, or from those that we tell about ourselves, this identity is mingled with that of others in such a way as to engender second order stories, which are themselves intersections between numerous stories. Thus, the story of my life is a segment of the story of your life; of the story of my parents, of my friends, of my enemies, and of countless strangers… entangled in stories.40
For Ricœur, the model of narrative hospitality can begin to rectify the harms of the past: “tradition represents the aspect of debt which concerns the past and reminds us that nothing comes from nothing. A tradition remains living, however, only if it continues to be held in an unbroken process of reinterpretation.”¹⁴ From liberating the memories of a wounded community through mourning, reinterpretation and exchanging memories of the past through narratives, the unfulfilled future can begin to make good on the promises, which have not been kept.

Finally, the model of narrative hospitality provides a positive foundation for solidarity within global processes. Although globalization has further marginalized women and the global poor, as exemplified in the case of the Syrian refugees, by concentrating power in the hands of wealthy nations and corporations, the model of narrative hospitality can provide a remedy: it can enable the exchange of memories across national borders, within and outside of technical platforms, and, moreover, maintain the methodological commitments sensitive to specificity and self-reflexivity.

V. Conclusion

The aim of transnational feminists has been to redress the injustices facing oppressed groups in a global age. Two further directions come from this proposal of Ricœur’s philosophy as a foundation for solidarity for these groups. First, I think that Ricœur’s account of collective memory might impact feminist aims by providing a conceptual framework to account for and unify the many disparate experiences and problematic representations of those who have been victims of injustice. Collective memory, then, may aid to strengthen the efforts of feminists who develop targeted sites of resistance against transnational injustices. Second, I have argued that Ricœur’s account of narrative hospitality would be able to provide an intersectional foundation for solidarity with regard to concerns of class, “race,” sexuality, ability, religion and other axes of oppression. It is my hope that this foundation of narrative hospitality will provide opportunities to deepen reflection and exchange in wounded communities rather than inhibit them.

As the plight of the Syrian women refugees reminds us, the identity of an individual or a community is neither wholly one’s own or wholly belongs to others. Rather, we are entangled in the stories of others. Likewise our life story is mixed with the life stories of others in our community. The narrative identity at the level of collective existence is that community’s ability to transform an intersubjective past for which it is responsible into an unrepressed and repentant present, with the promise of maintaining justice in future actions. To make good on those promises, forgiveness may prove necessary since it is the best way of shattering debt and restoring justice and recognition.

It is this model of narrative hospitality — an exchange of memories and shared testimonies in the retelling of past events — that I think provides the best foundation for a social bond for those with the common political aims of transnational feminist solidarity. The aim is thus no longer to speak for these women in the transnational public sphere, but to speak with them as allies, ensuring that their testimony is heard. Only then can the healing of a wounded community begin.


5 Ann Ferguson, “Feminist Paradigms of Solidarity and Justice,” Philosophical Topics, 37 (2), (2009), 161-177, 162.


9 Fraser, Scales of Justice, 98.

10 Fraser, Scales of Justice, 114.


13 According to Ricœur in Memory, History and Forgetting, 70, transference creates something like an intermediary domain between illness and real life; one can speak of it as a ‘playground,’ in which the compulsion is authorized to manifest itself in almost total freedom, offering an opportunity for the pathogenic background of the subject to manifest itself openly.

14 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 70.

15 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 70.


18 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 71.


20 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 71.

21 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 72.

22 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 72.

23 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 73.

24 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 74.

25 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 72.


32 Ricoeur states in “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe,” “I call the second model that of the exchange of memories. We see immediately how it links up with the preceding model: to translate a foreign culture into the categories peculiar to one’s own presupposes, as we have said, a preliminary
transference to the cultural milieu governed by the ethical and spiritual categories of the other. Now the first difference which calls for transference and hospitality is a difference of memory, precisely at the level of the customs, rules, norms, beliefs and convictions which constitute the identity of a culture.”

33 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe,” 5.
34 Leichter, “Collective Identity and Collective Memory in the Philosophy of Paul Ricœur,” 120.
35 Leichter, “Collective Identity and Collective Memory in the Philosophy of Paul Ricœur,” 120.
36 Leichter, “Collective Identity and Collective Memory in the Philosophy of Paul Ricœur,” 121.
37 See Hassan, “Female refugees face physical assault, exploitation and sexual harassment on their journey through Europe.”
38 See Masterson et al., “Assessment of Reproductive Health and Violence against Women among displaced Syrians in Lebanon.”
39 In Richard Kearney, “Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Translation,” Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007), 147-159, it is noted that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of translation provides five ethical functions, three of which are foundational for narrative hospitality: (i) an ethic of hospitality, (ii) an ethic of narrative flexibility, (iii) narrative plurality, (iv) transfiguring the past, and (v) pardon.
41 Ricoeur, “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe,” 8.