The Ambiguity of Justice: Paul Ricœur on Universalism and Evil

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Abstract:
This article examines Ricœur’s idea of the universal as it applies to his understanding of justice. Scholars have recently discussed the way Ricœur understands universal rules of justice in his anthropology of human action and questioned his idea of the universal in light of contextualism and cultural diversity. In this article I will join this debate, approaching Ricœur’s idea of the universal from a different angle. I shall consider it in the light of his idea of evil. The point I will try to make is that Ricœur’s idea of the relation between justice and evil can be used to demonstrate what I will call the ambiguity of justice, a characteristic that makes it difficult to define universal rules of justice. I will argue that justice is ambiguous in that it, on the one hand, aims at the establishment of social peace, but, on the other hand, also implies power, and possibly violence over others because it relates to vengeance, authority, and the struggle for values. I argue that because justice relates to particular values that imply the risk of violence we should question Ricœur’s understanding of universal rules for social peace in Oneself as Another. Yet, I will also draw on a series of other texts by Ricœur on the topic of justice (i.e., The Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, The Just and Reflections on the Just), and I will argue that Ricœur’s idea of justice allows for an understanding of how we find common sensibilities about justice through dialogue, a sensibility for the other, and narratives as a way of critiquing existing moral norms and rules of justice.

Keywords: Justice, Evil, Morality, Universalism, Cultural Diversity.

Résumé:
Cet article a pour but d’examiner le lien entre l’universel et la justice dans la pensée de Ricœur. Dans la littérature secondaire, la façon dont Ricœur comprend l’universalité des règles de justice dans son anthropologie de l’agir humain a été récemment interrogée à la lumière du débat concernant le contextualisme et la diversité culturelle. Cet article s’inscrit dans ce débat, mais il se propose d’envisager la conception ricœurienne de l’universel sous un angle différent. Mon hypothèse est que la relation entre l’universel et la justice, telle que la conçoit Ricœur, démontre ce que j’appellerai l’ambiguïté de la justice. Cette ambiguïté consiste en ceci: d’un côté, la tâche et la fonction de la justice est de maintenir la paix sociale,
mais, de l’autre, la justice institutionnelle présente un résidu de mal et de violence dans la mesure où celle-ci demeure liée à la vengeance personnelle, au pouvoir et à la lutte pour les valeurs. Telle est la raison qui conduit tout d’abord cet article à mettre en question l’idée ricœurienne, défendue dans Soi-même comme un autre, selon laquelle il serait possible de formuler des principes universels pour la paix sociale. En prenant appui sur l’examen d’autres textes de Ricœur – en particulier, L’idéologie et l’utopie et Le juste I et II – il s’agira néanmoins de montrer ensuite que l’approche ricœurienne de la justice nous offre les moyens de penser un certain sens commun de la justice à travers le dialogue critique, la sensibilité à l’égard autrui et la voie critique du narratif.

*Mots-clés: Justice, le mal, moralité, universalisme, diversité culturelle.*
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Introduction

Ricœur’s understanding of moral norms and rules of justice is complex and nuanced. He argues that moral norms should be understood as universal, yet in light of the plurality of existing communities and cultures. For example, in *Oneself as Another* he argues in favor of understanding moral norms in the universal ‘Kantian’ sense, even though these norms relate to different communal mores.1 And in his discussion with Rawls, Walzer, and Boltanski and Thévenot in *The Just*, he investigates the possibility of defining the idea of justice as the backdrop to the plurality of justice systems.2 Ricœur contends that human nature is predisposed with natural virtues and feelings, and that these virtues are cultivated within the context of a particular communal bond. Moreover, Ricœur agrees with Hegel that Kantian morality pays too much attention to the universal aspect of moral norms, and so fails to notice that morality is shaped by societies and their mores.3 Nonetheless, Ricœur is Kantian in that he contends that human nature in general, and human feelings in particular, are fallible. Although Ricœur recognizes, in contrast to Kant, the ethical side of human desire and therefore does not conceive of desire as being evil as such, Ricœur nevertheless stresses the fragility of human’s desire and the possibility of evil within human relations when desire results in power over others. Hence, his “little ethics” aims “at reconciling Aristotle’s *phronesis*, by way of Kant’s *Moralität*, with Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*."4 More exactly, Ricœur argues that self-esteem and desire are fallible and possibly tend towards “self-love,” the pathological form of self-esteem and desire.5 For that reason, moral norms and rules of justice should be understood as universal *correctives* of human evil according to Ricœur, i.e., as formal imperatives that guide moral actions and correct actions, which are based on feelings that could lead to egoism.

I will argue that Ricœur’s understanding of universal moral norms and universal rules of justice in relation to human evil underlines the ambiguity of justice. Justice is ambiguous, so this article aims to demonstrate, in that it implies institutional rules of justice that function in a way that compensates for human error, yet justice also relates to evil insofar as it involves the exercise of power over others. I will argue that Ricœur demonstrates that justice relates to power over others in three ways. (1.) Institutional justice implies punishment as compensation for violence against others, but punishment is itself an institutionalized form of violence and the expression of violent moral feelings (e.g., vengeance and blame). (2.) Justice’s rationality aims at the equality necessary for the recognition of others, but this implies a reduction of the singularity of the other and possibly the exclusion of others. (3.) Institutional justice systems relate to ideologies that are the defenders of one set of rules of justice, which exercise power over those who embrace different mores, values and norms. The ambiguity of justice makes it difficult to define, so this article sets out to demonstrate universal rules of justice: if justice relates to particular values and
to violence, then we should question the idea of finding one universal set of rules of justice for maintaining social peace. Accordingly, I think we should question Ricœur’s idea of universal rules of justice in *Oneself as Another*. Ricœur nevertheless does offer ways of understanding common sensibilities about justice throughout his writings (i.e., in the volumes on the just, in *The Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* and in *From Text to Action*). I argue that he shows that we critically approach rules of justice when those exercise violence toward others through dialogue (cf. his idea of practical wisdom), a sensibility for the suffering of others (cf. his idea of solicitude), and through texts (cf. his idea of fiction and historical narratives as recollection of the victims of the past and his idea of utopias as social critique).

**Universal Rules of Justice and Evil**

According to Ricœur’s idea of morality in *Oneself as Another*, moral norms and universal rules of justice should be understood as universal imperatives of reason designed to compensate for evil, something that originates in human desire and error. Ricœur states at the beginning of chapter 8 of *Oneself as Another*, which deals with the question of morality, that defining moral norms amounts to “isolating the moment of universality.” Further, Ricœur contends following Kant that the universal character of moral norms should be thought of along the lines of the purely “reflexive.” This means that, for Ricœur, moral norms are universal insofar as these norms are defined by the logic of reason, which is universal insofar as this logic is comprehensible to all humans that have the capacity to reason. Following Ricœur’s line of thought, moral norms can be understood and should apply to all human beings in the same sense. The function of these norms is to correct human behavior, which is fallible and possibly involves the exercise of power over and violence against others. Hence, Ricœur writes in *Oneself as Another*: “Because there is evil, the aim of the ‘good life’ has to be submitted by the test of moral obligation.”

Certainly, Ricœur is no ‘orthodox Kantian’ for several reasons. Ricœur rejects Kant’s transcendental approach to moral norms. Scholars agree that Ricœur resists idealism. Bruno Leclercq and Jean-Luc Petit defend the thesis that, in his discussion of analytical philosophy of language in *Oneself as Another*, he defines the ideas of the self and of consciousness in the first place in relation to the physical body, in order to avoid an idealistic interpretation of these ideas. Moreover, rather than contending that reason alone provides sufficient proof for moral norms, or that these norms should be derived exclusively from categorical imperatives, Ricœur contends that moral norms are not only universal constructs of reason in the purely formal sense, but should be derived from concrete ethical existence and desire as well. In this respect, Johann Michel argues, for example, that Ricœur’s Kantian approach to morality is not “auto-foundational” (my translation). As Michel points out, according to Ricœur Aristotle’s ethics “anticipates” the universal aspect of Kantian morality. According to Michel, this means that Ricœur recognizes in certain of Aristotle’s ethical principles “universal” “capacities” or “existentialia” (my translation). Indeed, Ricœur writes in *Oneself as Another* that moral norms express the self’s ipse-identity, which consists of existential “traits.” Ricœur writes:

And when we ourselves, following once again in the wake of Aristotle, posit as the object of self-esteem capacities such as the initiative of acting, choice on the basis of reasons,
estimating and evaluating the goals of action, did we not implicitly give a universal sense
to these capacities, as being that by virtue of which we hold them to be worthy of esteem,
and ourselves as well?13

Further, Ricœur points out that the motivation for acting according to moral norms is
“practical reason,” which is “common in principle to all rational beings.”14 For Ricœur, Aristotle’s
idea of phronesis expresses the universal capacities to make ethical decisions (through decision,
initiative, evaluation, etc.). Ricœur thus understands moral norms as universal imperatives in a
double sense. Firstly, for him moral norms are expressions of certain traits that are common to
human nature as a whole, and are universal in that sense. According to Ricœur, these traits can
be ‘translated’ into formal principles of reason, which turns these principles into universal moral
norms that should compensate for human’s tendency toward egoism. For example, following
Ricœur’s line of reasoning, the imperative to treat others as ends in themselves is universal,
because the tendency to care for others is a natural capacity of all humans.15 Yet the obligatory
aspect of the norm to treat others as ends should compensate for spontaneous encounters with
others that risk resulting in power over others. Secondly, Ricœur believes – and in that sense he is
Kantian as well – that the formal or logical structure of moral norms, or the fact that all
reasonable humans can understand the soundness and logic of these norms, means that moral
norms apply to all humans in the same sense. For Ricœur, the imperative to treat others as ends is
universal, since it is the logical way to act against violence for all people.

Yet one question that arises is whether it is possible to find, as Ricœur contends, a
universal understanding of moral norms given the plurality of moral traditions in ethical life.
George Taylor, for example, criticizes Ricœur’s approach to moral norms for putting too much
stress on the idea of the universal. Taylor defends the thesis that it is problematic to define
universal moral norms and rules of justice, because “there is no common source between
divergent understandings” of ethics and justice, “no one horizon, one tradition, one history, one
language, one universalism.”16 In a different context Taylor argues that although Ricœur offers
the means for finding common sensibilities about justice in ethical life, there is “no unifying
approach to the just.”17

The problem of finding a common source for defining moral norms and rules of justice
that can claim universality in the context of democracy is particularly timely, I think, in light of
recent theories in moral philosophy. Many contemporary theories in moral philosophy point out
that there are no universal criteria for morals and justice, because these criteria differ cross-
culturally. The fact that it is questionable whether we can find universal criteria for morality,
given cultural differences, challenges Ricœur’s idea that there exist moral norms that can claim
universality, because it is unclear whether and to what extent the rules of one culture are morally
superior to the rules of another. In Relative Justice, for example, Tamler Sommers argues that there
exist no universal criteria for justice, because the criteria for norms and principles are culturally
relative.18 Sommers finds inspiration for his theory in anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s distinction
between shame and guilt cultures. For example, Sommers refers to the shooting incident at
Virginia Tech University in 2007.19 After the shooting, carried out by a Korean student, a reporter
went on the streets to interview Korean-Americans in Los Angeles. One of the people
interviewed was a man who admitted to feeling ashamed that a fellow Korean had performed the
shooting. The American reporter in her turn was astonished by this declaration, and could not
understand why someone who had no part in the event could feel responsible for it. Similarly, Dong Sun Lim, the founder of the Oriental Mission Church in Koreatown stated later that: “All Koreans in South Korea – as well as [in the U.S.] – must bow their heads and apologize to the people of America.” South-Korean Ambassador, Lee Taesik, advised Korean Americans to be ashamed and to repent for the shooting. As Sommers points out, these reactions seem strange to members of Western cultures, who find it difficult to understand why one would feel ashamed and even responsible for something over which one had no control. According to Sommers this example illustrates how moral responsibility is relative to different cultures. Whereas Western cultures are typically guilt-oriented cultures, Eastern cultures are generally shame-oriented. This means that in Western cultures it is commonly believed that it is unjustified to hold people morally responsible for actions that they do not control. Western people are generally focused on individual guilt, whereas Eastern cultures, on the other hand, commonly believe that moral responsibility is related to a communal bond and to shame. The cultural differences regarding our moral outlook at least questions the idea that there are universal moral norms, since such singular outlooks shape moral norms.

Yet other moral philosophers, like Martha Nussbaum for example, defend a more complex, less relativistic, idea of morality, arguing that certain moral feelings and human sentiments in general are both universal and “differently shaped by different societies.” Nussbaum argues that humans share “the nature of their bodies” and in that sense have “a common animality,” which also means that they have natural sentiments in common. These sentiments constitute our human moral nature, which nevertheless finds a different expression in different cultures. The discussion around whether moral norms are universal or formed by societies should be understood in the context of the ‘Kantian-Hegelian’ dispute. Several philosophers in both the European and the Anglo-American tradition, Ricœur included, partake in this discussion in discussing Hegel’s critique on Kantian morality.

Justice’s Ambiguity: Three Ways of Understanding the Relation Between Justice and Evil

In the remainder of this article I argue that Ricœur’s understanding of justice in relation to evil offers a response to the problem of universalism regarding justice. I think Ricœur offers three ways of understanding the ambiguity of justice in his writings. First of all, institutional justice relates to evil insofar it relies on punishment, which amount to power over others, as a means of establishing peace. In other words, institutional justice systems connect to evil in that they use (minimal) violence to compensate for violence. Because institutional justice originates in practices of personal vengeance, it relates to evil. In several of his articles in The Just and in Reflections on the Just, Ricœur aims to understand the ambiguity of justice in pointing to the intrinsic relation between institutional justice and violence. For example, he argues in “Justice and Vengeance” that justice relates to violence in that it expresses “the spirit of vengeance.” Ricœur, of course, does not deny the essential differences between institutional justice and personal vengeance. As he points out, vengeance implies a personal and “hasty reprisal,” as the expression ‘an eye for an eye’ also suggests. Justice, on the other hand, is impersonal and implies an institutionalized and legal form of “punishment.” Ricœur writes in “Justice and
Vengeance,” the “distance between the imposition of an initial suffering by the offender and that of a supplementary one applied as punishment” breaks “the initial tie between vengeance and justice.”

This means that justice and vengeance differ in that justice involves a third party that mediates between the party of the offender(s) and the party of the victim(s). In the case of personal vengeance, victims take the task of punishing the offenders with their own hands. In the case of institutional justice, a third party decides which punishment applied to the offender(s) should compensate the victim(s). Both institutional justice and personal vengeance nevertheless have in common for Ricœur that they are ways of inflicting suffering on an offender as compensation for the initial suffering this offender caused to a victim. In this regard, institutional justice is “a kind of legal violence,” but it also inevitably implies punishment, and, as such, “suffering.” Ricœur’s distinction between justice and personal vengeance demonstrates, I think, the ambiguity of justice. On the one hand, justice is part of ‘the good life’ in that it aims at compensating for equality and thus for unjust suffering. On the other hand, it is precisely this aim that makes justice ambiguous, because even on the institutional level justice inflicts suffering in the form of punishment and, more generally, power over others in order to compensate for suffering.

The specific kind of evil that relates to justice is thus human violence, as opposed to non-human violence. More exactly, the violence that comes with institutions amounts to what Ricœur calls “power-over.” In fact, according to Ricœur, all human encounters that include action are relations in which one party exercises power over another. Ricœur writes in Oneself as Another: “It is difficult to imagine situations of interaction in which one individual does not exert a power over another by the very fact of acting.” Indeed, power comes with action. When acting, we set certain things in motion that possibly cause harm to others, even if that acting is well intended. This is the case, not only in concrete encounters with singular others, but also on the level of institutions and justice systems. Institutions ‘act’ to maintain justice: distribution of goods, passing of sentences, exercising punishments, etc. Hence, institutions imply “domination” of certain groups and/or individuals over others and thus the possibility of “political violence.” This happens in corrupt regimes, for example, that explicitly aim at oppressing certain minorities in order to maintain power. Yet, insofar that action implies power over others and justice implies action, justice relates to power and therefore to violence.

One might object of course that punishment is only ‘the last resort’ of justice, and that justice aims essentially at establishing peace. In other words, punishment is only the necessary minimum of evil and a means for establishing peace. Ultimate justice would amount to the state where there is no unjust suffering and no need for punishment. Exemplary in this regard is the trial in court according to Ricœur, which functions to resolve conflicts between offended parties in applying written laws. Following Ricœur’s line of reasoning, states and their laws in general, and the judge in court in particular, impose sentences that are meant to compensate victims, and in that sense aim to prevent a situation where citizens exercise personal vengeance, or take justice in their own hands. Yet the very rationality of justice makes it ambiguous in my opinion. The fact that justice has the capacity “to impose its will on subordinate individuals” means that it amounts to the exercise of power over others and so has a tendency towards violence. Further, insofar as practices of holding people responsible and institutional justice relate to punishment, there remains a residue of violence within these practices and institutional justice.
Justice’s mechanism thus implies exercising power over others, and thus violence, even if only in a minimal sense. In this respect, Ricœur writes in his article “The Act of Judging”: “justice is opposed not just to violence per se [...], but to that simulation of justice constituted by vengeance, the act of procuring justice by oneself.” In other words, justice is an institutionalized form of violence and therefore opposed to personal vengeance, yet it still is a form of violence. It relates to vengeance in that both justice and vengeance imply violence in the sense of power over others as ‘just’ compensation for harm. In the case of justice, contrary to personal vengeance, society exercises this violence in the form of legal punishment in order to avoid the violence that results from personal retaliation. In Ricœur’s understanding, justice aims to establish “social peace” in inflicting a minimum of violence. Social peace establishes “mutual recognition,” by which both the party of the offender(s) and that of the victim(s) recognize each other as equal subjects of rights. Ricœur writes in “The Act of Judging,” justice establishes social peace,

when someone who has, as we say, won his case still feels able to say: my adversary, the one who lost, remains like me a subject of right, his cause should have been heard, he made plausible arguments and these were heard. However, such recognition will not be complete unless the same thing can also be said by the loser, the one who did wrong, who has been condemned.35

In short, in institutional justice the conflict between the victim(s) and the offender(s) is resolved, in the ideal case, when these parties mutually recognize each other’s arguments and agree that the court’s sentence was justified. Yet even when this agreement is achieved there is (except in the case of an equal settlement) one party that has the power over the other, i.e., one party that is compensated and one that is punished.

For Ricœur, justice relates to evil in Western culture, and to symbols and feelings of violence in general. In his essay, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” Ricœur argues that “in the traditions of the West,” “evil” is “the common root” of both wrongdoing and of suffering. Ricœur, of course, does not fail to note the differences between evil and justice in that evil implies suffering related to sentiments of “lament,” while justice implies punishment related to sentiments of “blame.”37 In fact, evil is not necessarily caused by wrongdoing. Evil or injustice possibly occurs without there being agents directly responsible. In a similar fashion, Ricœur elaborately examines in The Symbolism of Evil the symbolic meanings of evil in Western myth and in scripture. More exactly, he argues in The Symbolism of Evil that the idea of responsibility in the “ethico-juridical” sense of “penal imputation” finds its roots, in Western society, in the experience of “guilt,” recounted in Greek myths and in the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Ricœur, the distinction in Ancient Greek culture between “Cosmos” and “City” in particular introduces the idea of injustice, i.e., of the fault that should be punished objectively by the city and that is thus profane and unrelated to the violation of the sacredness of the cosmos. It is interesting that Ricœur notes that the psychological experience of guilt appears in poetry as the result of this Ancient Greek idea of punishment.40 For Ricœur, the story of Œdipus is exemplary in this respect. Further, Ricœur argues in The Symbolism of Evil that the experiences of guilt and of responsibility also find their roots in “Pharisaism.”41 In particular, the Pharisees’ idea to lead a people under the “Law,” i.e., the Thorah, should be understood, according to Ricœur, as one of the sources of these experiences. Finally, the experiences of guilt and of responsibility should be understood in the context of St. Paul’s law, in Ricœur’s opinion, before the Roman juridical system came into
existence, which is the basis of justice as we know it today. Ricœur thus shows that moral norms and rules of justice are the remedy for human evil, yet also the expressions of cultural symbols that find their roots in violent feelings such as vengeance and blame. This is the first way, I think, in which we should understand of justice as ambiguous.

Ricœur's idea of formal rules of justice in *Oneself as Another* allows for the description of a second way in which justice relates to evil. As Ricœur points out, like formal moral norms, formal rules of justice can fail to apply to singular situations and so demand that an exception be made. Justice, understood as the recognition of the other and the establishment of social peace, has an institutional side and extends the limits of face-to-face encounters, since the other is “also other than the ‘you’.” The other who is entitled to an existence free from suffering is not, in other words, only the other that one actually meets in face-to-face encounters, but also the third person, or the stranger. As Ricœur puts it, the ideal of justice is the recognition of all others within the sphere of humanity as such: Justice’s “field of application is all of humanity.” More exactly, for Ricœur rules of justice should be understood in the context of institutions and “legal systems.”

By institutions Ricœur understands first of all moral value systems or mores: “What fundamentally characterizes the idea of institution is the bond of common mores … In this, we are carried back to the *ethos* from which ethics takes its name.” In other words, Ricœur points to the role of common moral values for defining justice: “By ‘institution,’ we are to understand here the structure of living together as this belongs to a historical community – people, nation, region, and so forth.” In this sense, Ricœur states, institutions have an essential “distributive character,” which functions to divide “rights and duties, revenues and patrimonies, responsibilities and powers, in short, benefits and charges.” However, for Ricœur institutional justice should also imply universal rules of justice. Ricœur points out that, ultimately, institutional justice implies legal systems that constitute rules of justice that oblige wrongdoers in community “to compensate for damages or pay the penalty.” According to Ricœur, these rules are rational norms that formalize the communal mores and “claim” “universality.” Hence, Ricœur defends the idea following Rawls that moral norms are universal formal rules. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is exemplary in this regard.

Insofar that they are formal, rules of justice underline the ambiguity of justice. On the one hand, these rules aim to recognize others and to establish social peace. Yet on the other hand, the formal character of rules of justice implies that they allow for no exception and apply to every situation in the same sense, even if this means neglecting one singular other, or excluding others. Ricœur gives the example of Antigone, where the laws of the city conflict with the singular situation to which they are applied: the conflict between the religious tradition that prescribes that Antigone bury her brother and the laws of the city that forbid this. As Ricœur points out following Levinas, justice implies a reduction of the singularity of the other. For Ricœur, institutional justice reduces the singularity of the other, because its rational-formal structure fails to take into account this singularity. Further, institutional justice is the community’s mechanism of power, designed to control the dominant mores, and to correct actions that deviate from the ‘good life’ by means of legal punishment. In that respect, rules of justice, although they can maintain social peace, can also oppress others, and exercise violence toward minorities. Ricœur states in *The Just*, that the state is the “guardian of legitimate violence.” Following Ricœur’s line of reasoning, there exists a thin line between legitimate punishment and unjustified violence, between justice and unjust suffering.
Yet if rules are the expressions of particular institutions, communities and cultures, then we should also question the idea, I think, of defining universal rules of justice. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is the expression of Western culture in particular. If rules of justice exist only in the context of particular legal systems proper to particular historical communities they are not universal in that they do not apply to all communities in the same sense. Given that different communities have different justice systems that apply different rules of justice, there is no ‘one’ set of rules that is absolute. If we accept Ricoeur’s idea that rules of justice relate to (possibly evil) mores, then we should also accept the idea, so I am arguing, that there is no universal set of rules for justice. If rules of justice should be considered as universal norms, then it is only in a purely formal or procedural sense. Moreover, if rules of justice are at permanent risk of exercising violence, then it also appears that they are not universal, since there is always the task of finding better rules, of re-envisioning the rules in light of the violence they cause, and of replacing old ‘violent’ rules with more ‘peaceful’ ones. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, remains a declaration, i.e., a claim for applying universal rules that originates in the West. These rules relate to a particular culture, and are therefore not absolute. They likely demand change or, at least, modification in view of cultural differences. From the fact that moral norms are universal in a purely formal or procedural sense, it does not follow that these norms are also universally applicable, i.e., universal maxims that determine what counts as a moral and as just over the different cultures.

Finally, there is a third way, I think, of understanding the ambiguous relation between justice and evil in light of the problem of defining universal rules of justice. Because rules of justice are expressions of particular institutions that, as I argued, find their roots in communal standards, values and norms, these rules are possibly expressions of violent ‘values’ or standards that function to oppress minorities. One might object again that this is the case for corrupt regimes, but that a just community with proper institutions aims at including others and minorities. We can think, for example, of laws against racism. However, the communal character of justice means that justice possibly tends to the oppression of minorities. Communal mores express what members of particular communities consider to be the good life. In his article, “Fragile Identities, Capable Selves,” Roger Savage draws the connection between Ricoeur’s idea of communities as fragile identities and communal values. As Savage explains in line with Ricoeur, communities are essentially places where a struggle of values occurs: “Religious, ethnic, cultural, and gender differences thus become sites of contested values that are inseparable from demands for recognition. By itself, each way of living holds out the prospect – received and chosen – of the ‘good’ life.” This means that within communities members struggle to promote different values, different mores, or values that are about “the good life.” Following this line of reasoning, violence occurs within communities when the leading members that represent the values of the communal identity oppress minorities that represent different values. Yet if this is the case, a permanent risk of evil remains within justice systems, because rules of justice exercise power over, and possibly violence toward, others with different values. If justice means the establishment of social peace and the recognition of the suffering of others, then there is no absolute universal set of rules of justice, since such rules are the expression of a struggle for values that possibly oppresses others who embrace different
values. In other words, if rules of justice are expressions of particular values, then these rules are not universal, because these values possibly conflict with different equally significant values.

In *The Course of Recognition* Ricœur argues in line with Hegel and Honneth that justice is characterized by struggle. Ricœur returns to the example of the trial in court. According to him, the trial in court is exemplary for what he understands as the struggle for recognition inherent to institutional justice. The trial regulates a “dispute” that results from “violence” caused by offenders and in that sense takes the place of “vengeance.” As the example of the trial attests, judicial systems essentially function as mechanisms of struggle between offenders and victims. According to Ricœur, judicial systems thus aim to regulate violence and vengeance. To the extent that institutional justice intrinsically relates to struggle, justice relates to violence. On the other hand, Ricœur contends in *The Course of Recognition* that institutional justice also aims to establish social peace. In that respect, Ricœur argues in favor of “more peaceful experiences of recognition,” than Hegel’s and Honneth’s ideas of the struggle for recognition propose. For example, he discusses the idea of *agape* as a peaceful relationship that is, although irreducible to justice, also closely related to the mechanism of recognition of justice. Love relates to justice, according to Ricœur, in that both are relations of recognition of others: personal recognition by means of affection in relations of love, and recognition of others as equal subjects of rights in relations of justice. Given that love relates to justice, for Ricœur, he nevertheless stresses one essential difference between *agape* and justice, namely that *agape* is a state of peace – part of the good life – whereas justice, at least in the institutional sense, implies “dispute, to which states of peace are opposed.” Hence, justice is ambiguous, so Ricœur demonstrates, in that it should aim at installing states of peace, yet is the expression of struggle.

**Common Sensibilities about Justice: Dialogue, the Other, and the Narrative**

However, if rules of justice are expressions of particular mores and at permanent risk of amounting to violence, does it follow that there are no universal criteria whatsoever for defining rules of justice? In other words, should we accept a radical relativistic theory of justice? I think that throughout his writings Ricœur offers the tools for understanding common sensibilities about justice, even if we should question his idea of universal rules of justice. In his discussion with Rawls in *The Just* Ricœur introduces the idea that societies are capable of a “bond between the rule of justice and the depth of beliefs” in constituting “an overlapping consensus.” Following this line of reasoning, consensus about certain beliefs concerning justice thus allows societies to search for an agreement about rules of justice and moral norms through intercultural dialogue. For example, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights originates in the West, many different countries embrace the principles of this declaration. In “Reenvisioning Justice” George Taylor calls this kind of consensus “horizontal,” which means that communities can establish a dialogue or communicate to search for similarities along their different moral norms and rules of justice. We can learn from different cultures and different values that might question the supposed superiority of our own moral values. Or, conversely, we can use our own moral values and norms to question those of other communities.

Yet dialogue and critique of moral norms occurs, I think, also on the individual level. We can critically judge moral norms not only on the communal and institutional level, through
dialogue between cultural values, rules and norms, but also in our own judgment. Clearly, one can take a critical attitude toward the moral norms of one’s own community or other communities when these communities stand for moral values and standards that one believes should be abandoned, or simply revised. Such an attitude is the onset of moral and political dissent. In this respect, humans are not simply the products of moral feelings, values and norms or of their environments and cultural heritage. Hence, Ricœur also points at the significance of practical wisdom for the application of justice, which means that moral norms and rules of justice should not simply be applied in concrete situations, i.e., without exceptions and regardless of the self’s capability to take ethical decisions that might conflict with the normative criteria for morals and justice. The trial in court, for example, should not simply be the application of formal rules of justice, but should imply practical wisdom from the members of the court, as cases of mitigating factors attest.62

Another type of critique might be what Taylor identifies as “vertical” critique.63 According to Taylor, we are not only capable of searching for possible similarities along the cultural differences regarding moral beliefs and beliefs about justice. It is also possible to search for transcendent truths or sensibilities about morals and justice, even if these “truths” remain “partial,” and are thus not absolute.64 I think that one particular transcendent sensibility is significant for understanding responsibility, namely our sensibility for otherness. It is in light of the possible violence that moral norms and institutions inflict upon others that we should critically judge these norms and institutions. Indeed, critique through intercultural dialogue relies mainly on opinion, the general opinion about moral values of a community. Yet the relation with the other offers a more ‘imperative’ way for critique of moral norms and for finding a common sensibility about morality in that the suffering of others implies the moral injunction of responsibility for others. I think that Ricœur’s idea of solicitude demonstrates that in the concrete relation with the singular other we are capable of a sense of justice. In Ricœur’s view, care or “solicitude” is the spontaneous recognition of the suffering of others in true sympathy or compassion for the other’s suffering. Ricœur writes in Oneself as Another: Solicitude “occurs, originating in the suffering other […].”:

Being confronted with the suffering other, the self […] gives his sympathy, his compassion, these terms taken in the strong sense of the wish to share someone else’s pain. […] In true sympathy, the self […] finds itself affected […]. For it is indeed feelings that are revealed in the self by the other’s suffering […], feelings spontaneously directed towards others. This intimate union between the ethical aim of solicitude and the affectionate flesh of feelings seems to me to justify the choice of the term ‘solicitude.’65

These lines suggest that solicitude or the act of caring for others begins with the passive affect of sympathy or true compassion for others. In experiencing spontaneous affections of sympathy for others who are vulnerable and exposed to suffering, we care in estimating the value of the lives of these others, in the sense that we are anxious about their suffering.66 Solicitude in the sense of care inspired by true sympathy thus implies suffering oneself, at least in the sense of being affected by the suffering of another. As this idea suggests, in caring for others one comes to understand why justice is important: because we are anxious about the well-being of others. Insofar as care gives rise to anxiety regarding the well-being of others it entails the experience of a sense of justice or a call for justice. More exactly, solicitude entails an equal
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relation between self and other in that care for others implies sharing their suffering. In true compassion, the self estimates that the other’s existence is just as worthy as his or her own existence. Ricœur explains this by introducing his notion of “similitude”: 

Similitude is the fruit of the exchange between esteem for oneself and solicitude for others. This exchange authorizes to say that I cannot myself have self-esteem unless I esteem others as myself. “As myself” means that you too are capable of starting something in the world, of acting for a reason, of hierarchizing your priorities, of evaluating the ends of your actions, and, having done this, of holding yourself in esteem as I hold myself in esteem.67

Given that compassion for suffering others amounts to suffering oneself to a certain extent, because of the other’s suffering, compassion facilitates the wish that others will not suffer. In this sense, compassion is the feeling that others are also entitled to a worthy life: a life free from suffering or, conversely, a life in which these others can be selves as well, capable of having self-esteem. Solicitude, as Ricœur understands it on the basis of true compassion thus entails the sense of justice, or, better, the experience of the need for justice as a response to the injustice we experience in the confrontation of the suffering of others. Ricœur writes that “the sense of justice is not limited to the construction of legal systems,” but that we become first aware of the idea of justice through the “sense of justice and of injustice”: “‘Unjust! What injustice!’ we cry.”68 I am thus arguing that Ricœur’s idea of solicitude offers an understanding of our common sensibility for justice, which we recognize through sympathy and care for others. Yet I am questioning whether we can also derive from this common trait, as Ricœur believes we can, universal moral imperatives, at least as part of a universal moral anthropology that applies regardless of cultural differences.

Furthermore, Ricœur’s idea of the narrative demonstrates, I think, how a critique of moral norms, based on our sensibility for the other finds its expression in narratives. Ricœur’s idea of obligated memory in the third volume of Time and Narrative and in Memory, History, Forgetting particularly highlights how fiction and historical narrative express our debt toward the victims of communities in the past. More exactly, in the eighth chapter of Time and Narrative 3, Ricœur defends the thesis that narratives testify to what he understands as our debt toward history in refiguring the past. Ricœur writes in that chapter, “fiction makes use of history […] to refigure time.”69 In refiguring past events into an imaginary narrative, fiction bears witness to the people who lived during these events, and in that sense expresses the “debt we owe the dead.”70 This means, for Ricœur, that fiction in particular, and narratives in general, refigure historical time in recounting the story “as if it were past,” or as if passed events are actually happening in time.71 Central to this process of refiguration in narrative is the role of “imagination” according to Ricœur.72 For Ricœur, fiction can re-enact the past by means of imagination in narratives (se figurer que).73 In this regard, narratives recreate the past in the timeline of the story, and in that sense testify to history.

Ricœur’s idea of obligated memory demonstrates how we use narratives to express what we experience as what Richard Kearney calls our responsibility toward the past.74 This experience finds expression, for example, in processes of mourning. The fact that humans find it significant to mourn the dead attests to their experience of feeling obligated to remember that which has
happened in the past and especially those who have gone before us. The narrative imagination can provide knowledge of the past, and thus can help us remember the past and mourn history’s dead. In *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Ricœur discusses again his idea of obligated memory. In the third chapter of that work, Ricœur aims to understand “memory in the imperative mood.” According to Ricœur, memory in this sense should be understood as a “duty […] imposing itself on desire,” and “exerting a constraint experienced subjectively as obligation.” Certainly, forgetting and remembering are, as Ricœur points out, spontaneous activities that befall us, and are therefore inevitable and uncontrollable, at least to a certain extent. Ricœur writes in *Memory, History, Forgetting*: “it is characteristic of memory to emerge as a spontaneous evocation, hence as pathos.” Yet human beings not only grant each other the right of (inevitably) forgetting certain passed events, as the idea of “amnesty” also underlines, but they also experience the obligation to hold on to certain passed events, which they find should be remembered. Following Ricœur’s line of reasoning, the narrative is thus the medium humans use to express the experience that they should not forget the past, and that they should bring the past back to life by re-enacting it in stories.

Ricœur demonstrates, so I am arguing, that fiction and historical narratives can aid in criticizing moral norms and institutions when these exercise violence toward others. In recalling the past, and in particular the victims of institutions in the past, fiction and historical narratives provide a critical warning for the future and in that sense function as media of moral and political dissent. In recalling violence toward others who are the victims of the past and in particular the victims of institutional violence, historical narratives and fiction criticize moral norms that are at the root of institutional violence. These narratives draw attention to occurrences of institutional violence and in so doing remind us that those occurrences should never be repeated. This is not to reduce history and narrativity to exercises in remembering the victims of the past, but to point to a critical function of the narrative. In *Time and Narrative 3*, Ricœur introduces his idea of “having-been,” by which he explains that we have only access to the past indirectly, through memory and imagination. Rules of justice are imperative within communities. However, because of the ambiguity of justice – it relates both to peace and to evil – narratives are alternative ways of reworking and criticizing occurrences of evil both in face-to-face encounters and on the level of institutions. Indeed, the whole idea of remembering the past is to pass it on to future generations. If we are responsible for recalling the occurrences of evil in the past, then this is clearly not simply out of a curiosity for history, but also in order to prevent these occurrences from repeating themselves in the future and, in that respect, in order to re-envision systems of justice and power that were the cause of those occurrences. In other words, it is first of all for the present and for the others of future generations that we recollect the past. Ricœur writes in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, “justice […] turns memory into a project; and it is this same project of justice that gives the form of the future and of the imperative to the duty of memory.” Humans hold on to memories of the past, and make this holding on a project for the future, in order to learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid them in the future.

I think utopias are a different kind of fiction that we can use to criticize and re-envision institutional norms and to find common sensibilities about justice. Ricœur demonstrates this in the three concluding lectures of the *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. In the *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* Ricœur understands utopia as a social group’s or minority’s capacity to constitute a narrative that goes against the leading ideological or institutional ideas and norms. Hence, for
Ricœur utopias have a sociological meaning, and should thus not be reduced to a particular literary genre in history, which Thomas More gave birth to with his *Utopia*. Ricœur defines the utopia then in relation to imagination, as opposed to ideology. In the *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* he writes,

imagination works in two different ways. On the one hand, imagination may function to reserve an order. In this case the function of imagination is to stage a process of identification that mirrors the order. Imagination has the appearance here of a picture. On the other hand, though, imagination may have a disruptive function; it may work as a breakthrough. Its image in this case is productive, an imagining of something else, the elsewhere. […] Ideology represents the first kind of imagination; it has a function of preservation, of conservation. Utopia, in contrast, represents the second kind of imagination; it is always the glance from nowhere.82

Following Ricœur’s line of reasoning, minority groups write their own utopian narrative: they can search for a common voice that allows them to criticize existing institutional rules and moral norms. We can think of feminist literature, African-American music or of theories that more explicitly present a utopian political idea, like Marxism. In that respect, they can find a form of moral and political dissent regarding the ruling and oppressing classes.

Ricœur’s discussion of Mannheim’s sociological criteriology of utopias is particularly fruitful, I think, for defining utopia as a way of critiquing moral norms. Ricœur distinguishes several main features in this criteriology. First of all, utopia is “situationally transcendent while ideology is not,” which means that utopias envision a different social reality than the one that is situated within the existing institutional system.83 However, despite its transcendent character utopia, understood as a way of scattering and redefining the social order, is also realizable in principle, and not “merely a dream” that is ‘α-topos,’ pure fiction.84 Next, a “utopia is the discourse of a group and not a kind of literary work floating in the air.”85 It is an expression of “ascending groups,” against “a collective ego,” rather than the voice of the “dominant groups.”86 Moreover, while ideologies represent the ruling order of the “past,” utopias aim at breaking with this order. I think Ricœur’s interpretation of Mannheim’s idea of utopia demonstrates how utopias function as critiques of existing moral norms and rules of justice. Ricœur’s idea of narrativity thus questions a reductionist approach to justice. In writing narratives humans are capable of questioning the symbolic order of a community, institution or ideology. This order is therefore not simply a fixed network of values, mores or beliefs, relative to a particular community: it can change in light of new ideas that narratives can introduce, in introducing a concept of another social order for the future, rather than in creating a fictional dream world. Utopias, in the sense of the narratives through which others that are oppressed by institutional power can find common sensibilities, recall the need for justice for others. These narratives are rhetoric tools that question and criticize institutional power and violence. Yet insofar as the utopia proposes an alternative structure of power it also implies the risk of becoming an ideology or resulting in institutional power over others. Hence, the dynamic between ideology and utopia is a “spiral” for Ricœur, which means that it is never fully realized, but that we should search with “practical wisdom” for common values concerning justice and the right institutional norms.87 This means that, although they are not absolute or universal, moral norms and practices
are not merely relative to natural and communal values either. It is in our common sensibilities, which find expression in the narrative, that we come to understand justice.

Conclusion

I examined Ricœur’s idea of the universal in light of his understanding of the relation between justice and evil. I discussed three ways in which evil in the particular sense of power over others manifests itself in institutions of justice: through practices of punishment that originate in vengeance and violent feelings, through justice’s formal character that implies a reduction of the singularity of the other, and through justice’s claimed universal character that implies struggle and institutions and ideologies defending dominant values that oppress others with different values. Certainly, institutional justice is a remedy against violence and evil. Yet a risk of violence always exists within systems of institutional justice. I argued that this is the ambiguity of justice. Ricœur writes in From Text to Action, “a residual violence continues to afflict even the State that comes closest to the ideal of a State of law, for the reason that every State is particular, individual, empirical.” This article’s aim was to demonstrate that the ambiguity of justice underscores the problem of finding universal rules of justice. I found two reasons for which we should question Ricœur’s idea of thinking of rules of justice as universal norms. The first reason is that rules of justice are expressions of particular communities. The second reason is because the quest for justice and social peace in institutions is unending in that a residue of violence always remains in justice systems, and therefore there is always room for improved rules. Ricœur’s thoughts on justice nevertheless allow finding common sensibilities about justice, through dialogue about values and norms, human’s sensibility for the other that is vulnerable to suffering, and through texts (fiction, historical narrative, utopia) that critically revise and question existing rules of justice in light of the power the exercise over others.


3 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 249 ff.

4 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 299.

5 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 215.

6 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 204; (original emphasis).

7 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 204.

8 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 218.


11 Michel, *Paul Ricœur*, 308: “Au lieu d’opposer polairement la téléologie aristotélicienne à la déontologie kantienne, Ricœur, en historien de la philosophie, préfère d’abord s’attarder sur les structures de transitions de la première vers la seconde. C’est que les principes de l’éthique d’Aristote, sous certains aspects, anticipent le moment d’universalité consubstantiel de la morale kantienne. […] [U]n aspect concerne le statut que Ricœur, dans le sillage d’Aristote, attribue aux capacités (la délibération, l’initiative, l’évaluation, etc.) de l’agir humain. Considérées comme des transcendentaux, ou plutôt comme des existentiels, ces capacités ont, aux yeux de Ricœur, un sens universel.”

12 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 205.

13 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 205; (original emphasis).

14 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 206.

15 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 218.


22 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 141.


30 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 220.

31 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 220.

32 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 220.


34 Ricœur, *The Just*, 130-1.


37 Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 250.


42 Ricœur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, 120.
43 Ricœur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, 139.
44 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 240 ff.
45 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 194.
46 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 202.
47 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 198.
48 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 194.
49 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 194; (original emphasis).
52 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 170.
56 Savage, “Fragile Identities, Capable Selves,” 68.
60 Ricœur, *The Just*, 72.
65 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 191-2.
67 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 193.

68 Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 198.


70 Ricœur, *Time and Narrative 3*, 184.

71 Ricœur, *Time and Narrative 3*, 189.

72 Ricœur, *Time and Narrative 3*, 184.

73 Ricœur, *Time and Narrative 3*, 181.


76 Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 84.


