Between the Prose of Justice and the Poetics of Love?
Reading Ricœur on Mutual Recognition in the Light of Harmful Strategies of “Othering”

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Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the challenges posed by xenophobia and other social phenomena that operated with harmful strategies of “othering,” this article considers the promise that the notion of “mutual recognition” as exemplified in the later work of Paul Ricœur holds for discourse on these matters. Can the hermeneutical and mediating approach of Ricœur provide an adequate framework in order to respond to these radical challenges? In light of this question, this article discusses and ultimately affirms Ricœur’s view that places mutual recognition between what he calls the prose of justice and the poetics of agápē. In addition this article draws attention to the value of symbolic gestures and an ethic of linguistic hospitality to give further texture to the plea for mutual recognition amidst experience of exclusion, conflict and violence.

Keywords: Recognition, Ricœur, Xenophobia, Agape, Linguistic Hospitality.

Résumé:
Face aux défis de la xénophobie et des autres phénomènes sociaux liés aux stratégies nuisibles “d’altérisation,” cet article réfléchit à la promesse que représente la notion de “reconnaissance mutuelle” telle qu’elle se trouve définie dans les derniers travaux de Paul Ricœur. Dans quelle mesure l’approche herméneutique de Ricœur et son travail de médiation sont-ils susceptibles de répondre à ces défis radicaux? En prenant cette question comme fil conducteur, cet article discute et reprend finalement à son compte la thèse de Ricœur selon laquelle la reconnaissance mutuelle se situe entre ce qu’il appelle la “prose” de la justice et la “poésie” de l’agapè. L’auteur attire en outre l’attention sur la valeur des gestes symboliques et de l’hospitalité ethnique et linguistique susceptibles de donner plus de consistance à l’appel pour la reconnaissance mutuelle au sein de cette expérience d’exclusion, de conflit et de violence.

Mots-clés: Reconnaissance, Ricœur, xénophobie, agapè, hospitalité linguistique.
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1. Introduction

In *Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship and Identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada*, sociologists Heribert Adam and Kagilo Moodley argue extensively for the importance of political literacy as a strategy to combat xenophobia.\(^1\) Using xenophobia as a prism for South African society at large, Adam and Moodley traces in their empirical, comparative and theoretical study how “the dream of an inclusive, non-racial democracy faded in South Africa” and how “the imagined post-apartheid solidarity is being jettisoned.”\(^2\) Their study is placed against the backdrop of outbreaks of violence against foreigners that occurred in May 2008 in various parts of South Africa. Forty-one migrants from other African countries, as well as twenty-one South African citizens mistaken for foreigners, were killed and many more injured as agitated mobs went on a rampage. Tens of thousands of people sought refuge in churches and police stations. These incidents evoked strong critical comments, including from Archbishop emeritus Desmond Tutu and former president Nelson Mandela. Since then, frequent incidents of violence and hostility against foreigners have become part of the South African social landscape. With this in mind, Adam and Moodley comments:

> The popular rage against foreigners contradicts the Mandela/Tutu vision of an inclusive ‘Rainbow Nation’ and glorious ‘African Renaissance,’ and makes a mockery of the much heralded African ‘ubuntu’ philosophy that self-development depends on the well-being and care of all other community members. In fact, the ongoing hostility may well be seen as a forerunner to an impending civil war between a growing underclass and an indifferent, self-enriching state elite.\(^3\)

Without going into the detail of Adam and Moodley’s richly textured discussion, it can be noted that they argue that, given what they view as the impossibility of effectively controlling borders in Africa, one has to take the view that only political education can reduce xenophobia. Therefore their plea for a growth in political literacy that does not merely imply “more information about the ‘other,’ but basic knowledge of concepts such as ethnocentrism, communalism, tribalism, racism, sectarianism, ethnicity, identity, patriotism, nationalism and others with which we explain our world and construct meaning.”\(^4\) From their interviews with students in schools in townships in South Africa, Adam and Moodley points not merely to some worrying tendencies that fuels xenophobia, but also to a reservoir of goodwill that holds promise for shaping a progressive collective moral mindset that can offer an antidote to the strategies of
“othering” that characterises xenophobia. Hence their statement: “If teachers and national leaders acknowledge the problem and show the resolve to tackle it, renewed political literacy and other interventions that go beyond charity can also improve the situation of migrants in South Africa.”

I share the plea for political literacy as a strategy to combat xenophobia put forward by Adam and Moodley, even if the challenges might look insurmountable. What is not strongly emphasised by Adam and Moodley though are the place of phenomena such as “the gift,” “forgiveness,” “love,” “desire,” “sacrifice,” “excess,” “trust,” “reconciliation,” “hospitality,” and “recognition” in this discourse, notions which Jan Olav Henriksen has termed “phenomena of surplus.” In this article I want to ask, therefore, whether programs of political literacy should not also include a greater emphasis on the notion of mutual recognition, given the fact that both racism and xenophobia have at its heart the posture of non-recognition or misrecognition. Or as Charles Taylor puts it in his much-discussed essay on “The Politics of Recognition”:

The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.

The radical challenges of our time, also those resulting from forced political and economic migration, with the concomitant challenges of the quest for just borders, the protections of the rights of refugees, and the need for countering xenophobia, invites further reflection on notions such as recognition, and also indicates the difficulties of appropriating these notions within our public discourse. In this article I consider the notion of “mutual recognition” as exemplified in the later work of Paul Ricoeur against the backdrop of the challenges posed by xenophobia and other social phenomena that operated with harmful strategies of “othering.” Can the hermeneutical and mediating approach of Ricoeur provide an adequate framework as we seek to respond to these radical challenges? In light of this question, this article discusses and ultimately affirms Ricoeur’s view that places mutual recognition between what he calls the prose of justice and the poetics of agape. In addition this article draws attention to the value of symbolic gestures and an ethic of linguistic hospitality to give further texture to the plea for mutual recognition amidst experience of exclusion, conflict and violence.

2. Ricoeur on Mutual Recognition

Paul Ricoeur addresses explicitly the notion of recognition in his last comprehensive book The Course of Recognition. In this book, Ricoeur – whose interest in this theme went back several decades – enters into conversation with various occurrences of the term recognition. Following his very interesting lexicographical survey of the rule-governed polysemy of the term, he engages three philosophical approaches. The first is the Kantian approach, with reference to the way in which the term recognitio is used in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The second approach is that of Bergson, with its focus on the recognition of memories. Thirdly, Ricoeur attends to the Hegelian approach, with its use of the term Anerkennung, dating from Hegel’s Jena
period. It is certainly not possible to do justice to Ricœur’s extended discussion of these episodes in this article. Despite the danger of over-generalising, one can say that, for Ricœur, Kant is concerned with the possibility of objective knowledge. In Bergson’s case the focus is on the age-old question of the relationship between body and soul, paired with the question of the recognition of memories. And with Hegel it is about the struggle for recognition, the demand for recognition. Ricœur provides a nuanced discussion of the possible interconnections as well as differences between Kantian recognitio, Bergsonian recognition, and Hegelian and post-Hegelian Anerkennung.

2.1 Mutual Recognition and the Challenge Posed by Hobbes

In this article I am particularly interested in Ricœur’s discussion of mutual recognition in The Course of Recognition, especially as it builds on Hegel’s understanding of Anerkennung as a response to Hobbes’s challenge that the state of nature is a “war of all against all,” with its passions of competition, mistrust and glory. Following his reading of Hegel, Ricœur also draws extensively on Alex Honneth systematic renewal of the theme of Anerkennung in Honneth’s important book Kampf um Anerkennung. Ricœur, moreover, also raises some critical question regarding the very idea of a struggle for recognition, since the demand for recognition can also be misused for narrow ethnocentric agendas that can fuel violence. Ricœur seems to be aware of the possible problems that can besiege the struggle for recognition, therefore his thesis “that the struggle for recognition would lose itself in the unhappy consciousness if it were not given to humans to be able to accede to an actual, albeit symbolic, experience of mutual recognition, following the model of the reciprocal ceremonial gift.”

For Ricœur the theme of Anerkennung provides a moral rejoinder to the challenge posed by what he calls a “naturalistic interpretation of the sources of the political.” In this regard Ricœur focuses in his reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan not so much on Hobbes’ theory of the state, but on his theory of the “state of nature,” in light of the question whether a foundational moral motive underlies our life together, our “being-with” or “being-amongst” others. Ricœur refers to Hobbes’ description of the state of nature as a “war of all against all,” with its three primitive passions of competition, distrust (or diffidence), and glory, which makes that humans invade for the sake of gain, safety or reputation respectively. The challenge posed by Hobbes can be summarized for Ricœur in the question: Can a political order be founded on a moral concept that is as foundational as the fear of a violent death in the “war of all against all”? Ricœur notes that for Hegel, in his response to the challenge posed by Hobbes, the answer lies in the concept of Anerkennung. The desire to be recognized can confront the fear of a violent death.

Of special concern for the argument of this article is the way in which Ricœur further draws and comments on Axel Honneth’s important work The Struggle for Recognition. According to Ricœur, Honneth systematic renewal of Hegel’s argument entails that the struggle for recognition (as rejoinder to Hobbes) proceeds from moral motives that can challenge the triad of competition, distrust and glory. In his reconstruction of Hegel’s Jena writings (offered as part of a renewal of Hegel), Honneth develops the idea of an interconnected sequence of three models of intersubjective recognition under the scope of – respectively – love, law and social esteem. The first model of recognition, namely love, includes the strong emotional attachments among a small group of people, such as erotic relations, friendship and family ties. This requires a degree of reciprocal recognition. The second model of recognition, namely law, functions on the juridical
plane. The third model of mutual recognition relates to social esteem, and it is on this plane that ‘ethical life’ reveals itself as irreducible to juridical views.\(^{15}\)

2.2 The Struggle for Recognition and States of Peace

In *The Course of Recognition* Ricœur discusses, in conversation with Honneth, what he terms “new subjective capacities” in the struggle for recognition such as self-confidence, respect and self-esteem. Yet Ricœur also registers some uneasiness with some of the claims associated with the idea of a “struggle.” Hence his important question: “When […] does a subject deem him-or herself to be truly recognized?”\(^{16}\) Or to quote his more pointed question and comment:

> Does not the claim for affective, juridical, and social recognition, through its militant, conflictual style, end up as an infinite demand, a kind of ‘bad infinity’? This question has to do not only with the negative feelings that go with a lack of recognition, but also with the acquired abilities, thereby handed over to an insatiable quest. The temptation here is a new form of the ‘unhappy consciousness,’ as either an incurable sense of victimization or the indefatigable postulation of unattainable ideals.\(^{17}\)

One can imagine several responses to this remark by Ricœur. One can ask, for instance, questions such as: Is this not a typical remark by a white, male, heterosexual Protestant European who speaks from a position of privilege? Is not a critique of the idea of struggle in the phrase “struggle for recognition” in itself a misrecognition of the concrete and painful experiences of non-recognition and misrecognition that form part of the lives of millions of people on a daily basis? And: Does this question of Ricœur display the necessary sensitivity towards those people in our global world that experiences on a daily level what Enrique Dussel described as the “underside of Modernity”?\(^{18}\)

One should indeed not underestimate the powers that sustain misrecognition and makes the continual vigilance and struggle against injustice in our global world necessary today. Axel Honneth too has expressed some misgivings with Ricœur’s critique of the term “struggle” in the phrase “the struggle for recognition.” In an interview with Gonçalo Marcelo, Honneth comments:

> When I was reading Ricœur I was surprised that he seemed to take struggle as being something very close to war […] I take struggle as being an enormously productive force in our human life-world. And it takes a thousand of forms […] It slowly changes the way we understand the principles of recognition, the way we understand ourselves, and slowly helps to make our societies normatively better.\(^{19}\)

Honneth also addresses Ricœur’s reference to “bad infinity” in his critical question, and argues for what he calls “productive infinity”:

> I contend that these forms of recognition – be it equality, be it love – have a normative surplus, and inbuilt normative demand, that we will never be able to institutionalize. But this means that we have a permanent demand imposed on ourselves, a demand to makes things better. The systematic point is that Ricœur believes that we should think of recognition as a one-sided act of grace – something like a gift – whereas I think that this is what comes second. I would always put reciprocal forms of recognition first.\(^{20}\)
These remarks by Honneth illuminate a possible difference between him and Ricœur with regard to mutual recognition, a difference that hinges on their respective understanding of reciprocity. It should be noted though that Ricœur’s view is not a naïve view of a struggle-free quest for recognition, but it does critically interrogate a wholly positive reading of the struggle for recognition.

2.3 Symbolic Mutual Recognition Between Justice and Agape

Notwithstanding Honneth’s reservations, the force of the question posed by Ricœur remains: When does a subject deem him- or herself truly recognized. Ricœur’s discussion in light of this question warrants further explication. So let us consider his thesis:

The alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition is to be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order of exchange.21

Ricœur calls attention to the fact that models of these “peaceful experiences” or “states of peace” exist in our culture, known by their Greek names as philia (in the Aristotelian sense), eros (in the Platonic sense) and agape (in the biblical and post-biblical sense). Ricœur is especially interested in the notion of agape where the notion of gift-giving seemingly does not require nor expect a gift in return, thereby challenging the idea of reciprocity associated with circularity.22

The question arises, however, how do we relate agape to justice? Ricœur has of course written much on the notion of justice,23 and on the relation between love and justice.24 And in The Course of Recognition he draws on his earlier work on the relationship between justice and love, this time placing it within the framework of his discussion of mutual recognition. Ricœur does not want to separate agape as a state of peace from justice, albeit that he makes it clear that “it is first in contrast to justice that agape presents in crede25. The credibility for talk about agape, Ricœur notes, lies in the dialectic of love and justice. Agape is in some ways incommensurable with justice in the way that it enters into language. The discourse of agape is that of praise, following the model of Paul’s well-known hymn to love in 1 Corinthians 13.26 The imperative “Love me!” has a poetic usage akin to that of the hymn or the benediction. Or as Ricœur puts it: “agape declares itself; justice makes arguments.”27 Moreover, Ricœur’s discussion of the dialectic between love and justice is not merely interested in indicating difference; rather, the central concern is about their interconnectedness. Hence his crucial question: “Can we build a bridge between the poetics of agape and the prose of justice, between the hymn and the formal rule?”28 For Ricœur this bridge must be built, since both justice and agape resides in the same world of action.

What is of central importance here is Ricœur’s use of the notion of symbolic mutual recognition in his discussion of the gift exchange (inspired by the ground-breaking work of Marcel Mauss). In his development of this idea of symbolic mutual recognition Ricœur further draws on the work of Marcel Hénaff. Ricœur writes:

What is revolutionary about Hénaff’s proposal is that the shifts the emphasis from the relation between giver and recipient to seek the key to our enigma in the very mutuality of the exchange ‘between’ the protagonists, calling the shared operation mutual recognition.
The initial enigma of a force supposed to reside in the object itself is dissipated if we take the thing given and returned as the pledge of and substitute of recognition. It is a pledge of the giver’s commitment through the gift and a substitute for the trust that this gesture will be reciprocated.  

Ricœur adds that one can view this relationship of mutuality as a form of recognition that does not recognise itself, to the extent that it is more interested in the gesture than in the words, thus the relationship symbolizes itself as a gift. This does not mean, however, the end of conflict, and the process of discerning between good and bad reciprocity remains. In this regard the notion of gratitude plays an important role for Ricœur: “A good receiving depends on gratitude which is the soul of the division between good and bad reciprocity.”

In short: Ricœur argues in his discussion of mutual recognition that in the exchange of gifts social partners can experience symbolic but actual recognition. Yet, we should note that for Ricœur “states of peace” through symbolic recognition are temporary truces, often a suspension of the dispute, a mere clearing in the forest of perplexities. Although these “states of peace” function within the horizon of hope, the creative tension between generosity and obligation, between love and justice, remains. Hence his remark:

The struggle for recognition perhaps remains endless. At the very least, the experiences of actual recognition in the exchange of gifts, principally in their festive character, confer on the struggle for recognition the assurance that the motivation which distinguishes form the lust for power and shelters it from the fascination of violence is neither illusionary nor vain.

3. Political Literacy, Gestures, and Linguistic Hospitality

In the Introduction to this article, I referred to the work by Adam and Moodley on xenophobia, citizenship and identity, and their emphasis on political literacy as strategy to combat xenophobia and racism. Political literacy – which functions within the framework of human dignity, equality and social justice – refers for them to the skills of inquiry needed to understand the ways in which power and institutions function in social contexts. In addition it focuses on understanding social conflict (and its causes) and the nature of dissent. Political literacy is about developing the skills to stay informed about current events, with as underlying goal “to engage in transformative actions by shaping democracy through the use of well-formulated, reasoned argument.” Adam and Moodley further challenges what they call “an apolitical consumerism that privatises the public realm while denigrating the public sphere,” since it is unable to grasp the political significance of racism or provide the resources to envision alternatives that could move beyond stigmatisation.

Without going into the detail of their discussion, I want to affirm their plea for political literacy as a strategy to challenge racism and xenophobia, also in post-apartheid South Africa. It is the wager of this article that Ricœur’s work on mutual recognition holds much promise for the continuing reflection on political literacy, also within contexts of social conflict and violence. The strength of Ricœur’s discussion of mutual recognition lies in the fact that he interrogates the
conflictual nature of the struggle for recognition with the telos of peace in mind. In the process phenomena of surplus, such as hospitality and recognition, receive their rightful emphasis.

In the editorial introduction to the essays collected in the book Phenomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hostility and Hospitality, Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch writes: “We belong to nations and cultures embroiled in debates about borders, immigration, and cultural assimilation. Our world calls on us to improve our capacity to respond responsibly: to learn to offer hospitality or to assess hostility.” The persistence of racism, the continuing outbreaks of xenophobia, and the hardening of a xenophobic mindset, poses great challenges to the social fabric of the South African society. The potential for conflict and violence amidst vast poverty, unemployment, and social and economic inequality indeed calls for the improvement of the capacity to respond responsibly, to assess hostility and learn to offer hospitality. The argument of this article is therefore that also in the response to the radical challenges posed in our time by racism and xenophobia we need a “thicker” moral language that does not minimalize the surplus meaning of notions like recognition and hospitality but places it, to use Ricœur’s words, between the prose of justice and the agape of love.

With this in mind, I want to highlight two further aspects emphasised in the work of Ricœur that seems to me pertinent for a discussion on mutual recognition, also in the light of the realities associated with racism and xenophobia. More precisely, the promise of a Ricœurian understanding of mutual recognition for addressing publicly some of the challenges posed by polarization in our globalizing world hinges on these aspects. A first aspect relates to Ricœur’s understanding of symbolic mutual recognition and especially the emphasis on the importance of gestures. In his discussion of forgiveness in the epilogue of his monumental work Memory, History, Forgetting, as well as in some other writings on this topic, Ricœur also alludes to the importance of gestures that cannot be transformed into institutions to assure some form of “normality” amidst conflict, also within the friend-enemy relationship. In his lecture “The Difficulty to Forgive,” Ricœur, for instance, writes: “Then what would the more specific marks of forgiveness be behind the mask of normality? I would lay the stress on certain gestures, such as that of Willy Brandt kneeling at the foot of the Jewish memorial in Poland, or the handshake between Rabin and Arafat, following that between Sadat and Begin.” Symbolic gestures – also those associated with mutual recognition – are of course open to misinterpretation and abuse; yet there potential to be in service of states of peace amidst conflict, polarization and violence should not be underestimated.

In The Course of Recognition, in his discussion of gift exchanges and mutual recognition, Ricœur writes that such gestures “cannot become an institution, yet by bringing to light the limits of the justice of equivalence, and opening space for hope at the horizon of politics on the post-national and international level, they unleash an irradiating and irrigating peace.” The festive character of the gift, as a gesture, is for Ricœur comparable to the hymn or other optative modes of language on the verbal plane. Such gestures require that one is attuned to what Ricœur refers to as the poetics of love.

A second aspect in Ricœur’s later work that holds promise for the further development of an ethics and politics of mutual (symbolic) recognition is the emphasis on what he calls “linguistic hospitality.” This notion feature prominently in some of the essays published in 2004 under the title Sur la traduction (and in English in 2006 under the title On Translation). Towards
the end of the essay “Translation as Challenge and Source of Happiness,” Ricœur, for instance, links the translator’s task to linguistic hospitality:

(J)ust as in the act of telling a story, we can translate differently, without filling the gap between equivalence and total adequacy. Linguistic hospitality, then, where the pleasure of dwelling in the other’s language is balanced by the pleasure of receiving the foreign word at home, in one’s own welcoming house.40

And in the essay on “The Paradigm of Translation” Ricœur writes:

Bringing the reader to the author, bringing the author to the reader, at the risk of serving and of betraying two masters: this is to practice what I call linguistic hospitality. It is this that serves as model for other forms of hospitality that I think resemble it.41

This emphasis on linguistic hospitality can serve as model for other forms of hospitality as well, including for life together with the strangers and foreigners that speak a different language, also a different moral and religious language. We should also take into account in this regard a remark by Ricœur towards the end of this essay:

And then, without the test of the foreign, would we be sensitive to the strangeness of our own language […] would we not in danger of shutting ourselves in the sourness of a monologue, alone with our books? Credit, then to linguistic hospitality.42

Commenting on Ricœur’s philosophy of translation and its emphasis on alterity and our interwoven stories and histories, Richard Kearney even writes in the Introduction to On Translation:

Ricœur goes so far as to suggest that the future ethos of European politics, and eventually of world politics, should be one based on exchange of memories and narratives between different nations, for it is only when we translate our own wounds into the language of strangers and retranslate the wounds of strangers into our own language that healing and reconciliation can take place.43

4. Conclusion: In Defence of the “Between”

In the call for papers to a conference in 2014 in Antwerpen on the theme “Paul Ricœur: Thinker on the Margins?” the point was made that Paul Ricœur is a dialogical and dialectic philosopher that is committed to mediate between conflicting philosophers and streams of thought, hence the frequency of the phrase “between” in the titles, headings, and body of his writings.44 The question is also asked whether this “thinker of the between” can appropriate the radicalness of certain insights, and thus hear more radical voices that resist easy synthesis. This legitimate question becomes pertinent in the current discourse on racism and xenophobia, which is also part of a broader discourse on migration, displacement, and economic inequality and injustice. In this article I indicated the promise of Ricœur’s emphasis that the struggle for recognition should be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition based on symbolic
mediations, emphasising in the process the need to build a bridge *between* juridical and symbolic recognition, *between* the prose of justice and the poetics of love.45

Yet as a counter-argument one can state that Ricœur’s hesitation to appropriate fully the language of “struggle” and a strict emphasis on justice as equivalence, and seeking the “between” (*between* self and other, *between* love and justice), is less helpful for some of the justice quests of our age. Might it not be that these quests require a more radical emphasis on the recognition of one’s own identity or that of a specific group, or a more conflictual and even militant struggle for just retribution, restitution and re-distribution? The force of these questions must be given its due consideration. One could, moreover, also draw upon Ricœur’s own hermeneutic philosophy to emphasise the need for discernment, in order to read the sign of the time, and to act accordingly. This process of discernment, I would like to argue, does not entail a suspension of mediation and hermeneutics, although it does point to a form of decision and action that follows from the struggle to find one’s voice and stance between the prose of justice and the poetics of love. The challenged posed by conflict and violence, also amidst harmful strategies of “othering” such as racism and xenophobia, therefore calls for a passionate defence (and not a suspension) of the Ricœurian emphasis on the “between.”
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1 The article was presented as a paper at the conference "Paul Ricœur: Thinker on the Margins?", held from 18-20 September 2014 in Antwerpen, Belgium.


3 Adam and Moodley, Imagined Liberation, 25.

4 Adam and Moodley, Imagined Liberation, 171.

5 Adam and Moodley, Imagined Liberation, 202.


8 Paul Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005). This book was published a year before Ricœur’s death, with as its original title Parcours de la reconnaissance (Paris: Stock, 2004). This book is based on lectures that Ricœur gave at the Institut für Wissenschaft des Menschen in Vienna, as well as at the Husserl Archives in Freiburg.

9 Charles Reagan writes: 'With respect to the word 'recognition,' I recall discussing its meaning with him as early as 1992. At this point he was fascinated with the word and all of its meanings, but he did not think that there was a coherent philosophical theory of 'recognition' that could put into a rational semantic order the various meanings. We talked about the different meanings as if they were completely different words. At one time we would talk about recognizing a person or an object, other times about the desire to be recognized […] Thus, I was not surprised that he would write a book about 'recognition,' but amazed that he was capable of doing so in his last days.” See Charles Reagan, “Paul Ricœur's The Course of Recognition: His Lost Work and His Last Days," Journal of French Philosophy 16/1 and 2 (2006): 9, 10.


11 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 153.

12 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 162.

13 Cf. Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 164. Ricœur further indicates that the full scope of Hobbes’ challenge includes his observations about the state of nature in light of what he calls natural laws and other laws of nature. Through his nuanced discussion of Hobbes, Ricœur points out that Hobbes’
challenge is a double challenge, namely “that of the naturalistic, and in this sense, anti-ethical premise, and that of a contractual, para-ethical order” (170). For Ricœur, however, the fault line in Hobbes lies in the absence of a dimension of alterity in his thought.

14 For a critical engagement with Ricœur’s reading of Hegel and Honneth, see Robert R. Williams’s review article “Ricœur on Recognition,” in European Journal of Philosophy 16/3 (2008), 467-73.

15 In his discussion of Honneth, Ricœur briefly discusses some paths he encountered in his own reading in which the term social recognition is used in connection with specific forms of conflict. He refers in the process to what Jean-Marc Ferry’s calls orders of recognition, as well as to the work of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot on what they call ‘economies of standing,’ and the discussion on ‘multiculturalism and the politics of recognition’ associated with the work of Charles Taylor. See Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 203-16.

16 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 217.

17 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 218. For a critical reflection on Ricœur’s suggestion that the demands for recognition might be insatiable (or a form of “bad infinity”), see Arto Laitinen’s article “Paul Ricœur’s Surprising Take on Recognition,” in Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies 2/1 (2011), 35-50.


21 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 219.

22 Ricœur refers the notion of “mutuality” to the notion of “reciprocity,” in order “to distinguish it from the kind of autonomous circularity attaching to the logical forms of reciprocity” (Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 219).


25 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 220.


27 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 223. Ricoeur continues: “The judgment operates as a word that separates, setting the victim on the one hand and the guilty person on the other. The judge thus appears bearing not only the scales of justice but a sword. The dispute is settled, but it is merely spared from vengeance, without yet being a state of peace.” (223).

28 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 224.

29 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 236.

30 Cf. Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 236.

31 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 243.

32 Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, 246. For an engagement with Ricoeur’s discussion of recognition that points to the way in which Ricoeur places the struggle for recognition within a horizon of hope, see Marianne Moyaert’s article “The Struggle for Recognition: A Festive Perspective,” in Philosophy & Theology 22 (2010), 105-130. See also Gonçalo Marcelo’s article “Paul Ricoeur and the Utopia of Mutual Recognition,” in Études Ricœur iennes/Ricoeur Studies 2/1 (2011), 110-33.

33 Adam and Moodley draws in this regard on work of the British philosopher Bernard Crick, and subsequently that of Anne Douglas. See Adam and Moodley, Imagined Liberation, 176 ff.

34 Moodley and Adam, Imagined Liberation, 176.

35 Moodley and Adam, Imagined Liberation, 179.


37 Cf. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 477.

transitional and post-transitional South African context gestures of reconciliation between former enemies often received media attention and, while one can be critical of misuses in this regard, one should note their positive role as well in fostering an ethos of reconciliation. A well-known example in this regard is Nelson Mandela’s gesture – amidst racial polarisation – to wear a number 6 Springbok rugby jersey (similar to that of the captain) when he appeared on the field during the final of the 1995 Rugby World Cup. For a reflection on this gesture, see Robin Petersen, “The Politics of Grace and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in To Remember and to Heal: Theological and Psychological Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation, eds. H. Russel Botman and Robin Petersen, (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1996), 57-64.

39 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, 245.


41 Ricœur, On Translation, 23.

42 Ricœur, On Translation, 29.

43 Ricœur, On Translation, xx. See also Richard Kearney’s article “Paul Ricœur and the Hermeneutics of Translation,” in Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007), 147-59.


45 The concluding paradigm of Ricœur’s essay “Love and Justice” is telling in this regard: “It is the task of both philosophy and theology to discern [...] the secret discordance between the logic of superabundance and the logic of equivalence. It is also their task to say that it is only in the moral judgment mad within some particular situation that this unstable equilibrium can be assured and protected [...] I would even say that the tenacious incorporation, step by step, of a supplementary degree of compassion and generosity in all of our codes – including our penal codes and our codes of social justice – constitutes a perfectly reasonable task, however difficult and interminable it may be.” See Ricœur, Figuring the Sacred, 329.