

Judgment, Imagination and the Search for Justice

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Abstract:

The multiplicity of demands and claims in ultra-pluralistic societies complicates the search for justice. Furthermore, the normative force of competing ideals gives rise to an aporia at the heart of the idea of justice's federating force. In this article, I argue that exemplary moral and political acts evince these ideals by reason of their fittingness with respect to the demands of the situations to which they respond. As such, these acts lay claim to their normative value by exemplifying the "rule" that each act summons. Drawing upon aesthetic experience's lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics, I show how imagination is operative in practical judgments (*phronesis*). Accordingly, I relate the search for justice to an eschatology of non-violence, which for Paul Ricœur takes the place of the critique of ideology in its opposition to an ontology of lingual understanding.

Keywords: Judgment, Imagination, Justice, Eschatology of Non-Violence.

Résumé:

Dans les sociétés ultrapluralistes, la multiplicité des demandes et des revendications complique la recherche de justice. De plus, la force normative d'idéaux concurrents engendre une aporie au cœur même de l'idée d'une force fédérative de la justice. Dans cet article, je défends l'idée selon laquelle les actes moraux et politiques exemplaires manifestent ces idéaux dans la mesure où ils correspondent étroitement aux demandes des situations auxquelles ils répondent. En ce sens, ces actes revendiquent leurs valeurs normatives en exemplifiant la "règle" que chaque acte requiert. En faisant référence à la transposition latérale de l'expérience esthétique sur les plans éthique et politique, je montre comment l'imagination est opérante dans les jugements pratiques (*phronesis*); et, dans cette perspective, je rattache la recherche de la justice à une eschatologie de la non-violence, qui, pour Paul Ricœur, prend la place de la critique de l'idéologie dans son opposition à une ontologie de la compréhension.

Mots-clés : Jugement, imagination, justice, eschatologie de la non-violence.

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Paul Ricœur's critique of social emancipatory projects that claim to be absolutely radical opens the way to a broader consideration of the challenges that beset the search for justice.¹ Since no one is capable of developing a critical consciousness that could master social conditions and circumstances in which the critic is also caught up, the dream of achieving a totalizing reflection that could found normative ideals is a theoretical and practical impossibility. No critic can distance herself completely from the social pathologies that the liberatory project she espouses aims to redress. Similarly, no social theory can attain a non-ideological status according to its own criteria. Rather, every theory that aims at explaining systems and relations is a theory that is caught in the network of motivations that animates the views, understandings and outlooks of the group to which the social theorist belongs. Values, convictions and beliefs rooted in the symbolic systems through which we express our positions in society, and by means of which we articulate our experiences and our aspirations, inhere in the ways that we inscribe our lives in the web of social and political life. No critical social science, therefore, is value neutral. On the contrary, every emancipatory project draws support from the ideals, normative ambitions, or utopian objectives it espouses and to which it is consequently tied.

Values, convictions and beliefs rooted in different ideological systems invariably conflict. These conflicts immediately complicate the search for normative requirements of justice. How, for example, could we be sure that a system of justice that some regard to be right and fair is not anathematic to others in view of the multiple sources of the claims made by different groups? In our ultra-pluralistic world, the claim to the right to live in accordance with one's own heritage and ideals engenders an aporia at the heart of the idea of justice. This aporia, I will say, wrests the idea of justice's federating force from the hegemony of one society or one group of nations. At the same time, this aporia calls into question the possibility of establishing norms or ideas that would fulfill the requirement of justice independently of the claims and convictions that fuel the demand for an end to all forms of personal, social, political and institutional violence. The impossibility of attaining a neutral theoretical standpoint serves as a strategic guide in my initial analysis of Ricœur's assessment of the conceptual weakness found in emancipatory social projects. In turn, this line of inquiry leads me to conclude that when Ricœur makes a wager that sets an eschatology of non-violence in place of the critique of ideology, he sets the stage for relating the imagination's productive power to exemplary moral and political acts.

These political and moral acts, I will argue, provide practical models that contribute to shaping the ideals that inform our sense of justice. By framing my analysis of the imagination's operative role in reforming social and political life in terms of a critique of how the social sciences are entangled in the ideological conditions they explain and denounce, I will highlight how individual moral and political acts respond to the demands of the situations calling for them. Through attesting to their fittingness with respect to the problem or crisis to which they reply,

these acts bear out the connection between judgments in situation and imagination's power of invention. Hence I argue that exemplary acts not only provide models that we could follow but they also fuel our hopes and expectations. To the degree that such expectations play a critical part in exposing the adverse effects of systemic abuses of power and institutional forms of violence, exemplary moral and political acts offer a practical alternative to social emancipatory projects that purport to be absolutely radical.² My analyses of, and reflections on, the way that exemplary acts figure in the search for justice focus on this practical alternative. If by turning to aesthetic experience I emphasize the kinship between music, literature, and art's power to refashion the real from within and singular acts, it is to highlight the similarities between them without losing sight of the difference between the claim a work makes and moral and political injunctions. As I will explain, the injunction proceeding from an exemplary act is the spring of a normative demand that seeks its universality through providing a model that we, and others, could emulate. Consequently, this normative demand rests on the singular case of an individual act that we – but not necessarily others – regard as a fitting example.

Aesthetic Experience and Practical Judgment

The impossibility of launching a critique from an absolutely radical standpoint underscores the significance of the wager that Ricœur makes when he sets an eschatology of non-violence in the place occupied by the critique of ideology in opposition to an "ontology of lingual understanding."³ An ontology of lingual understanding, such as the one Hans-Georg Gadamer sets out in *Truth and Method*, privileges the experience of belonging that precedes (phenomenologically speaking) any critical explanation of how social, economic, political and religious forces disfigure interactions between individuals and social groups.⁴ In contrast, ideology critique aims at unmasking distortions that remain hidden within the dialogical situation favored by Gadamer. By replacing the critique of ideology, an eschatology of non-violence reserves a place for imagination in combatting systemic injustices and the violence that deforms relations among human beings. For Ricœur, an eschatology of non-violence therefore "forms the ultimate philosophical horizon of a critique of ideology."⁵ To the degree that the search for justice animates the practical task of making freedom a historical reality, this philosophical horizon sets in relief the imagination's operative role in fulfilling this task.

In a way, the wager Ricœur makes by tying the problem of freedom's actualization and its corollary, the fulfillment of the demand for justice, to the critique of ideology's philosophical horizon is already at work when he places ideology and utopia in the same motivational framework. Within this framework, the social and cultural imagination appears as the mediating term between two dialectically related poles. Ideology and utopia's non-congruence with reality consequently opens the space for the imagination's integrative as well as its dissimulating role. By asking how a social interest can be expressed in "a thought, an image, or a concept of life,"⁶ Ricœur underlines how ideology functions at the basic level of social reality's symbolic mediation to structure the interpretive systems in which action (*praxis*) and its reasons, objects, and aims are intersubjectively meaningful. The regressive analysis he undertakes uncovers the most primitive function of ideology onto which the dissimulating function inherited from Marx is grafted. Drawing on Max Weber's notions of order (*Ordnung*) and domination (*Herrschaft*), Ricœur attributes the ideological phenomenon's legitimating function to the discrepancy between a

ruling authority's claim to legitimacy and the belief in a ruling authority's legitimacy on the part of those subject to its rule. The system of legitimation is accordingly also a form of motivation in which the opacity of the "relationship between an interest and its expression in ideas"⁷ conceals the process through which the ideas linked to particular interests appear as universally valid.

Situated within the same framework, ideology and utopia's non-congruence with the real is indicative of the social and cultural imagination's constitutive as well as its bewitching character. Imagination is constitutive: the network of mediations comprising a cultural system rests on the symbolism that is rooted in a culture's mythopoetic core, and imaginative alternatives augment the practical field of our everyday experiences. At the same time, imagination is also bewitching: the fascination with dreams of fulfilled desires loses its anchorages in the practical order of everyday life, and dissimulating images mask the systemic deformation of relations among human beings. Utopia's corollary functions correspond to the ideological phenomenon's integrative, legitimating and dissimulating functions. Fictive explorations of possible ways of thinking, feeling, and conducting our lives contest and subvert congealed outlooks, habits and practices, while experimenting with alternative ways of sharing power challenges existing systems of rule. In a way similar to ideologically dissimulating representations, fanciful flights from reality are a pathological form of escape.

The idea that imagination is critical to reforming or revolutionizing *praxis* and hence of making freedom a reality draws support from the way that literary texts, music and art refashion our ways of thinking, feeling and acting. The way that a literary fiction, an artwork, or a musical composition reworks reality from within not only provides a point of access to account for the imagination's operative power but the work's renewal of the real in accordance with the world projected by it also bears out how the distance taken from the practical field of our everyday experiences is the condition of the work's productive force. The greater the retreat from literal representations of the world, the "more intense the return back on the real, as coming from a greater distance, as if our experience were visited from infinitely further away than itself."⁸ This paradox is critically decisive. Since a work has no prior referent in the existing order of reality that it could be said to copy, the world that the work unfolds is one that the artist, composer or author invents. This power of invention attests to the imagination's creative impetus. Ricœur accordingly identifies the work's capacity to come bursting into the midst of our world (apart from which the work would be completely innocuous) with its capacity to refashion various aspects and dimensions of our everyday experiences. Consequently, the work's mimetic refiguration of the real "does not consist in reproducing reality but in restructuring the world of the reader [...] [by] penetrating the world of everyday experience in order to rework it from the inside."⁹ In the end, the truth of the work is inseparable from the capacity the work has to augment the field of our experiences through opening new paths into the heart of our ways of thinking, feeling and acting.

A work's power to refashion the real from within has a counterpart in how exemplary moral and political acts evince their innovative and even revolutionary potential. Like works that project possible worlds that we could make our own, acts and lives that we admire model modes of conduct, ways of living, and convictions that commend themselves to us. More critically still, we regard certain moral and political acts to be exemplary because we apprehend the sense of their rightness with respect to the demands of the situation to which each replies. This sense of

rightness has a counterpart in the way that a work of art, a literary text or a musical composition resolves a question, problem or crisis. Analogously, the act singularly attests to its fittingness by evincing the appropriate response to the problem or crisis to which the act answers. We can readily call to mind the names of those whose acts and lives offer many examples of courage, goodness and devotion to others that invite us to follow after them: Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, Kailash Satyarthi, Malala Yousafzai, the Dalai Lama, and Mother Teresa, to mention a few. Through apprehending the “relation of agreement between the moral act and the situation [calling for it], there is an effect of being drawn to follow.”¹⁰ Through apprehending this relation of agreement – which Ricœur points out is equivalent to the work of art’s communicability – we grasp the “rule” that the act or life summons.

Identifying this “rule” with the fittingness of the act constitutes a first step to understanding the role of imagination in redressing social and political injustices. This operative role is nowhere more apparent than in the way that the act summons the “rule” it exemplifies in response to the demand of the situation that calls for it. St. Francis of Assisi’s commitment to serve the needs of materially disenfranchised people stands as a riposte to the lust for power and worldly wealth. The injunction St. Francis extends to his followers passes to us by way of this exemplary act.¹¹ The conjunction of the work’s singularity – by which Ricœur means its unique, irreplaceable quality and character – and the work’s communicability is instructive in this regard. On the one hand, the “thought” or “idea” expressed by a work springs from the way the artist, author or composer takes up the challenge, question or problem addressed by the work. In contrast to the artist’s lived experience, which is closed in upon itself and hence is incommunicable, the work iconically augments this experience in response to a question, problem or crisis. Only this iconic augmentation as augmentation, Ricœur stresses, is communicable. Consequently, the work’s success depends in part on the spectator, reader or listener’s ability to grasp the “idea” expressed by the work through the manner in which various elements cohere. Here, imagination is at work both in the artist’s power of invention and in the spectator, reader or listener’s apprehension of the “thought” to which the work gives voice, thus countermanding the Romantic conceit that genius in understanding corresponds to the genius of artistic creation.¹²

Grasping the fit of a work “in a prereflexive, immediate manner”¹³ evinces the imagination’s efficacy *vis-à-vis* the kind of judgment made by the reader, listener or spectator. According to Ricœur, Kant differentiated between aesthetic judgment and determinative judgment by allowing for a “split within the idea of subsumption.”¹⁴ In aesthetic judgment, the act by which a case is placed under a rule is reversed. Here “one ‘seeks’ the appropriate rule under which to place the singular experience”¹⁵ occasioned by the individual work. This judgment is “‘merely’ reflective because the transcendental subject does not determine any universally valid objectivity, but instead only takes into account the procedure the mind follows in the operation of subsumption, proceeding in a way from below to above.”¹⁶ Accordingly, the reader, spectator or listener’s apprehension of the sense of a work’s rightness in grasping the work’s heterogeneous elements as they cohere corresponds on the side of aesthetic reception to the way the work exemplifies the “rule” that the work expresses by giving this “rule” a figure and a body.

Music is a case in point. The succession of tones, harmonies, and timbral combinations of various instruments not only shapes the contours of a musical passage as it unfolds, but it also gives voice to feelings and moods. The feelings or moods evoked by the passage are therefore ones that the passage possesses. The fit of the work is an effect of the operation through which the listener draws together the work's various constitutive components. This fit thus evinces the "rule" – or in this case, the feeling, ethos or mood crystallized by the succession of distinctive combinations of tones, timbral characteristics, harmonic implications and the like. Furthermore, as I just indicated, the listener apprehends the "rule" expressed by the work by schematizing it. The absence of the objective universality of determinant judgments in aesthetic judgments places the accent on the kinship between reflecting judgment – to which Ricœur reminds us aesthetic experience belongs – and Kant's concept of productive imagination "as schematizing a synthetic operation."¹⁷ Thus we could say that the work communicates the "rule" to which the work singularly attests by exemplifying it.

As I said above, the "rule" expressed by a work is a singular response to a question, problem, conundrum or crisis.¹⁸ As such, the work's exemplification of this "rule" provides a strong indication of the imagination's indispensable place in practical judgments. Like works, exemplary acts respond to the demands of a situation in singular ways. At the same time, the force of the claims emanating from a work's projection of its fictive world and the normative demands issuing from exemplary moral and political acts cannot be reduced to a common register. Tying these normative demands to singular moral and political acts poses a difficulty that is analogous to the central paradox of aesthetic experience and that presages the aporia that, from the outset, I situated at the heart of the idea of justice. Despite the differences between aesthetic judgment and practical judgment, the experience afforded by a work continues to have a heuristic value beyond the work's own power to explore alternative ways of inhering in the world. I will therefore follow this course of reflections on aesthetic experience further before turning to the question of the act's exemplary value.

The work's communicability and its singularity are the two sides of the paradox that Ricœur locates at the heart of aesthetic experience. On the one hand, each work makes a claim to truth by virtue of the way it breaks open a path by renewing reality in accordance with the world the work projects. Like every proposal of meaning, the work's projection of ways of living, feeling and acting that one could make one's own rises to the level of such a claim to truth.¹⁹ On the other hand, the universality of this claim to truth rests on the possibility that the experience occasioned by the work is in principle communicable to everyone. The work is accordingly "like a trail of fire issuing from itself,"²⁰ reaching beyond each individual reader, listener or spectator to all humanity. The paradox that Ricœur tells us must probably be maintained lays bare the enigma of singularity and universality that ensues. How, we could therefore ask, does following "the requirements of singularity to the end [...] give the best chance of the greatest universality"²¹ in view of the fact that the experience occasioned by an individual work in each case involves a unique reader, listener or spectator?

Ricœur's subsequent suggestion that the work of art is "a model for thinking the notion of testimony"²² provides a key. If one is serious about aesthetic experience's transposition onto the domains of ethics and politics, "one would have to take into account the two main aspects of the work: its singularity and its communicability, with the particular form of universality that the

latter implies.”²³ Not only does the work’s exemplarity and communicability have a counterpart in “the realm of extreme moral choices.”²⁴ The analogy between the claims individual works make and the injunctions issuing from exemplary moral acts also rests on the way these claims and injunctions arise in answer to questions, problems and crises to which works and acts reply. The difference between such claims and injunctions guards against relegating these injunctions’ normative force to the regions of aesthetic experience, as I pointed out above. Through preserving this difference, aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the domains of ethics and politics not only lays bare how imagination is at work in summoning the “rule” evinced by the act; the communicability of the work’s singular solution to the problem for which the work is the answer also provides further insights into the force of the injunctions issuing from exemplary acts.

Identifying the “rule” evinced by the act with the act’s fittingness *vis-à-vis* the demands of the situation calling for it underscores how this act’s practical character depends upon the capacity we have for coming up with novel solutions for difficult problems. As we know, the exercise of good judgment in any given situation attests to our ability to respond to a problem or crisis in such a way that we arrive at the best – or in some cases the least objectionable – response. Sometimes such practical judgments are less a matter of choosing “between good and evil, between black and white, than [of deciding] between gray and gray, or, in the highly tragic case, between bad and worse.”²⁵ Ricœur reminds us that the virtue Aristotle placed under the name *phronesis* consists in this capacity for judging wisely.²⁶ In many instances, there is no rule to which we could appeal in order to determine the right course of action. In such cases, when we find ourselves in situations where there are no prescriptive guidelines or rules to follow, we are called upon to respond creatively in order to achieve the “right” result or at least to avoid the greater harm.

Perhaps it should not surprise us that social agents and historical actors exercise reason in accordance with this capacity for discovering or inventing a fitting response. The preceding reflections on aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the plane of ethics and politics prepared us for this conclusion. That this exercise of reason is bound up with the fit of the response with the problem or crisis to which the act replies highlights once again the imagination’s operative role. For this fit is the result of the agent’s capacity to apprehend the problem or crisis and to respond to it in an appropriate way. *Phronesis* is thus akin to an act of genius in that the example of goodness, generosity, courage, compassion, or devotion modeled by a moral act is one that is uniquely suited to the situation. Hence, like a work of art, the moral and political act that we esteem exemplifies the “rule” to which the act singularly attests.

The Wager of Imagination and an Eschatology of Non-Violence

Our capacity to respond to the exigencies and demands of situations in which we find ourselves and in which we are invariably caught up throws a bridge across the gap that seems to separate practical reason from the imagination’s productive force. And yet as I just indicated, practical judgments entail an exercise of reason insofar as social actors and historical agents invent or discover a solution to the problem at hand. Moreover, these solutions affect the course of the world. Or, to borrow from Ricœur’s language when he speaks of metaphor’s redescription of reality or the world’s mimetic refiguration by a work of art, the initiative taken by the agent

when she responds to a problem, crisis or difficult situation opens new paths into the heart of the real by breaking with established modes of conduct and habits of thought. Like works of art that renew the real in accordance with the worlds they unfold, exemplary acts proffer models that we can emulate. More crucially still, the act's fittingness is the demonstration and proof of its reasonable character. This fit is a function of the solution the agent comes up with, as I previously stated. Consequently, the act's reasonableness with respect to its appropriateness is inseparable from – and is in a sense reliant upon – the imagination's operative power.

Aesthetic experience's lateral transposition onto the plane of ethics and politics authorizes us to go even further in tying practical wisdom to the power of imagination. Practical judgments, I said earlier, produce the "rule" exemplified by the agent's response to the demands of the situation in which she finds herself. Like the artist whose extraordinary powers of invention we sometimes attribute to her genius, the agent's "capacity to respond in a singular manner to the singular nature of the question"²⁷ lies at the root of the initiative she takes. The act's exemplary value, however, provides no guarantee that either the judgment she makes or the initiative she undertakes will prove to be the right ones. Hence this initiative, this judgment – and more crucially still, the injunction to which the act singularly gives voice – constitute a kind of wager.

This wager clearly sets the prospective view of social actors against the historical spectator's retrospective view. The agent's power to intervene in the course of the world bears out her capacity to respond to the demands of a situation by taking the initiative to set a plan or a project in motion. In seeking a passageway from political judgment's retrospective dimension to its prospective one, Ricœur emphasizes that the "acknowledged exemplarity of works of art, like that of great events, would not constitute a pledge of hope if exemplarity did not serve as [...] a proof, for hope."²⁸ At the same time, these signs of goodness, greatness, beauty and their superabundance of meaning draw upon – and in a way spring from – the imagination's poetic potency.²⁹ The fittingness of the act is a testament to this superabundance of meaning and to the point of futurity for which the singular act stands surety as promise and pledge. As such, the act and the injunction flowing from it lay claim to their universality by virtue of the act's exemplary value.

The wager linking the power of imagination to these signs of hope runs deep. By accentuating the role played by imagination in response to a problem or crisis, this wager creates a bridge between exemplary acts and the practical aim of the idea of justice. This aim redoubles the philosophical horizon that I previously indicated outlines the relation between ideology critique and an eschatology of non-violence. Consequently, Ricœur's assessment of social emancipatory projects that claim to be absolutely radical, and which I said then points to the imagination's productive function in reforming our social and political practices, anticipates the conjunction of an eschatology of non-violence with the federating force of the idea of justice. The act that answers a crisis, problem or dilemma in an exemplary way gives body to our sense of fairness, equitability, respect, and regard for those who have been deprived or dispossessed of material and spiritual goods. Moreover, this act is a testament to the way imagination figures in practical judgments. The fit of the act with the demands of the situation calling for it is thus proof of the act's reasonable – that is, its prudential – character. Only this proof, tied as it is to the act's exemplary value, safeguards against succumbing to the temptation of a totalizing reflection that

dares to elevate itself to the level of the absolute. Hence the depth and reach of the wager that sets an eschatology of non-violence against the teleological presumptions of both a Hegelian philosophy of history and of absolutely radical emancipatory projects: as handholds for hope, exemplary acts not only forge new paths but as models we can follow they also attest that the conviction that we can intervene individually and collectively to alter the world's historical course in accordance with our ideas of the just and the reasonable is not in vain.

Hannah Arendt's effort to free political judgment from teleological presumptions rests on this conviction. Rather than tie political judgment to teleological judgment through a philosophy of history, Arendt develops her concept of political judgment in relation to the judgment of taste. According to Ricœur, Arendt's own wager looms large, since the "ties between the philosophy of history and the teleological judgment are more immediately perceptible in Kant's work, if only because Kant did write out his philosophy of history."³⁰ In contrast, the political philosophy that Arendt attributes to Kant "is in large part a reconstruction, even if it remains inchoate, even virtual."³¹ The priority Kant gives aesthetic judgment lends some measure of support to Arendt's endeavor. Ricœur reminds us that aesthetic judgment's priority over teleological judgment "results from the fact that the natural order thought in terms of the idea of finality itself has an *aesthetic* dimension in virtue of its very relation to the subject and not to the object."³² Since order pleases us insofar as it affects us, "aesthetic judgment is called for by teleological judgment as the first component of reflective judgment."³³ Notwithstanding, the fittingness of the act evinces a power at work in a region different from the one in which Kant first identified the power of judgments of taste.

Arendt's concern to recover the political from a tradition of thought that, for her, had become too closely wedded to a teleological conception of history aims at opening a space for exercising our capacity to act. Her critique of Marx's conversion of the Hegelian dialectic into the law governing history's revolutionary advance serves as a reminder of the conflict between the philosophical presumption she identifies with the *vita contemplativa's* flight from the realm of action and the force the present has as the time of the initiatives we take. Arendt's venture consequently frees political judgment from the grip of a tradition that she argues subordinated the activity of thinking to means-ends calculations. According to her, the victory in the modern age of the *animal laborans* brought the tradition of political thought that began with the philosopher's contempt for the *vita activa* to a close.³⁴ Contrariwise, judgment for Arendt figures prominently among our capacities as political beings. The requirement to judge and to think for oneself, we might therefore say, is inscribed in the condition of plurality that makes speaking and acting with and among others preeminent political activities.

Similar to Arendt's effort to free political judgment from the grip of teleological philosophies of history, Ricœur's riposte to the critique of ideology's emancipatory ambitions involves an analogous if more far-reaching wager. This wager not only sets itself against the performative contradiction of a critique that loses itself in a negative dialectic such as Theodor Adorno's, which Ricœur points out "knows perfectly well how to recognize evil."³⁵ It also resists the temptation of a principle of hope such as the one Ernst Bloch advances, which projects itself "into a utopia with no historical handholds."³⁶ Adorno's relentlessly negative dialectical critique and Bloch's Marxist-millennialist project attest negatively to the practical requirement of preserving the tension between the space of our experiences and the horizon of our

expectations.³⁷ This practical requirement is the pragmatic correlate of every critical emancipatory project. In a way, the imagination's power to shatter ideologically congealed systems and habits of thought through renewing the real from within animates this practical requirement. Imagination's power is thus the spring of a hope that resists the allure of a totalizing reflection by embracing the task of actualizing freedom in opposition to the presumption of rising above history in order to master it.

Like the logic of hope, such an eschatology draws its force from as yet unfulfilled demands. The state of peace that Kant's essays "What is Enlightenment" and "Perpetual Peace" hold out, and the symbolic exchanges of gifts that Ricœur tells us are instances of mutual recognition, would seem to be promissory signs outlining the contours of this eschatology's liberatory aims.³⁸ These signs, however, would be nothing more than speculative phantasms if, like works that speak to us and acts that we admire, they did not exemplify a way of living and a manner of being that holds out the prospect of a richer, better and fuller life. It is perhaps worth recalling that for Ricœur, a philosophy of the will that would set out a theory of freedom's actualization "within the historical reality of humankind"³⁹ would be tasked with the question as to what the process of this actualization of freedom would be. The passion for the possible, he reminds us, "is the answer of hope to all Nietzschean love of destiny, to all worship of fate, to all *amor fati*."⁴⁰ Exemplary works and acts ignite this passion through fueling as yet unfilled expectations, claims and aspirations. These as yet unfulfilled expectations, claims and aspirations inhere in our most genuine experiences of action. The passion for the possible is thus the ground and support of the wager that breaks the hold of every emancipatory social project's claim to be radically absolute. To be sure, the place this wager has in Ricœur's philosophical anthropology is based on a confidence in, and conviction regarding, our capacities to judge well in accordance with the maxim that every expectation concerning our rights, freedoms and liberties must be a hope for humanity as a whole: to intervene productively in the course of things and to follow after the models set by exemplary works and acts. Hence the question to which I will now turn: If every hope must be an expectation for humanity as a whole, what normative force do injunctions issuing from singular acts have in the light of the idea of justice's federating force?

Justice and Imagination

In a way, this question exceeds the scope of the preceding reflections. By focusing on aesthetic experience's transposition onto the domains of ethics and politics, the foregoing considerations of the work of art's singularity, exemplarity and communicability highlighted the imagination's operative role in practical judgments that answer to the demands of individual situations. The fittingness of the response, I maintained, is the demonstration and proof of the reasonableness of an act that we regard as the suitable rejoinder to a problem or crisis. The act as such attests to its reasonable character by virtue of its exemplary value. As a model we could imitate in the sense of emulating it, the act not only renews the real from within; the destiny of the injunction issuing from the act also takes root in the singular judgment from which the agent's initial decision to act springs.

This last remark outlines the aporia engendered when injunctions springing from individual acts lay claim to their universality by reason of their exemplary value. Aesthetic

experience's lateral transposition onto the ethical and political planes clearly brings to the fore the place that the idea of the individual act's appropriateness has in these respective spheres or domains. At the same time, the stress I laid on the act's practical character is critically decisive in staving off any possibility of aestheticizing the demand for an end to violence and to the systemic social, political and economic injustices that deform relations among human beings. The beauty of moral acts and lives that commend themselves to us is one where the fittingness of the act or life provides examples of the goodness, generosity or devotion to others that, in contrast to the contagion of evil, "gathers [being] together."⁴¹ Ricœur's refusal to assign evil an ontological status (and to refuse the temptation of a theodicy) might be attributed to his conviction regarding the superabundance of meaning, the "not yet" and the "much more" that he maintains inheres in the logic of hope. This logic, I mentioned, is nourished by as yet unfulfilled aspirations and demands. Hence together with an eschatology of non-violence, it stands as a riposte both to the temptation of thought to elevate itself to the level of the absolute through "grasping history as the totalization of time in the eternal present"⁴² and to emancipatory projects for which a totalizing reflection remains an unstated supposition. This riposte, however, far from dissolves the aporia that springs from the claims to universality that are manifest in individual exemplary acts. On the contrary, an eschatology of non-violence fueled by the logic of hope redoubles this aporia by folding the question of the universality of individual singular claims stemming from singular exemplary acts into that of the destiny of a common humanity.

Consequently, one of the difficulties of drawing upon aesthetic experience as a model for inserting imagination's operative role into the demand for justice originates with this demand's normative requirements. Like expectations regarding rights, freedoms and liberties that Ricœur insists must be a hope for humanity as a whole, the demand for justice has a universal ambition in principle and in practice. We cannot ignore the possibility that, like the idea of a universal history that masks the hegemony of one society or one group of nations, one group's conception of justice might differ from – and even pose a threat to – that of others. Ricœur cautions that "it is not even certain that freedom in the sense of the establishment of a civil society and of a state of law is the sole hope or even the major expectation of a great part of humanity."⁴³ We have to admit that in pluralistic societies, the sources of our values are multiple and conflicted.⁴⁴ Ricœur accordingly stresses that the "ethical basis of a community is limited to values about which there is a consensus and leaves outside of any examination the justification, motivations, and deep sources of the very values that are the object of consensus."⁴⁵ Claims to the right to be different amply attest to the multiple foundations of the values, convictions and beliefs nourishing a group's identity and aspirations. To the extent that these claims fuel different groups' struggles for recognition, they are also the springs of competing and conflicting demands.

It seems, however, that above all else the demand for justice ought to prevent the claim to the right to be different from taking refuge in violence. Aesthetic experience's transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics thus complicates the problem that the multiple sources of values engender while pointing to a possible way out. The problem – to restate it briefly – is that what counts as appropriate or fitting based on one group's heritages, experiences and expectations may not be recognized, or credited in the same way, by others. Consequently, what some regard as right, reasonable or just may be anathematic for others. The force of injunctions issuing from exemplary moral acts here redoubles the limits or constraints I have insisted on placing on a work's claim to truth in opposition to these injunctions' normative value. Even Ricœur's

hermeneutics of testimony, which as testimony to the absolute is subject to a criteriology of the divine, reserves a place for this difficulty.⁴⁶ The model of aesthetic experience provides a way out not by subordinating normative demands and expectations to the rules of a weak universality based on established practices and habits but by highlighting these demands and expectations' prospective dimension. For akin to the work of art's renewal of the real in accordance with the world it projects, the exemplary moral act lays claim to its universality through seeking its normativity in answer to practical reason's task.

To the extent that the task of practical reason takes shape against the backdrop of the demand for justice, the prospective dimension of such a claim to universality opens the door to a much vaster field of inquiry into the connections between justice, ethics and politics in our modern ultra-pluralistic – some might say postmodern – world. That the injunction issuing from the act originates with the individual act's response to the demands of a historically contingent situation highlights the paradox at work. I readily admit that the normative value of claims rooted in different cultural systems calls for a further consideration of the virtue of justice that Ricœur identifies with the need to take varying abilities to compromise into account.⁴⁷ The limits of our ability to tolerate differences – the corollary of the multiple sources of values – here becomes the test of this virtue. Why then, we might be tempted to ask, should we prefer an eschatology of non-violence where the rule of justice prevails over a war of annihilation, which Arendt rightly insists destroys the condition of plurality that is the *conditio per quam* of all political life? The demand for respect for all here appears as the guardian of this condition, so that plurality itself figures in the virtue of justice. I therefore wonder whether some additional thought devoted to the role of imagination in judgments in situation might not shed some further light, for example, on the State's function of reconciling the technical-economic order of its rational operations with the customs and mores stemming from the multiple traditions, heritages and histories that fuel different groups' aspirations through giving rise to what counts as reasonable, fair and just.⁴⁸

The question that comes to the fore in the face of the multiple values of modern, ultra-pluralistic societies is undoubtedly part of this vaster field of inquiry concerning the idea of justice. For the fact that convictions and beliefs regarding the good and the just in our ultra-pluralistic societies are themselves multiple and conflicted prepares the ground for the tragic dimension of action. This tragic dimension, which arises when the protagonist finds herself in the difficult situation of having to choose between irreconcilably conflicting demands, calls for practical wisdom. Ricœur alerts us to the way that a "wholly formal concept of moral obligation, reduced to the test of universalization of a maxim"⁴⁹ excludes this tragic dimension of action from its procedural processes. Moreover this tragic dimension, he reminds us, "is no less overlooked in an ethics of discussion that also places itself in a perspective where convictions are reduced to conventions the protagonists in the discussion are assumed to have surpassed in assuming what is called a post-conventional posture."⁵⁰ By eliminating all references to the good life, such formalisms elude situations of conflict tied to different evaluations of the good and the just. However, once "situated along the trajectory of the wish for a good life,"⁵¹ these evaluations are at once also the source and potential spring of conflicts and instances of violence.

Conflicts rooted in the multiplicity of evaluative systems underscore the difficulties and obstacles that beleaguer the search for justice both in ultra-pluralist societies and in current geo-

political struggles. Earlier I argued that the imagination's operative role in reforming or revolutionizing *praxis* redresses the weakness of emancipatory social projects that become caught up in a totalizing reflection. An eschatology of non-violence, I accordingly indicated, vests the demand for justice with its practical task. However, the task of making freedom a reality for everyone cannot always be easily reconciled with the different demands, hopes and aspirations that individuals, groups, communities and nations hold out. Different heritages, convictions and beliefs fuel as yet unfulfilled aspirations that are the springs of the initiatives we and others take. Injustices endured and humiliations suffered ignite quests for an equitable share in social goods, liberties and opportunities enjoyed by others. Unfulfilled demands for rights, recognition and respect inhere in our most genuine experiences of action. Fueled by such demands, the passion for the possible becomes the ground and support of a wager we all make when, through intending to intervene in the course of the world's affairs, we take it upon ourselves to act in accordance with our considered convictions and beliefs. But others also have their convictions and beliefs, aspirations and hopes, expectations and demands. Hence like us, others lay claim to their destinies in accordance with their own heritages, histories, values and traditions.

The plurality of values from which competing and conflicting demands spring is consequently the locus of an aporia that lies at the heart of the idea of justice's federating force. By holding that "every expectation must be a hope for humanity as a whole,"⁵² Ricœur highlights the challenge this maxim poses. On the one hand, such a hope rests on the idea that humanity as a whole must be the collectively singular subject of one history. On the other hand, we have to admit that there is no single plot "capable of equaling the idea of one humanity and one history"⁵³ that can take the place of the struggles of different individuals and groups to realize their own destinies in accordance with their histories, convictions and beliefs. Tying expectations regarding our rights, liberties and opportunities to the hope of humanity binds an eschatology of non-violence to the idea of justice by reason of this aporia. The conviction that freedom's actualization should be a hope for all consequently joins this eschatology to the problematic with which Ricœur tasks practical reason. In the third volume of *Time and Narrative*, Ricœur identifies this problematic with the permanent ethical and political implications of the two meta-categories of historical thought, the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation." For only through preserving the tension between a horizon of as yet unfulfilled demands and a space in which the past has already been surpassed can the initiatives we take form the contours of a history in which the idea of a common humanity might still rule over the continuing threat of conflict and violence.⁵⁴

To the extent that the concept of freedom's actualization defines the field of practical reason, this concept ties an eschatology of non-violence and its presumption of the idea of justice to the ethical and political implications of these two meta-categories of historical thought ("space of experience" and "horizon of expectation"). Our experience of evil, Ricœur reminds us, offers "an important reason to think that a horizon of unfulfilled claim belongs to the most genuine experience of action"⁵⁵ if only because experiences in which one individual, community or group suffers at the hands of another attest negatively to the injustices that arise when individuals and groups are deprived of the power to exercise their own abilities and capacities. The evil that ensues when one individual, group or nation exerts its will over another not only perverts relations among human beings, but the violence of systemic social and political injustices also affects the origin of action at its root by dispossessing individuals and groups of their abilities

and powers.⁵⁶ Hence Ricœur's admonition: live in accordance with the maxim that "what *ought not to be*, namely evil, will indeed *not exist*."⁵⁷

For the philosopher, the reality of evil therefore belongs to the problematic of freedom's actualization as much as does its concomitant, namely, the obdurate blindness to a multiplicity of experiences of as yet unfulfilled claims.⁵⁸ The federating force of the idea of justice stands as a riposte to the violence and abuses of memory that prolong the violence that mars the course of history through its insidious, ruinous effects.⁵⁹ Justice, Ricœur reminds us, is the one virtue *par excellence* that wrests the "component of otherness inherent in all the virtues [...] from the closed-circuit of the self within itself"⁶⁰ through its constitutive turn toward others. This turn toward others thus stands at the threshold of a difficult but necessary engagement with others' demands to be treated fairly in accordance with their heritages, convictions, practices and beliefs.

The idea that justice's federating force is the riposte to evil and violence consequently complicates the foregoing discussion of the wager involved in setting the imagination's productive force against emancipatory social projects that intend to be absolutely radical. Like these emancipatory social projects, the universal ambition of this idea's federating force aims at achieving a state or condition of freedom that has not yet been achieved. At the same time, predicating an eschatology of non-violence on our capacity to respond to the demands of a situation in fitting ways sets in relief the fragile connection between the wager that inheres in the initiative we take and the normative value of the claims and injunctions issuing from exemplary acts. Here, aesthetic experience's lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics reaches its limit. Even so, the conjunction of the work's singularity and communicability authorizing this transposition continues to have some heuristic significance.

I noted before that according to Ricœur, the effect of being drawn to follow the example set by an exemplary moral act is analogous to the reader's or listener's apprehension of the fit of the work. Correlatively, our apprehension of the moral act's rightness in response to the demands of the situation is akin to the work of art's proposal of a meaning with respect to our manner of inhabiting the world. The work's ontological vehemence is therefore comparable to the moral act's claim to truth. On the aesthetic plane, the work's claim to truth takes hold in its mimetic refiguration of our ways of thinking, feeling and acting. The work's claim to universality – which Ricœur pairs with its singularity – is at once both normative and prospective, in that the force of this claim makes itself felt through the way the work in principle communicates itself to everyone.⁶¹ At the same time, the universal that poetry teaches, according to Aristotle, is one that we cannot say if it existed before it was invented.⁶² The force of the injunctions issuing from exemplary moral acts here exceeds the reach of aesthetic experiences that proffer imaginative alternatives we can claim as our own. For where the claim to universality on the moral and political planes intersects the demand for justice, this claim has a normative force that literature, music, and works of art's fictive explorations of possible ways of inhering in the world lack.

Does this difference between the claims works make and the injunctions springing from exemplary moral and political acts shipwreck the notion that imagination is critical to emancipatory projects that disavow the claim to be absolutely radical? Far from aestheticizing ethics and politics, the wager tying imagination to an eschatology of non-violence animates the dialectic of freedom's actualization in which the demand for justice also figures. Ultimately, this demand vests the idea of justice with its federating force. And yet at the same time, this

federating force seeks its own justification in the normative ideals at which it aims. Gadamer has alerted us to the fact that the goal one pursues in order to obtain the right result constitutes the universal under which one subsumes the concrete situation in order to judge it. The moral control of this situation thus “presupposes a direction of the will”⁶³ and its moral *hexis*. Yet this goal is one to which we lay claim by reason of the “rules” summoned by exemplary acts and lives. These “rules” prefigure the ideals to which we sometimes ascribe a regulative function. This regulative function, however, only acquires its force in terms of these ideals’ prospective – and dare we say – utopian dimension. The requirement of justice, it would seem, is bound to exemplary models of deeds, acts and lives in which we catch glimpses of the fairness and equitability that we seek to attain. Justice’s reason thus takes root in the fittingness of the responses to the demands of the situations in which we and others find ourselves. These models’ universality and normative force necessarily admit to a plurality of competing and conflicting ideals and claims. Hence the aporia inhering in the idea of justice’s federating force, which we can no longer relegate to the margins of our thought. This aporia wrests the requirement of justice from the hegemony of one society or group of nations. Identifying the requirement of justice with the demand for an end to violence thus stands at the threshold of a further consideration of the stakes of this broader eschatological wager.

- ¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented as "The Wager of Imagination" at the 4th Ibero-American Congress on Paul Ricœur: "The Social and Human Sciences in Dialogue," La Plata, Argentina. August 15, 2015.
- ² Paul Ricœur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 187.
- ³ Paul Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, trans. John B. Thompson, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 87; see Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 63-100.
- ⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd revised ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1989).
- ⁵ Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 87.
- ⁶ Paul Ricœur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. George H. Taylor, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 10.
- ⁷ Ricœur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 95.
- ⁸ Paul Ricœur, François Azouvi, and Marc B. de Launay, *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*, trans. Kathleen Blamey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 176.
- ⁹ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 173; see Paul Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). Ricœur places the "whole of textual hermeneutics [...] under the theme of the increase in being applied to the work of art" (Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 566).
- ¹⁰ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 182-3.
- ¹¹ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 183.
- ¹² See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 56; Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*. Ricœur stresses that "understanding has nothing to do with an *immediate* grasp of a foreign psychic life or within an *emotional* identification with a mental intention" (Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 230).
- ¹³ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 180.
- ¹⁴ Paul Ricœur, *The Just*, trans. David Pellauer, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 95.
- ¹⁵ Ricœur, *The Just*, 95.
- ¹⁶ Ricœur, *The Just*, 95.
- ¹⁷ Paul Ricœur, "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling," *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 145; see Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 180.

- ¹⁸ See Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 178. Ricœur points out that the success of a work rests on the way that “an artist has grasped the singularity of a conjuncture, a problematic, knotted for her in a unique point, and that she responds to this by a unique gesture [...]. Genius is found precisely here: in the capacity to respond in a singular manner to the singular nature of the question” (Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 178); see Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 162.
- ¹⁹ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 222.
- ²⁰ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 180.
- ²¹ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 180.
- ²² Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 182; see Roger W. H. Savage, “Aesthetic Experience, *Mimesis* and Testimony,” *Études Ricœuriennes/Ricœur Studies* 3, no. 1 (2012).
- ²³ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 182.
- ²⁴ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 182.
- ²⁵ Ricœur, *The Just*, 155.
- ²⁶ Ricœur, *The Just*, 154.
- ²⁷ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 178.
- ²⁸ Ricœur, *The Just*, 106. Attending to “the work of an imagination invited to “think more”” (Ricœur, *The Just*, 99) turns our regard for exemplary works and acts toward future expectations.
- ²⁹ See Paul Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, trans. David Pellauer, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). The law of superabundance that Ricœur identifies with the logic of hope consequently has an anchorage in the imagination’s productive power. According to him, hope signifies this superabundance of meaning in opposition to the profusion of senseless destruction and failure. Ways of living in accordance with this law of superabundance – ways of living that are personal and collective, ethical and political – thus bear the mark of the future as “not yet” and “much more.” Freedom, Ricœur therefore insists, “is the capacity to live according to the paradoxical law of superabundance” (Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 207).
- ³⁰ Ricœur, *The Just*, 101.
- ³¹ Ricœur, *The Just*, 101.
- ³² Ricœur, *The Just*, 95, (original emphasis).
- ³³ Ricœur, *The Just*, 95.
- ³⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Promise of Politics*, ed. Jerome Kohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 2005); Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).

- ³⁵ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 226.
- ³⁶ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 226.
- ³⁷ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 215-6.
- ³⁸ Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment" and "Perpetual Peace," *On History*, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor and Emil L. Fackenheim, (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Paul Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, trans. David Pellauer, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).
- ³⁹ Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 210.
- ⁴⁰ Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 206.
- ⁴¹ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 184.
- ⁴² Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 193.
- ⁴³ Paul Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 220; see Paul Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, trans. David Pellauer, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). When the "affirmation of an allegedly universal human potential [stands accused of being] [...] the expression of some hegemonic culture – that of the Enlightenment, for example – the conflict between the classical version of liberalism rooted in the idea of rational agents and the politics of recognition reaches its apogee" (Ricœur, *The Course of Recognition*, 215).
- ⁴⁴ Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, 335.
- ⁴⁵ Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, 335.
- ⁴⁶ See Roger W. H. Savage, "Crisis, Conflict, and the Struggle for Recognition," *Philosophy Today* 57, no. 1 (2013).
- ⁴⁷ Ricœur, *The Just*, 68: "It is precisely because moral and political behavior has to take varying abilities to compromise into account that the virtue of justice is a virtue."
- ⁴⁸ See Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, 331. According to Ricœur, the State is "the synthesis of the rational and the historical, of the efficient and the just. Its virtue is prudence" (Ricœur, *From Text to Action*, 331). Consequently, this rationality confers the task of education on the modern state.
- ⁴⁹ Ricœur, *The Just*, 154.
- ⁵⁰ Ricœur, *The Just*, 154.
- ⁵¹ Ricœur, *The Just*, 154. Accordingly, the "fragmentation of political ideals, of spheres of justice, and, even in the juridical domain, the multiplication of sources of law and the blossoming of codes of jurisdiction invites us to take seriously this idea of a reasonable disagreement" (Ricœur, *The Just*, 154-5).

- ⁵² Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 215.
- ⁵³ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 259.
- ⁵⁴ Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 215-6. Ricœur stresses the necessity of preventing the tension between the space of our experiences and the horizons of our expectations from rupturing completely. For him, the “universal ambition of these metahistorical categories [“space of experience” and “horizon of expectation”] is assured only by the permanent ethical and implications of these categories of thought. In saying this, we do not slip from the problematic of the transcendental categories of historical thought to that of politics. With Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, I affirm the underlying unity of these two thematic issues [...]. The unity of these two problematics defines practical reason as such. It is only under the aegis of such practical reason that the universal ambition of the metahistorical categories of historical thought can be affirmed. Their description is always inseparable from a prescription.” (Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* vol. 3, 214-5).
- ⁵⁵ Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 211. The breach that “prevents our partial experience of fulfilled achievements from being equated with the whole field of human action” (Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 211) attests to the evil of violence, which afflicts action at its root.
- ⁵⁶ See Paul Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 218. Accordingly, the “enigma of the origin of evil is reflected in the enigma that affects that actual exercise of freedom” (Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 218).
- ⁵⁷ Ricœur, *Oneself as Another*, 218 (original emphasis).
- ⁵⁸ Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred*, 215.
- ⁵⁹ See for example Ann Laura Stoler, “Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination,” *Cultural Anthropology* 23, no. 2 (2008); Savage, “Crisis, Conflict, and the Struggle for Recognition.”
- ⁶⁰ Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 89. By tying the idea of justice to the duty of memory, Ricœur underscores the moral priority that belongs to history’s victims: “The victim that is at issue is [therefore] the other victim, other than ourselves” (Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 89).
- ⁶¹ Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction*, 181: “in Kantian terms, with the project of representation what remained of determinate judgment in the work disappears, and reflective judgment appears in all its bareness, containing the expression of a singularity which is seeking its normativity, and finding it only in its capacity to communicate itself indefinitely to others.”
- ⁶² Paul Ricœur, *A Ricœur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdés, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 153.
- ⁶³ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 22. Hence for him, humanity’s moral and historical existence “as it takes shape in our words and deeds, is itself decisively determined by the *sensus communis*” (Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 22-3; italics added).