Communication, Translation and the Global Community of Persons

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Abstract:

Paul Ricœur shared Emmanuel Mounier’s personalist and communitarian ideal of a universal community, which ensures that every human being has access to the conditions for self-development as a person. Whereas Mounier talks about communication as the structure of personhood that summons us towards the gradual enlargement of the community, Ricœur’s reflections on translation provide a missing link by referring, not just to the human capacity to communicate, but more specifically, to our capacity to translate and the implied ethics of linguistic hospitality. This allowed him to show that what enables us to enlarge the circle of brotherhood is the capacity to gradually settle in the world of the other and to welcome the other into one’s own world.

Keywords: Ricœur, Mounier, Translation, Ethics, Community.

Résumé:

Paul Ricœur partageait l’idéal personnaliste et communautaire d’Emmanuel Mounier d’une communauté universelle assurant à chaque être humain les conditions pour le développement de soi-même comme personne. Tandis que Mounier parlait de la communication comme la structure de la personne qui nous appelle vers l’élargissement graduel de la communauté, les réflexions de Ricœur sur la traduction ont fourni le chaînon manquant en faisant référence pas seulement à la capacité de communiquer, mais plus précisément à la capacité de traduire et l’éthique de l’hospitalité langagière. Cela l’a permis d’indiquer que ce qui nous permet, en dépit de toute étrangeté, d’élargir le cercle de la fraternité est la capacité de se transporter dans la sphère de l’autre et d’accueillir l’autre chez soi.

Mots-clés: Ricœur, Mounier, traduction, éthique, communauté.
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Paul Ricœur was deeply influenced by the charismatic public intellectual Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), the founder of the journal *Esprit* and leader of the French personalist movement.¹ Mounier described the ambition of the personalists as the “remaking of the renaissance” towards a universal “personalist and communitarian civilization” that enables every person to live her life to the fullest.² In this article, we will see how Ricœur’s reflections on translation can be read as both a continuation of as well as an improvement upon Mounier’s work.

The Universal Unity of Persons

French personalism stood as a plea to uphold the dignity of the person against the threatening ideologies of the time. Mounier believed that restoring respect for the dignity of the human person would require nothing less than a social revolution that would bring about a personalist and communitarian civilization. Such a civilization would enable everyone to live their lives to the fullest and to recognize natural communities in their own purpose, although these communities would also have to be directed towards the full development of every person. Mounier described personhood as follows:

A person is a spiritual being constituted as such by a way of subsistence and of independence in his being; he maintains this subsistence by his adhesion to a freely adopted, assimilated and lived hierarchy of values, by means of responsible commitment and constant conversion; hence, he unifies all of his actions in freedom and, moreover, develops the singularity of his vocation on the basis of creative actions.³

In his *Manifeste au service du personnalisme* (1936), Mounier described the institutional preconditions for making personhood possible in several domains, such as the economic, the political, the educational, and the cultural. However, he emphasized that his proposed social revolution was not restricted to the nation-state. In fact, the nation-state was considered to be an outdated concept from the personalist point of view. If the person is the primary political concern, then our political responsibility is not bound by state borders:

There is no foreign policy for personalism: neither national politics that would play its own game, using persons and communities that constitute the nation for its own benefit; nor international politics that would impose itself on existing states as an impersonal rule, voluntarily ignorant about their content.⁴

Mounier considered the task implied here to be in line with the essential structure of personhood itself, which is communication.⁵ This essential connection of one’s own existence with
the existence of others expresses itself politically in the task of creating a society where all institutions and traditions are permeated by this understanding of the nature of the person. Mounier explicitly linked the commitment to this task with a continuing openness towards mankind as a whole. Hence, he described a fundamental tension in personalism. This tension “is constituted by a double movement, apparently contradictory, but in fact dialectical, towards the affirmation of personal absolutes that resist all reduction, and towards the construction of a universal unity of the world of persons.” In other words, personalism constantly strives not only to create better services, but to affect an increasingly greater number of persons as well. This task is the responsibility of every human being. It is the communicative structure of personhood that allows us to assume this responsibility. Mounier indicated that upholding the dignity of the person is cumulative and takes place specifically over the course of five steps: 1) by continuously approaching the other, 2) by developing an understanding of another’s point of view, 3) through empathy and, 4) generosity, and the final and hardest part, 5) by remaining loyal to this acquired sense of community. The scope of this undertaking was no less than “the movement towards the unification of the personal universe”.

Paul Ricœur held Mounier’s ideal of a personalist and communitarian civilization very dearly. This is most evident in his reflections on moral theology. In his famous essay Le socius et le prochain (1954), Ricœur stressed that the love of one’s neighbor not only has an interpersonal meaning, but also an institutional dimension. He went on to argue that this duality implies that the love of one’s neighbor exerts a two-sided critical pressure on the social bond:

In comparison to love of neighbor, the social bond is never as profound or as comprehensive. It is never as profound because social mediations will never become the equivalent of encounter or immediate presence. It is never as comprehensive because the group only asserts itself against another group and shuts itself off from others.

The same concern defined his political philosophy. In his reflections on the ethics of citizenship, Ricœur emphasized the need for a dialectical tension between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility. Civic virtue is not a matter of espousing an absolute ethics of conviction that blindly follows an ideal without consideration of the consequences of the exercise of power in the real world. An ethics of conviction has to be counter-balanced by an ethics of responsibility, which stands for reasonable, prudent political action and which is aware of the dangers of the paradoxical nature of power, without ever losing sight of the ideal. However, even if the political paradox forces us into an ethics of responsibility, this should never detach us from the ethical ideals that are meant to ground our political actions. What is important for us now is that Ricœur identified these ideals while making explicit reference to Emmanuel Mounier’s idea of a personalist and communitarian utopia, that is the idea of a universal community that allows every human being to develop into a complete person. The universal dimension of this aspiration remained present in Ricœur’s later political thought. In Oneself as Another (1992), he wrote about the concern for the common good, not as a given, but as something that needs to be formulated step by step in an endless dialogue that requires the active participation of every individual. This dialogue is what constitutes practical wisdom in the institutional domain. Ricœur emphasized the fact that this project of fostering the common good requires a maximal recognition of both contextualism and universalism, in order to be able to arrive at well-considered convictions. The task, then, is to develop a social creativity that allows...
us to work together on the basis of diverse historical and traditional sources. Hence, we have to cherish our roots, without letting those roots weigh us down.\textsuperscript{12} However, Ricœur did not only consider this task in light of the common good within a given community. The task also concerns the extension of the community, in light of the never ending enlargement of the circle of recognition.\textsuperscript{13}

The Paradigm of Translation

The ethics of the enlargement of the political community is an important framework for understanding Ricœur’s reflections on translation, for it is the so-called “paradigm of translation” that he identified as the model for this enlargement project.\textsuperscript{14} The first principle of this paradigm is the plurality of languages, in contrast with the universality of linguistic competence. Everyone speaks, but there are thousands of different languages in the world. The second principle is the fact of translation. Man has always produced translations, which implies that he has the ability to learn and to use a language other than his own.\textsuperscript{15} If languages were radically heterogeneous, translation would be theoretically impossible. The opposite hypothesis, namely that there is a common basis to all languages in the sense of an original or implicit universal language, is no less problematic. However, despite these theoretical difficulties, we do translate in practice: “Yes, we need to confess, from one language to the next, the situation is indeed one of dispersion and confusion. And yet translation is part of a long litany of ‘in spite of all that.’ In spite of fratricide, we campaign for universal fraternity. In spite of the heterogeneity of idioms, there are bilingual, polyglot people, interpreters and translators.”\textsuperscript{16} Based on this finding, Ricœur characterized translation as a task. It is obviously a task for the purposes of utility, often from the simple need to get something done, but for things as complex as trade or war as well. He referred, however, to a deeper dimension of the task of translation, namely “the desire to translate,” a desire that relates to \textit{Bildung} and the broadening of one’s own horizon. Ricœur emphasized the important fact that the task of translation is double. The translator has to restate something that was stated elsewhere, in a different linguistic and cultural context, drawing on the resources of his own linguistic and cultural context. This implies that he has to find a place in his own language for elements of another language, hence creating an opening in his own language to be able to phrase things in a different way.\textsuperscript{17} Ricœur talked about this as “the spirit of translation, consisting in transporting oneself into the sphere of meaning of the foreign language and in welcoming the other’s discourse into the sphere of the target language.”\textsuperscript{18}

The fact that translation can serve as a model for enlarging the political community comes from Ricœur’s emphasis on the ethical dimension of translation:

\textit{It seems to me that translation poses not just an intellectual, theoretical, or practical labor but also an ethical problem. To bring the reader to the author and the author to the reader, at the risk of serving two masters, is to practice what I would like to call “linguistic hospitality.” It is the model for other forms of hospitality that I see as akin to it.}\textsuperscript{19}

Linguistic hospitality highlights the ethical dimension of the desire to translate. It refers to the aspiration of bringing together oneself and the other, but with the risk of betraying both. It refers to overcoming one’s fear of the unknown and the feeling of one’s identity being threatened.
It also refers to recognizing the impossibility of performing a perfect translation. The ethics involved is a distinct dimension of justice. It is the realization of the equivalence between the familiar and the strange, without reducing the one to the other: “equivalence without identity.”

Ricœur raised this ethical model of translation to the status of a paradigm for all rapprochements between people: “Everywhere where there is the foreign, there is a place for the struggle against non-communication.” Linguistic diversity contributes to the plurality that is so crucial to being human. Linguistic differences are associated with different identities and, hence, with the fragmentation of humanity. Ricœur emphasized the political implications of this phenomenon:

Politics more than anything else is affected by this condition of plurality. There are states because first of all there are distinct historical communities upon which their political form confers a capacity for decisions. At this highly conflictual level, the relation friend-enemy tends to transform political diversity into unbending feelings of animosity, owing to claims for sovereignty, a political form of identity.

In this regard, Ricœur referred to the biblical story of the Tower of Babel, where the introduction of linguistic differences led to the dispersion of peoples and, eventually, hatred and war. Brotherhood was no longer a given, but a task. Hence, for Ricœur, the myth of the Tower of Babel is symbolic of the human condition: “Like the whole sequence of narratives that the Tower of Babel story crowns, the myth can be read as the pure and simple advent of our factual linguistic condition: no recrimination, no deploring, no accusation... Starting from this reality: ‘Translate!’.”

Hence, Ricœur emphasized how the myth illustrating the setback of plurality amongst people is, first and foremost, an appeal to realize harmony. Translation is the first step in that direction and, moreover, it is the model for the entire enterprise. In the same way that linguistic plurality models human plurality in general, the overcoming of the difficulties of plurality in translation models every endeavor to overcome the problems of dispersion and difference:

Translation is from end to end the remedy for plurality in a world of dispersion and confusion. [...] This struggle with plurality, its failures and successes, continues in spheres more and more distant from that of work properly speaking applied to language and languages. Translation functions as a paradigm by which to expand the problematic. Humanity, I said, only exists as fragmented. In this regard, historical communities, with their dominant ethnic, cultural, juridical, political and religious features, can be compared to heterogeneous linguistic conglomerations concerned to protect their identity when confronted by such diversity.

What this paradigm suggests is that different communities should be considered collections of meanings, with internal links and concepts that can be transposed in the same way that a language can be transposed into another language, with all of the same possibilities and limitations: “Blocks of meaning, blocks to be translated.” This means that in that context, we also have to search for equivalence without identity and that we have to recognize the fact that there is no overarching perspective that illuminates these relations once and for all. It is a step by step – “de proche en proche” – process in which an understanding of another’s view and an enrichment of one’s own view is achieved. Just as we assume that no language is untranslatable a
priori, we can also assume that no community, culture or outlook on life is radically alien. Through hard work, we can come closer and closer to one another and enlarge the circle of brotherhood.  

It is important to see that the paradigm of translation and the idea of linguistic hospitality do not appear out of nowhere in Ricœur’s work. Just like Emmanuel Mounier connected the path towards the universal unity of persons with the identification of communication as the basic structure of personhood, Ricœur’s concepts of translation and linguistic hospitality are essentially linked to his anthropology of personhood. The possibility of opening oneself to the other and of enriching oneself by experiencing the other are linked to an interpretation of selfhood that leaves room for the other, not only as a stranger, but as a part of oneself. That is the core of the anthropology developed in Ricœur’s On *oneself as Another*. The entire dialectics of selfhood and alterity is about this relationality whether it is a question of the ability to interpret oneself as another and another as oneself – the dialectics of sameness and selfhood – or a question of the constitution of personal identity, not only as a matter of characteristics that stay the same, but also as a matter of staying true to oneself because others are counting on you. Hospitality is ingrained in a self that is not self-sufficient. This self can only find itself by setting itself free without losing itself in the other. An openness toward humanity as a whole puts into perspective the notion of the self-determination of communities, while the possibility of working step by step towards unification closely resembles the relation between oneself and the other on the personal level. The relationship with the other is implied in the very structure of personhood, not only as a given, but as a hopeful aspiration as well.

The Ethics of Transnational Community Building

The concern for the inclusiveness of the political community is an integral part of Ricœur’s conception of civic responsibility. He placed our political responsibilities as citizens in line with our ethical responsibilities as human persons. The concern for just political institutions is part of the ethical aim of living the good life with and for others in just institutions. The fact that a just institutional framework enables us to develop ourselves as persons implies a duty to preserve this framework, not only for ourselves, but also for others. This responsibility does not stop at the borders of a historical community: “Justice adds […] to solicitude, to the extent that the field of application of equality is all of humanity.” Eventually, our responsibility concerns an institutional framework that enables literally every human being to develop herself as a person, in line with Emmanuel Mounier’s ideal. In his late hermeneutical phenomenology of personhood, Ricœur considered this task in the light of the ethical dimension of translation, i.e. the risky but hopeful ambition of bringing the self and the other closer together. This opened out onto an ethics of transnational community building, seen as an integral part of the responsibility of the person as a citizen. The aim of this ethics of transnational community building is clear. It is about finding an institutional framework that will allow every human being, wherever he may be, to fully flourish as a person. The question remains how this can be realized, or rather approximated, given the utopian nature of the goal. Of course, the question of how to realize this goal in real world institutions is part of this query. At this point in history, no one has a clear picture of how to organize a global political community. The institutional problems of the European Union show how hard it is to develop transnational political structures that will be broadly supported. Even
on this relatively modest level, all known models of federalism fall short. When we raise this to a global level, we are confronted with the same problems only magnified. However, Ricœur emphasized that even the most ingenious blueprint does not get us very far here. The perfect cosmopolis on paper is null and void in practice if it lacks an adequate bottom-up dynamic: “Indeed, it would be a mistake to believe that transfers of sovereignty in support of a political entity which is entirely unrealized can be successful at the formal level of political and juridical institutions without the will to implement these transfers deriving its initiative from changes of attitude in the ethos of individuals, groups and peoples.”

Ricœur considered this project of mentality integration to be the pre-eminent locus for the ethical paradigm of translation. He elaborated this in three steps, each with an increasing degree of significance. The first step pertains strictly to the sphere of translation. Ricœur used translation as a model based on the insight that there is no language, only languages, in the plural. Human communication is manifested in a variety of different languages, each with its own sounds, words, grammar and style. Fortunately, languages are not closed systems. There is always the possibility of producing a translation, thanks to the skills of bilingual translators that look for “optimum commensurability between the distinctive resources of the receiving language and those of the original language.” Ricœur stressed the fact that this is not only an art of transfer, but also an ethical matter of linguistic hospitality: “It is really a matter of living with the other in order to take that other to one’s home as a guest.”

On a practical level, this responsibility is expressed in the task of learning foreign languages and participating in the activity of translation. Eventually, the hospitality will not so much concern the language itself, but the foreign culture that expresses itself by means of the language in question. Hence, translators have an important role to play in the transfer of meaning, ranging from the meaning of customs and beliefs to that of social principles. Being sensitive towards another language makes it easier to be sensitive towards other cultures and other ways of thinking and acting. In this way, linguistic hospitality fosters the ethical impulse for more sympathetic political interaction between persons and for political integration.

The second step follows from the preceding step. What is exchanged by means of translation is, to a large extent, a matter of distinct memories that are linked to a community’s identity. Hence, the second step concerns the exchange of memories. Given the narrative conception of identity, different identities come to the fore in different stories. These stories can always be revised. Moreover, the stories that compose a community’s identity are always linked to the stories of others. This brings a different dimension of hospitality to the surface:

What we are supposed to break here is the principle of closure that always threatens to contaminate what I have called narrative identity. It is important to always remember that we are entangled in the story of others, in plural stories, told by others about themselves and by others about us. That is where the task of exchanging memories has its origins. This task consists in assuming the history of others in imagination and in sympathy through the life stories that concern them. This demand goes a long way, it asks us to learn to narrate ourselves differently through the stories that others tell about us.
By enriching the stories of one’s own community, the stories of others’ linguistic hospitality become narrative hospitality. The primary step, then, is to resist the temptation to consider the identity of one’s own political community as a given. In this regard, Ricœur referred to the specific role of community founding events, such as the French Revolution, in his own case. The task is to learn to read these historic events in a pluralistic way, by introducing the perspective of minorities and other communities. That is the way to keep traditions alive and to open up new meanings that can bring people and communities closer together.35

The third step of the integration process again follows from the preceding. The shared recollection of memories is usually painful. In this process, we inevitably encounter, what Ricœur described as, “the broken promises of history.” This points to the fact that throughout history every community has confronted suffering, both in the sense that its members have endured suffering and in the sense that they have caused suffering to others. The aim of narrative hospitality in this respect is to start from the suffering of others. At this point, the exchange of memories shifts into the domain of forgiving:

This exchange demands more than the imagination and sympathy which were called for above. This “extra” has something to do with forgiveness insofar as forgiveness consists in “shattering the debt” […]. Its “poetic” power consists in shattering the law of the irreversibility of time by changing the past, not as a record of all that has happened but in terms of its meaning for us today. It does this by lifting the burden of guilt which paralyses the relations between individuals who are acting out and suffering their own history. It does not abolish the debt insofar as we are and remain the inheritors of the past, but it lifts the pain of the debt.36

Hence, the enlargement of political brotherhood requires a radical step, not so much to offer to forgive the other from a superior position, but primarily to ask for forgiveness in humility. Here, Ricœur seems to have left the domain of politics. However, he framed this in terms of the dialectics of love and justice, which indicate that the striving for justice occasionally requires input from the logic of the gift, rather than the strict logic of reciprocity. Moreover, he referred to historical examples that make the theory more tangible, such as the prostration of German chancellor Willy Brandt in Auschwitz or the speech of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat before the Knesset.37

Conclusion

The final, formal goal of the course of community building that Ricœur outlined was not unambiguous. However, there is no doubt that from a very early stage, Ricœur was convinced that the nation-state was a largely outdated concept. In both moral theological and philosophical essays, he underlined how the paradigm of the nation-state clashes with the global scale of economy, science and technology. This led him to stress the need to work towards a universal cultural and political understanding.38 However, he expressed serious reservations with regard to the idea of a world-state. Referring to the criticism of Éric Weil, he deemed the dimension of conflict and violence intrinsic to politics to be incompatible with the idea of a unified world-state.
Therefore, he argued that the idea was both necessary and basically unfeasible in the nuclear era. He spoke more concretely about the construction of institutions that take up the same role among states as states do with regard to its own citizens. He insisted, however, that this cannot be a super-state:

Like states have withdrawn the exercise of violence from their citizens, we are looking for new political institutions that could do with regard to states what each state has done with regard to its own members. The solution is not to create a super-state, but a new kind of institution that, in some way, marks the death of the state.

Although Ricœur was skeptical regarding the utopian nature of a world-state, he considered the cosmopolitan idea to be the vague horizon of a striving for integration. Thus, his focus was more on the course than on the final destination.

The transnational dimension of Ricœur’s conception of civic responsibilities picked up and further developed Mounier’s personalist and communitarian ideal. Ricœur reiterated Mounier’s plea for a bottom-up, gradual enlargement and deepening of the will to live together. Like Mounier, he based this plea on the radical relationality of the self and the other. However, where Mounier talked about communication as a structure of personhood that summons us to approach the other, Ricœur’s reflections on translation provided the missing link. Mounier had been forced to admit that his five step course towards unification on the basis of communication was doomed to failure. He had discovered structural impediments in an ineffable residue found in alterity, in the opacity of our own existence and in a general inclination towards isolation. All that was left was what Ricœur called Mounier’s “tragic optimism.” Ricœur himself, however, identified what it is that justifies this optimism, by referring not just to the human capacity to communicate, but more specifically to our capacity to translate. What enables us, despite all the strangeness we encounter, to enlarge the circle of brotherhood is the capacity to gradually settle in the world of the other and to welcome the other into one’s own world. Ricœur recognized the importance of community, but he tied this to a striving for inclusiveness. That is what his three-step ethics of transnational community building is meant for, in the sense of a non-exhaustive guideline. Moreover, his ethics of translation clarified the idea that the aim is not to come to a total fusion, but rather to a will to live together as equals. The relevant ideal is not fusional cosmopolitan brotherhood, but “equivalence without identity,” or “a just distance.”


3 Mounier, Œuvres I, 523 (own translation).

4 Mounier, Œuvres I, 629 (own translation).


6 Mounier, Œuvres III, 459 (own translation).

7 Mounier, Œuvres III, 453-455.

8 Mounier, Œuvres III, 461 (own translation).


10 Contrary to Max Weber, who coined the terms, Ricœur emphasized that the distinction between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conviction is not absolute. For the details of Ricœur’s use of Weber’s distinction between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility, see Ernst Wolff, Political Responsibility for a Globalised World. After Levinas’ Humanism (Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2011), 229-232.


15 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 106-111.

16 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 111.

18 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 30.

19 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 115-116.

20 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 31, 115.

21 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 23.

22 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 25.

23 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 26.

24 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 28-29.

25 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 30.


28 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 169-296.


30 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 202.


34 Ricœur, “Responsabilité et fragilité,” 136-137 (own translation).


41 Mounier, Œuvre III, 455-456.

42 Ricœur, History and Truth, 146-149.

43 Ricœur, Reflections on the Just, 31, 114.