Explorations in Otherness
Paul Ricoeur and Luce Irigaray

Morny Joy
University of Calgary

Abstract
This essay explores the work of both Paul Ricoeur and Luce Irigaray particularly in regard to their appeal to imagination and imaginary constructs as ways of introducing change in thought and action. While metaphor is at the heart of Ricoeur’s theory, Irigaray eschews metaphor – at least consciously. Nevertheless, there are a number of fruitful ways that their work can be compared and contrasted, especially on the question of the other, and the concept of recognition.

Keywords: Imagination, Metaphor, Women, The Other, Recognition

Résumé
Cet article explore le travail à la fois de Paul Ricoeur et de Luce Irigaray, en particulier s’agissant de leur contribution à l’imagination et aux constructions imaginaires comme moyens d’introduire le changement dans la pensée et dans l’action. Alors que la métaphore est au cœur de la théorie de Ricoeur, Irigaray la met de côté - au moins consciemment. Néanmoins, il existe d’autres manières fructueuses de montrer que leur travail peut être comparé et mis en contraste, en particulier au sujet de la question de l’autre, et à propos du concept de reconnaissance.

Mots-clés: L’imagination, La métaphore, La femme, L’autre, La reconnaissance
Explorations in Otherness
Paul Ricœur and Luce Irigaray

Morny Joy
University of Calgary

Introduction

The work of Paul Ricœur, specifically his work in hermeneutics with its appeal to metaphor and imagination, has not been widely employed by women scholars. It did inspire a few women scholars to introduce a model of feminist hermeneutics which I explored in an earlier essay, but since that time nothing further has appeared. For many feminist theorists, this is largely because hermeneutics and its textual significations/representations are often regarded as presupposing outdated modernist or irrelevant metaphysical assumptions. The role of metaphor in hermeneutics, in particular, is viewed as simply one tool among many of patriarchal privilege. The prevailing attitudes appeal either to the Derridean critique of metaphor as either signifying total presence or the Lacanian view as denoting lexical substitution. What I propose to do in this essay is to take a radical step and place Ricœur’s theory of metaphor and hermeneutics in “dialogue” with Luce Irigaray’s attempt to revise the western philosophical mindset. In her initial book Speculum of the Other Woman (1985), Irigaray alleged this western tradition had posited woman as “other” to its androcentric, normative concerns. Her intention is to restore the balance – introducing measures that celebrate both women’s minds and bodies. Irigaray herself is, however, particularly hostile to Jacques Lacan’s use of metaphor, and does not mention metaphor in her work, except in a disparaging manner. Initially, then, Ricœur and Irigaray would appear to have very little in common.

First, I would like to review aspects of Ricœur’s work on the body, followed by his carefully observed theory of metaphor, imagination and their role in hermeneutics. Then, in a second step, I will introduce the work of Luce Irigaray, as she explores the role of women in western culture and proposes fundamental changes. As a further development, I will compare and contrast Ricœur’s and Irigaray’s respective ideas. In this exercise I will endeavor to discern elements in both their positions that could constructively inform each other’s approach, and that could enrich the work of both scholars.

Ricœur and the Body

From his earliest work after World War II, Ricœur, influenced variously by Maine de Biran, Gabriel Marcel, and Merleau-Ponty’s construct of the “flesh,” was affirmative of human existence and the human body. He remained nonetheless somewhat hesitant to endorse the body unreservedly – relegating it to the realm of otherness in Oneself as Another, as if to signal difficulties in both its accessibility and expression. In his phenomenological approach, although he differed finally from Husserl and Heidegger, he also followed their example in moving beyond the mind/body split. Finally, he was also delighted when he discovered Hannah Arendt’s notion of natality, as it resonated strongly with his own positive orientation towards life in this world. Yet, in all his dealings with the human body, even in the attentive treatment of it as a
mode of otherness in *Oneself as Another* (1992), the body remained neutral, ungendered. Ricœur was nonetheless aware that contemporary women had definite issues about their status. From his own particular political position, however, it would seem that he regarded the liberal platform of equal rights as the best way to address these wrongs.⁷

While Ricœur cannot be faulted for not undertaking a phenomenology of the female body, there is a definite lacuna in his work regarding the critiques made by women philosophers. This essay, by placing Ricœur in “dialogue” with Irigaray, strives to remedy what could be termed as Ricœur’s lack of acknowledgment of the fact that philosophy could be enriched as a result of such feminist evaluations. It is not that Irigaray herself provides an ideal model or is representative of all women thinkers, and I have written on my problems with aspects of her work elsewhere.⁸ Nevertheless, her revolutionary suggestions as to ways to include women as well as their bodies and minds in future philosophical reflections are extremely challenging. As such, they are provocative in ways that can initiate a productive discussion of the principal issues involved.

It is not as if Ricœur is without potential resources for such a task. Louise D. Derksen and Annemie Halsema have addressed this issue.⁹ Also Drucilla Cornell has also drawn attention to the scope of his work on metaphor and imagination for her own project of a “feminine imaginary.”¹⁰ Irigaray, however, never makes mention of Ricœur, and would probably dismiss him as a disinterested male philosopher. This adds to the perception that they have little in common. Yet it is my contention that, if her own rejection of metaphor is reviewed, definite grounds for a mode of rapprochement between Irigaray and Ricœur can be discerned.

**Ricœur on Metaphor and Imagination**

The process of hermeneutics and the role of imagination in that process preoccupied Paul Ricœur’s early work on hermeneutics. They are vital components of the experience by which he believes we come to understand ourselves and our world. In his work, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. I, Ricœur expands on his previous understanding of hermeneutics: “It is the task of hermeneutics … to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their acting.”¹¹ Inherent in Ricœur’s optimistic reading is the assumption that hermeneutics has the capacity to effect changes in our ways of being and doing. It is the role of imagination in hermeneutics to sow the seeds of other possibilities, although the actual outcome may depend on a further period of rational evaluation. The pivot of imaginative variations in Ricœur’s hermeneutics is the metaphorical moment as he described it in *The Rule of Metaphor*. Ricœur’s controversial thesis is that with the appearance of metaphor a potentially novel experience is introduced by means of language.¹²

In focussing on metaphor as the stimulus of creative insight in hermeneutics, Ricœur is weaving together several diverse strands. He wishes to assimilate an innovative element that, while appreciative of Kant’s notion of a productive imagination, also takes into account recent developments in structuralism and linguistic philosophy. Appropriating ideas from Benveniste,¹³ de Saussure,¹⁴ Jakobson,¹⁵ and Frege,¹⁶ Ricœur intends to account for rule-governed deviations in meaning whose metaphoric modality acts as a catalyst of change not only in the lexical and semantic fields but in the domain of everyday existence. This sweeping panorama, involving a complex interaction of word and world, is extremely challenging.
To facilitate an existential application Ricœur posits that, on the ontological level, a metaphor’s linguistic disjuncture generates a mode of “seeing as” which can be extrapolated to encompass a mode of “being as.” The tension at the level of the copula – the struggle is between “is” and “is not” – is not simply one between different meanings but also between one’s present circumstances and one’s as yet unrealized potentialities.17

This innovative experience then has certain repercussions for the reader of the text. For Ricœur the ultimate importance of metaphor is not so much the instigation of new meaning by language but its impact on the reader’s worldview. It is in this connection that Ricœur will say that a live metaphor can alter the world. Ricœur’s use of the expression “world” in this context contains elements of both Husserl’s Lebenswelt and Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-Sein,18 i.e., it applies to our existential situation. Thus, from Ricœur’s point of view, the world of everyday life or, more specifically, the reader’s worldview, provides the ultimate reference of metaphor. In his further adaptation and incorporation of narrative as a form of allowing for a creative encounter of a poetic/practical nature, imagination also plays a central role.

All of these changes could not be achieved without the grounding of Ricœur’s theory of hermeneutics in a framework that exemplifies self-understanding as a type of reflexive awareness within a heuristic process. The conception of imagination that undergirds these movements is a result of Ricœur’s own melding of his interpretation of Kant’s productive imagination from the third Critique of Judgment with the power of transformative imagination that he identifies in Aristotle’s Poetics. Though for Aristotle poiesis may be but a “fictive doing about a practical doing,”19 this fictive doing, within Ricœur’s rubrics, seeks the place where meaning grows.20 And so it is that narrative as fiction, as poiesis, combined with praxis, has a crucial role to play in Ricœur’s imaginative scheme of things. As Ricœur observes:

> Imaginative variations, play, metamorphosis – all these expressions point to a fundamental phenomenon, namely, that it is in imagination that this new being is first formed in me.... For the power of allowing oneself to be struck by new possibilities precedes the power of making up one’s mind and choosing.21

It is this imaginative experimentation that then is the precursor of an application of the original insights that have been entertained and deemed appropriate, even requisite, measures for implementation.

> Without imagination, there is no action, we shall say. And this is so in several different ways: on the level of projects, on the level of motivations, and on the level of the very power to act.... And it is indeed through the anticipatory imagination of acting that I ‘try out’ different possible courses of action and that I ‘play,’ in the precise sense of the word, with possible practices.22

Indeed, Ricœur would even seem to suggest that it is imagination itself that injects the vital impetus that can transform exploratory representations into actuality.

> I impute my own power to myself, as the agent of my own action, only by depicting it to myself in the form of imaginative variations on the theme of ‘I could.’... What is essential from a phenomenological point of view is that I take possession of the
immediate certainty of my power only through the imaginative variations that mediate this certainty.\textsuperscript{23}

These imaginative variations, then, are not simply entertaining possibilities, they can have practical consequences. It is this sense of imagination that I believe similarly sustains Irigaray’s own imaginary diversifications. At the heart of her project is a desire to experience the world in a different way from accustomed impositions. There is a sense of play in her imaginative excursions, but her interventions are also serious play, with the purpose of introducing us to ways of seeing and living otherwise. I will now turn to an overview of her work.

Introducing Irigaray

Luce Irigaray is one of the most radical and controversial figures on the contemporary philosophical scene. In her first works, \textit{Speculum of the Other Woman},\textsuperscript{24} and \textit{This Sex Which is Not One},\textsuperscript{25} Irigaray sought to investigate women’s ‘otherness.’ She understands this term indicating women’s inferior status in comparison to men who have abrogated the position of a superior and inaccessible ‘Other.’ “[T]he Other often stands … for product of a hatred for the other. Not intended to be open to interpretation.”\textsuperscript{26} It is from this perspective that she announces her aims for woman as a repressed ‘other.’ She proposes that there is: “An other that we have yet to make actual, as a region of life, strength, imagination, creation, which exists for us both within and beyond, as our possibility of a present and a future.”\textsuperscript{27} Irigaray’s specific intention is to change accustomed sexual and textual dynamics. She is highly critical of those who believe that simply addressing the political and legal situation is sufficient.\textsuperscript{28} And it is in this connection that she presents her own idiosyncratic approach by which she hopes to illuminate two things: (1) the sexual indifference that has permeated Western philosophy, and (2) the distinct nature of difference that woman embodies. This challenge has revolutionary implications for sexual and textual interrelations and interpretations.

In a later work, \textit{An Ethics of Sexual Difference}, Irigaray attempts to map the ideas which would begin to alter the (ir)-regular arrangements that have existed between the two sexes. The traditional relegation of woman to simply an object needs to be corrected by an ethics that allows women a different mode of otherness – one that cannot be manipulated into conformity with masculine dictates. “But what if the ‘object’ started to speak? Which also means beginning to ‘see,’ etc. What disaggregation of the [male] subject would that entail?”\textsuperscript{29}

Irigaray’s work constitutes, in fact, a hermeneutics of the western philosophical text \textit{writ large} – where she engages in what she terms “amorous exchanges”\textsuperscript{30} with a number of philosophers, e.g., Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche, among them. She also describes herself as influenced by phenomenology.\textsuperscript{31} Her own phenomenological endeavor is devoted to a careful appreciation of women’s experiences. Irigaray states that her work cannot be appreciated properly without an awareness of this philosophical grounding.\textsuperscript{32} Given that Irigaray is engaged in a reinterpretation of western philosophical texts where these phenomenological observations are central, her work can be accepted as a form of hermeneutic phenomenology, though it emphasizes other dimensions of human experience because of her particular attention to women. In Irigaray’s discussion of a revised form of interaction with western philosophical texts, she will stress that meaning can never be predetermined according to demands of an ideal or preordained prescription. Irigaray observes: “The circuit is open. Meaning does not function like the circularity of something
already given and received. It is still in the process of making itself.”33 In this regard, a resemblance to the ideas of openness that are a part of Ricœur’s hermeneutic enterprise could be posited. Yet while it appears that Irigaray holds certain notions similar to those of a creative form of hermeneutics, particularly with regard to a refusal to control the process so as to allow for innovation, she is adamant in her rejection of the Lynch-pin of Ricœur’s hermeneutics, metaphor. Nevertheless, if Irigaray’s view of metaphor were to be recast, perhaps such a change could enable a mode of interchange with Ricœur. Before this possibility can be entertained, however, there are a few other topics that to be clarified.

In Chapter Two of *This Sex Which is Not One*, Irigaray refers to the absence of a female imaginary, not just as the underside of the Freudian and Lacanian male-focused psychoanalytic scenario, but of the entire western mindset itself.

The rejection, the exclusion of the female imaginary certainly puts woman in the position of experiencing herself only fragmentarily, in the little-structured margins of a dominant ideology, as waste, or excess, what is left of a mirror invested by the (masculine) “subject” to reflect himself, to copy himself.34 This reference to the imaginary and the word “mirror”35 indicates the early influence of Jacques Lacan on Irigaray’s work, and her subsequent negative reaction to it.36 Her problem with Lacan’s revision of Freud’s model is that Lacan posits the *imaginary* as the equivalent of the pre-oedipal phase involving a child’s a symbiotic entanglement with the mother. The (paradigmatically male) child must free himself from this attachment to help attain an independent sense of identity.37 Irigaray wants to move beyond the mandatory rejection of the mother. Most especially, Irigaray wants to challenge the resultant stereotypical roles of male and female. Her alternative construct of the *imaginary* phase would allow daughters to realize a productive bond with their mothers who are regarded women in their own right, and not deemed as inferior to men. This change would enable female children to flourish in a milieu that is creative, exploratory, flexible. The *imaginary* would thus not predetermine a girl’s identification with the mother as inculcating her own repetition of the maternal role, but as establishing the basis for a positive achievement of a women’s integrity and independence.

I agree with Margaret Whitford when she remarks that Irigaray does not restrict herself to Lacan’s postulate of the *imaginary* (though she uses the same word), but construes the term according to her own purposes.38 Whitford detects elements of the thought of Sartre, Bachelard, and Castoriadis, among others, relating to the imagination as described in Irigaray’s composite. (A problem is that Irigaray rarely employ footnotes, so it is extremely difficult to document her sources with accuracy). Whitford remarks:

Whenever we find the term “imaginary” in Irigaray’s work, then, we have not only to look for the network of associations within her work that give the term its meaning, but also to bear in mind the network of associations circulating in the intellectual context within which she is writing and being read.39

As many commentators have remarked, Lacan’s employment of the terms metaphor and metonymy is eccentric, even inconsistent. And it is the very intricacies of the metaphorical/metonymic interplay both in Lacan and in Irigaray’s equivocal response that make it extremely difficult to pinpoint the nature of the problematic status of metaphor in Irigaray. A
short survey of Lacan’s views on metaphor provides a necessary background to Irigaray’s own ambivalent attitude to this mode of language.

Lacan’s extemporizations relied heavily on both Saussure’s system of linguistic differential elements and Jacobson’s characterizations of metonymy and metaphor. These finally coalesced into a system of signification that allied metaphor with condensation, and both similarity and metonymy with displacement and contiguity. The two operations were then employed to account for the mechanism of the unconscious substitution of compensatory objects (or, more specifically their verbal signifiers) for repressed material. Yet, as David Macey observes, the usage of the two terms by Lacan is not particularly uniform:

Although the metaphor-condensation and metonymy-displacement equations rapidly became an integral part of Lacanian linguistics or linguisterie, they rest upon highly unstable definitions. Lacan’s own classifications are uncertain: in “Fonction et champ” both metaphor and metonymy were “semantic condensations,” but in the Seminar of 9 May 1956 condensation, displacement and representations are all said to belong to an order of metonymic articulation which allows metaphor to function. A week earlier, Lacan had been insisting that metonymy is the opposite of metaphor and established a polarity between the two.40

At the same time, in all these mechanistic and austere calculations, with their deterministic calculations, the seemingly unpredictable nature of metaphoric creativity seems to be missing. As Macey comments with reference to one of Lacan’s cryptic pronouncements:

Whether or not this is a true metaphor by any standard other than Lacan’s own definition (“one word for another”) must be open to doubt, particularly as the game in question relies upon a systematic and indeed stereotypical distortion which has little to do with the defiance of usage implicit in most effective metaphors.41

Unfortunately, however, as a result of Lacan’s inflexible attitude, metaphor became associated with a process of substitution on a vertical axis of selection whereby there is a resolution involving fixation and repression. In contrast, metonymy, on a horizontal axis of combination, initiates a constant process of substitution of one term by another.42 This latter semiotic displacement demarcates theoretically for Lacan the interminable operation of a desire (for the repressed maternal) that can never be satisfied. This had even further repercussions. Because of Lacan’s autocratic and inflexible posture – metaphor has unfortunately become identified as a symptom of the Lacanian version of psychoanalysis with its denial and repression of the feminine. As a result, in feminist theory, metaphor is tarnished as the epitome of patriarchal oppression – the implement of the phallus.43

There is no doubt that Irigaray is suspicious of metaphor in this phallic mode. This wariness of Lacan’s exclusive, if misguided, deployment of metaphor has led to it being dismissed by women scholars simply as a tool of the fathers to keep them in their repressed and defective place. In Irigaray’s analysis of Freud, she states:
Therefore the girl shuns or is cast out of a primary metaphorization of her desire as a woman, and she becomes inscribed into the phallic metaphors of the small male. And if she is no male, because she sees – he says, they say – that she doesn’t have one, she will strive to become him, to mimic him, to seduce him in order to get one.\textsuperscript{44}

As if in response to Lacan’s phallic version of metaphor, in \textit{This Sex Which Is Not One}, Irigaray introduces her notorious emblem of the two lips as her response to the monopoly of phallic symbolic to indicate the plurality and diffuseness that she believes is indicative of a female imaginary.\textsuperscript{45} This proposal has been labelled variously as “vaginal,” “vulval,” “labial,” “hysteric,” and inevitably, “essentialist.” It is often regarded as merely the female counterpart of the phallus. But Irigaray is being far more ingenious than proposing any such simplistic reversal. Whereas in Lacan’s chain of metonymic signifiers, the phallic metaphor intervenes in such a way as to dominate and control proceedings, Irigaray wants to intimate that the process need not be so biased and determinate. For her, the free-play is open-ended in a spontaneous activity that does not promote closure and conformity.

There are those who say that Irigaray simply favors a labial/contiguous metonymic mode in place of the phallic metaphoric, but I believe Irigaray is more subtle than that, and continues to operate in a deconstructive mode of simultaneous critique and construct that itself seems to redeploy metaphor. Diana Fuss presents this alternative interpretation of Irigaray’s usage:

\begin{quote}
What is important about Irigaray’s conception of this particular figure is that the “two lips” operate as a metaphor for metonymy; through this collapse of boundaries, Irigaray gestures toward the deconstruction of the classic metaphor/metonymy binaries. In fact, her work persistently attempts to effect a historical displacement of metaphor’s dominance over metonymy.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

Such an alleged displacement of the binary works, however, only if one accepts Lacan’s definition of metaphor as substitution.\textsuperscript{47} There is no question that in both her early works, \textit{Speculum} and \textit{This Sex Which Is Not One}, Irigaray favors metonymy and shares Derrida’s distrust of the old metaphor/metaphysics affiliation,\textsuperscript{48} but when she begins to investigate the question of difference and what that might imply for ethics, as she does in \textit{An Ethic of Sexual Difference}, Irigaray’s disposition changes. For though her earlier introduction of the feminine element might have seemed to exploit the trappings of a Derridean exercise in \textit{différance}, Irigaray becomes more insistent in \textit{Ethics of Sexual Difference} on the location of her feminine figure and its subjectivity within a specific social and cultural milieu.

It is in connection with this move (involving a reworking of the actual basis of exchange between male and female) that a revised theory of metaphor, beyond the confines of a Lacanian substitution model, as well as of a Derridean deconstructive strategy, appears necessary. Far from being a compensatory measure, Irigaray’s female-inspired mediation is a rebuttal of Lacan’s system in a way that contests his metaphoric/metonymy division while exploring a more fluid and permeable syntax of expression. Her goal is one of metamorphosis. To do this, Irigaray exploits all possible gradations of meaning in what she terms her “double style.” Thus, for Irigaray, a woman’s body is at once verbal, \textit{imaginary}, carnal, social and philosophical. It can have
multiple pleasures as well as infinite ways of disrupting established limits. In this way it can realign the terms of reference regarding sameness and otherness. These novel constellations are never absolute or final, yet their permutations have reverberations for both how women think and act.

In an interview, Irigaray defines these tactical measures that characterize her “double style”:

Thus, in my book *Ethics of Sexual Difference*, which relies on a larger number of earlier cultural analyses … there is no basic narrative, no possible commentaries by others, in the sense of an exhaustive decoding of the text. What is said in these books moves through a double style: a style of loving relationships, [and] a style of thought, of exegesis, of writing. The two are consciously or unconsciously linked, with a more corporeal and affective side in one case, a more socially developed style in the other.49

The implementation of this “double style” simultaneously incorporates but interrogates the accepted approach of hermeneutics from a woman’s perspective. Thus, Irigaray’s textured and intertwining motifs of difference50 – applied to women and her sexual/textual articulations – do disrupt old symmetries, and help recast the role of women’s otherness. At the same time, however, they allow for a new space that is at once expressive and embodied. Such an approach fosters the expression of an innovative ethos of self-understanding and refigured experience in a way that resonates with Ricœur’s use of metaphor.

**Ricœur and Irigaray in Dialogue**

Irigaray, with her deliberate deviations of meaning that aid her ‘recuperation’ of a repressed female past in anticipation of a revitalized future, exploits meaning in ways that resembles Ricœur’s metaphorical usage. As Ricœur observes: “In schematizing metaphorical attribution, imagination is diffused in all directions, reviving former experiences, awakening dormant memories, irrigating adjacent sensorial fields.”51 Similarly, on an existential level, her work also has certain affinities with Ricœur’s description: “The strategy of discourse implied in metaphorical language is neither to improve communication nor to insure univocity in argumentation, but to shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language.”52 In the light of these statements, and mindful that Irigaray herself does not use the term ‘metaphor,’ her work could nonetheless be said to share Ricœur’s appreciation of an interconnection between a distinctly novel deployment of language and imagination. The basic differences would be that Ricœur does not mention women as a category of humanity whose situation needs special attention, while Irigaray avoids metaphor. At this stage, however, it would seem appropriate to suggest that their respective projects could be considered as supplements to each other. While of course it is impossible to undertake revisions of either Ricœur’s or Irigaray’s ideas *in situ* – it is a fascinating exercise to envisage how their respective approaches could inform each other’s insights. This is the mode of ‘dialogue’ that I have in mind.

Ricœur’s theory of metaphor could help to clarify Irigaray’s own dismissive approach because, as it has become obvious, her work is vibrant with metaphors of a non-Lacanian variety
– though, as observed earlier, Irigaray herself does not admit to this. This clarification would help to stabilize her work as she moves to express her new ethics of relationship. At the same time, Irigaray’s positive endorsement of women’s bodies could add a more affirmative aspect to Ricœur’s omissions in this area, as he further develops his work from hermeneutics in the direction of ethics.\(^{53}\) For what is also an extraordinary co-incidence in their respective later work, as they both move purposefully in the direction of ethics, is that they each undertake a modification of Hegel’s definition of recognition in relation to other human beings. (This topic is addressed later.)

At this juncture, however, instead of inventing a hypothetical dialogue between Ricœur and Irigaray, I will make a careful analysis of Drucilla Cornell’s work as a way of introducing certain cogent comments. This is because Cornell has also detected similarities in Ricœur’s approach and Irigaray’s seemingly implicit use of metaphor. In her book, *Transformations*, she discusses her understanding of a female imaginary, drawing on Derrida, Irigaray and Ricœur. Her work is supportive of the three thinkers, although she does not differentiate them, nor discuss Ricœur’s work in great detail. Such a lack of theorizing tends to weaken her case. For example, she states:

> Metaphor as transference and analogy always implies both the like and the not like. The definition of the feminine … *is* only as metaphor. Metaphor, in turn, allows both for expansion of meaning and for reinterpretation … the realization of “feminine being” as metaphor is what allows us to reinterpret and, more important, to affirm the feminine as other, and *irreducibly other*, to any of the definitions imposed by patriarchy.\(^{54}\)

By using only the words “like” and “not like” Cornell seems to assume that her position is analogous to Ricœur’s. Yet there is no reference to Ricœur’s nuanced development of metaphorical theory and its applications. This means, if taken in a simplistic way, her observation concerning the “realization of ‘feminine being’ as metaphor” seems to indicate only the non-coincidence of literal and figurative referential frames of meaning. This would result solely in semantic insights. As a result, the traditional binary structure of a male/female dichotomy with its exclusionary ‘lifeworld’ applications would remain unchanged. There is also nothing in Cornell’s work of a philosophical nature that supports Cornell’s remark elsewhere that: “Correctly understood, the feminine also opens the space in which the performative powers of the metaphors of the feminine can operate to enhance and expand our reality.”\(^{55}\) She seems to be making an amalgamation of Irigaray’s and Ricœur’s ideas without any substantive arguments to support her position. Cornell does not elaborate philosophically on the significance of the terms “feminine being” and “reality,” or in what way “correctly understood” is to be taken, specifically with relation to her own ideas of a “feminine imaginary.” It would seem that Ricœur’s sophisticated merger of semantic and experiential elements would help both to explain and bolster the existential observations Cornell makes here. This is because such a theory alone can entertain the complex interaction of theoretical and lifeworld references that are a part of Irigaray’s double style that Cornell endorses. Otherwise, it is obvious that, in her adaptation of Irigaray, Cornell’s theoretical gaps only serve to highlight Irigaray’s deficiencies and not do justice to Ricœur’s highly nuanced theory.

It is also interesting that Cornell recommends a suspicious attitude toward metaphor, especially in connection with the feminine voice that is articulated in a double style such as
Irigaray’s. Her proviso is that such an utterance must never be accorded a final or comprehensive status. Yet in her appeal for an arbiter for this critical stance, Cornell turns to Derrida. Cornell remarks in Beyond Accommodation:

My contention then, is that the writing of the feminine, in spite of the “danger” of the reliance on metaphor, is perfectly consistent with the “Derridean gesture” as long as the attempt to specify the feminine is understood as proceeding through a process of metaphorization that never fully captures Woman. There is always more to write.56

While some authors have seen the influence of Derrida’s deconstructive approach in Irigaray’s early work, it does not appear in her later work. It is because of such a lack of self-reflexivity that many have found fault in Irigaray’s later work.57 Yet such a critical move is provided by Ricœur’s own “hermeneutics of suspicion.”58 This would seem to be more appropriate strategy rather than resorting, as Cornell recommends, to Derrida’s deconstructive approach, which ultimately deprives metaphor of any creativity.59 Ricœur’s polyvalent and tensional view of metaphor could thus prove helpful to Irigaray. It would permit her to invoke at once the full array of polymorphous possibilities of enactment. At the same time, a hermeneutics of suspicion could provide Irigaray with a helpful intervention to assess any ideological or utopian excesses that her words may elicit. Yet there is another fascinating development, as Ricœur began to turn more towards ethics. He ceased being lyrical about imagination and its innovations and became quite cautious in his later pronouncements, especially in regard to indiscriminate imaginative explorations:

We ought not to demand too much of a theory of metaphor or a theory of narrative, even when extended to the public sphere. It is within an ethics that we have to seek the reference of norms. Yes, imagination can be taken to be a means of initiation to the ethical function, insofar as it teaches us to dream of a different way ... A critical force is [nonetheless] held in reserve in this “different way.”60

It is in this awareness of the untoward excesses that could be encouraged by imagination that Ricœur moves beyond both Cornell and Irigaray. Irigaray, in contrast, seems far more interested in disturbing, if not dismantling, the complacencies of thought and behaviour that she views as restrictive for women. She revels in disquieting extravagances. In fact, in some senses, Irigaray is fomenting revolution. As she declares:

A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral [sic].61

While the later Ricœur is more guarded, and not so impassioned in his expressions as Irigaray, his hopes for the future do remain open-ended to the possibilities of change. “There is a place in
my book on metaphors when I say that when language is itself in the process of becoming once more potential it is attuned to this dimension of reality which is itself unfinished and in the making.”

The goals of personal metamorphosis, of political and societal transformation, continue to inform both their committed approaches, although more qualified in Ricœur’s work. Irigaray will also continue to ask uncomfortable questions. “Who is the other, if the other of sexual difference is not recognized or known?” In this specific instance, Irigaray poses the question to Emmanuel Levinas, but it is also appropriate to ask the same of Ricœur. It is quite apparent this is the principal contribution that Irigaray can make to Ricœur’s work. It is her adamant advocacy and interrogation on behalf of women – even if at times it may seem extreme – that jolts one to attention. Her unrelenting demands for just and mutual relationships signals her disruptive power of intervention in the name of the other, woman. Her writing serves to announce the arrival of woman, of the return of the repressed other, who has now come to reclaim her inheritance. Irigaray, however, also has a surprise up her sleeve.

**Irigaray and Ricœur on Ethics and Recognition of the Other**

Ultimately, both Irigaray and Ricœur turn their attention towards ethics. As indicated earlier, both will also undertake revisions of Hegel’s concept of recognition as part of this expansion. For Irigaray, however, the ethical turn will involve building on something she had first intimated in *Ethics of Sexual Difference*. This is that she wishes to establish an ethics that places an emphasis on the relationship between the two sexes.

> [I]n order for an ethics of sexual difference to come into being, we must constitute a possible place for each sex, body, and flesh to inhabit. Which presupposes a memory of the past, a hope for the future, memory bridging the present and disconcerting the mirror-symmetry that annihilates the difference of identity[\textit{sic}].

This statement introduces in a graphic way the new orientation Irigaray’s work will take to establish an ethics that will honor otherness. This is elaborated on in detail in her book, *I Love to You* (1996). She suggests that once women have come into their own, that a new ethical worldview can come into being between man and woman. This worldview encompasses the encounter of two incarnate beings where both exemplify a position of trust and vulnerability. For Irigaray, intersubjective ethics has to be based on a love relationship where neither partner seeks to dominate. Instead, each person affirms the integrity and irreducibility of the other person. To provide an understanding of what this equitable heterosexual relationship entails, Irigaray will undertake a revision of Hegel’s concept of recognition.

Recognition, will no longer be dependent on a mastery of otherness in the name of a greater unity. It acquires a more positive designation. This involves an acknowledgment of one’s own limitations and of the utter transcendence of the other. In Irigaray’s reformulation, the notion of recognition is then no longer simply an abstract principle, but becomes a living interchange: “With this recognition, I mark you, I mark myself with incompleteness, with the negative. Neither you nor I are the whole nor the same, the principle of totalization.”

She modifies Hegel’s notion of negativity, renaming the “labor of the negative” as a “labor of love.” Negativity thus assumes a new understanding. It now indicates that each partner respects the other, without qualification, without the assimilation that can mark the Hegelian dialectic. For both women and men this also implies that instinctual desire with its need to possess and master
must be carefully disciplined. As a consequence: “[T]he negative can mean access to the other of sexual difference and thereby become happiness without being annihilating in the process.”

She then adds: “Hegel knew nothing of negative like that.”

In such a re-envisioned dialectic, “There will be no definitive ‘negation of negation.’ Man being irreducible to woman and woman to man, there no longer exists any absolute spirit nor one finality of being.”

In such an ethics, recognition respects difference or otherness and fosters its flourishing. Irigaray concludes by avoiding theoretical formulas, and personalizes her own appreciation of this process of recognition.

I am listening to you as someone and something I do not know yet, on the basis of a freedom and an openness put aside for the moment. I am listening to you: I encourage something unexpected to emerge, some becoming, some growth, some new dawn, perhaps. I am listening to you prepares the way for the not yet coded, for silence, for a space for existence, initiative, free intentionality and support for your becoming.

From this attentive and other-affirming exchange, new possibilities not simply of meaning, but of co-existence can emerge.

In contrast, Ricœur’s own move to ethics was motivated by his consciousness of the fragility of human existence, all too evident in the violence and unmerited suffering visited on human beings by their fellows – the global extent of which greatly troubled Ricœur in his later years. He turned to ethics and to a revision of the concept of recognition in an effort to help reduce such suffering. In the concluding chapter of one of his final books, The Course of Recognition (2005), Ricœur provides an overview of this particular philosophical trajectory in his work:

The dynamic I could call a “course” of recognition becomes apparent – I mean the passage from recognition-identification, where the thinking subject claims to master meaning, to mutual recognition, where the subject places him- or herself under the tutelage of a relationship of reciprocity, in passing through self-recognition in a variety of capacities that modulate one’s ability to act, one’s agency.

In this statement, Ricœur demonstrates clearly that his preoccupation with identity and subjectivity had not been undertaken without an acute awareness of a person’s ineluctable involvement with other human beings. They have indeed been situated within the purview of the philosophical relationship that is termed “intersubjectivity,” but that, even more especially, entails recognition. Ricœur signals this toward the end of Oneself as Another, where he reflects on the nature of the process of “imputation” that is a key term in his development of an ethics of relationship. Imputation, the taking of responsibility upon oneself for one’s activities is closely involved with the movement of the self-esteem or self-evaluation. It seems that without these two forms of self-reflexivity, recognition cannot occur. Ricœur states:

If ... I had to name a category that corresponded to the categories of imputation and responsibility ... I would choose the term recognition, so dear to Hegel in the Jena period and
throughout the subsequent course of his work. Recognition is a structure of the self reflecting on the movement that carries self-esteem toward solicitude and solicitude toward justice. Recognition introduces the dyad and plurality in the very constitution of the self.74

This mode of intersubjectivity with its concomitant understanding of recognition indicates that, according to Ricœur, each person must be held in the same estimable regard as one holds oneself. Ricœur also indicates that “each person is irreplaceable in our affection and our esteem.”75 In this orientation, the integrity of the other, as actually different from myself, is also paramount. The ethical implication is that every person whom one encounters is to be accepted as a fully capable human being who is subject to the same rights and responsibilities as I am. (This takes on special connotations with reference to the excluded, the downtrodden, those who have been deprived not just of their rights, but of their capacity to undertake remedial action.76)

It is from this exacting mode of reciprocal relationship that Ricœur derives the title of his book, Oneself as Another. By this, Ricœur wants to communicate that he understands the expression: “the esteem of the other as oneself,” is basically equivalent to “the esteem of oneself as an other.”77 This is no mere comparative exercise, it is an extremely radical claim. For what Ricœur is proposing is not simply that I am similar to others, and thus accord them similar privileges to those I attribute to myself, but that one cannot become aware of one’s identity unless this complex interrelationship of both self-recognition and mutual recognition takes place. Ricœur explains: “Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other.”78

Such a claim would seem to go beyond Hegel in that what Ricœur appears to be proposing is not simply that recognition of others is necessary for growth in knowledge and self-awareness, but that recognition involves a sense of identification with others in the uniqueness of their worth, i.e., their “irreplacability.” This means that their difference or otherness as a human being does not exist to be incorporated, subsumed or even eradicated. Ricœur’s reading of a symbiotic, but not assimilated relationship, is a highly nuanced and qualified development of his early phenomenological hermeneutics where he posited in a generalized sense that one only came to self-awareness by means of interaction with the other. In most of Ricœur’s earlier work, however, he was preoccupied with an encounter with otherness mediated by symbols or texts. In this later work, it is now another human being who is the other. One thus encounters this other person both as irreducible in him- or herself, and as an irreducible condition of the “dialogical constitution of the self.”79 This is an extraordinary proposition of relational symmetry as reciprocity which Ricœur wishes to establish on ethical grounds that are neither metaphysical (in the sense of Heidegger’s definition of traditional onto-theology where God is identified with Being) nor innately religious (in the sense of either a categorical imperative or divine command). It is a human capacity to be able to recognize one another. “Being-recognized, should it occur, would be for everyone to receive the full assurance of his or her identity, thanks to the recognition by others of each person’s range of capacities.”80 With these words, Ricœur issues a challenge to work towards a just world where such a vision can be implemented.
Conclusion

Irigaray’s model of recognition is founded on the acknowledgement of another human as a partner in a loving heterosexual relationship – where each affirms the irreducibility of the other. She focuses on a heterosexual relationship because she believes that the existence of such an appropriately respectful relationship is crucial for righting the imbalance that has existed between the sexes over the centuries. To achieve such a transformation in society, she endorses a distinct sexual difference where the parity of each partner provides the needed remedy that will help to amend the deformations and exclusions formerly inflicted on women. This constituted the system that deemed women as ‘other’. Whether one agrees with her or not, Irigaray is also motivated to establish this love relationship as the foundation of democracy, as is evident in her book, Democracy Begins between Two.81 Ricœur, however, in his promotion of recognition upholds the “irreplaceability” of each person. Yet it would seem that he is no longer simply proclaiming a neutral definition, as he insists above that each person, “receives the full assurance of his or her identity.” It thus needs to be admitted that Ricœur does acknowledge the right of women to parity of treatment, though he does not address any distinct forms of discrimination that have affected women in the past. Nor does he name a particular institution or practice as bearing responsibility for abuse of women that needs to be rectified. Ricœur, in his advocacy of a just society, is seeking to redress the many injustices that have afflicted all humanity. Is he, then, promoting unity or identity at the expense of distinguishing difference? Is he being too general where Irigaray is far more specific? In the studies described in this paper, Ricœur has not been gender-specific, nor does he advocate the transformation of society in the same manner as Irigaray. The question that still troubles the world today is whether even justice itself has moved beyond the charges once also leveled at it of being gender-blind.82 Yet one could also ask of Irigaray’s edifying proposals as to whether they are sufficiently robust to challenge the ingrained prejudices and deeply-embedded emotional investments that undergird the institution of marriage. Could Irigaray’s recommendations simply reinforce age-old prejudices based on sexual differentiation? Finally, is love enough to change the world – especially the world of commodified late capitalism? These are not easy questions to answer. Each option no doubt has its both advocates and dissenters, and probably there will never be a clear-cut consensus on these matters. The hope would be, following Ricœur’s example, that there can be a constructive dialogue that arises from a comparison and contrast of both Ricœur’s and Irigaray’s work. This could lead to original forms of thinking more, rather than situating them as locked in intransigent positions.

In their diverse ways, both Luce Irigaray and Paul Ricœur have examined the topic of the “other;” refining their theories and amplifying the extent of their reach. Their preoccupations remain timely and contemporary, especially in their efforts to advance the cause of parity and justice, informed by their own sense of righteousness and concern for humanity. It would be churlish to hold Ricœur to account for not extending his reflections on recognition to women – this is because, in his treatment of this topic he establishes criteria for just intersubjective human relationships that hold true for all. Perhaps, however, as a mark of esteem for his reflections on recognition, one could take his insights and apply them to specific circumstances in women’s contemporary lives, and evaluate the efficacy of his recommendations.83 As for Irigaray, she continues her own public labor of the negative, attempting to convince the world of the viability of the coexistence of love and democracy. Ricœur’s and Irigaray’s respective explorations can thus be recognized as have enriched the domain of intersubjective ethics in efficacious ways. To
this gift we are indebted. They both challenge their readers to continue to question inequitable designations of the “other.” We can pay them respect by persevering in a process of resisting complacency and continuing to contest inegalitarian and uncivil conduct that demeans human relations.


5 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 319–29.

6 Ricoeur describes himself as reacting to with “a certain amazement” to Arendt’s term “natality” when he first encountered it. See Charles Reagan, Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 135.


8 See Morny Joy, Divine Love: Luce Irigaray, Women, Gender, and Religion (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), especially chaps. 1 and 7. Mistakenly labelled as a “French feminist,” she rejects this term as well as all “-isms.”


14 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 110–33.


Ricœur, *Time and Narrative* I, 40.


Ricœur, “Imagination in Discourse and Action,” in *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics* II, 177.


Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, 135


Irigaray, *This Sex Which is Not One*, 30.

Within Lacan’s own psychoanalytic model, the imaginary is associated with the pre-oedipal phase, though Lacan qualifies Freud’s outline with the ingenious extrapolation of the mirror stage to describe the process of primary narcissism.
With the publication of *Speculum of the Other Woman*, which was highly critical of both Freud and Lacan, Irigaray was expelled from Lacan’s École Freudienne in Paris.

Basically, the child’s view of itself in a mirror (which can also be the mother’s gaze) activates a process that is at once physiological, psychological, and linguistic, that marks the emergence of a separate ego. This can only happen with the concomitant repression of all things maternal. As Elizabeth Grosz further observes: “The ego sees itself in its relations with others. Its fascination with specular reflections will forever orient it in an imaginary direction. Imaginary identifications, the identifications of self with the other and other with self, vary widely, ranging from the so-called ‘normal’ attitude of falling in love to psychoses. The imaginary is the order of identification with images” (Elizabeth Grosz, *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction* [New York: Routledge, 1990], 43). Though in time replaced by the symbolic order by which Lacan implies the cultural/social matrix with its rules and regulations and its linguistic significations, the imaginary and its emotional residue will continue to surface during a lifetime in dreams and other symptomatic creations/delusions.


Whitford, *Luce Irigaray*, 56.


Ideally however, in this complex scheme of linguistic/psychic representation, the two formulas should work in tandem. As Elizabeth Grosz explains: “If the metaphoric process generates the signified from the chain of signifiers, and the metonymic process ensures that each signifier has multiple connections and associations which relate it always to other signifiers and thus give it meaning, then it becomes clear these two processes must work hand in hand” (Grosz, *Jacques Lacan*, 103). That is, although every metaphor involves an imposition of closure on the signifying process, every metonymic displacement in turn depends for its impetus on the meanings that are sustained by metaphoric this substitution.

There are various accounts as to why this occurs. David Macey gives as plausible an account as any as to the reasons for this development: ‘Lacan’s linguistics constantly drifts into *linguisterie* and he often refers to privileged signifiers, thus contradicting the basic tenet that a signifier is defined solely by the differences that mark it out from other signifiers. It is difference alone which allows a signifier to signify; in and of itself, it signifies nothing. Yet the phallus is a “privileged signifier,” or even the “signifier of signifiers”’ (Macey, *Lacan in Contexts*, 191). The phallus, as a ‘neutral term’ supposedly functions as a signifier of two different but related phenomena that are part of the resolution of the
Oedipus complex (or access to the symbolic world of the societal contract, as Lacan refined Freud's original description). On the one hand, it signifies all that has had to be renounced or repressed as part of the acquisition of linguistic competence and subjectivity (another Lacanian formulation for resolving the Oedipal conflict). The principal object of this repression is the mother, who has to be renounced because of her lack of phallus, and thus of inadequate 'equipment' to facilitate her son's progress. At the same time, the phallus also signifies for Lacan those appropriate 'positive' prerogatives that pertain to the symbolic order. Hence, it is irrevocably masculine in both its connotations. Kaja Silverman describes this duplicitous state of affairs tellingly in The Subject of Semiotics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 184–89.

44 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 84.
45 Irigaray, “When our Lips Move Together,” in This Sex which is Not One, 205–18.
46 Diana E. Fuss, Essentially Speaking (New York: Routledge, 1990), 66. Initially Fuss’s description of the “two lips as a metaphor for metonymy” might seem a little odd. What Fuss is getting at is that, in reality, Irigaray does actually use metaphors – even if unintentionally. The “two lips” as Irigaray describes them do function as a metaphor for contingency, and hence for metonymy. Fuss observes: “I would argue that, despite Irigaray’s protestations to the contrary, the figure of the two lips never stops functioning metaphorically. Her insistence that the two lips escape metaphoricity provides us with a particularly clear example of what Paul de Man identifies as the inevitability of “re-entering a system of tropes at the very moment we claim to escape from it” (Fuss quoting de Man, 66).
49 Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 177.
53 It is not as if Ricœur will reject hermeneutics outright in this move. As he states: “It belongs to the reader, now an agent, an initiator of action, to choose among the multiple proposals of ethical justice brought forth by reading. It is at this point that the notion of narrative identity encounters its limit and has to link up with the non-narrative components in the formation of an acting subject,” in


55 Cornell, *Beyond Accommodation*, 83.

56 Cornell, *Beyond Accommodation*, 171.


Ricœur has described this relationship: “Imputation and responsibility are synonymous, the only difference being that it is actions that are imputed to someone and it is persons that are held responsible for actions and their consequences.” See Paul Ricœur, The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricœur, eds. Peter Kemp and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 101.

Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 296.

Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 193

Ricœur reflects of the situation as he sees it: “It is this speculative problem of action and passion, but also the problem of victimization – the whole story of this cruel century, the twentieth century – and all of the suffering imposed on the Third World by the rich, affluent countries, by colonialism. There is a history of victims that keeps accompanying or reduplicating the history of the victors.” In Charles Reagan, Paul Ricœur: His Life and His Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 114.

Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 194.

Ricœur, Oneself as Another, 3.


