Hermeneutics and Truth
From Alētheia to Attestation

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Abstract

This essay aims to correct a prevalent misconception about Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which understands it to support a conception of human understanding as finite as Heidegger did, but in a more “conceptually conservative” way. The result is that Ricoeur’s work is viewed as incapable of addressing the most pressing problems in contemporary Continental metaphysics. In response, it is argued that Ricoeur is in fact the first to develop an infinite hermeneutics, which departs significantly from Heideggerian finitude. This position is demonstrated by tracing the itinerary from Heidegger’s account of Aletheia to Ricoeur’s account of attestation. The conclusion, then, not only clears Ricoeur of the stated charges, but also presents a more viable path for the future of hermeneutics.

Keywords: Aletheia, Attestation, Events, Heidegger, Truth

Resumé

Cet essai vise à corriger une fausse idée répandue sur l’herméneutique de Paul Ricoeur selon laquelle elle s’entend comme une conception de la compréhension humaine pensée comme finitude, comme Heidegger le propose, mais selon une manière plus “conceptuellement conservatrice.” Par conséquence, le travail de Ricoeur est considéré comme incapable de résoudre les problèmes les plus pressants de la métaphysique continentale contemporaine. En réponse, nous soutenons que Ricoeur est en effet le premier à développer une herméneutique de l’infinitude, qui se démarque radicalement du sens de la finitude trouvé chez Heidegger. Cette proposition est vérifiée en retraçant le parcours qui va de la conception heideggerienne de la vérité comme Aletheia à la conception ricoeurienne de la vérité comme attestation. La conclusion permet alors de montrer que la conception de Ricoeur offre un chemin plus viable pour l’avenir de l’herméneutique.

Mots-clés: Aletheia, Attestation, Événements, Heidegger, Vérité
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The aim of the present essay is two-fold. On the one hand, it seeks to correct a misconception in the received view regarding the character of Paul Ricoeur’s reflective hermeneutics. This is a misconception that, if true, would suggest that Ricoeur’s thought is inadequate for addressing the most fundamental concerns of metaphysics, even if it is innovative in other areas. On the other, by correcting this misconception and demonstrating how it is that Ricoeur’s reflective philosophy is committed to what might be considered the infinite dimension of understanding, it seeks to pose a challenge to Heideggerian thought.

The misconception that I seek to redress holds that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is, like Martin Heidegger’s and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s, committed to the finitude of human understanding (Verstand), but unlike Heidegger it is not open to the radical and unpredictable, horizon-shattering im-possibility of the event (Ereignis). In Anglophone circles, one finds this treatment, for example, in John Caputo’s Radical Hermeneutics and other of his essays concerning the hermeneutics of religion. In a chapter of the book, he begins his critique by arguing that Gadamer is a “right-wing” conservative hermeneutician, and then moves to critique Ricoeur stating: “Dissemination effects a disruption of semantics, even when semantics tries to protect itself, when it tries to make concessions, with a theory of polysemy, such as those of Ricoeur.” In this criticism one notes that he merely asserts, rather than argues, that what holds for Gadamer must hold “a fortiori” for Ricoeur as well. A similar evaluation is also to be found in Francophone discourse. Claude Romano, who considers himself a hermeneutic phenomenologist, brings Gadamer and Ricoeur together as failing to live up to the task announced by Heideggerian hermeneutics stating: “By being thus diverted from the problem of metaphysics on the one hand (Gadamer) in an explicit manner, and on the other (Paul Ricoeur or Charles Taylor) in a manner less declared, the representatives of hermeneutic philosophy have acted in large measure to the detriment of their coherence.” What separates Gadamer from Ricoeur in Romano’s estimation, then, is that the latter is more muddle-headed, less clear, about what he is doing, but there is no real conceptual difference. Finally, I note that this understanding of Ricoeur’s philosophical position as wed to Heidegger through Gadamer also seems to be behind Alain Badiou’s severe criticism of Memory, History, and Forgetting, since he takes it as certain that Ricoeur shares Heidegger’s account of truth.

There are more cases which exhibit this misconception concerning Ricoeur’s thought. Yet the philosophically relevant aspect of this assessment concerns its implications for the viability of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics. Since it is maintained, and I agree, that only an openness to the event enables one to twist-free from the metaphysics of presence, from ontotheology, Ricoeur’s thought is held to be too conservative to meet the challenges of contemporary Continental metaphysics. The general implication of this assessment, then, is that
it renders Ricoeur’s thought obsolete, unfruitful for any serious or “live” philosophical conversation on the most profound philosophical topics.

In response, I hope to demonstrate that Ricoeur’s account of hermeneutics is fundamentally distinct from that form developed by Heidegger and extended in Gadamer’s work. It is committed to the “infinite” dimension of human understanding, rather than to its finitude. The result not only enables it to countenance the occurrence of events, but also does so in a way that I believe makes it more viable than Heidegger’s own position. To make my case, I aim to go to the heart of what constitutes hermeneutic philosophy: the hermeneutic circle. What I hope to show is that Ricoeur transforms the sense of this circle through a dislocation of both the origin (Ursprung) and status of truth. In short, I argue that one can witness the fundamental cleavage between pre- and post-Ricoeurean hermeneutics if one attends to truth’s itinerary from alētheia to attestation. Because I aim to distinguish Ricoeur from Heidegger, I begin by recalling what I take to be a broad consensus among Heidegger scholars concerning the status of truth as alētheia.9

Truth and Finitization

Heidegger’s account of truth is plangently counter-intuitive. His statement on the matter is that “Truth is un-truth.”10 This is the formulation that one finds in Contributions to Philosophy, but it retains a number of important continuities with his earlier work. In what follows, I plan to lay out as clearly as I can what structure is at work in Heidegger’s account of truth, a structure that I take to be common to both the early and later Heidegger, and which might be called, following Heidegger himself, the structure of finitization [Verendlichung].

Because Heidegger’s account of truth as alētheia is complex, I begin with a brief outline of his argument. Heidegger finds the common account of truth, truth understood as correctness, inadequate to account for itself. This account of truth opposes rather than correlates truth and untruth. Ordinarily, one thinks of statements such as “2+2=4” as true, while others such as “7+9=13” as false. In §44 of Being and Time Heidegger articulates this sense of truth in three points: “1. The ‘locus’ of truth is the proposition (judgment). 2. The essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of the judgment with its object. 3. Aristotle, the father of logic, attributed truth to judgment as its primordial locus, he also started the definition of truth as ‘agreement.’”11 What makes some judgments true and others false, then, is that in the true ones there is an adaequatio mentis et rei (correspondence of mind and reality) while in the false ones there is not. In his essay “On the Essence of Truth” Heidegger notes that this correspondence has traditionally been considered in two ways: either as adaequatio intellectus ad rem (correspondence of understanding to reality) or adaequatio rei ad intellectum (correspondence of reality to understanding). But both “concepts of the essence of veritas have continually in view a conforming to … [Sichrichten nach …], and hence think truth as correctness [Richtigkeit].”12 What Heidegger wants to question is not whether one or another account of truth as adaequatio is the right one, but the essence of truth itself.13 These accounts of truth do not tell us what truth is, or why it should be understood as some sort of correspondence; they presuppose that point.

To remedy this deficiency, he proceeds by way of regression, by way of demonstrating what is presupposed in the ordinary account of truth as correctness, to a deeper level that would answer what the essence of truth is. There are several steps to this regression, and Heidegger changes the character of these steps at different points in his career, but he moves ultimately to
demonstrate that truth understood as a-λῆθεια is the opening, the clearing of Being (Sein). It is a process of Being’s happening [Ereignis].

To be clear, Heidegger maintains that there are three distinct aspects of being. The most ordinary sense of beings [Seindes] concerns such items as coffee mugs, pencils and books. The second aspect concerns the Being [Sein] of these beings [Seindes]. If I decide that I have not enough room on my desk, so that I need to collect all my pens and pencils, I could use my coffee mug as a pencil holder by putting all these loose items in it. In doing so, I have transformed its Sein from a coffee mug to a pencil holder. This example is a little misleading, however, since what Heidegger has in mind by Sein is not a subjective property of beings, but the epochal totality of all possibilities of such beings. When I decide to use my coffee mug as a pencil holder, I take it as something else, but the range of the possibilities I can take it as depend crucially on the epoch in which I live. It is a feature of our contemporary epoch, for example, that I can take certain items as a space shuttle. This possibility is something that was unavailable to an ancient Greek. More fundamentally, Heidegger argues that our contemporary period standardly takes beings as having a technological mode of Being [Sein], and he is concerned with this because it closes off the most fundamental aspect of Being; it forecloses even asking after the meaning of Being. What he is most interested in, then, is not the epochal Being of beings, but the meaning of Being, its clearing [Lichtung] or truth [a-λῆθεια], as he later writes. This is a third thing, distinct from the other two senses of being. In the Contributions he discusses it as the event, the Ereignis, since it concerns the shifting from one epochal totality of Being to another. In this way it is a radical and unpredictable shift in the meaning of Sein itself; it is that which twists-free [Herausdrehung] from the history of Western metaphysics, which, since Plato’s discussion of truth in book seven of the Republic, has forgotten that there is something more fundamental than Sein itself.

If truth as correctness concerns the correspondence of understanding to beings at the most superficial level, a-λῆθεια concerns the truth (or perhaps better: truth-ing) of the happening [Ereignis] of the epochal shift in Being. Assessing this sense of truth alone can answer what truth really is. This task is something Heidegger accomplishes by regressively arguing back to two more fundamental levels of truth than truth as correctness. Such a double regression is evident in both his early and late work. What changes is the character of the second regression. I move, now, to the specifics of Heidegger’s arguments, and begin with the account he provides in Being and Time.

Heidegger’s argument in the last section of the first division of Being and Time (§44) proceeds by way of a double regress. First, he argues regressively from the common account of truth as correctness to an account that follows Husserl’s exposition of meaning-fulfilling intentions in the Logical Investigations. His guiding question here is: “what does the term ‘agreement’ mean in general?”14 In other words, how do intellectus and res meet? To give the question a more concrete form, Heidegger proposes the following situation. Suppose a person with his back to the wall makes the true assertion, “The picture on the wall is hanging askew,” and then turns around and confirms the statement. What occurs in this demonstration, or with respect to what do the assertion and the thing known agree? Following Husserl, Heidegger argues that it cannot be with respect to a representation of a state of affairs, a mental picture of the picture, since “[w]hat one has in mind is the real picture, and nothing else.”15 Any representational account simply falsifies the intentional character of consciousness. What comes to be demonstrated “is solely the being-discovered of the being itself, that being in the how of its
being discovered.”¹⁶ This is to say, the adequation that comes to be demonstrated is an agreement between what is meant and the thing itself, not something psychic and something physical. In Heidegger’s words: “This is confirmed by the fact that what is stated (that is, the being itself) shows itself as the very same thing. Confirmation means the being’s showing itself in its self-sameness.”¹⁷ What the demonstration demonstrates about the assertion is its being-uncovered [entdeckend-sein], the assertion “lets beings ‘be seen’ [apophasis] in their discoveredness.”¹⁸

Yet Heidegger does not stop at this Husserlian point. Rather, he indicates a second point of regress from truth as being-uncovered to the ground of the possibility of such truth, which he identifies with his previous analysis of the worldhood of the world. He writes: “Being-true as discovering is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world. This phenomenon, in which we recognize a basic constitution of Da-sein, is the foundation of the primordial phenomenon of truth.”¹⁹ While Heidegger does not fully carry out the move in Being and Time (it was to be completed in the unfinished Division III), one can nevertheless understand what is indicated. Briefly, in order for Dasein to comport itself to beings, such as the picture hanging on the wall, in such a way that they are uncovered in apophasis, the world must already be disclosed. Commenting on this passage, John Sallis notes that this is the case for two reasons: “because world is that within which things can be intended, meant, as in assertion; and because world is that from out of which things can show themselves in such a way that a demonstration of an assertion becomes possible.”²⁰ One could take a step further, reading this statement in light of what comes later in division two. Since the fundamental mode of being-in-the-world is care [Sorge], and care is in turn to be understood in terms of temporality (§65), truth must ultimately be understood in terms of temporality.

In his Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger denounces his attempt to account for truth in Being and Time and related works, such as his lectures on The History of the Concept of Time, since these attempts “had to remain inadequate, because they were always still carried through by opposition and so were still oriented to what they opposed, thus making it impossible to know the essence of truth by way of its ground.”²¹ Looking to his statement in “On the Essence of Truth” it becomes clear that what Heidegger has in mind with this self critique is that he was off track in the second regression, that is by regressing beyond Husserl’s account through his own existential analytic. Because in Being and Time Heidegger never succeeded in fully separating time from its origin in Dasein, this move repeated the structure of Kant’s Critical project if not its content.²² In the essay “On the Essence of Truth” the matter is quite different.

Like his approach in Being and Time, Heidegger again begins with common sense, and asks after that to which intellectus and res are supposed to accord. His answer is equally phenomenological: accord is only possible because the statement is not an utterly differently thing, but a moment of comporting oneself to the thing about which the statement is made. “But the statement,” he writes, “relates ‘itself’ to this thing in that it presents [vor-stellt] it and says of what is presented how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it is disposed.”²³ He then undertakes a second regress to what grounds this phenomenological openness of comportment. His answer this time, however, is that freedom grounds this comportment. Why freedom and not his Dasein-analytic? Because comportment requires a certain kind of engagement in the openness that lets beings show themselves. “To free oneself,” Heidegger writes, “for a binding directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an open region. Such being free points to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of freedom.”²⁴ Still,
this account seems to make truth a matter of human caprice. To clarify why this is not so, Heidegger must turn to address the essence of freedom.

Heidegger’s account here moves through several steps, but the heart of his argument pursues the following points.25 “To let be … means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as ta alētheia, the unconcealed.”26 Freedom, then, is submitted to unconcealment in the sense of alētheia. This point corrects the account of truth in Being and Time, since the most fundamental level of truth now exceeds Dasein. Yet this move also introduces the non-essence of truth into its essence, since the non-essence of truth does not first refer to human incapacity or some form of privation; “rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to alētheia as its own.”27 This point illuminates what Heidegger means when he writes in the Contributions that “truth is untruth.” The statement, which Heidegger admits is hyperbolic, is meant to emphasize this correlation between truth and untruth. Taking a moment to spell out the implications of understanding truth in this way (i.e., as the correlation of truth and untruth), Heidegger notes that the concealing aspect of truth, its non-essence, is “older than every openedness of this or that being.”28 The term “older” here means that it exceeds the tradition of metaphysics, so that Heidegger is here indicating a way to twist from that history. The point that Heidegger makes is that this correlation (truth is untruth) occurs as a process, as a truth-ing. This is, of course, what is emphasized by Heidegger’s statement that “the essence of truth is the truth of essence.”29 The truth of essence, which Heidegger maintains is the subject of this statement, means that truth essentially unfolds [vosen]. And by truth he means both unconcealment (clearing) and concealment (as both mystery and errancy), which taken together can be written as a-lētheia. In short, this play of un-concealing unfolds, and it unfolds, as a note to the text mentions, in Ereignis, in the structuring of epochal meaning.

How are we to bring the early and later Heidegger together—if at all? In one sense, they clearly cannot be brought together. Heidegger drops the priority of the Dasein-analytic for his later account. Still, both accounts retain a three-leveled thesis, and both accounts refer the most fundamental level to a kind of activity: temporality as the fundamental meaning of Sorge, and a-lētheia as the strife of concealment and unconcealment. I venture that there is a word that connects them: finitude, or better Verendlichung (finitization). This is a term that Heidegger uses in his lecture “What is Metaphysics?” to characterize the most profound aspect of metaphysics, and I think it can bring out not only the continuity in Heidegger’s project, but also (and more importantly for the present essay) the structure of the event, of that third thing that is neither beings nor Being.

This lecture, rather (in)famously, is concerned with the nothing. Much like the works examined above, one finds in this piece that Heidegger undertakes to demonstrate a double regression: one that moves from the object of scientific investigation, namely beings, ta physika, to what is “beyond” them, and another that moves to the verge of this very metaphysical transcendence, to its structur-ing, to its happening.

The first regression is from science to the nothing. Science, Heidegger writes, is concerned with what is “and nothing further.”30 This leaves to metaphysics, what might be beyond physical beings, only nothing. Yet, metaphysics is not concerned with the nothing in any indeterminate way, but insofar as it is revealed in the mood of anxiety: “[i]n anxiety beings as a whole become superfluous … the nothing makes itself known with beings in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole.”31 This way of taking beings reveals that only if Dasein is capable
of not always being absorbed in beings, can it comport itself to them otherwise, can it even comport itself to them in a scientific way. “Da-sein,” thus, “means: being held out into the nothing.”32 Da-sein transcends being in its very existence (Dasein). It turns out, then, that the nothing is included in the objects of scientific investigation as what is excluded from such investigation. Moreover, “[t]he nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such,” for without the nothing, one could not even begin scientific investigation.33

Heidegger regresses yet one more time, “beyond” the nothing to the nothing-ing. He writes: “[w]e are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own determination and will. So abysmally [abgründig] does finitization [Verendlichung] entrench itself that our most proper and deepest limitation [Endlichkeit] refuses to yield to our freedom.”34 The word Verendlichung suggests a process of finitude, the way of the nothing’s occurrence, happening, or Ereignis in the language of the Contributions. The structure of the Ereignis, of the nothing’s finitude-izing, thus has two facets. First, it is included in what is, in being, as that which is excluded from it but nevertheless structures their essential unfolding. Second, it is an unpredictable occurrence, something that happens to Dasein, and is not willed.

This structure brings together Heidegger’s earlier and later statements on truth, for in both cases he is not only after the truth-ing of that third thing that is different from both beings and Being, but he also characterizes it in relation to this structure of finitudizing, which is a temporal occurrence. This most fundamental sense of temporality is finitude happening as the unpredictable shifting in the Being of beings (e.g. the shift from a pre-technological mode of approach the world to our technological mode). In Being and Time, recall the role that death plays: it puts a limitation [Endlichkeit] to one’s possibilities, so that one undergoes angst and perhaps projects a future with anticipatory resoluteness. In that case one authentically appropriates one’s historical possibilities, and this is important because it enables one to recognize the character of the Being of beings. The end (death), as a result, is not the terminus of life (external and outside it), but distributed throughout life (internal and constitutive). Here one finds the structure of included exclusion. Heidegger of course expresses the same structure with truth in his later thought: untruth is not external and outside truth, but an essential component of truth (as its non-essence). In his early thought, Dasein’s finitude as temporality is supposed to take the role of that third thing in Being and Time, the structuring of possibilities that make up historicality. Yet in his later work, Heidegger abandons this project because the structure of the Dasein-analytic ties its happening to Dasein, thus repeating the Kantian critical (and hence metaphysical) project. The later shift to the nothing’s finitudizing on its own, such that it appropriates man and Being [Sein] avoids this difficulty, but it retains the same two-part structure: (1) the included exclusion of death/truth, and (2) unpredictable happening/shifting in the Being of beings.

The relation between the earlier and later Heidegger on this score is critical for the present argument. If accurate, it suggests that when Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger for the structure of the argument at work in his early thought (he does not much address his later thought), Ricoeur’s critique hits both Heidegger’s early and later thought. Should it fail to be accurate, then perhaps there may still be other reasons for taking up Ricoeur’s hermeneutic path.
Beyond the Hermeneutics of Finitude

In order to address Ricoeur’s marked difference from Heidegger, I pause to consider two arguments that Heideggerians have been unable to address well, if at all, and which might motivate a turn from Heidegger to Ricoeur. The first of these is a generalization of Ricoeur’s own critique of Heidegger, and the second is a distillation of one of Alain Badiou’s recent criticisms. For the sake of clarity, I call these arguments The Regression Problem and The Romantic Problem, respectively.

The Regression Problem. This problem is one that Ricoeur produced in response to Heidegger’s thought in the 1960s, and which he continued to maintain throughout his career. Rather than merely repeat Ricoeur, I would like here to expand his points somewhat, and clarify what I take to be its central moments. It has two parts.

First, whenever one argues that a level of discourse, or being, or anything at all is reflectively prior to another by way of regression, one’s argument must have two parts. One must argue from some domain x back to a prior domain y, and one must also show how y explains the posterior level x. Without this latter move, one could argue regressively to any conceivable prior level. For example, if one did not need to show how this “prior” level explains the posterior level, and does so in a way better than competing claims, including those that argue that no prior level is needed, then one could argue that occult forces (spirits of the undead and the like) are “prior” to the claims of modern natural science.

Second, regressive arguments have their place, but do not apply to the sciences. No one can establish the required priority to the “positive” sciences, because the “positive” sciences are not static. The best that one could accomplish would be to articulate the priority of some domain relative to the scientific conclusions of one’s time. Yet, because it is widely recognized that scientific thought undergoes radical (Kuhnian-like) shifts, one will never be in a position to determine in advance the meaning or epistemic warrant for all possible claims scientists make. One thus cannot claim to have argued regressively to what is prior to all scientific inquiry, but only (in the best case) to some domain prior to a specific set of scientific claims. The route to prioritization, which would dig under the discourse of the “positive” sciences once and for all, is thus blocked. It must instead be acknowledged that the very aim of these regressive arguments is incoherent when applied to the sciences; it is a remnant from the Enlightenment, or at least some form of positivism, when it was still assumed both that the content of scientific knowledge was accretional and unreviseable, and that the character of its warrant was static as well.

The implications of this argument for Heidegger are profound. It demonstrates that all arguments that claim to regress to another domain of reflection prior to logic, mathematics, and science fail to do so. Heidegger’s account of truth, which is established by way of regression to a domain doubly prior to the sciences, is quite directly implicated.

The Romantic Problem. In his essay “Philosophy and Mathematics,” Alain Badiou argues that the disjunction between philosophic thought and mathematics, certainly typified in Heidegger’s thought (for whom neither science nor math think), turns on a commitment to “the Romantic speculative gesture.” While Badiou fingers Hegel as the ultimate culprit, the Romantic structure that he discerns in Heidegger’s thought may be distilled as follows. This gesture has two parts. First, it establishes the existence of some sphere of cognition (broadly construed) which stands opposed to what is called “reason.” Next, the Romantic thinker...
subordinates what is called “reason” to this alternative sphere. One could think, for example, of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work, wherein he first separates feeling and reason, and then subordinates the latter to the former. Badiou’s point is that this move allows a philosophe to disentangle mathematical thought and philosophy, or more broadly “reason” and the most fundamental aims of philosophical thought.

Both Heidegger and Hegel may be understood to make such a Romantic gesture. In Heidegger’s early thought, Dasein’s understanding (Verstehen) is fundamentally about the world, and is prior to the discourse of logic and mathematics. In his later thought the appropriation of man and Being (Sein) by the event (Ereignis) is explicitly prior to logical thought. For Hegel, one need only note that the whole point of his Science of Logic is to articulate a kind of logic that is broader than mathematical and logical reasons, and which in fact embeds the categorical logic of his day within this larger logic.

One might wonder: just what is wrong with this gesture? Why cannot Heidegger and Hegel argue that there exists some form cognition that is prior to logic and mathematics, in the sense that these latter are derivative and not fundamental for philosophical reflection? The Badiouian response is that it (i) presupposes what is meant by “reason,” usually along the lines of something calculative, instrumental, and closed—a rather Leibnizian ideal, and (ii) that this presupposition is untenable if one reflects more carefully on those practices that supposedly typify this kind of reasoning, such as logic, mathematics, and science.

One of the major efforts of Badiou’s two major works, Being and Event and Logic of Worlds, is to demonstrate just how non-calculative, anti-instrumental, open, and just plain thought-provoking mathematical logic is. His basic supposition is that mathematics, specifically the abstract algebras known as set theory and category theory, capture all that can be said about reality. In a line: mathematics is ontology. Yet, even if one makes the assumption, as Badiou does, that set theory and classical Frege-Russell logic are capable of capturing all intelligible relations of the existing world, it still turns out that the Leibnizian ideals of reason prove unrealizable. It is important for Badiou that these are not philosophical claims, but conclusions that mathematicians themselves proved about the very character of our best abstract algebras.

The foregoing can be stated more precisely with a bit of technical terminology. Badiou’s specific point concerns the significance of the continuum hypothesis. Even if one assumes the standard axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice, then it still turns out that (given certain restrictions) Easton’s theorem shows that the difference between any two subsequent transfinite cardinals is a large as one chooses, provided that one’s chosen size is larger than the first cardinal.37 In short, the Leibnitzian dream of total closure, which Kurt Gödel was the last great thinker to pursue, proves to be unrealizable under what was traditionally taken to be the best circumstances.

It is thus by making precisely these ontological assumptions that Badiou is able to demonstrate that contingency is a necessity, that errancy is written “into the heart of what can be said of being.”38 Being, what there is, must have an irrecoverable excess, and this excess is what always allows for intervention, radical change, what might legitimately be called events.

Most critically, what the foregoing means is that there is no motivation for the Romantic speculative gesture, no reason to want to circumvent logic. For if one is able to accomplish all that was desired of feeling, or of pre-comprehensive understanding, or of dialectical reasoning, etc., by sticking with classical reason alone, why go through all the trouble of articulating such an
alternative sphere in the first place? Why even try to oppose Heideggerian understanding [Verstand] to rational discourse, if rational discourse is able to accomplish just what was desired of understanding [Verstand] in the first place—and furthermore, is able to do so without making highly problematic and unsubstantiated assumptions about the character of rationality?39

To sum up, The Romantic Problem argues, first, that human cognition (even under the best circumstances) is incomplete, so that, second, all the attempts by philosophers to circumvent the reach of “reason” are both obviated and made questionable in their results. Its main aim is to question the motivation for a commitment to finitude, but it also questions the adequacy of the characterization of reason one finds in the work of Heidegger (or even Hegel).

It seems to me that scholars of Heidegger’s thought have not appreciated the depth of these arguments yet. The best that one finds is a possible response to the latter of these difficulties. One could argue that Heidegger’s account of hermeneutics, at least in Being and Time, does account for precisely the internal fissuring or “errancy” of reason by way of his account of “fundamental concepts.” He simply digs beneath those too. For example, John Caputo, in his essay “Hermeneutics and the Natural Sciences: Heidegger, Science, and Essentialism,” argues that the fundamental concepts that Heidegger mentions in §3 of Being and Time can be construed as paradigms, and that what Heidegger even suggests there is a notion of scientific crisis very similar to Thomas Kuhn.40 It might thus be argued that Heidegger recognizes precisely what Badiou is addressing, and would maintain that there is no problem with it, save that Badiou thinks that his concern with ontic sciences can substitute for the proper task of fundamental ontology.

This response, however, meets at least four of its own difficulties. First, as Caputo clearly indicates, making such an argument requires that one admit as wrong all of the later Heidegger’s work on technology, typified by an account of reason as “cybernetics,” art as a kind of saving power, and their relation to truth.41 This is certainly a high price to pay, and given Heidegger’s self-critique of his early work, it borders on inconsistency. Second, it is not clear that Heidegger’s account can be extended to anything other than an early Kuhnian account of science, which has largely been discredited. The specific emphasis on crises makes it incompatible with, for example, Larry Laudan’s reticulated model, and it is only this latter kind of model that is viable any more, given the many advances in the philosophy of science after Kuhn.42 Third, the response is straightforwardly inconsistent with the account of truth provided in §44 of Being and Time, which assumes a simple correspondence between the proposition and the thing (not a paradigm or scientific aim). Caputo’s account, then, is not only incompatible with the later Heidegger; it is also inconsistent with the arguments of Being and Time itself. Fourth and finally, it does nothing to respond to the structural difficulty Ricoeur identifies, i.e. The Regression Problem. With these difficulties noted, it makes sense to look elsewhere for an account of hermeneutic truth, and this is why I now turn to Ricoeur’s breakthrough.

Infinite Hermeneutics

The prevalent misconception of Ricoeur would suggest that if Heidegger faces difficulties, especially insofar as his hermeneutics is committed to a sense of finitude (as Verendlichung), then so too must Ricoeur. This would seem to be so for at least two reasons. First, as Ricoeur states repeatedly, he appropriates the Heideggerian hermeneutic circle, which dislocates it from Dilthey’s epistemological plane and founds it on the ontological.43 If Ricoeur
appropriates Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, and if that account is characterized by finitude, then Ricoeur’s hermeneutics must be as well. Second, when Ricoeur addresses attestation, he is clear that its opposite is not untruth but suspicion. Furthermore, he argues that “[s]uspicion is also the path toward and crossing within attestation. It haunts attestation, as false testimony haunts true testimony.”\(^{44}\) Suspicion, then, seems to function in relation to truth just as un-truth functions in relation to truth in Heidegger’s account of \(\alpha\ell\varepsilon\theta\varepsilon\alpha\). The reason neither of these points hold, so that it does in fact make sense to look to Ricoeur’s thought as a solution to the difficulties facing Heidegger’s, is that the prevalent misconception of Ricoeur must decontextualize his statements in order to maintain such a reading. When viewed in their context, one finds that Ricoeur breaks entirely with the position of finitude, so that his reflective hermeneutics may more adequately be understood as an infinite hermeneutics. In order to make my case, I begin by outlining the general features of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.

The most important point to understand about Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is that it is not primarily to be understood in terms of the ontological “de-regionalization” that Ricoeur discusses in essays such as “The Task of Hermeneutics.” Rather, as Ricoeur makes clear in his exchange with the neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeaux, his hermeneutics hails from a three-fold philosophic heritage: “‘reflective philosophy,’ ‘phenomenology,’ and ‘hermeneutics.’”\(^{45}\) To use Ricoeur’s famous horticultural metaphor, the stem of hermeneutics must be grafted onto the tree of phenomenology, and for Ricoeur the “hand” that does the grafting is reflective philosophy. The lynchpin of his hermeneutics, then, turns on his use of reflective philosophy, and he takes that philosophy primarily from Jean Nabert.

There is one seminal essay in which Ricoeur lays out just in what ways he is committed to Nabert’s thought: “Nabert on Act and Sign.” There he argues that reflective philosophy is committed to the following points. To begin, one must recognize that there is a distinction between (first-person) consciousness and the representation of that consciousness in signs. There is, in other words, a difference between my perception that my notepad is on my desk and the representation of that perception as: “my notepad is on my desk.”\(^{46}\) Second, Ricoeur does not take this representation by signs to be a barrier to truth. Instead, he understands it to complete conscious perception, even though and especially because it now gives rise to the need for interpretation. Traversing the conflict of interpretations, then, enables one to return to the conscious act in a renewed way, without one’s original naïveté. In this third step, then, one traces the referent of the signifying representation back to its ontological ground. Still, one cannot suppose that the return to consciousness is final. Rather, as Ricoeur writes in his early essay “Truth and Falsehood,” the “One is too distant a reward; it is an evil temptation.”\(^{47}\) The result of this movement, then, is “a sort of dialectic with a postponed synthesis,” in which the moment of refiguration, the return to the ontological referent by way of the conflict of interpretations, is only ever a provisional conclusion.\(^{48}\)

Within this context it becomes clear that “finitude” for Ricoeur, whenever he discusses it, means lack of self-coincidence, not Verendlichung, and neither is it defined in strictly temporal terms.\(^{49}\) This lack requires a positive objectification of conscious acts in meaningful signs, which must then be recovered hermeneutically. It is this course of recovery that one finds in early works such as Fallible Man, and late works such as Oneself as Another and The Course of Recognition. And it is for these reasons that Ricoeur writes: “we dissociate ourselves to some
extent from the contemporary tendency to make finitude the global characteristic of human reality.”

Truth, attestation, initially finds its place within this framework at two levels, the epistemological and ontological, though its completion requires a traversal through meaningful signification in action, personal identity, ethics, and political life. For both levels, Ricoeur argues that the most fundamental sense of truth (attestation) tracks events in meaning, much like Heidegger. Unlike Heidegger, however, in the course of his career Ricoeur developed three separate models for these events in meaning: the symbol, the text, and translation. These are models in meaning that Ricoeur developed in relation to the human sciences, though he always maintained that a similar approach might be possible with the natural sciences. Events in meaning for him are found by engaging with the sciences, by going through them, rather than by “digging under” them.

This point follows rather straightforwardly from the criticism of Heidegger raised in The Regression Problem. One consequence of that argument is that Riceour’s account of truth not only can, but must address the social and natural sciences. Since the force of the argument suggests that hermeneutics is only possible by taking a long road of traversal through meaning at an ontic level, rather than by way of Heidegger’s “short road,” which attempts to dig under these sciences, engagement with the meaning of scientific claims is inevitable. A second consequence is a dislocation of the origin [Ursprung] of truth. Since truth in its most originary sense cannot be located beneath the sciences, it must be located within their discourses. Ricoeur’s proposal is to find that origin as an event of meaning occasioned by polysemy, either at the level of the sentence, the text, or through translation.

A second departure from Heidegger on the topic of truth concerns the structure of events: in Ricoeur’s thought that structure is three-fold, as opposed to Heidegger’s two-fold account of events. It is this three-fold structure that qualifies his thought as positively infinite in its orientation, and not simply not finite (in the sense of Verendlichung). The three-fold structure of events of meaning is something that Ricoeur carries with him throughout his career, but he announces it first in his early The Symbolism of Evil. This work, as its title suggests, develops and makes use of the model of the symbol by focusing on “evil” as a paradigmatic symbol. Ricoeur outlines a three stage process for the recovery/completion [aufhebung] of symbolic meaning as follows:

1] I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and of the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic thought. [2] That wager then becomes the task of verifying my wager and saturating it, so to speak, with intelligibility. [3] In return, the task transforms my wager: in betting on the significance of the symbolic world, I bet at the same time that my wager will be restored to me in the power of reflection, in the element of coherent discourse.

To summarize, this process has three stages: a wager, verification, and transformation. The wager itself is a wager on symbolic meaning, that is to say, meaning that is not present in the semantics of ordinary, dictionary sense. To use Badiou’s terminology, symbolic meaning “in-exists” in the structure of sense; it exists in the structure of univocal semantics precisely as that which is excluded from it, just like Heidegger’s nothing exists in beings as what is excluded from them. Because a symbol does not exist as something literally meaningful, one can imagine logical
positivists dismissing the investigation of “evil” in the Bible as nonsense. It is because of this inexistence, then, that one must wager that symbolic meaning (or for Ricoeur’s later work: textual, or translatively meaning) does exist. Second, one must act, one must do something to bring about this meaning, and this is the process of veri-fication. The long detour through the conflict of interpretations just is this process of verifica-tion, of truth-making. Finally, if successful, this process will have brought a new kind of meaning into existence, so that one’s wager is transformed and the world of dictionary sense is displaced/completed. This is a structure that Ricoeur maintains for all his models of sense; it holds just as much for the new sense provided by symbols as it does for that provided by texts, or for that provided by translation.

The epistemic dimension of attestation already establishes what can properly be called an infinite hermeneutics, since the three-fold process of wager, verification, and transformation already initiates a form of inquiry that is infinite not in the sense that it continues indefinitely, but in the sense that it breaks utterly with established semantic sense. Symbols cannot be translated into univocal language, metaphor emerges only from the ruins of literal non-sense, and the text only begins by its distanciation from the event of speech. These qualify as events of meaning precisely because one will never be able to determine their existence through a critique of meaning or sense beforehand. They shatter the pretentions of any such critical enterprise that would seek to assess their limits in an apriori way, and equally any claim to some form of pre-comprehension that only needs explication. In appropriating Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Ricoeur irrevocably transforms it, and the role suspicion plays is only as a second part on the way to a third productive part without which one has not yet finished the process of truth. Both concerns that were raised earlier, then, have been answered: Ricoeur neither tries to circumvent the sciences (The Regression Problem), nor does he subordinate scientific meaning to some other form (The Romantic Problem). Events of meaning are ruptures in literal meaning, but they are sustained only by our intervention, by traversing the conflict of interpretations. Furthermore, if they are successful, they transform our sense of literal meaning. This last point brings one to the ontological dimension of attestation.

Because it is always possible to follow the referent of any sign to its ontological base, each of these ruptures in the established order of sense (symbolically, textually, translatively) is at the same time a rupture in the order of being. A metaphor emerges out of the literal non-sense of a statement, a text from the fixation of meaning and distanciation from the original author. In each case, utterly new and unpredictable forms of meaning and being are brought forth. Events, in short, have not only epistemic but also ontological facets.

I think these points are enough to indicate how the ontological dimension of attestation functions for Ricoeur. What is attested as semantic polysemy finds an ontological reference, specifically for the project of human capability, and that reference has suggested six ways of being-able. The rifts in meaning from which these conclusions emerge are utterly novel, yet do not entail total chaos. An event of meaning that indicates a shift in intelligibility, not a loss of it. Human capability is thus attested in the ways that we all respond to events of meaning, from tragic injustices to the establishment of just institutions, from poetic and religious epiphanies to philosophic ontologies. In brief, since this capacity is only accessible indirectly through the positive objectification of human thought and action, the best one can do is gather the traces of these acts, which were formed in response to events of meaning. It is by preserving the tensions in the conflict of interpretations, then, that one remains most faithful to the event.
The Future of Hermeneutics

Heidegger and Ricoeur do share some fundamental commitments. Among these is the need to twist free from the metaphysics of presence, from onto-theology, and the view that the best way to do so is by recognizing the role of events in our metaphysical accounts. Likewise, they share a commitment to multiple forms of truth, the most fundamental of which is the truth of events. Where they differ concerns the specific details of this account. For Heidegger, events have a two-fold structure: the nothing is included in the totality of beings as what is excluded from them. Yet, the nothing also nothings, it happens [ereignet], it structures the Being of beings in an unpredictable way. *A-lētheia* is the truth of the event, and it is prior to the truth science, the sense of truth that is measured by its *adaequatio*. For Ricoeur, events have a three-fold structure. They emerge from an inexistent point of meaning, whether a symbol, a text, or a translation. Because their meaning in-exists, one must wager on that inexistence (part one), and then undertake to veri-fy that meaning by traversing the conflict of interpretations (part two). Finally, (part three) if one is successful one may trace the referent to its ontological base, which transforms the realms of meaning and being. Truth as attestation is the arc of this process; it is the arc of wager and response to an event of meaning/being. Attestation is a sense of truth that is different from the sense of truth that one finds in the sciences, but it is not deeper or prior to them. Rather, attestation is the sense of truth that one achieves only by traversing these sciences.

One way to express the differences between Heidegger’s hermeneutics and Ricoeur’s is to suggest that the former’s is a hermeneutics of (radical) finitude, while the latter’s is an infinite hermeneutics. Both Heidegger and Ricoeur share a basic commitment about the character of events, namely that they are occurrences that shatter the limits of cognition and being, shatter the pretentions of searching for the boundaries of these supposedly finite domains, because their occurrence just means that there are no fixed *a priori* boundaries for these domains. Heidegger’s finitude, then, is not Kantian finitude, but a radical finitude—a finitude that happens *Verendlichung*. It tries to “dig beneath” the sciences and makes use of a two part structure, which brings one to the verge of the event as an unpredictable occurrence. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is infinite not only because it has a three-part structure and because it goes through the sciences. It is infinite primarily because this hermeneutics is defined in terms of bringing the event, the happening that breaks the bounds of finitude, into being. This matter of agency is the third part of his structure (wager, *verifiction*, transformation) that is different from Heidegger’s account. The happening of Heidegger’s two part structure is what he calls truth as *alētheia*, while the happening, the arc of the three part structure of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is what he at a certain point in his career calls *attestation*. The different senses of truth, then, define the capital differences between these two forms of hermeneutics.

It seems to me that the most profound relation (and difference) between Heidegger and Ricoeur can be expressed in their opposed choices in how to resolve the critical impasse of *Being and Time*. The difficulty that Heidegger encountered in *Being and Time* is that it retained the structure of the Kantian critical project insofar as temporality and Dasein remain identified—temporality is the meaning of care [*Sorge*], which is the meaning of Dasein. It thus did not twist-free from the history of metaphysics. In his later work, Heidegger explicitly removed humans from the happening of events, so that there was no longer any problematic identity. Rather humans and Being [*Sein*] are appropriated by the event, which is prior to both. What Heidegger chose to retain in his later work was the structure of finitude, what he rejected was the privileged...
role of Dasein and the Dasein analytic—and that point explains both the continuity and difference in his work. Ricoeur’s thought, by contrast, chooses the other option. He rejects finitude in favor of the infinite, but retains a primary interest in philosophical anthropology, even in the agency of human beings to effect events. This difference, at base, is the difference between finite and infinite hermeneutics.

If this were all there were to the matter, then one would be faced with a sort of groundless choice between two competing conceptions of hermeneutics. Yet, there are two noted problems facing the Heideggerian approach to truth as alētheia, namely The Regression Problem and The Romantic Problem. Because Ricoeur’s account of truth as attestation does not suffer these difficulties, it seems to me to be a viable alternative to Heidegger’s thought, but one that retains many of his insights. If this is correct, then several significant consequences follow. I would like to close, then, by sketching three of these in the hope of suggesting new avenues for further research.

First, because Heidegger’s account of technology was so closely tied to his sense of alētheia, a new discourse on science and technology seems to be required. In a very significant way, realizing this consequence has animated Don Ihde’s work for the past two decades. But not only has he emerged as something of a lone voice among Ricoeur’s students, more work is needed to articulate this consequence. Specifically I have in mind the following. The insight behind Badiou’s critique of Romanticism is that what has for more than a century now passed as “calculative” or “instrumental” reason is fundamentally incorrect. What is needed from hermeneuts is thus an answer to the following three concerns. First, we need to try to pin down what exactly the character of this form of reasoning is—in a hermeneutic way. Is there any holdout for the old conception, for example in logic, or is even that domain, as certain logicians suggest, subject to the same kind of Evental shifts that Thomas Kuhn first popularized? Second, how is this (re)new(ed) sense of reason related to the human sciences? Finally, this sense of reason cannot pose the threat that Heidegger thought technology embodied, so what exactly is the significance of technological reason for human meaning?

A second consequence of this shift to infinite hermeneutics concerns its implications for the “theological turn” in Continental philosophy. In a characteristically clear essay, Caputo compares the Derridian option for religion favorably to Jean-Luc Marion’s. At the heart of the comparison is the following thesis: “My hypothesis in this essay is that phenomenology has recently become religious and it has become so by a series of transgressions I identify as movements of ‘hyperbolization.’” By this I mean that the religious element enters phenomenology in the form of a transgression or a passage to the limits [passage aux frontières] precisely in order to open phenomenology to God, who exceeds its limits.” Both Derrida and Marion aim to hyperbolize phenomenology, the difference is only that the former does so by attending to what falls under the realm of being—in a khoric way—while the latter does so in a Platonic way (the good beyond being), which Caputo fears militantly subjects religion to philosophy’s demands. Ricoeur’s account of truth as attestation, which he argues is closely related to testimony, religious as much as legal, shows that both camps are still operating within the tradition of finitude, and so equally subject to the same critiques as Heidegger was above. The very aim of assessing limits, which might then be transgressed, makes no sense after the turn to infinite thought. It is a “hang-up” of critical philosophy that we must overcome if we are serious about avoiding the metaphysics of presence. This is why the operative term for entering theological discourse for Ricoeur is hope, not faith. Belief is already ingredient to a reasoned response to events in the
form of a wager, as noted, so that the principal concern for religious thought must pass through the Nietzschean question: but why would I want to believe? Ricoeur’s role within the theological turn, then, is both unique and poses a serious challenge to the main contenders of that turn—one quite different from Dominique Janicaud’s concern with methodological purity.56

A final consequence bears on the character of philosophy itself. Since at least Aristotle’s definition of philosophy as the “epistēmē tēs aλētheias” (the science of truth), it has been clear that what it is that philosophers do concerns truth in some way.57 There are two implications of the turn to infinite thought, it seems to me. First, the pretensions of philosophy to architectonic status are over. Philosophers neither provide the foundation for the sciences, nor do we facilitate their communication, which is only an enervated form of the same project. With the objectivity that is appropriate to it, philosophy is itself a truth procedure like the sciences, but with the distinct aim of responding to events of meaning occasioned both in science and in broader human culture. Second, as Aristotle held that philosophy was a bios, a way of life, one can state that philosophy is the way of life that tries to discern new and better ways to live. There is an ethics to attestation, then, which Ricoeur was clear to indicate could not be divorced from its normative moral claims that exist in institutions and lived with other people. One, of course, does not need to be a professional philosopher to take up a philosophical life, but this democratic quality of philosophy puts an injunction on all to continue ethical innovation. Perhaps it is in the promise of a renewed sense of ethics, then, that one can find the most important implications of the turn to infinite hermeneutics.
1 The present essay was facilitated by many helpful commentators, including those in the audience at the third annual Society for Ricoeur Studies Conference at George Mason University as well as the insightful comments by two anonymous reviewers.

2 To a certain extent, then, the present essay shares the aim of responding to certain postmodern critics of Ricoeur, as Alison Scott-Baumann’s Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion (New York: Continuum Press, 2012), though the focus remains more closely focused on truth than the entirety of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical project.


5 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 5. One might also note that it is just this criticism that stands behind Caputo’s more recent critiques of Ricoeurian inspired hermeneutics, such as one finds in Richard Kearney’s The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), Strangers, Gods, and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness (New York: Routledge Press, 2003) and Anatheism: Returning to God after God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). In Caputo’s essays “The possibility of the impossible: A Response to Richard Kearney” in Cross and Khora: Deconstruction and Christianity in the Work of John D. Caputo, eds. N. Deroo and M. Zlomiac (Eugene: Pickwick Press, 2010), 140-150, and “God Perhaps” he criticizes Kearney along very similar lines.


8 To mention just two other writers, both of whom are sympathetic to Ricoeur, one might consider the way that T.M. Seebohm, in Hermeneutics: Method and Methodology (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005) understands his work only to have extended a “hermeneutics of polysemy and latent meaning,” but returns continually to Gadamer as the more serious innovator (18). Christopher Smith, in a similar vein, argues that Ricoeur’s work on the relation of self and Other is but a restricted account of Gadamer’s more pervasive sense of “Zughörigkeit” in his essay “Destruktion-Konstruktion: Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur” in Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics, eds. Fransis J. Mootz III and George H. Taylor (New York: Continuum University Press, 2012), 15-40.

9 There are, of course, limits to any consensus. In the following one will find that the presentation of Heidegger has sided with Thomas Sheehan’s three-level account of Heidegger’s principle focus as opposed to William Richardson’s two-level account. For a clear account of the former, see Sheehan’s essay “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 34 (2001): 183-202, for the latter one can of course look to Richardson’s classic Heidegger: Through Phenomenology
to Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), especially the first chapter of the second part over the essay "On the Essence of Truth." There is a rather deep divide here, but both sides of this divide agree that what Heidegger was trying to "dig underneath" the discourse of the positive sciences, and that finitude characterizes what he was after in both his early and late work. These are the only points of consensus necessary for the current project, though I happen to think that Sheehan is correct on this score, so that the exposition that follows makes use of his account.

10 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 65, Beiträge Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt Am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989); Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1999), 351/245. Hereafter cited as: GA 65.


13 Heidegger also takes care at this point to show how the sense of truth as *adaequatio* only makes sense within the framework of Medieval philosophical-theology. The deconstructive suggestion, then, is that any borrowing of this notion without critically addressing the differences is bound to be confused from the beginning.

14 Heidegger, GA2, 215/199.

15 Heidegger, GA2, 217/201.

16 Heidegger, GA2, 218/201.

17 Heidegger, GA2, 218/201.

18 Heidegger, GA2, 218/201.

19 Heidegger, GA2, 219/201.


22 For the best account of the difficulties Heidegger encountered on this score, see chapter two of John Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger (Indiana and Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

23 Heidegger, GA9, 79/141.

24 Heidegger, GA9, 81/142.
I direct the interested reader to chapter six of John Sallis’s *Double Truth* for a careful account of Heidegger’s full argument.

Heidegger, GA9, 89/148.

Heidegger, GA9, 89/148.

Heidegger, GA9, 89/148

Heidegger, GA9, 96/153.

Heidegger, GA9, 3/84.

Heidegger, GA9, 10-11/90.

Heidegger, GA9, 12/91.

Heidegger, GA9, 12/91.


Badiou spells this point out clearly in ”Meditation Twenty-Six” of *Being and Event*, trans. Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum Press, 2005) especially subsection seven on Easton’s theorem.

Badiou, *Being and Event*, 278.

Making just this point one of the major aims of Badiou’s *Number and Numbers*, trans. Robin Mackay (New York: Polity Press, 2008). See especially the introduction, “Number Must Be Thought.”


This is, of course, the whole point of the second section of Ricoeur’s “The Task of Hermeneutics” in *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, trans. John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 53-74.


46 See Ricoeur’s essay “Nabert on Act and Sign” in *Conflict of Interpretations*, 211-222.


50 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 3.


53 Ricoeur is clearest about the ontological implications of reference for metaphor in chapter eight of *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Zerny with Kathleen (New York: Routledge, 2003). For an equally clear account see Ricoeur’s essay “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in *From Text to Action*, which model of the text undergirds the account of narrative employed in *Oneself as Another* and provides a more systematic account of the statements he makes there.


55 It is noteworthy that the critical response to Caputo’s essay, Matthew Schunke’s “Apophatic Abuse: Misreading Heidegger’s Critique of Ontotheology,” *Philosophy Today*, SPEP Supplement (2009): 164-172 does not contest the ideal that Caputo establishes, only his fear that Marion submits theology to philosophic constraints.
